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This dissertation examines three phases in post-Cold War relations between 
Turkey and the ex-Soviet Turkic republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus, not from the 
macro-level perspective of political and economic protocols and accords agreed by state 
actors, which has been ably outlined by other scholars, but rather from the micro-level 
perspective of efforts pursued on a less formal plane to promote linguistic rapprochement 
among the disparate Turkic peoples.  The actors in this unfolding drama were an shifting 
collective of interested individuals, composed predominantly of linguists and language 
professionals, who were readily classifiable neither as official representatives of their 
respective nations, nor solely as invested individuals acting in their own interests, but 
rather operated at the meso level and comprised, I would argue, a “community of 
practice” dedicated to uniting the Turkic peoples linguistically, socioculturally, and 
perhaps even geopolitically under the rubric of an emergent supranational “Turkic 
world.”   
In exploring the shifting sands of supranational relations in the post-Soviet Turkic 
world through the lens of linguistic rapprochement, I focus, in particular, on two 
ostensibly discrete language ideological debates--the first centered around a series of 
 xiii 
early Turkic linguistic congresses held during the initial phase of post-Soviet Turkic 
relations that focused on the creation of a common Turkic alphabet (ortak alfabe) and 
Turkic lingua franca (ortak dil), and the second emerging during the third phase of 
relations among the Turkic peoples that focused on defending the Turkish alphabet from 
pernicious “outside” influence, where “outside” was largely identified as “the West” yet 
intersected in interesting, ways with the “outside Turks” (dış Türkler) of Central Asia and 
the Caucasus.  In addition, I reconstruct the transitional “bridge” between the first and 
third phases of Turkic relations by also examining the dimensions of ongoing discussion 
and debate over issues of language, orthography, and identity both in Turkey and in the 
emergent Turkic world that, although more diffuse and less formal by nature than the two 
debates described above nonetheless, I argue, constitute two additional language 
ideological debates which together define the second stage of relations among the Turkic 
peoples in the post-Cold War era.   
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Chapter One:  Three Phases and Four Debates: Post-Cold War 
Relations in the Turkic World and the Language Ideological Debates 
that Define Them 
 
Türklerin ana yurdu Türkçedir (The motherland of Turks is Turkish) 
Turkish saying 
 




This dissertation examines three phases in post-Cold War relations between 
Turkey and the ex-Soviet Turkic republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus, not from the 
macro-level perspective of political and economic protocols and accords agreed by state 
actors, which has been ably outlined by other scholars, but rather from the micro-level 
perspective of efforts pursued on a less formal plane to promote linguistic rapprochement 
among the disparate Turkic peoples.  The actors in this unfolding drama were a shifting 
collective of interested individuals, composed predominantly of linguists and language 
professionals, who were readily classifiable neither as official representatives of their 
respective nations, nor solely as invested individuals acting in their own interests, but 
rather operated at the meso level and comprised, I would argue, a “community of 
practice” (Lave and Wenger 1991, Eckert and McConnell-Ginet 1992, Wenger 1993) 
                                               
1 As quoted in Landau and Kellner-Heinkele (2001). 
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dedicated to uniting the Turkic peoples linguistically, socioculturally, and perhaps even 
geopolitically under the rubric of an emergent supranational “Turkic world.” 
In exploring the shifting sands of supranational relations in the post-Soviet Turkic 
world through the lens of linguistic rapprochement, I focus, in particular, on two 
ostensibly discrete language ideological debates (Blommaert 1999)--the first centered 
around a series of early Turkic linguistic congresses held during the initial phase of post-
Soviet Turkic relations that focused on the creation of a common Turkic alphabet (ortak 
alfabe) that would serve as the foundation for the creation of a Turkic lingua franca 
(ortak dil), and the second emerging during the third phase of relations among the Turkic 
peoples that focused on defending the Turkish alphabet from pernicious “outside” 
influence, where “outside” was largely identified as “the West” yet intersected in 
interesting, ways with the “outside Turks” (dış Türkler) of Central Asia and the 
Caucasus.  In addition, I reconstruct the transitional “bridge” between the first and third 
phases of Turkic relations by also examining the dimensions of ongoing discussion and 
debate over issues of language, orthography, and identity both in Turkey and in the 
emergent Turkic world that, although more diffuse and less formal by nature than the two 
debates described above nonetheless, I argue, constitute two additional language 
ideological debates which together define the second stage of relations among the Turkic 
peoples in the post-Cold War era.   
The conceit behind this approach to relations in the post-Soviet Turkic world lies 
in the belief that by studying local, micro-level discourses of broad macro-level 
constructs, such as “nationalism” and “pan-Turkism,” that informed the abovementioned 
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language ideological debates, it is possible to lend critical ethnographic detail to broad 
sociopolitical shifts, such as were occasioned by the fall of the Soviet Union and end of 
the Cold War, that thereby challenge dominant, but facile, political and economic 
explanations of “postsocialist” relations which have tended to coalesce under such rubrics 
as “transition” and “globalism” (see also Gal 1994, Gal and Kligman 2000, Verdery 1996 
and 1997, Ries 2002).  From the perspective of history, political science, and 
international relations, then, this study seeks to discover what Hobsbawm (1990) 
identifies as “the view from below.”  Although, in suggesting that this view from below 
“is exceedingly difficult to discover,” Hobsbawm was referring to “the nation,” 
specifically “the nation as seen not by governments and the spokesmen and activists of 
nationalist…movements, but by the ordinary persons who are the objects of their action 
and propaganda,” and Blommaert and Verschueren, who take Hobsbawm’s caveat as a 
departure point for exploring the role of language in European nationalist ideologies from 
the perspective of the “everyman,” also organize their investigation around the reified 
construct of “the nation,” suggesting that “[a]n assessment of the ideological processes 
involved [in nation-building and nationalism] requires access to the ‘view from below’” 
(1998:189), I would argue that Hobsbawm’s insight nonetheless holds true more 
generally and that a “view from below” is likewise essential in creating an understanding 
of other broadly imagined social constructs and identity formulations, such as the 
supranationalist, pan-Turkist notions of collective ethnolinguistic identity that emerged 
among the Turkic peoples following the collapse of the Soviet Union.   
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At the same time, this dissertation seeks to contribute to scholarly discourses in 
anthropology that, despite a defining focus on the particular and the local, nonetheless 
insist on explicating the processes by which the local is linked to the national, regional, 
international, and global.  Central to an approach that seeks to explore such linkages 
between the narrowly defined ethnographic problematic and the larger context of its 
instantiation is the need to emplace specific practices and processes within the context of 
the broader historical, political, and economic discourses within which they have 
emerged and the narratives of power than run through them (Wolf 1982).  As Caroline 
Humphrey notes in a collection of essays on the “unmaking” of Soviet life, in adopting 
such an approach “one may start with the exception… one is enabled to take almost any 
event or action as significant in itself and representing no more than itself.  But because 
the anthropologist ‘sees it’ in all its dimensions of interpretability, createdness, and 
capacity for containing implicit power, this action can also be read for what it connotes 
about the world in which it exists” (2002:xix). The task, then, is to explore the 
particularistic with an eye to the “broader political geography” (Gal and Kligman 2000:4) 
of its emergence, not only because the broader context helps to explicate the specific 
local practice, but also because the local practice contributes to a richer understanding of 
operant conditions within the overarching sociopolitical milieu.   
 
 5 
THE EMERGENT TURKIC WORLD 
The emergence from the ruins of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 
1990s of five independent Turkic nations within Central Asia and the Caucasus 
(Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan) coupled with the 
increasing recognition of Turkic ethnicity in other regions of the former Soviet Union, 
awakened among this broad swath of Turkic peoples a nostalgic interest in their ethnic 
“brethren” and raised great expectations of supranational cooperation (e.g., Turan and 
Turan 1998, Winrow 1998, Başlamış 2001, Smolansky 1994, Aydın 2003a).  Politicians, 
galvanized by legendary tales of the Turkestan of centuries past, spoke of the Turkic 
peoples as one nation crossing many state borders and heralded a geopolitical and 
sociocultural union of Turkic peoples stretching from the Black Sea to the Great Wall of 
China.  Then president Turgut Özal repeatedly and passionately declared that the twenty-
first century would be the “Turkic century” and spoke of forming both a “Turkic” Trade 
and Development Bank and a “Turkic” Common Market, (Winrow 1998, Çandar 1992), 
while then prime minister Süleyman Demirel, emphasizing cultural resonances among 
the peoples of this emergent geography in a speech implying that Turkey stood ready to 
take them under its wing, ardently enthused: “Within the 15 thousand square kilometers 
from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China, there is a great Turkic society with 
traditions, customs, lullabies, epics, and everything else” (“Adriyatik Denizi’nden Çin 
Seddi’ne kadar 15 bin kilometer içerisinde an’aneleriyle, görenekleriyle, ninnisiyle, 
destanıyla ve herşeyiyle bir büyük Türk topluluğu vardır.”) (as quoted in Turgut 2001:19, 
translation mine).   
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“Bir millet, iki devlet” (“one people, two states”) became the rousing, and 
pleasingly harmonious, slogan of the times, echoing at all levels of Turkish society and 
across the Turkic world, from the halls of the political elite to the stalls of the 
marketplace vendor.  For their part, the leaders of the emergent Turkic nations responded 
positively to the exultant and exuberant rhetoric of “brotherhood” (“kardeşlik”) and 
cooperation, at least initially, travelling to Ankara on highly-publicized state visits and 
receiving distinguished Turkish diplomats and politicians with high pomp and 
circumstance in their home countries in aid of signing protocols and agreements on a 
variety of cooperative endeavors and economic aid packages (e.g., Smolansky 1994, 
Turan and Turan 1998, Winrow 1998, Aydın 2003a).  Nostalgia for and genuine curiosity 
about their “brother Turks” was also palpable among average citizens of the Turkic 
republics when I first travelled to the region in the early 1990s and, speaking Turkish (or 
Azeri with a Turkish accent), was often, and usually to my benefit, mistaken for a Turk. 
 
In the ensuing years, Turkey, as the sole member of this putative Turkic world 
with the economic wherewithal and international political standing to turn rhetoric into 
concrete action, strove to do so.  Pledging Turkish support and offering the Turkish 
nation as both a developmental “model” for the nascent Turkic nations and as “window” 
or “bridge” to the Western world (e.g., Olcott 1996, Smolansky 1994, Aydın 1996, 
Winrow 1998, Turan and Turan 1998, Rashid 1994, Fridman 1994), Turkish diplomats 
opened missions in the far-flung reaches of Central Asia; politicians prepared high-
profile protocols for cooperation in media and communications, education, and 
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economics; and businessmen, with state encouragement and support, established joint 
business ventures with Central Asian counterparts, inexperienced in the practices of the 
free market system but eager to learn its fundamentals. (e.g., Turan and Turan 1998, Bal 
2000, Devlet 2001, Pope 2005, Aydın 2003a, Turgut 2001).   
The notion that Turkey might act as a developmental “model” for the newly 
independent Turkic nations also had resonance in Central Asia and the Caucasus, 
particularly in contrast to the Iranian model Tehran was actively promoting amongst its 
new neighbors.  Although the Turkic leaders by and large declared their fledgling nations 
interested in pursuing their own path in development, they also all noted, to greater or 
lesser degrees, that the Turkish experience of peaceful transition to a market economy, 
albeit problematic in certain regards, was relevant in informing their approach (e.g., 
Sander 1994, Blank 1994, Israeli 1994, Smolansky 1994, Demir 1996).  In a poetic turn 
of phrase, President Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan declared Turkey to be “the morning 
star that shows the Turkic republics the way.”2  Furthermore, the possibility of a “Turkish 
model” for Central Asia had generated significant interest in the West, again amid fears 
that the Iranian model might emerge ascendant (e.g., Mango 1993, Vassiliev 1994, and 
Winrow 1992).  In February 1992, the ex-Soviet republics were visited by then U.S 
Secretary of State James Baker who promoted their adopting a “Turkish model” of 
development, and in June 1992, then Secretary General of the Council of Europe, 
Catherine Lalumière, visited the region with what amounted to the same message (Mango 
                                               
2 Akayev was quoted in The Economist April 25, 1992, p.34. 
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1993).  In light of such visits, some Turkish analysts have suggested that purveying the 
Turkish model for development in the ex-Soviet Turkic republics was the brainchild of 
Western diplomats (Yalçın 1993, Mango 1993), but there is ample evidence that Turkish 
diplomats were themselves already pursuing such a tack, not only among the ex-Soviet 
Turkic republics themselves but also with Turkey’s Western allies, albeit not always 
under the “Turkish model” rubric (e.g., Somalansky 1994, Turan and Turan 1998, Aydın 
2003a).  
In the halcyon days of early contact between the Turkic peoples, it was, however, 
scholars, particularly linguists and other language professionals, who were at the 
vanguard of efforts to promote Turkic consolidation, organizing a series of Turkic 
linguistic congresses with the express intention of achieving linguistic rapprochement 
among the Turkic peoples.  Designed to usher in an era of increased cooperation which 
would pave the way for eventual sociocultural and geopolitical affiliation, synthesis, and 
potential union under the rubric of the Turkic world, these efforts were focused, first, on 
the development of a common Turkic alphabet (ortak alfabe) which would set the stage 
for the formulation of a Turkic lingua franca (ortak dil) for use among the Turkic 
peoples.  Although centered around issues of orthography and language, the 
metalinguistic discourses that emerged within and surrounded the early Turkic linguistic 
congresses also revealed the underlying ideological complexity of supranational 
affiliation in the post-Soviet era.  
Although the ortak alfabe project soon foundered on ideological, political, and 
pragmatic grounds, and the ortak dil project was thus never formally pursued past an 
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initial conceptual phase, the ideological issues raised during the course of the early 
language congresses nonetheless created a synergistically charged intellectual 
environment which fostered ongoing engagement with the linguistic dimensions of 
supranational rapprochement and national consolidation in the post-Soviet era.  While the 
issue of orthographic unification remained salient, and topics related to orthographic and 
linguistic rapprochement continued to be discussed at numerous linguistic conferences, 
Turcology conventions, and Turkic world events, however, the dimensions of ongoing 
linguistic debate shifted substantially over time in ways which both contributed to and 
were characteristic of successive phases of Turkic world relations.  By exploring the 
metadiscursive dynamics of the early linguistic congresses, conceived during the 
euphoric phase of first contact amongst the Turkic peoples, as well as the successive 
series of language ideological debates--both focused and diffuse, emerging 
metadiscursively and in praxis--that ensued as the dimensions of national identity 
formation and pan-Turkic affiliation were negotiated, this study thus seeks to add critical 
detail to emergent understandings of identity politics in the post-Cold War era Turkic 
world which ultimately framed broader efforts toward geopolitical rapprochement among 
the Turkic peoples.  
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POLITICAL PARADIGM FOR POST-COLD WAR RELATIONS IN THE EMERGENT TURKIC 
WORLD 
In a thoughtful retrospective assessment of the development of political and 
economic relations between Turkey and the Turkic peoples of Central Asia and the 
Caucasus, around which this study is framed, Turan and Turan (1998:179) delineate three 
phases of post-Cold War relations in the Turkic world.  Critical to their paradigm is the 
observation that the phases are not distinguishable in terms of specific events, and while 
therefore best constructed as “fluctuations on a continuum” rather than discrete stages, 
nonetheless “reflect transformations of the outlooks that have given direction to the 
relationship.”  The first phase of relations, they suggest, was marked by “high levels of 
optimism and expectations about the future,” while the second was defined by “the 
mutual discovery of constraints that helped define the limits of the relationship,” and the 
third revolved around the “routinization of the relationship.”  While in agreement with 
their characterization of the first two phases of relations, I would, however, suggest a 
slightly more nuanced reading of the third phase.   
Although “routinization,” with its sense of habitual pragmatism, might well 
describe relations in the political and economic spheres as the details of accords and 
agreements signed in phases one and two were worked out, to my mind, it fails to 
adequately capture the prevailing outlook, or “mood,” that pervaded all levels of society 
both in Turkey and amongst the Turkic peoples and that was most palpable in 
metalinguistic discourses about linguistic rapprochement in the Turkic world.  In this 
sense, I would suggest that relations within the post-Soviet Turkic world transitioned 
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from an initial phase of “euphoria” through a stage of bilateral “sobering” to end in a 
persistent mutual sense of “disillusionment,” within which a requiem for “what might 
have been” was a consistent and palpable theme, resulting in a steadfast and self-
interested focus on pragmatism that persists to this day.  Ultimately, I argue, it is this 
pervasive mood of disillusionment that best explains the failure of the Turkic peoples, 
despite their ongoing engagement at the political and economic levels, to coalesce under 
the rubric of the Turkic world, as initially envisioned, or even to develop the “special 
relationship” that often characterizes international relations between countries that share 
linguistic, ethnic, religious, and/or historical ties.  
Insofar as I have already employed the term “bilateral” to describe post-Cold War 
relations in the Turkic world, it is important, at this juncture, to note that while the ex-
Soviet Turkic peoples, whether as a result of Soviet “encouragement” or innate 
inclination, exhibit distinct differences from one another, there was, in the words of 
Turan and Turan, “a tendency on the part of Turkey to view other Turkic states as 
constituting a reasonably homogeneous whole, not harbouring significant conflicts of 
interest among themselves.”  They continue: “This exaggerated perception of unity 
derived, on one hand, from earlier lack of familiarity with the region and, on the other 
hand, from projections of hopes and aspirations” (1998:188).  In light of this undeniable 
reality of early relations between Turkey and the Turkic peoples, I will, despite 
occasionally choosing to highlight the differences among the Turkic peoples, particularly 
when such differences made a difference in the dynamics of the language ideological 
debates I examine, generally follow suit, focusing on the obvious similarities among the 
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ex-Soviet Turkic peoples rather than the patent differences and hence treating them as a 
relatively cohesive bloc in bilateral relations with Turkey.   
I justify this approach by noting that not only did the ex-Soviet Turkic peoples 
share the broad strokes of a recent and defining history under the Soviet Union, which 
bound them to one another as it distinguished them from Turkey, but also that they each 
faced the same prevailing concerns in the post-Soviet era, namely those related to the 
successful establishment of an independent nation.3  Furthermore, I would note that my 
primary vantage point in examining relations within the Turkic world in the post-Cold 
War era resides with Turkey and emphasize the appropriateness, therefore, of adopting 
the Turkish perspective on the nature of the Turkic peoples as related to establishing such 
relations.  To this I would add, as will be addressed in subsequent chapters, that not only 
was it Turkey’s initial tendency to speciously overestimate the homogeneity of all Turkic 
peoples living in former Soviet lands, but also to overrate the degree to which the Turkic 
peoples, as a whole, approximated Anatolian Turks--i.e., were “just like us.”  The issues 
arising from such a perspective will become clearer in subsequent chapters.  Finally, I 
would note that, in speaking of “bilateral” relations and otherwise borrowing the 
terminology of political science and international relations in an attempt to both broadly 
contextualize efforts at linguistic rapprochement in the Turkic world and suggest the 
                                               
3 Although of all the ex-Soviet Turkic peoples, only those with defined nations--i.e., 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan--were concerned 
with nation-building in the truest sense of establishing an independent nation state, the 
autonomous Turkic peoples--e.g., the Chuvash, Bashkurds, and especially the Tatars--
were also engaged in “national” identity-making, albeit within the framework of a larger 
central state, namely Russia. 
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involvement of language ideological debates in framing broader efforts at post-Cold War 
consolidation among the Turkic peoples, “Turkey” itself is likewise reified.  While this is 
useful at times, insofar as it suggests not only the early pervasive interest in the Turkic 
world within the general Turkish populace, but also the relatively unified policy-driven 
approach to the Turkic world taken by Turkish government officials, and the ways in 
which non-state actors, such as scholars and businessmen were rallied in quasi-official 
support of this overarching approach, in subsequent chapters I nonetheless seek to 
demonstrate the ways in which the “Turkish” perspective regarding the Turkic world and 
Turkey’s role in its consolidation, even within a community of practice actively 
interested and involved in the negotiation of Turkic world relations, is nonetheless 
“partial, contested, and interest-laden” (Woolard and Schieffelin 1994:58).   In short, I 
argue that despite an admittedly important general tendency within anthropology to 
eschew or problematize such overarching and essentializing constructs, the fact remains 




This dissertation is rooted first and foremost in a critical approach to the study of 
the relationship between language and the social world which, having grown out of key 
avenues of investigation in linguistic anthropology and sociolinguistics, as well as work 
in other language-related fields, has recently coalesced around the notion of language 
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ideologies (e.g., Woolard and Schieffelin 1994; Gal and Woolard 1995; Schieffelin, 
Woolard, and Kroskrity 1998; Blommaert 1999; Kroskrity 2000c).  At heart, the study of 
language ideologies is founded on the revolutionary shift, or, to borrow Kuhn’s (1962) 
term, scientific revolution, in scholarly approaches to the study of language occasioned 
by work in the disciplines of anthropology and philosophy of language that challenged an 
accepted focus, within the field of linguistics, on the formal structures of language over 
its social uses for communicative purposes.  By focusing on language as a formal system 
defined by the structural relationship between signifier and signified, structural linguistics 
privileged the normative over the performative, thereby drawing a sharp division between 
the linguistic sign and the material world.   
Beginning in the early 1960s, however, scholarship refocused attention on speech 
(parole) rather than language (langue) by not only attending to speaking as an “act” 
(Austin 1962), thereby enabling it to be analyzed alongside other social activities, but, 
more importantly, calling attention to the role played by the full range of “ways of 
speaking” in the social life of a community (Hymes 1962, Gumperz and Hymes 1964).  
Language was thus conceived not only as a system defined by its structural properties, 
but as a social activity characterized by the practices in which its speakers engaged.  This 
perspective was transformative insofar as it advocated attending to the hitherto neglected 
non-referential functions and uses of language, particularly its interactional role in 
establishing, negotiating and maintaining social relations.  In this way, this seminal 
paradigm shift set the stage for investigations by linguistic anthropologists and 
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sociolinguists alike into the relationship between language and the social world, or 
between language as formal system and language as a social practice.   
Furthermore, by attending to local categories of communication, as well as to 
beliefs about and attitudes toward language, both of which were deemed extraneous 
distractions in structural linguistics, the emergent “ethnography of communication” 
approach to language and culture transformed notions of communicative competence, 
which, within its theoretical framework, was defined as knowledge not only of the 
grammatical and structural rules of language, but also its appropriate use within cultural 
context, thereby paving the way for later interest in language ideology.  Thus, whereas 
structural linguists believed that to account for language attitudes, beliefs and values in 
defining communicative competence would be to render language “a chaos that [was] not 
worth studying” (Chomsky 1977b:153), scholars advocating an ethnography of 
communication approach argued that communicative competence was “integral with 
attitudes, values, and motivations concerning language, its features and uses, and integral 
with competence for, and attitudes toward, the interrelation of language with the other 
codes of communicative conduct” (Hymes 2001[1972]:60).   
The study of attitudes about language, in the critical sense of language ideology 
(Woolard and Schieffelin 1994, Woolard 1998) was, however, a much later arrival on the 
scholarly scene (Kroskrity 2000a).  In an influential article that set the stage for such a 
critical approach, Michael Silverstein defined language ideologies broadly as “any sets of 
beliefs about language articulated by users as a rationalization of perceived language 
structure and use” (1979:193).  Later definitions, including Woolard and Schieffelin’s 
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depiction of language ideology as the “mediating link between social structures and 
forms of talk” (1994:55), placed greater emphasis on the sociocultural embeddedness of 
language ideology, while others, including Irvine’s description of language ideology as a 
“cultural system of ideas about social and linguistic relationships, together with their 
loading of moral and political interests” (1989:255) highlighted the inherent political 
force of language ideologies and their involvement in relations of power within a society.   
In a comprehensive review of the origins of the field of language ideology, 
Woolard notes that the term “ideology” has been employed in two broad senses--as 
“neutral, descriptive, notional…ideational, and representational” and as critical, focusing 
on “power and interest” and the ways in which representation is subject to deliberate 
distortion (1998:7-8).  Language ideology, as becomes clear from the various definitions 
offered above, is situated at the intersection of both conceptualizations of ideology, 
simultaneously concerned with “the social origins of thought and representation [and 
with] their roots in or responsiveness to the experience of a particular social position” 
(Woolard 1998:10).  As such, language ideologies can be both explicit and implicit, 
discoverable “in linguistic practice itself; in explicit talk about language, that is, 
metalinguistic or metapragmatic discourse, and in the regimentation of language use 
through more implicit metapragmatics” (Woolard 1998:9, emphasis in original), the 
common thread being that language ideologies are always tied to speakers’ conscious or 
subconscious perceptions of social structure and their individual and collective sense of 
place in the material world. 
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Thus, as numerous studies in linguistic anthropology have convincingly 
demonstrated, language ideologies, whether made explicit in metalinguistic discourse or 
implied through discursive practice, are never simply and transparently about language.  
Rather, as Woolard and Schieffelin argue, language ideologies “envision and enact links 
of language to group and personal identity, to aesthetics, to morality, and to 
epistemology” and “[t]hrough such linkages, they often underpin social institutions” 
(1994:56).  In a similar vein, Debra Spitulnik’s investigation of the ways in which 
Zambian national radio mediates both national unity and diversity through the allocation 
of airtime to the country’s diverse languages in accordance with varying perceptions of 
their political and economic value, likewise leads her to conclude that “[l]anguage 
ideologies are, among many other things, about the construction and legitimation of 
power, the production of social relations of sameness and difference, and the creation of 
cultural stereotypes about types of speakers and social groups” (1998:164). 
The observation that language ideologies underpin, and hence are implicated in 
the production and reproduction of social structure and social institutions rests on an 
explicit recognition that language is inherently multifunctional, both indexical and 
constitutive of the social world (Irvine 1989).  As Silverstein argues, “people not only 
speak about, or refer to, the world ‘out there’--outside of language--they also presuppose 
(or reflect) and create (or fashion) a good deal of social reality by the very activity of 
using language” (1979:194).  Expanding on this notion of the multifunctionality of 
language to address the relations of power and interest implicated in linguistic praxis, 
Blommaert argues that “discourse is in itself…a crucial symbolic resource onto which 
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people project their interests, around which they can construct alliances, on and through 
which they exercise power. Power (including the (re)production of ideology) must be 
identified as a form of practice, historically contingent and socially embedded” (1999:7). 
In this sense, scholarship in language ideology owes much to French sociologist 
and social theorist Pierre Bourdieu’s articulation of a comprehensive conceptual 
framework for deconstructing the symbolic power of language and the political economy 
of linguistic exchanges.  Bourdieu’s central argument, first articulated in a 1977 article, is 
that linguistic practices constitute a form of social capital which may be exchanged for 
political, social, and economic capital within a local or national economy.  Such 
exchanges, Bourdieu contends, are regulated by the state insofar as the value accorded 
linguistic practices relies on external legitimation, which is primarily accomplished 
through state level institutions, particularly those associated with education.  Such 
institutions produce “a foundation of shared belief” (Thompson in Bourdieu 1991:23) 
which comprises the mechanism by which symbolic power may be misrecognized and 
therefore legitimized by those subjected to it and hence constitutes the basis for symbolic 
as opposed to coercive power.  
Of even greater relevance to a language ideology approach is Bourdieu’s 
foundational work on the subject (1991) that provides a means for exploring ways in 
which institutional interactions are implicated in the production and reproduction of 
broader social inequalities through linguistic legitimation.  In explicating the central 
premise behind his “economic” model of linguistic exchange, Bourdieu argues that 
“relations of communication par excellence--linguistic exchanges--are also relations of 
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symbolic power in which the power relations between speakers or their respective groups 
are actualized” (1991:37).  In other words, linguistic practices--i.e., the appropriate use of 
the various styles, registers, and varieties of language that characterize the speech 
economy of a community--constitute symbolic capital which may be traded in for 
political authority, social flexibility, and economic power.  In this sense, it is the ability 
of linguistic practices to provide access to material resources which constitutes their 
value on the linguistic market.  Thus, for example, in a study of the comparative economy 
of praise-oratory among a caste of griots (bards) in a Wolof community in rural Senegal 
who derive income from their facility in the verbal arts, Irvine argues that “verbal skills 
and performances are among the resources and activities forming a socioeconomic 
system; and the relevant knowledge, talents, and use-rights are not evenly, randomly, or 
fortuitously distributed in a community….  The fact of uneven distribution is itself 
economically relevant” (1989:255).   
The ability of linguistic practices to provide access to material resources depends, 
in turn, on these practices having been legitimated by a recognized, often state-sponsored, 
institutional authority.  Thus, in Irvine’s study, the relevant institutional authority is the 
political system itself, in that the ability to gain and retain high office is dependent on 
facility in the verbal arts which must be performed on the behalf of high-ranking officials 
by griots, as participation in such practices is considered incompatible with a politician’s 
social stature.  While Bourdieu’s concept of institution includes formal political, 
religious, economic, and, most importantly, educational organizations, he also argues that 
“[a]n institution is not necessarily a particular organization...but is any relatively durable 
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set of social relations which endows individuals with power, status and resources of 
various kinds.  It is the institution, in this sense, that endows the speaker with the 
authority to carry out the act which his or her utterance claims to perform” (Thompson 
1991:8).  Furthermore, building on his earlier theory of practice (1977), Bourdieu argues 
that institutions, like all social relations, are emergent in interaction, insofar as they are 
reproduced through the processes of daily social interaction, including linguistic 
practices, of their members and/or participants, thereby rendering the dominated 
complicit in their domination.   
Over time, Bourdieu’s theory has come under criticism from scholars who have 
suggested that it overstates the role of social institutions in legitimizing linguistic 
practices, thereby downplaying human agency and circumscribing the possibility of 
contestation of institutional authority (e.g., Gal 1989, Irvine 1989).  Furthermore, studies 
in the political economy of language contact, such as Woolard’s (1989a) study of 
bilingualism and the politics of subnational ethnic identity in Spanish Catalonia and 
Jaffe’s (1999a) study of diglossia and the politics of indigenous ethnic identity on the 
island of French Corsica, have called into question whether the linguistic marketplace 
Bourdieu posits is able to achieve integration to such a degree that its underlying 
assumptions become hegemonic, inexorably and invariably compelling those members of 
a society who are unable to claim facility in the officially sanctioned linguistic variety to 
regard its dominan(ce/ation) as legitimate.   
Such critiques of Bourdieu’s concept of the “linguistic marketplace” as overly 
deterministic in allowing little possibility for the emergence of language ideologies not in 
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keeping with the “foundation of shared belief” ratified by state level institutions and 
hence little opportunity for linguistic choice to resist or transform the system 
notwithstanding, the notion that structures of power are implicated in linguistic praxis is 
important to elaborating a clearer understanding not only of the specific ways in which 
language ideologies developed under the influence of broad institutionalized 
sociopolitical processes create a political economy of linguistic choice at the local level 
but also of the “precise role played by language ideologies in more general sociopolitical 
developments, conflicts, and struggles” (Blommaert 1999:2).  As Gal writes in 
concluding remarks to a volume that seeks to pull together disparate avenues of scholarly 
endeavor under the rubric of a language ideologies approach, “[i]f the notion of ‘language 
ideology’ encourages analysis to encompass both social interaction on the one hand, and, 
say, state policy on the other, this is in part because it can be understood both as 
verbalized, thematized discussion and as the implicit understandings and unspoken 
assumptions embedded and reproduced in the structure of institutions and their everyday 
practices” (1998:319).   
 
Language Ideological Debates 
Within the burgeoning volume of literature on language ideology, of particular 
relevance to the present study is a volume dedicated to the study of language ideological 
debates, which Blommaert, in a detailed introduction, defines as “[d]ebates, that is, in 
which language is central as a topic, a motif, a target, and in which language ideologies 
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are being articulated, formed, amended, enforced” (1999:1).  The study of debates is 
proposed as a entrée into an approach that Blommaert terms an “historiography of 
language ideologies,” which, by reintroducing the historical processes by/within which 
the “socioculturally motivated ideas, perceptions, and expectations of language, 
manifested in all sorts of language use and themselves objects of discursive elaboration in 
metapragmatic discourse” (1999:1) emerged and developed, provides the rich 
ethnographic context, that Blommaert finds generally lacking, for better understanding 
and situating contemporary manifestations of language ideologies.  
In advocating an historiographical approach to the study of language ideologies, 
Blommaert thus explicitly rejects an “idealist approach to language related ideational 
phenomena” (1999:6, emphasis in original) in which language attitudes or linguistic 
ideologies are treated as intrinsic to speakers, or something they “just happen to have.”  
Approaching language ideologies from the perspective of the here and now amounts to 
nothing less than “a dehistorization of the phenomena,” Blommaert argues, which, in 
turn, creates analytical difficulties insofar as the power relations that obtain in speech 
communities, not to mention speech communities themselves, cannot be productively 
theorized on the “synchronic plane” alone.  Drawing inspiration from Bourdieu’s work in 
the political economy of linguistic exchanges and Heller’s (1994) application of that 
theoretical framework in French Ontario, Blommaert argues instead for locating the study 
of language ideologies solidly within an investigation into linguistic praxis, in which the 
role played by language in creating, maintaining, negotiating, and contesting social 
relations is central.  In essence, then, Blommaert suggests a materialist, view of language 
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ideology in which the “ethnographic eye [is attuned to] the real historical actors, their 
interests, their alliances, their practices, and where they come from, in relation to the 
discourses they produce.”  In such a formulation, “discourse is in itself seen as a crucial 
symbolic resource onto which people project their interests, around which they construct 
alliances, on and through which they exercise power.  Power (including the 
(re)production of ideology) must be identified as a form of practice, historically 
contingent and socially embedded” (1999:7). 
 
Orthography as Ideology and Orthographic Ideologies   
The symbolic nature of orthographic systems has long been understood to derive 
from their provision of a conventional, if arbitrary, representation of the phonological 
inventory of a language.  This capacity to render speech into writing has, however, 
largely consigned orthography to relative inattention by creating a dichotomy between 
the spoken and the written in which the orthographic is understood to be no more than a 
graphic modality of speech.  This normative separation between the spoken and the 
written--which is also reflected in the related dichotomies of sound/sign and 
signifier/signified-- finds antecedents over the course of the past two and a half centuries 
in the works of such linguists and social theorists as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Ferdinand 
de Saussure, and Claude Lévi-Strauss, who in their various ways each dismissed writing 
as a supplement or mere representation of speech.  In this vein, Rousseau argued:  “The 
analysis of thought is made through speech, and the analysis of speech through writing; 
 24 
speech represents thought through conventional signs, and writing represents speech in 
the same way; thus the art of writing is nothing but a mediated representation of 
thought…” (as quoted in Derrida 1974:295).   
In a celebrated deconstruction of the speech/writing complex, Jacques Derrida 
critiques Rousseau’s depiction of writing as “a supplement of speech,” arguing:  “The 
movement of supplementary representation approaches the origin as it distances itself 
from it.  Total alienation is the total reappropriation of self-presence.  Alphabetic writing, 
representing a representer, supplement of a supplement, increases the power of 
representation.  In losing a little more presence, it restores it a little bit better” (1974:295).  
By thus reformulating the relationship between thought, speech, and writing, Derrida 
paves the way for an approach to orthography that recognizes its unique capacity, as a 
signifier thrice removed from the signified, to concisely, but powerfully, index 
sociopolitical constructs.   
With the long-accepted subordinated relationship of writing to speech thus 
problematized, scholarship in linguistic anthropology and other language-focused fields 
has increasingly turned to the problematic of written communication.  Beginning with 
Basso’s 1974 call for rescuing the study of writing systems from relative inattention by 
including writing “as a form of communicative activity,” within an ethnography of 
communication approach that explores “the social and cultural factors that influence the 
ways written codes are actually used” (1991[1974]:426), scholarship of written modes of 
communication has critiqued assumptions of neutrality born of pervasive portrayals of 
writing as mere representation of speech and highlighted the socioculturally embedded 
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nature of orthography by, for example, examining the mechanisms of social, economic, 
and political control that surround literacy (e.g., Scollon and Scollon 1981, Street 1984 
and 1993, Besnier 1991, Schieffelin 1995) and exploring the socially mediated nature of 
transcription (e.g., Ochs 1979, Jaffe and Walton 2000, Bucholtz 2000).  Having thus 
turned a critical eye on formulations that privilege the spoken over the written, 
scholarship has increasingly focused on the symbolic power of orthography to index non-
linguistic social constructs and argued that conventions of use are subject to historical, 
social, political, and economic contingencies (e.g., Coulmas 1990, Winer 1990, 
Hornberger 1995).   
Furthermore, as a burgeoning new volume of work suggests, contrary to received 
wisdom (e.g., Lepsius 1981[1855], Pike 1947) orthography is intrinsically implicated in 
attitudes, beliefs, and values about language.  Arguing this point in a study of the 
dimensions of debate over orthographic representation for Haitian kreyòl, Schieffelin and 
Doucet write: “The processes of transforming a spoken language to written form have 
often been viewed as scientific, arbitrary, or unproblematic.  However the creation of 
supposedly arbitrary sound/sign (signifier/signified) relationships that constitute an 
orthography always involves choices based on someone’s idea of what is important.  This 
process of representing the sounds of language in written form is thus an activity deeply 
grounded in frameworks of value” (1998:285).  In a study of the meaning of orthographic 
practices in British Creole, Sebba (1998) reiterates this point, taking Brian Street’s (1984) 
seminal distinction between what he terms “autonomous” and “ideological” perspectives 
on literacy as a departure point in arguing that taking an “autonomous” approach to 
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orthography, in which orthography is portrayed as a technical solution and neutral vehicle 
for reducing speech to writing, likewise disguises the “ideological” considerations 
involved in devising writing systems.   
Not only is the institutionalized belief that there is a correct way to graphically 
represent the sounds of spoken language, no matter how naturalized, itself ideological 
(Jaffe 1999a, Johnson 2005b), but when orthographic conventions enter the social life of 
a community they are also put to ideological purposes, acting as a means of constructing 
sociopolitical identities at the local, regional, national, supranational, and international 
levels (Winer 1990, Brown 1993, Jaffe 1996 and 1999a, Vikør 1993, Eira 1998, Bird 
2000, Stebbins 2001, Johnson 2005b), and hence as a symbolic resource in negotiations 
over the dimensions of self and other.  In defining the range of linguistic practices 
informed by values, beliefs, and attitudes toward language, or language ideologies, 
Woolard includes orthography as a symbolic medium in processes of identity formation, 
concluding that “[i]n countries where identity and nationhood are under negotiation, 
every aspect of language, including its phonological description and forms of graphic 
representation, can be contested” (1998:23).  She goes on to argue: “This means that 
orthographic systems cannot be conceptualized as simply reducing speech to writing but 
rather are symbols that themselves carry historical, cultural, and political meanings” 
(1998:23).   
Employing this conceptual framework to explore the ideological underpinnings of 
metalinguistic discourses surrounding orthographic choice within the context of 
competing systems of orthographic representation for Haitian kreyòl, Schieffelin and 
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Doucet note the ways in which various proposals for orthographic reform reference 
language attitudes toward different varieties of kreyòl which are revealed in 
metalinguistic terminology and linked to notions of the “inherent” superiority of one 
language variety over another.  These notions are, in turn, based on perceptions of the 
purity, authenticity, and proximity to French of these language varieties as well as the 
prestige of the groups who speak them.  Thus, despite a system of diglossia which 
officially privileges French over kreyòl, Schieffelin and Doucet suggest that contestation 
over the standardization of kreyòl orthography reveals complicated attitudes toward the 
two languages which speak to an ongoing negotiation of African/ European cultural 
duality, concluding that in Haiti, “orthographic debate is not purely about how to write 
kreyòl, i.e., how to represent graphically the sounds of kreyòl.  It is about the conception 
of kreyòl itself as a ‘language’ and as an element of Haitian national identity.  It is about 
how Haitians situate themselves through languages at the national and international 
levels” (1998:300).   
Alexandra Jaffe’s (1996 and 1999a) explorations of the first and second annual 
Corsican spelling contest likewise demonstrate that from the perspective of Corsican 
language activists, the codification of Corsican orthography has to do not simply with 
standardizing divergent spelling conventions, but with attempts to generate increased 
interest in the Corsican language itself and raise its status by demonstrating the ability of 
the threatened minority language to function in high-status domains generally reserved 
for the dominant French language (1996:816).  Thus, in terms borrowed from the study of 
language planning, corpus-based concerns take on a status-based gloss, whereby issues 
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surrounding the standardization of Corsican orthography speak directly to negotiations 
over the respective status of the French and Corsican languages, and hence cultures, 
within contemporary Corsican society.  Jaffe furthermore suggests the applicability of the 
ideological precept equating legitimacy with literacy that drives activist linguists’ 
attempts to standardize Corsican orthography is resisted by average speakers of Corsican 
both explicitly, in the rejection of new Corsican road signs naming their villages, and 
implicitly, in contestants unconscious spelling of dictated Corsican words in accordance 
with regional variations in pronunciation rather than the accepted standard orthography 
during annual spelling contests organized by activist linguists.  Jaffe therefore concludes 
that in their seeming preference for maintaining a strict division in the domains of 
language use, in which French serves the public sphere while Corsican is reserved for the 
private sphere, average Corsicans are likewise engaged in mapping out identity politics 
within contemporary Corsican society, albeit along different lines than activist linguists.   
Jaffe’s work thus suggests that the notion of orthography as a site for contested 
identities can be found not only in metalinguistic discourse about orthography but also in 
orthographic practice, a point which is reinforced by Sebba’s study of the ideological 
nature of orthographic practice in the ways in which British Creole, a language with no 
recognized orthography, has been represented in writing.  In particular, his description of 
the ways in which native speakers of British Creole have attempted to capture Caribbean 
inflection, especially in cases in which there exists no phonemic distinction that justifies a 
spelling divergent from English, the lexifier language, suggests that writers of Caribbean 
origin are deliberately enacting their sense of a distinct identity through the use of non-
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conventional orthographic practices that inscribe differences between Creole culture and 
mainstream British culture.  Sebba thus argues that “by treating orthography as a set of 
cultural practices rather than simply a system for ‘reducing’ speech to writing, we are 
able to account for writers’ choices in terms of an implicit ideology of difference 
(‘Abstand’) between the creole and the lexifier” (1998:37).   
 
METHODOLOGY: “DISLOCATED ETHNOGRAPHY” AND THE MIGRATORY 
ANTHROPOLOGIST 
In a discussion of the ways in which a language ideology approach “allows an 
integrated study of social phenomena usually taken to be of different scales of analysis, 
and therefore too rarely discussed together in social approaches to language,” Gal writes: 
“To the degree that the implicit assumption of a micro/macro split has determined, in 
practice, the researcher’s choice of field site and method, a switch in focus encourages 
multisite and multimethod research, a trend that converges with developments in other 
corners of social science” (1998:318).  Indeed, attending to the different “matters of 
scale” involved in studying the dynamics of a transnational collection of individuals 
engaged at the meso level in language ideological debates that defined efforts to promote 
linguistic, sociocultural, and geopolitical rapprochement in the post-Cold War era has 
necessitated certain shifts in traditional methodological approaches to ethnographic 
practice, particularly with relation to defining and locating the “community” involved.   
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First and foremost, the practice of what I’m calling “dislocated ethnography” 
requires a theoretical and methodological paradigm that provides a means of 
investigating a shifting, dislocated, and transnational collection of individuals who are 
nonetheless engaged in negotiating the dimensions of collective identity.  By enabling an 
emphasis on commonalities of interest rather than proximity of location, the notion of a 
“community of practice” (Lave and Wenger 1991, Eckert and McConnell-Ginet 1992, 
Wenger 1993) does just that.  Where the term “community,” with its traditional 
connotations of long-standing interactive co-locatedness, fails to adequately characterize 
a group marked by its extreme dislocatedness and perpetual transience and hence lacking 
in everyday face-to-face interaction, the notion of “community of practice” in the sense 
of an “aggregate of people who come together around mutual engagement in an 
endeavor” which differs “from the traditional community primarily because it is defined 
simultaneously by its membership and by the practice in which that membership 
engages” (Eckert and McConnell-Ginet 1992:464) offers a useful framework.   
Capable of encompassing heterogeneous as well as homogeneous social 
groupings and conflictual as well as harmonious social relations, the notion of a 
community of practice avoids assuming complete homogeneity in the worldview of its 
members, while nonetheless allowing for the probability that they will share certain 
context-based understandings, arising from mutual engagement in a particular set of 
practices.  According to Eckert and McConnell-Ginet, “[w]ays of doing things, ways of 
talking, beliefs, values, power relations--in short practices--emerge in the course of this 
mutual endeavor” (1992:464).  While practices may emerge from “communities of 
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practice,” however, it is likewise possible to say that communities of practice emerge “in 
practice.”  Thus, it is within the meeting halls of periodic Turkic world events as well as 
the digital space of the ever-available internet forum that the sustained interaction 
between geographically dispersed individuals, which allows for the development of 
shared values, beliefs, and norms around which the Turkic world community of practice 
coalesces, is found.   
But the question remains, just how does the ethnographer gain access to this 
community of practice?  Just as the collapse of the Soviet Union and emergence of a new 
global order offered the opportunity for the Turkic peoples to cross established national 
borders in aid of supranational rapprochement, contemporaneous changes in the 
technological environment of the post-Cold War era forever altered the vistas in which 
communication takes place, allowing for the possibility that dislocated, transnational, or 
otherwise translocational, communities might form without heed for the complexities 
involved in traversing national borders or other physical boundaries.  As globalization 
and other transnational trends thus alter the accepted dimensions of community, they 
simultaneously offer a challenge to such established ethnographic practices as locating 
fieldwork within a single site.  As pioneer in the field transnational anthropology and the 
cultural dimensions of globalization, Arjun Appadurai suggests, in arguing that 
ethnographic practice must adapt to the shifts in local communities occasioned by global 
transformations, “[t]he terms of negotiation between imagined lives and deterritorialized 
worlds are complex, and they surely cannot be captured by the localizing strategies of 
ethnography alone” (1996:52).   
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Ethnographic practice involving geographically dislocated or transiently co-
located communities does not, however, always preclude traditional “localizing 
strategies” customarily associated with ethnographic practice, such as siting fieldwork in 
a single location.  Thus while Liisa Malkki’s (1995 and 1997) work among Hutu refugees 
in Tanzania offers an excellent application of Appadurai’s injunctive “to capture the 
impact of deterritorialization on the imaginative resources of lived, local experiences” 
(1996:52), her research was largely conducted within a refugee settlement in Mishamo, 
western Tanzania.  Thus, while turning traditional ethnography on its head by attending 
to the extraordinary chain of events that occasioned the refugees’ transnational 
displacement and defined their sense of identity and community over an examination of 
the ordinary routine of life in the refugee camp that would normally have constituted the 
organizing focus of fieldwork, Malkki’s study nonetheless powerfully demonstrates that a 
singular fieldsite remains feasible when the ethnographic problematic resides primarily in 
the shared experience of a community, which, although transnationally dislocated and 
ostensibly transitory, is nonetheless geographically situated for the near term.   
Nonetheless, the broadening horizons of dislocated anthropology also allow for 
innovations in methodology in keeping with the specific character of the community.  In 
this sense, the study of highly mobile communities argues for a methodological approach 
that is migratory in nature, allowing the ethnographer to follow members of the 
community, or “community of practice,” as they traverse national borders and other 
spatial divides/boundaries.  Thus, while dislocated ethnography can be practiced from a 
stable base, I suggest that a more methodologically appropriate approach for investigating 
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communities that coalesce around shared ideology rather than coinhabit a shared 
communal space involves joining the translocational currents that form the loose bonds of 
the community, be they, in the present case, the physical affirmation of periodic 
gatherings or the ethereal affiliations found in internet communications, thereby enabling 
the ethnographer to experience in some fashion the ineffable sense of unity and 
community that emerges from such transient and attenuated contact.   
With this in mind, I took a more mobile approach to ethnography, entering the 
flow of Turkic peoples and their “traveling discourses” (Gal and Kligman 2000) about 
the Turkic world by turning migratory.  From my base in Ankara, seat of government, 
and hence home to the Turkish Language Society (Türk Dil Kurumu-TDK) and the 
distinguished university that played host to one of the early linguistic congresses I discuss 
in chapter three, I crisscrossed Turkey and into Azerbaijan attending congresses, 
conferences, symposia, lectures, and other Turkic world events, always as a participant 
and occasionally as a presenter.  Alongside other attendees, I took trains and overnight 
buses, stayed in conference hotels and teacher’s hostels, was fêted at municipal dinners 
and swept up in the communitas of cultural events, presented papers and attended 
lectures, gave interviews and collected “Turkic” cultural swag, and, most importantly, 
spent hour after hour speaking in Turkish, Azeri, Russian and even English to fellow 
attendees of the events who had traveled from all regions of Turkey and remote corners 
of the Turkic world not to mention Europe, the U.S., Australia, etc. to partake in the 
convivial communitas of these physical instantiations of Turkic unity and thereby affirm 
their sense of belonging to a Turkic world community imagined--to invoke and extend 
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Benedict Anderson’s (1983) influential construct--by the community of practice that has 
coalesced around a determination to bring about its actualization.   
Nonetheless, it is when ethnographic practice turns to internet forums, chatrooms, 
and news and discussion lists rather than the communal spaces and face-to-face 
interactions that define a traditional fieldsite, that dislocated ethnography is pushed to its 
extremes, given that the physical link among members of a community is sharply 
attenuated or disappears altogether via the internet, requiring other bases for establishing, 
negotiating, and maintaining commonality.  It is here that the notion of a community of 
practice that animates this study becomes most methodologically salient, for not only did 
I accompany members of this dislocated Turkic world to repeated rounds of Turkic world 
events, but I followed many of them into the realm of cyberspace, becoming a member of 
several core internet news and discussion groups which not only served to advertise the 
Turkic world events “we” collectively attended, but also played host to ongoing 
negotiations over issues of Turkic language and identity and the nature of linguistic and 
sociocultural rapprochement among the Turkic peoples in the post-Cold War era.  Indeed, 
it was within the bounds of a particular news and discussion group that the impromptu, 
but intense, language ideological debate, concerning Turkish orthography but speaking 
more broadly to issues of post-Soviet Turkic world relations, which forms the subject of 
chapter six, was enacted.   
Recalling Gal’s observation that attending to different “matters of scale” requires 
not only a move toward multi-sited ethnography, but also other shifts in method, I also 
derived inspiration from an assessment of ethnographic methodology by Akhil Gupta and 
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James Ferguson who, while writing in a similar vein, offer a slightly different take on 
reconceiving the siting of ethnography, arguing that the notion of ethnographic location 
which has always been central to fieldwork should be construed not as spatial sites, but as 
political locations, not as points on a compass, but as “sites constructed in fields of 
unequal power relations” (1997:35).  Such a reconfiguration of ethnographic “location,” 
they suggest, necessitates methodological innovations that enable ethnography “to 
become recognizable as a flexible and opportunistic strategy for diversifying and making 
more complex our understanding of various places, people, and predicaments through an 
attentiveness to the different forms of knowledge available from different social and 
political locations” (1997:37).  Noting that ethnographic practice is increasingly being 
retheorized along such lines, Gupta and Ferguson nonetheless argue that “the 
institutionalized disciplinary framework of reception and evaluation too often continues 
to see ‘experiential,’ field-based knowledge as the privileged core of an ethnographic 
work that is then “fleshed out” with supplementary material” (1997:37).   
Drawing on such reconceptualized notions of ethnographic practice, my 
methodological approach to the study of the Turkic world community of practice engaged 
in negotiating the terms of linguistic rapprochement among the Turkic peoples in the 
post-Cold War era turns the traditional disciplinary paradigm, as described by Gupta and 
Ferguson, upside down by focusing on what might once have been considered 
“supplementary material,” namely a variety of textual records pertaining to several 
particularly salient “moments” in the negotiation of Turkic linguistic rapprochement, 
which I proceed to unpack and “flesh out” with experiential knowledge gained from 
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sustained participant observation within the community of practice involved both in the 
production of the texts associated with these particular “moments” and also in continuing 
efforts to promote linguistic, sociocultural, and geopolitical rapprochement within the 
Turkic world.  It is, however, important to note that in decentering “experiential 
knowledge,” I do not seek to thereby privilege “supplementary material,” but merely to 
suggest that the two sources of knowledge are mutually constitutive of any given 
culturally-situated phenomenon and that it is therefore equally possible to use the latter, 
as it is the former, as an entrée to developing a rich and nuanced understanding of the 
ethnographic problematic.  
In shifting central focus from ethnographic observation to analysis of textual 
records produced in the course of language ideological debates, it is furthermore 
important to note, following Blommaert, that not only are such debates prolific producers 
of language-related texts, but also that these texts are not static and discrete, but rather 
fluid and dynamic, entering the social fabric and intellectual life of the community in 
which they are enacted.  In this regard, Blommaert writes:  
 
[Debates] are textual/discursive, they produce discourses and metadiscourses, and 
they result in a battery of texts that can be borrowed, quoted, echoed, vulgarized, 
etc.  In sum, they are moments of textual formation and transformation, in which 
minority views can be transformed into majority views and vice versa, in which 
group-specific discourses can be incorporated into a master text, in which a 
variety of discursive means are mobilized and deployed (styles, genres, 
arguments, claims to authority), and in which sociopolitical alliances are shaped 
or altered in discourse (1998:10) 
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In this sense, the discursive texts produced both in and around language 
ideological debates bear examination not only as socially-embedded artifacts in their own 
right, but also as dynamic contributions to contemporaneous sociocultural relations and 
enduring sociopolitical processes.  In examining such discourses and texts, I therefore 
take an explicitly ethnographic and, again following Blommaert, historiographical 
analytical approach whereby the links between discursive texts at the micro-level and 
sociopolitical processes at the macro-level are elucidated, thereby avoiding the potential 
pitfalls of a close textual or critical discourse analytical approach that often “seems to fall 
into the trap of situating power inside textual structures or discourse patterns, assuming a 
too self-evident stance with regard to the producers, the audience, the setting--in short, 
the context of the discourse (1999:34).  In this sense I take Blommaert’s injunction to 
assume an explicitly historiographical approach to the study of language ideologies--
whereby not only is the court durée, or “real time” of everyday life that “people can see, 
feel, and control,” but also the durée, or more gradual and incremental temporality that 
characterizes the workings of, for example, social, political, and economic systems which 
“are beyond the reach of individuals” accounted for--to mean attending, in the present 
case, not only to the history of the language ideological debates of the post-Cold War era 
Turkic world, but also their dialectical relation with the present and their prefiguring of 
the future.  It is in this sense that an ethnographic approach, involving participant 
observation and thick description, becomes indispensible.   
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OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
Employing Turan and Turan’s (1998) paradigm of relations in the post-Cold War 
Turkic world as a framework, in the following chapters, I examine the three phases of 
relations they identify through the lens of the metadiscursive dynamics of four language 
ideological debates--one formal, two informal, and one quasi-formal--that collectively 
defined and were defined by the broader ambient sociopolitical milieu in which they 
emerged.  Keeping in mind Blommaert’s injunction to attend to the “intrinsic historicity” 
of language attitudes, values, and beliefs in which “language processes are seen as real, 
socioculturally and historically anchored phenomena, not epiphenomenal to reality, but 
co-constructive of reality” (1999:6), I begin, in chapter two, with an exploration of the 
ways in which the identity of the Turkic peoples--whether collectively or individually, 
supranationally or nationally conceived--has long been defined by and constituted 
through issues of language and orthography.  In particular, I examine the ways in which 
the linguistic identity of the Turkic peoples is intertwined with the history of “pan-
Turkism” and the enduring notion of an imagined Turkic world, which, by virtue of being 
imagined not only largely in absentia but also at the supranational level, transcends the 
bounds of even Anderson’s (1983) evocative concept of “imagined communities.”  This 
chapter thus serves to situate the four language ideological debates that characterized the 
first decade of post-Soviet relations among the Turkic peoples within the broader 
historical and sociopolitical discourses of their emergence, allowing for a more in-depth 
exploration of their dimensions in subsequent chapters.   
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After thus providing the larger contextualization, I turn, in chapter three to the 
first of the post-Cold War era language ideological debates, exploring the ideological 
underpinnings behind formal efforts to create a common Turkic orthography and lingua 
franca which emerged in the metadiscursive interplay among Turkish and Turkic 
scholars and language professionals during a series of three international Turkic linguistic 
congresses convened in Turkey between September 1990 and May 1992.  While the early 
linguistic congresses were conceived and convened during the initial, euphoric, phase of 
post-Soviet relations among the Turkic peoples and were thus organized around many of 
the ostensibly shared ideological precepts that characterized the overarching outlook of 
the time, I nonetheless suggest that the ideological conflicts which emerged in the course 
of these instances of first linguistic contact contributed to an emergent understanding not 
only of the complexities of linguistic rapprochement among the Turkic peoples, but also 
of the social and political sensitivities that attended broader efforts at promoting 
solidarity within the Turkic world.   
In chapter four, I explore the ways in which this emergent sense of the ambient 
sensitivities and constraints in Turkic world relations, in turn, sparked a second, far more 
informal and diffuse, language ideological debate that in speaking more openly to issues 
of language and identity in the post-Cold War Turkic world, contributed to sobering even 
state-level actors, thereby generating the more rational and pragmatic assessments of the 
possibilities for cooperative endeavor that characterized the second phase of relations 
among the Turkic peoples.  It is here, I suggest, that the capacity of language ideologies 
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to not only reflect aspects of the material world, but also participate in its constitution is 
most visible.  
Chapter five, in turn, centers around an exploration of contemporaneous 
innovations in orthographic practice within the Turkish Republic which, in paralleling 
and thus expanding on decades of linguistic resistance to state-sponsored efforts to purify 
and preserve the Turkish language, constitute, I argue, a second diffuse language 
ideological debate over the politics of identity in the post-Cold War era.  While 
concurrent with the diffuse language ideological debate over the dimensions of pan-
Turkic identity and affiliation described in chapter four, what distinguishes this debate is 
not only that it emerged in praxis rather than metadiscursively, but also that, despite 
speaking to broader issues of post-Cold War identity politics and thus necessarily 
intersecting with ongoing negotiations over the dimension of Turkic world relations, it 
was constrained, in province, to Turkish identity politics and the struggle over the 
Turkish alphabet. 
In chapter six, I turn my attention to the virtual vistas of cyberspace, in particular 
to those internet forums and news and discussion groups within which members of the 
community of practice that played an instrumental role in keeping alive the notion of a 
broader Turkic world coalesced around discussion of issues of Turkic language, culture, 
and identity in aid of further negotiating the dimensions of the imagined Turkic world 
they were determined to see actualized.  Here I explore the dynamics of a fourth, quasi-
formal yet impromptu, language ideological debate that, in concentrating solely on issues 
concerning Turkish orthography, which nonetheless proved to be entwined in interesting 
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and contradictory ways with the pan-Turkic ortak alfabe, spoke to the sense of 
disillusionment and pragmatism that characterized the third phase of Turkic world 
relations.  In this sense, I suggest that it within this final language ideological debate that 
emergent understandings of relations within the Turkic world in the post-Cold War era 
formed during preceding language ideological debates become manifest.  
Chapter seven offers some final insights and conclusions with an eye to 
explicating the ways in which the study of a series of language ideological debates 
exploring the dynamics of linguistic rapprochement among the Turkic peoples serves to 
elucidate the broader dimensions of identity-making in the post-Cold War Turkic world 
and hence contributes to wider theoretical discourses concerning identity politics in the 
aftermath of transformative shifts in the local, national, or global order. 
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Chapter Two:  Imagining the Turkic World Through Language and 
Orthography: Supranationalism, Pan-Turkism and Turkic 
Nationalisms 
 
Bir ben varım, 
Benimle birlikte Türkçem, 
Türkçemle birlikte bir ben varım. 
Ne başında ne sonunda gelir uygar dillerin. 
Azeri’den tut, Balkanlara çık 
O Türkçem benim, ben o Türkçenin. 
 
Bir ulusum var, 
Ulusumla birlikte Türkçem, 
Türkçemle birlikte bir ulusum var. 
Ne başında ne sonunda gelir uygar ulusların. 
Orta Asya’dan tut, Orta Anadolu’ya çık 
O ulus benim, ben o ulusun. 
 
Ben bir varım, 
Benimle birlikte Türkçem, 
Türkçemle birlikte bir ulusum var. 
Ne başında ne sonunda gelir uygar dil ve 
uluslarin. 
Türkçem başlar Azeri’den Balkanlara, 
Ulusum Orta Asya’dan Anadolu’ya çıkar. 
There is just me, 
Along with me is my Turkish.  
It’s just me and my Turkish 
Neither at the fore nor lagging behind civilized tongues. 
Begin with Azeri and proceed to the Balkans 
That is the Turkish of mine, I belong to that Turkish. 
 
I have just one nation, 
Along with my nation is my Turkish. 
It’s just my Turkish and my nation 
Neither at the fore nor lagging behind civilized nations. 
Begin with Central Asia and proceed to Central Anatolia 
That is the nation of mine, I belong to that nation. 
 
There’s just me, 
Along with me is my Turkish. 
It’s just my Turkish and my nation 
Neither at the fore nor lagging behind civilized tongues or 
nations. 
My Turkish begins with Azeri and proceeds to the Balkans 




But the homeland is partly invented, existing only in the imagination of the 
deterritorialized groups, and it can sometimes become so fantastic and one-sided that it 
provides fuel for new ethnic conflicts.   
Arjun Appadurai 
Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization, 1996, p.49 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Efforts aimed at uniting the Turkic peoples in the post-Soviet era rely heavily, 
whether consciously or unconsciously, on perceptions of the “Turkic world” as a 
                                               
4 As quoted in Ercilasun (1996 [1977]:100), translated by Güneli Gün. 
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cohesive entity.  While this notion of cohesiveness is the touchstone to which the 
participants to this endeavor continually return as they negotiate the pragmatic terms of 
contemporary Turkic rapprochement, the ways in which the Turkic world is conceived 
have nonetheless proved both diverse and negotiable.  As such, this chapter seeks to offer 
a nuanced understanding of the dimensions of the Turkic world by exploring the 
historical emergence of notions of pan-Turkic unity which formed the basis for early 
conceptualizations of this supranational collective.  Moreover, since the notion of pan-
Turkic unity has, since its inception, competed first with clan-based or proto-national 
identity constructs and, more recently, with fully articulated, if nascent, national 
constructions of identity, even as pan-Turkism has been depicted as an expansion or 
extension of such local identities, I also examine the historical dimensions of national 
identity formation in the Turkic world.   
In exploring the emergence of pan-Turkism and nationalism in the Turkic world, I 
focus, in particular, on the ways in which these two ideological poles, between which 
identity politics in the post-Soviet Turkic world alternate, have largely coalesced around 
issues of language and orthography.  Although it is not ground-breaking, given the 
pervasive hegemony of a perceived metonymic link between language and nation, to 
suggest that the Turkic nations have been largely conceived by and through language, I 
nonetheless extend this paradigm to suggest that the putative Turkic world itself, not 
unlike its individual constituent parts, has also largely been constituted in linguistic 
terms.  In this sense, I would suggest that the Turkic world, both historically and in 
present times, has been conceived of, or, to borrow Benedict Anderson’s (1983) 
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influential notion, imagined as a broad language community.  Thus, while it is beyond the 
scope of this article to offer a full treatment of the intersecting histories of pan-Turkism 
and nationalism, since present manifestations of these ideologies find their roots in 
historical antecedents, a brief overview of their development, particularly as relates to 
linguistic issues, will serve to contextualize present-day discourses of rapprochement 
among the Turkic peoples.   
In suggesting that an elucidation of the historical parameters by which the Turkic 
world has been conceived through language will allow for a deeper understanding of the 
dynamics inherent to contemporary supranationalist efforts at linguistic, sociocultural, 
and geopolitical rapprochement among the Turkic peoples, I follow Blommaert who, in 
developing his case for a historiography of language ideologies, in which language is 
seen as a “material thing” that is manufactured and manipulated by interested parties, 
points to the inherent dialogism between the “real” time of the court durée and the 
“historic” time of the durée, as mentioned briefly in his introductory chapter to a volume 
devoted to exploring language ideological debates.  He writes:   
 
The patterns in which [linguistic] interventions occur are discontinuous: there are 
crucial moments in history during which languages become targets of political, 
social, and cultural intervention, and there are moments in which very little in the 
way of drama and crisis seems to happen. There are slow movements and rapid 
movements, period of intense activity and period of flow, periods of production, 
of establishment, of consolidation, of challenge, and of decay.  In short, the 
historical patterns in which the emergence and development of ideologically 
framed concepts of language and language usage occur are broken, fragmented, 
and multilayered, for every moment of intense struggle and debate is intertextual 
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with and develops against the background of previous developments over a longer 
span of time” (1999:425-6). 
 
This chapter, then, is an attempt to account for the historical “background of 
previous developments” that contextualize those “crucial moments” within the 
contemporary Turkic world when language has once again become a target for 
sociopolitical intervention.  Furthermore, given that the language ideological debates 
which are addressed in subsequent chapters largely revolve around issues of language 
planning and policy, whether overt or covert (Schiffman 1998a), Blommaert’s injunction 
to attend to “the historical production and reproduction of language ideologies” (1999:2) 
also intersects nicely with Harold Schiffman’s suggestion that attempts to manage the 
linguistic life of a community through language policy and planning arise out of the 
“historical, social, cultural, educational, or religious conditions extant in a particular 
area” (1998a:5), and his assertion that “[i]f we are to search for explanations of why 
certain polities have the kinds of language policies they have, we must look more deeply 
into their linguistic histories, in particular those aspects of language that I have come to 
refer to as ‘linguistic culture’” (1998a:5).   
 
GEOGRAPHICAL CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF THE TURKIC WORLD 
Although anthropological studies of borderlands (e.g., Alvarez 1995 and 1996, 
Donnan and Wilson 1994 and 1999) have called into question the presumed inviolability 
of national borders, arguing that people who inhabit the interstices between nations, and 
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the practices in which they engage, suggest permeability rather than containment, the 
geographic bounds of an imagined supranational community are arguably even less 
distinct than those of recognized nations, due, in large part, to the absence of an 
internationally recognized perimeter and the lack of a centralized state authority to, at 
least theoretically, enforce and reinforce it.  Nonetheless, since imagined communities 
generally possess a corresponding, if likewise imagined, territoriality, I begin this chapter 
by locating the Turkic world in geographical terms.   
Broadly speaking, the Turkic world has been defined as the homeland of the 
Turkic peoples--i.e., those lands identified in origin myth and epic as the site of Turkic 
ethnogenesis as well the many regions to which the Turkic peoples have since dispersed, 
settled, and now inhabit.  From a geographic perspective, then, the Turkic world is 
composed of Turkey; the four independent republics of Central Asia; Azerbaijan; various 
parts of Siberia, the Caucasus, and the Volga region; areas of Iran and Afghanistan; 
regions of Moldova, Ukraine, and western China, and areas of both the Balkans and the 
Middle East populated by Turkish communities established during the Ottoman era.  In 
1880, Şemsettin Sami, noting linguistic boundaries of the Turkic world in compiling his 
Kâmûs-i Türkî dictionary, noted that “the name Turk is an appellation for an important 
nation extending from the shores of the Adriatic Sea to frontiers of China and the inner 




Figure 2.1  Mahmud Kashgari map of the Turkic World for Divânü Lügati’t-Türk 5   
                                               
5 This map was drawn by Mahmud Kashgari for inclusion in the Divânü Lügati’t-Türk he 
prepared in 1072 AD for the Caliph of Baghdad. It is the first known world map of 
Turkish origin and centers on Turkic Central Asia, including Balasagun (9), which is 
located in present-day Kyrgyzstan, but depicted in Kashgarli’s map as the center of the 
world, and Kashgar (10), Kashgari’s place of birth.  It was found at http://bigthink. 
com/ideas/21130, last accessed August 2, 2011).  According to the introduction to a 1982 
translation of the Divânü Lügati’t-Türk by Turcologist Robert Dankoff, Kashgari’s map 
indicates the location of various Turkic “dialects,” suggesting the importance he placed 
on language in defining the Turkic tribes, which he divided into two main groups: Turks 
and Oghuz.  Kashgarli also encouraged the non-Turkic peoples of the region to learn the 
language of their Turkic neighbors, writing “every man of reason must attach himself to 
them, or else expose himself to their falling arrows. And there is no better way to 
approach them than by speaking their own tongue, thereby bending their ear, and 
inclining their heart.”  This quote was found at http://www.registan.net/index.php/ 
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Nearly a half century later, founder of the Turkish Republic Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk famously described the Turkic world as occupying “a large homeland roughly to 
the west of Asia and the east of Europe, separated by the boundaries of land and sea and 
known throughout the world…as ‘Türkeli’” (as quoted in Turgut 2001:21).  Another six 
decades later, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the geographic parameters of 
the Turkic world as described in detail by then-President Suleyman Demirel remain 
roughly the same: 
 
The borders of [the Turks’] historical fatherland begin to the north of the Black 
Sea.  The Ural mountains, the Volga and Ural rivers, the Caucasus mountains, the 
vast steppes of Asia, the Caspian Sea and plains that surround it are all found 
within this region.  Along with the majestic Aral Sea, the Amu Darya and Syr 
Darya rivers that flow into the fatherland are the great sources of water that 
sustain it.  The Altay and Tanri mountains of legend likewise lie within this 
region.  This immense geography stretching to Siberia in the north, the Great Wall 
of China in the east, and the Himalayas in the south, encompasses exactly 3.9 
million square kilometers.  These famous mountains, rivers and plains which 
constitute the recognized features of every world geography are fixtures of the 
Turks’ fatherland (as quoted in Turgut 2001:19, translation is mine). 
 
                                                                                                                                            
2007/02/28/mahmud-kashgaris-11th-c-map-of-turkic-world/, last accessed August 2, 
2011. 
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Figure 2.2  Turkish map of the Contemporary Turkic World6  
 
Despite such consistency over time in definitions of the geographic parameters of 
the Turkic world,7 it is, as suggested above, the human dimension, or the shared 
                                               
6 This map shows the contemporary geographical dimensions of the imagined Turkic 
world.  Pink indicates independent Turkic nations, yellow indicates Turkic autonomous 
states and provinces, and yellow with pink hatching indicates non-autonomous Turkic 
regions. It was found at http://www.turkdunyasi.aku.edu.tr/harita.php, last accessed on 
August 2, 2011). 
7 I would, however, note that even the physical boundaries of the putative Turkic world 
have, at various junctures, been imagined quite differently.  Thus, for example, to the 
mind of Turar Ryskulov, chairman of the Central Electoral Committee of Turkestan 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic from its inception in 1918 to its dissolution in 
1924, the Turkic world, under the rubric of “Turkestan” was limited to Central Asia, 
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sociocultural features of the inhabitants of this vast territory, that lies at the heart of 
conceptualizations of the Turkic world, for it is around the idea of a broad, shared 
identity as “Turks” that notions of the Turkic world first coalesced.  In such formulations 
of the Turkic world, both historical and contemporary, shared language, culture, and 
religion take precedence over geographical territoriality as the basis for distinguishing 
between self and other.  Thus, in excerpts from a manuscript originally prepared in the 
1930s and entitled “Observations on the Future of the Turkish World,”8 Crimean exile 
and well-known publicist and political writer Cafer Seyadahmet Kirimer writes: “In 
deliberating on the Turkish world, we have in mind those Turks professing the same 
religion and having homogenous language and culture.”  He goes on to explain the failure 
of the Turkic world to be realized, despite such shared attributes by oblique reference to 
external political intervention, arguing:  “If all the Turkish people had, by their own will, 
been able to maintain the nationalist current that had fired them with great enthusiasm 
since 1905, especially in the Soviet Union, where live the majority of the peoples of 
                                                                                                                                            
while for Tatar Bolshevik Mirza Sultan Galiev, the Turkic world, or “Republic of Turan” 
stretched from Kazan to the border with China (Bennigsen 1985).  The authors of both, 
somewhat anomalous, conceptualizations of the Turkic world, conceived in the early, and 
hence more tolerant, years of Bolshevik power, were later accused of being national 
communists, or independent Muslim leaders, and executed during extensive Stalin-era 
purges of former Bolsheviks (Bennigsen 1985). 
8 Hostler translates “Türk dünyasi” as “Turkish world,” where I have chosen to translate 
it as “Turkic world.”  Although both are correct, I would argue that “Turkish world” is 
more suited to the time in which Kirimer was writing and “Turkic world” is more suited 
to contemporary times.  The difference in translation arises from the fact that there exists 
no distinction in Turkish or related languages as there does in English (and Russian) for 
the adjective Turkish (Turetskii in Russian) and the adjective Turkic (Turkskii in 
Russian), Türk is used in both circumstances.  
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Turkish nationalism, there is no reason to doubt that unity of all these Turks would now 
be an actual fact” (as quoted and translated in Hostler 1993:171). 
In more contemporary times, former Turkish president Suleyman Demirel, known 
for jauntily and repeatedly conjuring a Turkic world that stretched “from the Adriatic Sea 
to the Great Wall of China” (“Adriyatik’den Çin Seddi’ne”), was nonetheless quick to 
emphasize that the unity of the Turkic world resided not in a common geography but 
rather in shared language, culture, and beliefs.  Thus, in a speech delivered during an 
April 1992 press conference marking the inauguration of Turkey’s Avrasya9 channel, 
designed to bolster sociocultural bonds within the Turkic world by introducing the Turkic 
peoples to traditional Turkish culture, he remarked: 
 
Today is a historic day for the Turkic World.  Our brother countries which are 
spread across a wide geographic area stretching from the Adriatic to China and 
who have newly found themselves faced with independence are now face to face 
with the possibility of being a single ear, a single heart….  We [Turks] migrated 
to the Mediterranean region, but in heart and spirit we were always with you.  Our 
shared language, culture, and beliefs formed (constituted) tightly bound ties 
between us (as quoted in Turgut 2001:50-51, translation mine). 
 
                                               
9 “Avrasya” translates as “Eurasia” and is a term that, while broadly encompassing both 
Europe and Asia, came to be used in place of “Turkic world” to designate the Turkic 
peoples due to concerns that the latter term carried unwanted pan-Turkic connotations. 
The Avrasya television channel was designed to acquaint the Turkic peoples with the 
people, geography, and cultural traditions of Turkey. It was broadcast in simplified 
Turkish with subtitles in the Latin alphabet to familiarize viewers with the Turkish 
language and orthography.  
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Likewise, in an address delivered at the Fifth Summit of Turkish Speaking 
Countries (Beşinci Türkçe Konuşan Ülkeler Zirvesi) in Baku, Azerbaijan in 2000, 
Demirel opined:   
 
Fundamentally, what has brought us together for the fifth time is the unity of 
inclination and spiritual partnership of a Turkic world composed of 200 million 
people spread across 11 million square kilometers.  The roots of this great 
partnership are found in our history and our language.  Indeed to seek these roots 
is to seek the common values that form a bridge between the past and the future 
and bind us to one another (as quoted in Turgut 2001:636, translation mine). 
 
PAN-TURKISM AND THE EMERGENCE OF A NASCENT TURKIC WORLD IDENTITY 
Despite such grandiloquent rhetoric of primordial affinities, the Turkic peoples 
have not always been conceived of as a community, imagined or not.  Indeed, notions of 
the Turkic world as a cohesive entity did not emerge until the late nineteenth century, 
when a group of Turkic intellectuals seeking to foster a broad ethnolinguistic and 
religious, or pan-Turkic, consciousness among the Turkic peoples of imperial Russia, 
looked for support to the Ottoman Empire, which, deep in the throes of its own 
homegrown identity crisis, presented a receptive audience for such suggestions.  This 
section explores the emergence of political and cultural pan-Turkism among the Turkic 
peoples, paying particular attention to the ways in which emergent notions of the “Turkic 
world” were constituted through language and orthography. 
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The Emergence of Social and Political Pan-Turkism among the Turkic Peoples 
Up through the better part of the 19th century, constructions of identity among the 
Turkic peoples scattered across the then Russian empire tended to be localized and 
compartmentalized.  Although commonalities of language, culture, and religion existed 
amongst these diverse Turkic peoples and were recognized by their respective 
intelligentsia, such commonalities were not generally conceived of in a systematic 
manner nor understood to contribute to a broader shared identity (e.g., Hostler 1993, 
Fierman 1991a).  Beginning in the late nineteenth century, however, prominent 
intellectuals among the Turkic peoples living within the territories of what was then 
czarist Russia, and hence subject to the pressures of pan-Slavism and its attendant 
policies of christianization and russification, responded by formulating a 
counterbalancing focus on local ethnic and religious identity which ultimately developed 
into the entwined ideologies of pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism respectively (e.g., 
Benningsen 1985, Hostler 1993, Landau 1995a).10  Pan-Islamism was already a familiar 
concept in the Ottoman Empire, where Sultan Abdul Hamid II had long sought to impose 
the primacy of Islam as the basis for common identity.  Pan-Turkism, however, was a 
more novel concept, depending on the development, first among the intelligentsia and 
then the masses, of a sense of ethnic affinity centered around common language, culture, 
                                               
10 Although it is beyond the scope of this study to address, historians of this era have 
noted that while some prominent pan-Turkists (e.g. Ismail Gaspirali) took a staunchly 
secularist stand, for many, Islam was accepted as an important aspect of pan-Turkic 
identity and conflicts between pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism were minimal (Bennigsen 
1985, Hostler 1993, Landau 1995). 
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and religion.  Despite the challenges, Turkic jadidists (reformers), recognizing that 
fragmentation and socioeconomic backwardness among the Turkic peoples of the 
Russian empire rendered them vulnerable to Russian hegemony and its assimilationist 
forces, undertook an ambitious program of reform as a matter of cultural survival.   
While pan-Turkist ideology was developing in Russian lands, the foundations of 
pan-Turkism were simultaneously being laid within the Ottoman Empire where 
Ottomanism had long defined the politics of identity and the moniker ‘Turk’ had hitherto 
been regarded as a derogatory term, nearly synonymous with an uneducated country 
bumpkin.  Renowned scholar of pan-Turkism Jacob Landau (1995a) describes how, at the 
end of the nineteenth century, Ottoman scholars, under no small influence from European 
orientalists, began to develop an appreciation for the historical achievements, language, 
and literature of their Turkic predecessors.  The primary effect of this new-found 
enthusiasm for Turcology was to raise interest in Turkishness, thus laying the foundation 
for the later development of Turkism--a revolutionary shift in identity politics within the 
Ottoman Empire which replaced traditional identification as an Ottoman or Muslim with 
a sense of Turkish nationalism (Bennigsen 1985, Hostler 1993, Landau 1995a). 
This incipient sense of national pride, based on an appreciation for the cultural 
legacy bequeathed them by their Turkic predecessors, also paved the way for increasing 
interest in the modern descendants of the shared Turkic ancestor--the so-called dış 
Türkler (outside Turks)--and hence the eventual development of pan-Turkist ideology 
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among the Ottoman Turks (Landau 1995a, Hostler 1993).11  It wasn’t until the early 
twentieth century, however, that pan-Turkist ideology gained traction in the Ottoman 
Empire through a confluence of events including the ascendancy of Turkish nationalism 
after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and the influx of Turkic intellectual émigrés 
from Russia following the First Russian Revolution and subsequent repression of 
liberalism.  In the ensuing years, influential intellectuals such as Ziya Gökalp, Yusuf 
Akçura, Ali Hüseyinzade, and Ahmet Ağaoğlu wrote articles, poems, and pamphlets 
appealing to nationalist sentiment among the Turkic peoples of both Ottoman and 
Russian lands by emphasizing their common cultural and linguistic heritage (Hostler 
1993, Landau 1995a, Arai 1992).  Of pan-Turkism, Landau writes: “In its heyday, the 
guiding objective of this movement [was] to strive for some sort of union--cultural, 
physical, or both--among all peoples of proven or alleged Turkic origins, whether 
living… within [or] without the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire” (1995a:1).   
In describing the desired union as either “cultural, physical, or both” Landau 
points to an important distinction in the taxonomy of pan-ideologies, in general, and pan-
Turkism, in particular, between those that are cultural and those that are political by 
nature (1988:2).  Political pan-Turkism, Landau suggests, is defined by a desire for 
physical union among kindred peoples.  In Turkey, political pan-Turkism found 
                                               
11 Due to the shared root of their emergence in Ottoman Turkey, numerous scholars (e.g., 
Landau 1995, Hostler 1993) have noted that the distinction between Turkism and pan-
Turkism was frequently not apparent and that the two terms were often used 
synonymously.  This continues to be the case in reference to relations between the 
Turkish and Turkic peoples in the post-Soviet era, when the term pan-Turkism, carrying 
perceived racist overtones, is eschewed in favor of Turkism, which invokes a more 
benign association with Kemalist nationalism (Tchervonnaia 2002). 
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expression in a focus on irredentism, which Landau defines as: “an ideological or 
organizational expression of passionate interest in the welfare of an ethnic minority living 
outside the boundaries of the state peopled by that same group” (1995a:1).  Landau goes 
on to distinguish between moderate and extreme strains of political pan-Turkist thought, 
noting that “[m]oderate irredentism expresses a desire to defend the kindred group from 
discrimination or assimilation, while a more extreme manifestation aims at annexing the 
territories which the group inhabits” (1995a:1).   
Political pan-Turkism reached its zenith in the Ottoman Empire during its dying 
days, when a collection of ideologues, beleaguered by the threat posed by the separatist 
ambitions of emergent nationalist movements among the non-Turkish minorities, came to 
believe that rapprochement with the Turkic peoples and annexation of their lands offered 
the promise of restored empire.  Among the Turkic peoples of Russia, political pan-
Turkist thought reached its height at roughly the same time, when in the wake of the 
overthrow of czarist regime in the February Revolution of 1917, notions of possible 
independence gained currency (Landau 1995a).  Although such notions revolved around 
uniting the Turkic peoples of Russia, there was nonetheless the general sense that closer 
relations, and perhaps union, with Turkey would serve to better ensure their sovereignty.  
Hostler notes: “It was clear to the Turko Tatar leaders that the united efforts of the Turks 
of Russia were not strong enough to achieve their national aims.  Without help from 
abroad, it was impossible to liberate themselves from Russian domination or to unite with 
their conationals abroad. The only foreign state that was in a position to help was 
Ottoman Turkey” (1993:109).  Such pragmatic considerations were further reinforced by 
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a romanticized sense of affinity with Ottoman Turks.  Hostler writes: “In the opinion of 
the far-off Turko-Tatar peoples in Russia, [the Turkish sultan] was the only independent 
and powerful ruler among the Turks.  This natural attractiveness of Istanbul as a center of 
the Islamic and Turkish world… tinted the eastern Turks with Pan-Islamic and Pan-
Turkish concepts” (1993:94).  The dual sense of pragmatism and romanticism of this era 
strongly foretells similar considerations in the post-Soviet era. 
 
The Role of Language in the Development of Pan-Turkism 
While political pan-Turkism embraced irredentism, cultural pan-Turkism, on the 
other hand, eschewed such ambitions, seeking cultural union rather than territorial 
unification of the Turkic peoples.  In its focus on cultural rapprochement, this strain of 
pan-Turkism ultimately coalesced in important ways around language both as a marker of 
shared cultural identity and a means for discovering and expressing it.  Since efforts at 
Turkic rapprochement in the contemporary era have tended to emphasize cultural 
solidarity rather than political or territorial union and have thus centered around issues of 
linguistic unity, the remainder of this section will address the specific role played by 
language in the history of pan-Turkism, focusing on earlier attempts at linguistic 
unification among the Turkic peoples and their contribution to the creation of a cohesive 
Turkic identity.  Such previous language planning initiatives serve to contextualize 
modern-day discourses at both a conscious and unconscious level and are referenced by 
direct participants as well as the general populace, thus providing the backdrop for 
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contemporary notions of the Turkic world, efforts at Turkic rapprochement, and attempts 
at linguistic unification among the Turkic peoples.   
According to Landau, pan-Turkism’s focus on language was a natural outgrowth 
of the recognition that “since Turkic groups were not contiguous geographically, some 
other element should be selected and developed to bring them closer to one another” 
(1995a:9).  He notes: 
 
The linguistic element was obviously the first choice, as languages were similar, 
though not identical, among these groups, and intellectuals could communicate in 
a sort of ‘High Turkish’.  The main difficulty in this respect was that vernaculars 
often varied markedly, and literacy rates were very low.  Not unexpectedly, 
increasing literacy and the creation of a common language for cultural 
rapprochement became the order of the day as a first step towards union. 
(1995a:9) 
 
Crimean Tatar intellectuals and reformers were instrumental in the emergence of 
pan-Turkism in the mid-nineteenth century, but none played a role more important to its 
development than a man by the name of Ismail Bey Gaspirali, also known by his 
Russified surname, Gasprinsky.  Gaspirali’s combined focus on language and education, 
both formal and informal, formed the basis for the development of pan-Turkist ideology 
in the Russian lands.  In 1883, arguing that “[f]or the revival of a great people, who have 
long remained in ignorance, the press will play a crucial role” (Lazzerini 1992), Gaspirali 
began publishing a news journal under the bilingual title Perevodchick/Tercüman, 
meaning interpreter in Russian and Turkish respectively.  The journal was issued weekly 
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in a dual language format with two pages dedicated to Russian and two to a Turkic lingua 
franca of his own design.   
Although not the first journal to cater to the Turkic peoples (c.f., Akiner 1990), 
Tercüman was to become the longest running and most influential.  Codifying his 
overarching pan-Turkist agenda under the banner: “Unity in language, thought, and 
action,” (Dilde, fikirde, işte birlik), Gaspirali sought to remedy manifest barriers to 
communication resulting from linguistic differentiation among the various Turkic 
languages, with the ultimate aim of effecting the cultural unity of the Turkic peoples 
residing in Russian lands.  According to Landau, “Gasprinsky’s usul-i cedid curriculum 
reform and journal Tercüman both advocated a common language as a top-priority means 
of rapprochement (implying subsequent union) among all Turkic people” (1995a:10).  
The emphasis Gaspirali placed on language as the core feature common to the Turkic 
peoples, and thus the key to unifying them, was instrumental in the development of pan-
Turkist ideology.   
Despite the Russian state’s suspicion of pan-Turkist activities, Gasprali managed 
to avoid attracting unwanted scrutiny by focusing on the linguistic aspects of 
rapprochement among the Turkic peoples, and eschewing overt politics.  Within the 
pages of Tercüman, Gaspirali sought to develop a language that could be understood by 
“the boatman of the Bosphorus and by the camel driver of Kashgar” (Bennigsen 1985, 




As dialect differences consisted chiefly of vocabulary variation, a special effort 
was made to ‘purify’ the language of foreign words, such as those of Russian, 
Arabic, or Persian origins--which presumably were employed in only a part of the 
Turkic languages--and substitute for them others of Turkish or Turkic origin as 
used in the Ottoman Empire, also the object of linguistic reform.  A parallel effort 
(apparently less successful) was directed at minimising phonological diversity.  
The result was a language somewhere between Ottoman Turkish and Tatar, 
reasonably comprehensible to both groups and to others as well.  This hybrid, 
called ‘the Common Language’ (Lisan-ı umumî) was one of the factors 
contributing to the success of Tercüman, which reached not only Southern Russia, 
but also Central Asia and Eastern Turkestan….” (1995a:10) 
 
Despite Gaspirali’s deference to Russian power and attendant circumspection in 
overtly addressing topics of a political nature, the political implications of Tercüman’s 
progressive social agenda cannot be overlooked, particularly its direct contributions to the 
development of a program of social reform and civil rights for the Turkic peoples.  
According to Lazzerini, Tercüman “set the stage for a broader and more tolerant 
entertainment of ideas: about reforming the traditional educational system, about 
simplifying the Arabic script and overcoming distinctions among Turkic languages, about 
the importance of studying foreign languages as passages to other cultures and their 
achievements, about developing skills (particularly economic ones) and unleashing 
talents (especially in women), and about restructuring the administration of Muslim 
religious practices” (1992).12  In this sense, Tercüman’s focus on the role of language and 
education, broadly defined, constituted a seminal effort in an overarching social agenda 
ultimately aimed at uniting and empowering the Turkic peoples.  
                                               
12 This quote was taken from an electronic document (without page numbers) found at 
http://www.iccrimea.org/gaspirali/clarion.htm and last accessed August 2, 2011. 
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Political unrest throughout Russia in the early twentieth century brought about a 
relative liberalization of the political milieu which resulted in an expansion of pan-
Turkist activities and inaugurated the development of the next, more political, phase of 
pan-Turkist ideology among the Turkic peoples (Hostler 1993).  In response to relaxation 
of the censorship under which it had previously operated, Tercüman eliminated its 
Russian-language section, which had already dwindled considerably; adopted the new 
name Tercüman-i Ahval-i Zaman (The Interpreter of Contemporary News); and gradually 
increased its publication schedule, eventually becoming a daily.  Between 1904 and 1905, 
Gaspirali and other noted pan-Turkists became directly involved in politics, forming the 
Ittifaq al-Muslimin (the Muslim Union) political party as a means of advancing social 
reforms and addressing educational issues (Bennigsen 1985, Landau 1995a)  Meanwhile, 
Gaspirali took part in numerous congresses convened by leading intellectuals among the 
Turkic peoples of Russia during the relatively liberal atmosphere of the time, using the 
opportunity to further advocate linguistic rapprochement as a means to political and 
cultural union among the Turkic peoples.  At the Third Congress of Moslems of Russia, 
convened near Nidzhni-Novgorod in August 1906, Gaspirali is said to have remarked:  
“In the evolution of our languages, we have come to such a point that we do not 
understand each other. Schools must open the way for our language and for our literature.  
It must bring us to a common understanding” (from Mende 1936:48 as quoted in Hostler 
1993:103).   
In May 1917, Gaspirali’s unflagging push for linguistic unification finally won 
formal approbation with the passage of a resolution at the first All-Russian Muslim 
 62 
Congress in Moscow which was revolutionary in mandating the language of instruction 
in educational institutions across the Turkic world.  In particular, it stipulated the use of 
the local Turkic language in primary and secondary schools, “common Turkic” and 
Russian in secondary schools, and “common literary Turkic” in institutions of higher 
education (Zenkovsky 1960).13  The stage was thus set for the unification through 
language of a kindred peoples, many of whom had little practical knowledge of one 
another or the commonalities they shared, through the legitimation of a shared language 
promulgated through state-level institutions (Bourdieu 1991).  
Within a year of the congress, however, the conditions for linguistic unification of 
the Turkic peoples were quite altered.  The Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917 was 
soon followed within a year by the closure of Tercüman, but the era of linguistic pan-
Turkism Tercüman helped spawn in the Russian cum Soviet lands did not come to an 
abrupt end with the shuttering of the journal.  To the contrary, Bennigsen argues that pan-
Turkist activities associated with language received “a new and unexpected impulse” in 
the aftermath of the October Revolution (1985:43).  Although no doubt due in large part 
to the weakness of the nascent regime, such activities also appear to have been tolerated, 
even encouraged, by the Bolsheviks for some years to come by dint of their perceived 
usefulness in dividing the Turkic peoples from the Ottoman Empire, seen as a potential 
rival for their loyalties, and displacing religion, deemed antithetical to Bolshevik 
ideology, as the focal point of identity.   
                                               
13 For a text of the resolution see a translation by Komatsu (1994:126). 
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Under the influence of a cadre of Turkic intellectuals who were simultaneously 
devoted pan-Turkists and genuine communists, linguistic unity, particularly orthographic 
reform, received the benefit of official state support and assistance (Bennigsen 1985).  
Corroborating this point, Winner argues that although the issue of orthographic reform 
had been raised amongst the Turkic peoples prior to the Bolshevik revolution, “[i]n the 
early period study of the problem of the new alphabet was carried out solely by 
individual national groups, and no attempt was made to…unify and standardise the many 
projects conceived.”  He adds that it was not until after the Revolution “that the first 
attempt was made to discuss the question in its larger aspects and to study it in an 
organised fashion” (1952:138).  In describing the seemingly contradictory quasi-official 
support for linguistic pan-Turkism provided by the Bolshevik regime, it is essential to 
mention the First International Turcology Congress, not only because it constitutes one of 
the defining moments in the history of linguistic pan-Turkism, but also because the 
special role it played in both native and colonial efforts aimed at linguistic rapprochement 
among the Turkic peoples largely prefigured the ways in which contemporary attempts at 
linguistic rapprochement within the Turkic world have developed in the post-Cold War 
era. 
 
Pan-Turkism and the Quest for a Common Orthography 
The First International Turcology Congress, also known as the Baku Turcology 
Congress, was convened in the Azerbaijani capital of Baku from February 26 to March 6, 
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1926, during the early days of Soviet ascendancy when the regime was as yet too weak to 
fully impose its will on its Central Asian subjects and found it expedient to abide pan-
Turkic activities insofar as they coincided with the larger aims of the nascent central state 
in Moscow.  The congress was attended by a hundred and thirty one delegates, including 
ninety-eight representatives from the Soviet Turkic peoples as well as Turkish, Russian, 
and other “foreign” Turcologists.  Turkey was represented by renowned Turcologists 
Huseyin Zade Ali Bey, himself an émigré from Azerbaijan, and Fuat Koprulu.  The issue 
of alphabet reform was of immediate interest to Soviet authorities who were intent on 
establishing the means for mass communication but were concerned that the Arabic 
alphabet in use among the elite of Central Asia would prove of sufficient difficulty to 
hinder a literacy campaign aimed at the common man.  Thus, while the agenda included 
discussions on issues of Turkic culture and history, debates about language, and in 
particular the creation of a common orthography and lexicon for the Turkic languages, 
took center stage.   
Alphabet reform had been the focus of debate for some time among certain of the 
Turkic peoples, particularly the Azeris who had adopted, albeit to a limited degree, a 
Latin-based orthography known as the yeηi Turq əlifbası (new Turkish alphabet) in 1922.  
According to historian Bilâl Şimşir (1991), the Baku Turcology Congress was conceived 
of by its hosts as a forum for legitimizing the Latin-based orthographic system and 
encouraging its adoption among the other Turkic peoples.  Participants to the congress 
largely endorsed the Azerbaijani perspective, presenting papers that argued the 
advantages of a phonetic alphabet for the Turkic languages and maintained that a Latin-
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based orthography most closely adhered to the principle of phonetic orthography.  
Furthermore, it was argued, adopting a Latin-based alphabet would benefit the multitude 
of Turkic peoples, approximately ninety percent of whom were illiterate, by reducing the 
number of letters from 120 to 33, thereby allowing the new alphabet to be learned in 3-4 
months, whereas the old alphabet had taken twice as long.  The Latin alphabet was 
contrasted to the Arabic alphabet which was criticized as difficult to learn and unsuited to 
Turkic phonology (Şimşir 1991).  The Latin-based yeηi Turq əlifbası of Azerbaijan was 
particularly singled out by delegates for its inclusion of sufficient vowels to accurately 
represent vowel harmony and for allowing words to be separated into syllables, vowels to 
be stressed, and proper nouns to be distinguished by capital letters--all features said to 
offer distinct advantages to children learning to read and write properly.   
Even the Russian delegates joined in advocating a Latin-based orthography over 
Cyrillic, thereby confirming that Moscow’s main aim at the time was to separate the 
Turkic peoples from Turkey by whatever means possible.  Thus, Russian Turcologist L. 
Zhirkov joined Azeri colleagues in praising the yeηi Turq əlifbası, declaring it superior to 
the Arabic alphabet from every perspective, and Zhirkov’s compatriot, N.F. Yakovlev, 
acknowledged that the Cyrillic alphabet had been tied to the politics of Russification of 
the czarist era, declaring the Turkic peoples’ resistance to it understandable.  The Turkic 
peoples had entered an era of renaissance, a “spring” of national culture, Zhirkov 
declared, and were naturally seeking a new alphabet suitable to modern technology and 
the printing industry.  For reasons both of practicality and Turkic solidarity, he therefore 
judged it essential to drop the Arabic alphabet and adopt the Latin alphabet in its place.  
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In his concluding remarks, Russian Turcologist A.N. Samoylovic even went so far as to 
recommend that the different Latin-based alphabet projects pursued by the various Turkic 
peoples be united and developed into “a single alphabet for all Turks” (Şimşir 1991).   
Despite near consensus regarding the virtues of the Latin-based alphabet, 
unanimity was not to be found.  Particularly vociferous in objecting to the Latin script 
was the Kazan Tatar delegate Alimcan Şeref Bey who offered a spirited defense of the 
Arabic alphabet.  The communiqué he presented was later published in Istanbul under the 
title A Defense of Our Letters and served as a reference for opponents of alphabet reform 
in Turkey, but according to Şimşir (1991), Alimcan Şeref Bey’s opposition to the 
adoption of a Latin-based alphabet was informed by economic rather than linguistic 
considerations.  At the time, the Kazan Tatars were at the forefront of efforts to reform 
the Arabic alphabet and had built a printing industry around the modified script they had 
devised.  Were the Latin alphabet to be adopted in its stead, their investments would have 
been for naught and the edge they held in commercial printing would pass to the Azeris.  
In contrast to this historical account, my own discussions with contemporary Tatar 
scholars on the topic of Alimcan Şeref Bey’s motives for defending the Arabic alphabet, 
have, however, suggested that his objection to the Latin alphabet was ideological rather 
than economic in nature, rooted in the belief that Islam constituted a fundamental pillar of 
Turkic identity and that the Turkic people’s link to Islamic literature, both sacred and 
profane, would become attenuated and wither were the Arabic alphabet to be abandoned.   
Whether this alternative view constitutes historical rehabilitation of a national 
figure in view of contemporary orthographic debates is hard to say, but it nonetheless 
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does point to the role played by identity politics in early efforts at promoting orthographic 
rapprochement among the Turkic peoples.  In a similar sense, it is interesting to note that 
in advocating adoption of a Latin-based orthography, North Caucasian delegate Omer 
Aliev observed that the Latin script was used in Europe, America, Australia, and even in 
various parts of Asia, declaring that its sheer universality proved it to be a superior 
alphabet.  Although offering a competing vision to that of Alimcan Şeref Bey, for whom 
Turkic identity centered around Islam and thus the Arabic alphabet, Aliev’s promotion of 
the Latin script, likewise appears to have been based in identity politics couched in 
linguistic terms.  
In the end, proponents of the Latin-based orthographic system prevailed, as only 
they could, given that, as numerous delegates indicated, the Azeris, Yakuts, and north 
Caucasian Turkic peoples had already adopted Latin alphabets and the Turkmen, Uzbeks, 
Bashkurts, and Anatolian Turks were poised to do the same.  At the conclusion of the 
debates, delegates to the Baku Congress ratified two resolutions by an overwhelming 
majority with only seven delegates opposed and six abstaining.  The first resolution 
proclaimed the cultural and historical significance of the new Latin-based orthographic 
system and declared its superiority to both the modified and unmodified Arabic 
alphabets, but nonetheless left its specific form and the details of its implementation to 
the discretion of the individual Turkic peoples.  The second resolution applauded the 
adoption of the new Turkic alphabet in Azerbaijan and elsewhere and called upon Turkic 
leaders to investigate and learn from the Azeris’ and other Turkic peoples’ experience in 
implementing a Latin-based alphabet, so that they might ease transition to the new 
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orthographic system in their own countries.  By thus recommending adoption of a 
common Latin-based orthographic system, but leaving the details of form and 
implementation to the individual Turkic peoples, these concluding resolutions constituted 
a nod to the distinctiveness of the various Turkic peoples, within a clear injunction in 
favor of broader Turkic consolidation--an approach which was, at least ostensibly, to 
inform the Turkic linguistic congresses of the early post-Soviet era   
By the same token, however, because the exact dimensions of the new alphabet 
were not spelled out, latinization of the Turkic alphabets remained daunting and may well 
have foundered were it not for the establishment of the All-Union Central Committee of 
the Supreme Soviet charged by the Central Executive Committee of the Supreme Soviet 
with the task of aiding standardization and unification of the various national latinization 
projects among its Turkic subjects. As a result of the combined pressure exerted and 
assistance afforded by the central government, the Unified Turkic Alphabet 
(Birləşdirilmiş Jeni Tyrk Әlifbasь), consisting of 33 letters--four of which were borrowed 
from Cyrillic and the rest from Latin--was devised and adopted in each of the Central 
Asian republics between 1927 and 1930 (Akiner 1990, Martin 2001, Şimşir 1991, Henze 
1977). 
Although the Unified Turkic Alphabet was to last less than a decade, the Baku 
Congress nonetheless marked a watershed moment not only in the history of Turkic 
orthographic reform, but also in the sociocultural history of the Turkic peoples of the 
Soviet Union.  In ideological terms, debate over “reforming” and unifying the Turkic 
peoples had coalesced around pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism with proponents of the 
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former advocating modifications of the Arabic script and proponents of the latter 
recommending adoption of a Latin-based script.  Thus, the consensus reached at the 
conclusion of the Baku Congress not only spelled victory for the ‘Latinists,’ who, having 
received the approval and support of prominent academics at an international Turcology 
congress, were able to move forward with implementing a common alphabet among the 
Turkic peoples (Şimşir 1991), but also for the ideological force of pan-Turkism over pan-
Islamism.  Thereafter, the Turkic peoples were to be collectively defined by language as 
opposed to religious faith.  From a sociocultural perspective, then, the congress affirmed 
the basic presumed affinity of the Turkic peoples and their languages and offered a 
symbolic, yet simultaneously pragmatic, means of furthering their actual unification 
under the rubric of a shared pan-Turkic identity.  Moreover, for the purposes of the 
present analysis, a final important detail to be gleaned from accounts of the Baku 
Congress is the degree to which extralinguistic issues, such as regional politics and 
domestic economics, were implicated in attempts at orthographic unification among the 
Turkic peoples, thereby foreshadowing the pitfalls that would plague similar efforts sixty 
five years later during the early Turkic linguistic congresses of the post-Cold War era 
described in chapter three.   
 
THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALISM WITHIN THE TURKIC WORLD 
Having detailed the development of pan-Turkism in Turkey and among the Turkic 
peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus in pre-Cold War era, with a particular eye for 
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the essential constitutive role played by language and orthography, I now turn to an 
examination of the emergence of nationalism on both sides of the Iron Curtain, again 
through the lens of language and orthography, for, as noted above, pan-Turkism and 
nationalism constitute the two ideological poles around which language and identity 
politics in the post-Soviet Turkic world revolve.   
 
Seeds of Nationalism in the Turkic Republics: The Soviet “Nationalities” Policies 
While the roots of national consciousness among the Turkic peoples stretch back 
to the pre-revolutionary era (Hostler 1993), it wasn’t until the Soviet period that the 
notion of nationality was fully articulated and nation-building in Central Asia was 
undertaken in earnest.  Developed as a strategic response to the perceived threat of pan-
Turkism and pan-Islamism in the region, the nation was conceived of by Soviet 
authorities as “a historically evolved, stable community arising on the foundation of a 
common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up, manifested in a 
community of culture” (Stalin 1913 as quoted in Pipes 1997[1954]:38).  Despite apparent 
parallels with contemporaneous European notions of the nation, the specific dimensions 
of nationalism in Central Asia were profoundly influenced by its emergence within the 
framework of socialist ideology and under the constraints of central state control.  Thus, 
the implementation of the so-called Soviet nationalities policies within Central Asia 
resulted in a sociohistorically specific brand of nation-building, the effects of which 
continue to resonate in contemporary manifestations of nationalism in post-Soviet Central 
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Asia.  Although it is beyond the scope of this study to address in full detail the 
implementation of the nationalities policies among the Turkic peoples of the region (for 
detailed descriptions of these policies, see for example Wheeler 1964, Bennigsen and 
Quelquejay 1967, Conquest 1970, Allworth 1973, Rumer 1989, and Glenn 1999), there 
are nonetheless a few general points worth making regarding the overarching nature of 
these policies, as they serve to set the stage for a more detailed discussion of the key role 
played by linguistic and orthographic reform in Soviet nation-building and thus outline 
the dimensions of national consciousness in the post-Soviet era.   
First, it is important to note that the nationalities policies of the Soviet state were 
inspired as much by realpolitik as by Marxist ideology and that the creation of distinct 
republics from those pre-revolutionary Turkic groups resident in Central Asia with the 
most well-defined, albeit nascent, sense of national identity was largely dictated by the 
perceived threat to the integrity of the Soviet state posed by supranational identification, 
particularly pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism (cf. Bennigsen and Quelquejay 1967, 
Bennigsen 1985, Glenn 1999).  Although there is some debate over whether the Turkic 
peoples, left to their own devices, would ultimately have united under a pan-Turkist 
identity or the nascent sense of national identity among more developed groups would 
have instead brought about eventual fragmentation into individual nations, there is little 
doubt that Soviet authorities, working on the principle of divide et impera, sought to 
capitalize on extant differences among the Turkic peoples to separate them into discrete 
nations and then further distance them from one another by defining each in as distinct 
terms as possible so as to eliminate any possibility of their ever reorganizing under the 
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rubric of pan-Turkism.  Moreover, as if to further guard against this possibility, the 
borders of the new republics were deliberately drawn in such a way as to bisect ethnic 
communities, thus creating national minorities within each republic which the state could 
exploit to foster instability should any of republics become intransigent to the directives 
of the central state or the need otherwise arise.  Although driven largely by pragmatic 
considerations, however, the nationalities policies as applied to the Turkic peoples of 
Central Asia were also ideologically justified by a “Marxist progressivist interpretation of 
history which regarded nationalism as a lesser evil when compared to Pan-Islamic and 
pan-Turkic movements which were then evident within Central Asia” (Glenn 1999:49).   
Second, it is worth noting that although the ultimate aim of the Soviet state was 
the construction of a new kind of society, based not on nationality, religion, or other so-
called “bourgeois” affectations, but on the principle of “proletarian internationalism,” the 
creation of nations was considered a key stage in its formation.  Thus while some 
scholars have argued that the principle of “national in form, socialist in content” was 
nothing more than a ruse designed to obfuscate the assimilationist aims of the state which 
ultimately sought the creation of the new Soviet people (Sovietskii narod), others have 
countered that the nationalization of the union republics was a genuine objective of the 
Soviet state.  Proponents of this view argue that although the nation-building process was 
to be carefully managed by central authorities and complemented by assimilationist 
policies that would integrate each republic into the federation, thus allowing for the 
eventual “merging” (sliyanie) of their respective proletariat, nationalization was 
nonetheless a process that was pursued in earnest and regarded as an important stage of a 
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“progressive dialectical process,” the ultimate aim of which was “the advent of a new 
historical epoch heralding the establishment of a new community of Soviet people” 
(Glenn 1999:49). 
Among those scholars who contend that nation-building was a genuine objective 
of the state, some have further suggested that the nationalities policies succeeded insofar 
as they fostered a sense of national consciousness that effectively supplanted extant sub-
national and supranational identities deemed incongruent with socialist ideology.  Others 
have argued that the nationalities policies nonetheless failed to produce fully articulated 
modern nations due in no small part to the state-imposed and overtly ideological nature of 
the nation-building process which ultimately delegitimized it in the eyes of the putative 
nationals (c. f Glenn 1999).  Regardless of such scholarly disagreement, however, there 
can be no doubt that the nationalities policies of the Soviet state profoundly influenced 
the dimensions of post-Soviet nation-building in Central Asia, insofar as they created the 
“proto-nations” which were to claim status as independent nations in the post Soviet era 
(e.g., Glenn 1999, Landau and Kellner-Heinkele 2001).  
Finally, given the role of the nationalities policies in creating the “proto-nations” 
of Central Asia, a brief examination of the actual mechanisms of this process will enable 
a better understanding of the specific dimensions of nationalist sentiment that has 
emerged within the independent Turkic republics in the post-Soviet era.  Although many 
of the eminent scholars cited above have aptly described the nationalities policies of the 
Soviet state, Glenn (1999) offers a particularly useful assessment of the role played by 
these policies in nation-building within Central Asia, discussing, in particular, the 
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creation of a national classificatory grid, national modernization, and the construction of 
national myth-symbol complexes.  Glenn begins by noting that the radical reorganization 
of Central Asia into five union republics closely resembled what Benedict Anderson 
(1983) termed “official nationalism,” in his description of the European powers’ relations 
with their colonies.  By pointing to the similarity between Soviet and colonial nation-
building--which despite being imposed from above ultimately proved little hindrance to 
the emergence of modern nations--Glenn thus seeks to resolve the debate as to whether 
the development of the union republics under the aegis of the Soviet nationalities policies 
can be classified as “proper” nation-building given the enforced nature of the process.  
He then goes on to describe the ways in which the national classificatory grid developed 
for Central Asia by the Soviet authorities entailed the division of the Turkic peoples into 
five national republics, the borders of which were further reinforced by census data that 
reclassified groups originally recognized as separate minorities as belonging to the titular 
nationality.  Thus, in order to maximize the distinctions between the republics and 
reinforce the borders that separated them, the minority enclaves deliberately included 
within the borders of non-eponymous republics were to be fully incorporated as citizens 
of the titular republic in which they resided until such time as Soviet officials found it 
useful to exploit the destabilizing potential they represented. 
Moving away from the geographic and demographic aspects of “official 
nationalism,” Glenn, following Smith (1986), notes that “[n]ational cohesion is also 
promoted by a ‘myth symbol complex’ which generates a belief in commonality through 
a myth of a common ancestor, an emphasis on a common history and the creation or 
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reinvention of such matters as national traditions” (1999:84-5).  He goes on to describe 
the imposition of official “myth-symbol complexes” on each of the Central Asian 
republics by Soviet authorities, addressing the deliberate reconstruction of history, 
reinterpretation of existing national epics, and localization of Islamic practice.  Such new 
inventions were designed to replace the supranational pan-Turkic or pan-Islamic 
consciousness inherent to indigenous “myth-symbol complexes” and promote state-
sponsored national consciousness in their place.  While some scholars have suggested 
that the deliberate manipulation of indigenous history, stories, and traditions in the 
service of Soviet ideology was never fully accepted by the Turkic peoples (Glenn 
1999:85-6, Bennigsen 1985), these state-sponsored “myth-symbol complexes” 
nonetheless remain salient in the post-Soviet era insofar as aspects of them continue to be 
embraced by the citizens of the independent nations of Central Asia.  Thus, for example, 
the veneration of Turkic poet and Sufi mystic Ahmet Yesevi, who predated the Kazakhs 
emergence on the world stage in the sixth century by four centuries, as a national saint of 
Kazakhstan during the Soviet era continues in post-Soviet Kazakhstan as is reflected in 
the first Turkish-Kazakh high school and university being named in his honor. 
Although the imposition of invented “myth-symbol complexes” on the Central 
Asian nationalities during the Soviet era has definite implications for the dimensions of 
nationalism in the post-Soviet era, Glenn’s description of the process of national 
modernization is even more relevant for the purposes of this study.  By national 
modernization, Glenn refers specifically to the imposition of “high culture” on the 
indigenous “low cultures” and, in particular, the creation, codification, implementation, 
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and elaboration of a national language designed to replace the multitude of local 
languages and dialects within each of the Central Asian republics.  Glenn writes: 
 
It is generally accepted that although a national language is not a sine qua non for 
the existence of a nation it does act in many cases as the keystone of a nation.  
The Soviet language policy within Central Asia is thus of major importance for 
the nation-building that occurred within the region.  The fact that the Soviet 
authorities chose to adopt separate national languages as the verbal and written 
medium of communication within each republic… was to have fundamental 
implications for the nation-building process within the region” (1999:79). 
 
I now turn to an examination of the role played by language in the creation of the 
Soviet socialist republics in Central Asia and Azerbaijan as a means of better 
understanding the importance of language to emergent formulations of nationalism in the 
post-Soviet Turkic republics.  
 
Linguistic Dimensions in the Creation of the Soviet Turkic “Nationalities” 
The role of language in the creation of the Soviet Turkic republics goes as far 
back as the national delimitation of October 1924, insofar as the borders of the five 
republics were based largely on the research of Russian and Soviet philologists and 
corroborating census data that indicated extant dialectical divisions among the major 
Turkic nationalities (e.g., Akiner 1990).  Once the union republics had been established, 
however, language issues were to take on even greater significance.  In large part this was 
due to the immediate exigencies faced by the Soviet hegemon in its efforts to 
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communicate the fundamentals of Bolshevik ideology to its new citizens--an endeavor 
which necessitated dramatically increasing literacy rates as well as developing a means of 
mass communication.  Although language reform was driven largely by such pragmatic 
considerations, however, it was nonetheless reflective of the larger ideological agenda of 
the nationalities policies in the sense that it was: 1) considered a corrective to the threat of 
pan-Turkism (for Soviet authorities could otherwise have capitalized on ongoing 
indigenous efforts to unite the region around a Turkic lingua franca), and 2) a two-
pronged effort that simultaneously incorporated aspects of nation-building and 
assimilation/russification with the objective of creating individual Central Asian nations 
which would ultimately foster the emergence of a new form of citizenship divorced from 
the politics of nationality and re-formed on the basis of class solidarity. 
Soviet language planning among the Turkic peoples thus began in the 1920s with 
the creation and standardization of national literary languages for each of the five Central 
Asian republics with the ultimate aim being “the transformation of tribal and community 
languages into developed national languages with a rich terminology and vocabulary” 
(Wheeler 1966:104 as quoted in Glenn 1999:79).  Although the elite of each of the 
nationalities employed a literary language in the pre-revolutionary era, only the Kazakhs 
possessed a well-established indigenous literary language.  The Tajiks wrote in Persian, 
whilst the Uzbeks employed an ancient literary language known as Chagatai, deemed 
largely unsuitable to the modern age; the Turkmen wrote in an eighteenth century literary 
language that was a mixture of Chagatai and Turkmen, and the Kirghiz borrowed Kazakh 
or Chagatai for their literary needs (Bennigsen and Quelquejay 1961, Bennigsen and 
 78 
Wimbush 1985, and Bennigsen and Broxup 1983).  The region was furthermore home to 
a welter of different spoken dialects which had often been influenced by surrounding 
languages and were of limited mutual intelligibility, rendering them of little use for the 
purposes of mass communication--the more so because they were unwritten and their 
speakers largely illiterate.  Thus, as Shirin Akiner notes in an examination of the 
dynamics of Soviet language planning in Uzbekistan, the general gist of which also holds 
true vis-à-vis the other Central Asian republics, ‘language planning was necessary… 
[insofar as the] old literary style was too distant from the everyday speech of the people 
to be a suitable vehicle for mass communication [and] the dialects differed too greatly 
amongst themselves to provide a unified base” (1990:104).   
Soviet language planning, like other aspects of the nationalities policies, was a 
manifestation of principles prevalent within contemporaneous European notions of 
nationality.  Indeed, as Akiner (1990), Kirkwood (1990), and Silver (1978), among 
others, have pointed out, the systematic approach to language planning in Central Asia 
employed by Soviet authorities closely resembles the characteristic stages of language 
planning identified by sociolinguists beginning in the 1960s: selection of a norm, 
codification, implementation, and elaboration (Haugen 1966 and 1987, Fishman 1974b, 
Eastman 1983).  As such, the first step in republican language planning involved 
judgments as to which of the many extant dialects within the borders of each republic 
would best serve as the basis for the new and distinct literary languages.  Given the rich 
diversity of local dialects, these were not easy decisions, and early choices were often 
subject to later revisions, as is evident from the Uzbek example in particular.   
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Writing of the process of selecting a linguistic norm for Uzbekistan’s literary 
language, Allworth notes that Soviet planners first settled on the vowel-harmonized 
dialects spoken north of Tashkent and south of Samarkand which “specialists conceived 
to be the cleanest, most distinctive, most Uzbek version of the tongue” (1990:237).  In 
1927, however, planners reversed their decision and the “Iranized, unharmonized 
Tashkent dialect” was declared a more appropriate linguistic base for the national 
language--a choice which was likely intended to strengthen Tashkent’s status over 
Samarkand as the political hub of the republic, but which likewise offered Soviet 
authorities the advantage of distancing the Uzbek national language from the other 
republican languages--and indeed other Turkic languages--in which vowel harmony 
remained a defining characteristic.  This central distinction was later reinforced by the 
removal from the alphabet of four characters--representing the “open” counterparts 
(ä,ö,ü,ï) of the “closed” vowels a,o,u,i --deemed unnecessary given that the newly-minted 
Uzbek national language was no longer marked by vowel harmony (Allworth 1990).14   
The Uzbek example points to the overtly political nature of decisions and 
revisions made in the process of designating a linguistic base for the republican 
languages.  Akiner further emphasizes this point, arguing: “The debate over which dialect 
was to provide the foundation for the national language was couched in linguistic terms, 
but, as with all the other language questions, was actually a political battle between the 
‘nationalist’ faction and the pro-Russian faction.  The latter won on every count…. Other 
dialects may have been ‘purer’ or more ‘typical’, but it was that group of dialects that had 
                                               
14 See also Bennigsen and Wimbush (1985) and Fierman (1991a). 
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all the practical advantages.  They represented the language of the nerve centers of the 
economic, political, and administrative life of the republic” (1990:104).  In addition to the 
pragmatic advantages and political considerations Akiner highlights, decisions made in 
aid of designating the linguistic base of the new republican languages were in keeping 
with the overarching ideological objective of the nationalities policies to create discrete 
national entities in Central Asia.  In short, language reform was a key element in efforts 
by the Soviet state to promote “recognition of distinct national territories…[which 
ultimately proved] critical in transforming the fluid relationships between language and 
ethnicity into a cohesive sense of nationality (Dave 1996:76-7).   
The next phase of language planning to be carried out by Russian philologists and 
their local proxies involved the creation of a standardized lexicon, the codification of 
grammatical rules, and the adoption of an orthographic system.  Given the pragmatic 
need for mass communication, the expansion and standardization of a lexicon for each of 
the republics was of particular importance.  In this, as in other linguistic matters, pro-
Russian factions triumphed over their nationalist counterparts, who recommended 
drawing necessary lexical items from the older literary languages or surviving dialects, 
and by the mid 1930s, the lexicon of each of the republican languages had been 
“internationalized” (i.e., russified) through the adoption of Russian loanwords that 
replaced Arabic or Persian borrowings or described new concepts.  Although lexical 
commonalities served to unite rather than divide the republican languages, the broader 
shared identity they promoted was Soviet rather than pan-Turkic or pan-Islamic.  This 
phase of language planning thus represented the second goal of the nationalities policies, 
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namely the russification of the Turkic languages as a means of facilitating Russian 
language learning and the ultimate creation of a new society of Soviet people.  
 
The Role of Orthography in the Creation of the Soviet Turkic “Nationalities”  
Orthographic reform in the Central Asian republics followed a course similar to 
language reform insofar as it was intended to mitigate the threat posed by pan-Turkism 
and pan-Islamism, create independent republics among the Turkic peoples in Central 
Asia, and ultimately foster the creation of the new Soviet people.  At first, Soviet 
planners chose to retain the Arabic script, which already had a long history among the 
Central Asian elite, and the five national literary languages created in the early 1920s 
were rendered in the Arabic letters.  Between 1927 and 1930, however, the Arabic script 
was replaced by the Unified Turkic Alphabet, a Latin-based orthographic system devised 
on the basis of recommendations reached at the 1926 Baku Turcology Congress.   
Insofar as the United Turkic Alphabet unified the Turkic languages under a 
single, Latin-based script, state support for its adoption seems to suggest a certain 
indulgence for pan-Turkist sentiment in the early years of Soviet rule, however numerous 
scholars have suggested that the decision to replace the Arabic with the Latin script was 
actually a strategic move by the Soviet state designed to mitigate the threat posed by pan-
Turkism and pan-Islamism by distancing the Turkic peoples of Central Asia from the 
Anatolian Turks, with whom they shared ethnic and linguistic ties, and other Moslems, 
with whom they shared Islam and the Arabic alphabet (Hostler 1993, Henze 1977, 
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Karamanlı and Pirverdioglu 1993).  Proponents of this view have further argued that 
compulsory Latinization offered the additional advantage of rendering Turkic literary 
works unintelligible to future generations, thereby ensuring greater receptivity to Soviet 
state influence.   
The notion that the adoption of a Latin-based orthography was ultimately 
designed to disrupt relations between the Turkic peoples and their Anatolian cousins 
likewise finds support in later policies of Soviet state, most notably the abrupt decision to 
replace the Unified Turkic Alphabet with Cyrillic-based orthographies after Turkey’s 
formal adoption of a modified Latin alphabet reintroduced the possibility of literary 
exchange and linguistic rapprochement.  The languages of the five republics were thus 
transliterated into Cyrillic between 1939 and 1941 as a means of facilitating russification 
of the republican languages and easing Russian language learning with the ultimate goal 
of producing loyal citizens of the Soviet Union.  The creation of separate Cyrillic 
alphabets for each of the republics further served the assimilatory goals of the 
nationalities policies by reinforcing the distinctness of each republic, thereby diminishing 
the grounds for their possible rapprochement.  Thus, while the implementation of the 
Unified Turkic Alphabet in the 1920s promoted the linguistic unification of the Turkic 
peoples but estranged them from the Anatolian Turks, the imposition of the Cyrillic 
alphabet (or, more precisely, Cyrillic alphabets) on the Turkic languages in the late 1930s 
and early 1940s served to isolate the Central Asian Turks from one another as well as 
their Anatolian cousins.   
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Regardless of whether initial support for national languages and the Unified 
Turkic Alphabet constituted a premeditated precursor to the linguistic reforms of the 
1930s or simply a “false start” by a regime that had not fully consolidated control over its 
far-flung regions or articulated its ultimate aims, Soviet linguistic policies were 
undeniably implicated in a political agenda that was far more broad-reaching than simply 
dividing the Turkic peoples from their Turkish cousins.  Part of the well-documented 
“divide et impera” policies of the Soviet authorities, linguistic and orthographic reform 
constituted a deliberate political program aimed at creating distinct nationalities, by 
standardizing local dialects within a defined geographic span into distinct national 
languages.  Such efforts sought to eradicate any sense of supranational identification--i.e., 
all traces of pan-Turkism or pan-Islamism--amongst the Turkic peoples, who were 
instead to become nationals of a particular republic or province and eventually loyal 
citizens of the Soviet Union (the proverbial sovetskii chelovek, or “Soviet man”).  This 
process was aided by the contemporaneous emergence of disagreements among Turkic 
intellectuals between those who continued to advocate a broad pan-Turkic nationalism 
and those who promoted a more circumscribed republic-based nationalism.  With the 
support of the Soviet state, the latter were to prevail, thereby paving the way for the 
creation of separate Cyrillic alphabets for the individual Turkic languages (Akiner 1990).  
Thereafter, even though political issues continued to be played out on the linguistic front, 




Nationalism over Pan-Turkism in the Early Turkish Republic 
While the 1930s saw the consolidation of central control over the sociocultural 
and linguistic identities of the Soviet Turkic republics and the further refinement of the 
concept of Soviet nationalism, on the other side of the Iron Curtain, a more traditionally 
independent brand of nationalism had taken root in Turkey.  With the attempt by the 
Entente powers to divide Turkish territory amongst themselves in the wake of World War 
I, pan-Turkist ideology was temporarily put aside as nationalist sentiment was rallied in 
defense of the Anatolian heartland.  Even as the Turkish war of independence raged on, 
Kemal Atatürk had already begun formulating/ promulgating his vision for a new Turkish 
nation.  In a 1921 speech delivered in the town of Eskişehir, Atatürk rejected both pan-
Islamism and pan-Turkism as the basis for the as-yet unrealized nation-state.  “Neither 
Islamic union nor Turanism15 may constitute a doctrine, or logical policy for us.  
Henceforth, the Government policy of the new Turkey is to consist in living 
independently, relying on Turkey’s own sovereignty within her national borders” (as 
quoted in Landau 1995a:74).  While the exact disposition of Turkey’s national borders 
was yet to be determined, it was, by that time, relatively clear that they were not to 
encompass the full reach of lands considered by pan-Turkists to comprise the ancestral 
Turkish homeland. 
                                               
15 Turanism is a closely related but a more general term than pan-Turkism, since the latter 
applies only to peoples of Turkic ethnicity whereas the former refers to a broader swath 
of peoples, potentially including the Mongols and other peoples belonging to the Altaic 
language group to which the Turkic languages are considered to belong. Turanism and 
pan-Turkism have, however, largely been used interchangeably to describe the ideology 
behind efforts to unite the Turkic (and related) peoples (e.g., Landau 1995). 
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By the late 1920s and early 1930s, Atatürk and his supporters had consolidated 
their power sufficiently to see through an extensive program of social and linguistic 
reforms that capitalized on notions of ethnic identity and patriotic pride to instill a new 
national identity (Lewis 1961, Kinross 1964, Zürcher 1997, Mango 1999), and in an 
October 1933 speech celebrating the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Turkish 
Republic, Atatürk sounded the death knell of political pan-Turkism in Turkey, arguing: 
 
Today the Soviet Union is our friend, our neighbor, our ally.  We are in need of 
this friendship.  But no one can say today what will come to be tomorrow.  Just 
like the Ottoman Empire, just like the Austro-Hungarian Empire, it could fall 
apart, it could crumble.  The world could reach a new equilibrium.  And in that 
case Turkey must know what it will do.  Under the governance of this alliance we 
have brothers of shared origin with whom we share one language, one belief 
system.  We must be ready to take responsibility for and support them.  To stand 
ready does not mean simply keeping quiet and waiting for that day.  We must 
prepare ourselves.  How do the people prepare themselves for this?  By laying the 
foundation of solid spiritual bridges.  Language is a bridge.  Belief is a bridge.  
History is a bridge.  We must dig back to our roots and unite within our shared 
history that circumstance has separated.  We mustn't wait for them (the Outside 
Turks) to come to us.  We must go to them.16 
 
Thus was inaugurated the official policy of Turkish nationalism, in which the 
sphere for ethnolinguistic consolidation was confined to the contemporaneous borders of 
the Turkish nation.  Although the official separation between pan-Turkism and the 
Turkish nationalist ideology that defined the nascent Turkish state was to have significant 
implications for Cold War era policy toward the Turkic peoples of the Soviet Union, 
                                               
16 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, 29 October, 1933, Republic’s 10th anniversary speech, 
available online at: http://www.istanbul.edu.tr/edebiyat/edebiyat/dekanlik/arastirma 
_merkezleri/avrasya_arkeoloji_enstitusu.htm, last accessed August 2, 2011. 
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which was, in turn, to inform, as well as considerably constrain, the initial development 
of a foreign policy orientation toward the Turkic peoples of Central Asia during the 
waning years of the Soviet empire and following its collapse in 1991, it is also important 
to note that this separation was not as distinct as it has sometimes been portrayed.  
Arguing that the two ideological frameworks late-Ottoman revolutionaries resorted to in 
seeking to rescue the Ottoman Empire--i.e., pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism--were 
ultimately discredited by the empire’s demise and thereafter publicly rejected by the 
founders of the modern nation-state that emerged from its ashes, Landau (1995a) notes 
that aspects of those forsaken ideologies were nonetheless co-opted and incorporated into 
the new state’s nationalist ideology.  Thus, the pan-Turkist agenda was absorbed into the 
state not only through the appointment of figures harboring pan-Turkist leanings to 
government positions, but more importantly through cooptation of aspects of pan-Turkist 
philosophy.   
Nowhere was this more evident than in the significant influence on the 
development of Turkish national identity exerted by the work of sociologist Ziya Gökalp, 
particularly his concept of the nation as a linguistically and culturally unified entity in 
which membership was inherent, rather than chosen, which retained key aspects of pan-
Turkism.17  Thus, while Gökalp’s expansive, three-tiered model of national identity, 
delineated in his 1923 Principles of Turkism,18 paved the way for Turkish nationalism by 
                                               
17 In other words, Gökalp’s concept was of ethnonationalism rather than civic 
nationalism. 
18 This work was published in English in 1968 by E.J. Brill in an edition translated and 
edited by Robert Devereux. 
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identifying, as the most contracted tier of national identity, an entity comprised solely of 
the Turks living within the borders of the modern Turkish republic, it nonetheless 
accounted for overarching, pan-Turkic affinities with speakers of the Oguz branch of 
Turkic languages at the second tier, and speakers of the more linguistically distant Kipçak 
branch of Turkic languages at the third tier.  Gökalp’s paradigm thus divided overarching 
pan-Turkist ideology into three increasingly-expanding ideologies--Turkism, Oghuzism, 
and Turanism--thereby enabling basic pan-Turkist ideology to be equally easily mustered 
in support of a modern nation-state or a broader pan-national, or supranational, entity.  In 
this sense, the discourse of pan-Turkism, although held up as a foil to the Turkish nation, 
and hence officially subsumed to the state, was far from excised, and the possibility 
remained, as is indeed implied in Atatürk’s tenth anniversary speech, that the contracted 
form of Turkish nationalism might one day be expanded to encompass a broader Turkic 
nationalism.  
At this juncture, it is, however, important to note the continued involvement of 
pan-Turkism in the politics of identity within Turkey.  Although Gökalp was explicit in 
denying that the ideological force of pan-Turkism was in any way political, and pan-
Turkist thought was unequivocally sidelined in state politics,19 it nonetheless became 
entangled over the years, in the fractious identity politics surrounding domestic political 
struggles over the orientation of the Turkish nation.  Thus, while as a coherent and 
                                               
19 Gökalp wrote: “Turkism is not a political party but a scientific, philosophic and 
aesthetic school of thought.  Or, to phrase it differently, it is a course of cultural effort 
and renovation.  Yet Turkism cannot remain entirely indifferent to political ideals, for 
Turkish culture involves political as well as other ideals….” (1968[1923]:125-6). 
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autonomous political ideology, pan-Turkism “continued only latently, as a tiny peripheral 
and semiclandestine movement nourished by an ideology propounded in a number of 
irregularly published periodicals whose brief existences were terminated by a lack of 
funds or government closures” (Landau 1995b:76), strains of pan-Turkist thought 
continued to hold sway within certain conservative, nationalist circles.  As a result of the 
reverence with which it was regarded within such radical and marginalized groups, and 
due in no small part to the unfortunate association of many of its early ideologues with 
Nazism (Landau 1974), pan-Turkism thus quickly became synonymous, among the 
liberal Turkish elite, with territorial irredentism--i.e., political pan-Turkism--and racism.   
This ideological divide was further reinforced by the 1969 founding of the 
National Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, or MHP), whose party platform is 
rooted in ultra-nationalist ideology shaded with pan-Turkist overtones.  Driven by the 
exigencies of survival as a domestic political party, the MHP generally emphasized 
Turkish nationalism over pan-Turkism, and tended to focus its concern for the “outside 
Turks” (dış Türkler) on the plight of Turks living in the peripheries of Europe and the 
Middle East (e.g., Cyprus, Bulgaria, and Syria) rather than in Central Asia, which, 
although the cradle of pan-Turkist ideology and hence inextricably associated with its 
principles, was firmly sealed off behind the Iron Curtain.  Nonetheless, its adherents 
never fully abandoned their concern for the Soviet Turkic peoples and a desire, albeit 
latent, to unify, either culturally or politically, the so-called Turkic world (e.g., Çağlar 
1990, Poulton 1997, Arıkan 1999).   
 89 
Defining themselves in opposition to such radical irredentist, ethnic-based 
politics, Turkey’s liberal elite, after an initial surge of curiosity, deliberately eschewed 
any interest in the Turkic peoples, as an overt rejection of the principles of pan-Turkism 
and indication of their affinity for Western-style nationalism.  This was brought home to 
me on a personal level throughout my fieldwork as my local affiliation was with a liberal, 
Western-leaning academic institution, whose faculty, although themselves engaged in 
research into Turkey’s political, economic, and diplomatic relations within Avrasya 
(Eurasia)--a broad construct that incorporates both Europe and Asia and hence 
encompasses the Turkic republics--were nonetheless skeptical of and troubled by my 
interest in linguistic and sociocultural relations within the Türk dünyası (Turkic world), 
as indeed they were by my husband’s academic interest in traditional Turkish wrestling.   
Concern for the cultural dimensions of the “Turkic world,” it was felt, even by 
members of the sociology/anthropology department, betrayed a search for the primordial 
essence of Turk-ness, which not only recalled controversial early republican era efforts to 
“purify” the Turkish language by replacing Arabic and Persian loanwords with 
neologisms constructed on roots derived from the “pure” languages of the Turkic 
peoples, but also betrayed a concern with preserving traditional Turkish culture, a 
sentiment which was deemed politically reactionary within a community hegemonically 
conditioned by their socioeconomic and political position to revere Turkey’s founding 
father’s injunction to eschew the “backwardness” bred by traditional culture, in the drive 
for westernized modernization.  Thus, not only was “Eurasia” the preferred term over 
“Turkic world” for referring to the Turkic republics, but research was best restricted to 
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exploring political and economic issues.  As a result, my fellow liberal academics had 
difficulty understanding why a western academic, schooled in the scholarly traditions 
they sought to emulate, would chose to study such an inconsequential issue, particularly 
one so tied to marginalized reactionary politics, and were concerned that my research 
would contribute to what they perceived to be widespread impressions of Turkey as 
“backward” and “racist.”  In all fairness, my colleagues, while wrong in suspecting my 
research motives, were largely correct in linking an interest in the culture of the “Turkic 
world” with conservative and/or reactionary politics, as the proliferation of publications 
on the topic published by conservative governmental, quasi-governmental, and non-
governmental organizations will attest.  Thus, as one of my students, when asked about 
Turkic identity politics studiously protested: “This assumption that Turks have a natural 
affinity for the Turkic peoples is patently untrue.  Growing up in Izmir, I feel more 
cultural commonality with Greeks than I do with the so-called Turks of Central Asia.  
This is simply the reactionary racist view of the ‘idealists’20 that has hijacked public 
policy.” 
In this sense, although Turkish diplomats, politicians, and even scholars claim a 
pronounced distinction between Turkish nationalism and pan-Turkism (Ersanlı-Behar 
2002), a fair amount of overlap between the two ideologies remains, resulting in a certain 
                                               
20 Inspired by the writings of renowned pan-Turkists Ziya Gökalp and Nihal Atsız, 
members of the Grey Wolves (Bozkurtlar) youth organization, founded in 1969 as the 
youth wing of Turkey’s ultra-nationalist National Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket 
Partisi) but now denying direct links with the party, have adopted the moniker “idealists” 
(ülkücüler).  The Grey Wolves rally around various pan-Turkic causes and their platform 
calls for the establishment of greater Turkistan, or Turan.  
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degree of analytical indeterminacy.  According to Hostler, “[i]n the Turkish republic, 
nationalism forms a distinctive trait of its structure, constitution, and current policy.  In 
times of war or revolutionary change within neighboring areas during the twentieth 
century, Turkish policy has, [however], historically moved toward Pan-Turkism” 
(1993:4).  This tendency, Hostler argues, is what underpins the current influence of 
“Turkish nationalism (especially the Pan-Turkish variety of Turkish nationalism) in the 
policies of the Turkish Republic and the actions of the politically developed Turkish-
speaking peoples” of Central Asia and the Caucasus in the aftermath of the Soviet 
Union’s disintegration (1993:4).  Thus, while the brand of nationalism developed in the 
Soviet Turkic republics was deliberately designed to eliminate pan-Turkic sentiment, the 
form nationalism took in Turkey, did not exclude a continued, albeit secondary, interest 
in the broader Turkic world, at least not on ideological grounds.  This ideological 
distinction in national cultures, was to become a key factor in post-Soviet efforts aimed at 
linguistic, sociocultural, and geopolitical rapprochement within the Turkic world.   
 
THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE AND ORTHOGRAPHY IN NATIONALISM IN TURKEY 
As with the development of the Soviet Turkic nationalities, language and 
orthography played a defining role in the formation of nationalist identity in the Turkish 
republic.  The specific ways in which linguistic issues were instrumental to the 
development of Turkish national identity will be addressed in much greater detail in 
chapter five as a means of setting the stage for an examination of recent innovations in 
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orthographic practice that I suggest constitute a diffuse language ideological debate about 
Turkey’s shifting national, regional, and international identity in the post-Cold war era.  
Nonetheless, with the aim of providing contextualization for issues addressed in 
intervening chapters, I offer a brief outline of the topic below, focusing on the ideological 
dimensions of the 1932 First (Turkish) Language Congress as well as on divergences 
between the United Turkic Alphabet agreed at the 1926 Baku Congress and the Turkish 
alphabet unveiled in 1928.   
While the Soviet Turks were engaged in implementing the new Latin-based 
alphabet agreed at the Baku Turcology Congress across Central Asia, the issue of 
orthographic reform, broached but rejected on several occasions under Ottoman rule, had 
likewise resurfaced in the newly-established Republic of Turkey.  Arguments in favor of 
reforming the Turkish alphabet were first reintroduced at the Izmir Economic Conference 
of 1923, but five years had passed before the new republican government took up the 
issue.  Finally, in May 1928, Turkey’s Council of Ministers established the Language 
Commission (Dil Encümeni) to guide transition from the Arabo-Persian alphabet to a 
Latin-based orthography.   
In less than four months, a new Latin-based alphabet had been devised, ratified, 
and implemented throughout the Turkish republic.  Although members of the Language 
Commission were certainly aware of orthographic developments occurring amongst the 
Soviet Turkic peoples, little attempt at coordination appears to have been made.  This 
seeming lack of coordination is, however, not surprising insofar as the Turkish alphabet 
reform was conceived in an atmosphere of nascent nationalism in which pan-Turkist 
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concerns with the larger Turkic world were deliberately subsumed to the exigencies of 
nation-building within the Anatolian homeland, as will be explored at greater length 
below.  In this sense, the decision on the part of Turkish language reformers to create a 
uniquely Turkish alphabet was in keeping with the political orientation of the new 
republic and foreign policy objectives of its founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.  In the end 
analysis, only twenty-three of the twenty-nine letters in the new Turkish alphabet 
formulated by the commission matched those of the Birləşdirilmiş Jeni Tyrk Әlifbasь.  
Thus, while both alphabets were based on the same orthographic system, differences 
between the characters of the Birləşdirilmiş Jeni Tyrk Әlifbasь and the new Turkish 
alphabet hampered orthographic rapprochement with the Turkic peoples of Central Asia, 
effectively extending the nascent Turkish state’s policy of circumscribed Turkish 
nationalism over expansive pan-Turkism to the linguistic realm. 
Four years after the successful implementation of the new Latin-based Turkish 
alphabet, attention turned to the more contentious issue of language reform.  In July 
1932, the Society for Study of the Turkish Language (Türk Dil Tetkik Cemiyeti, or 
TDTC), later renamed the Turkish Language Society (Türk Dil Kurumu, or TDK), was 
established and tasked with organizing a meeting of linguists and language professionals 
designed to inaugurate this second phase of linguistic reform.  The First Language 
Congress (Birinci Dil Kurultayı) was hastily convened in September 1932, with 
subsequent congresses organized biannually thereafter.  Although the effects of decisions 
reached during the congress were not as patently and immediately obvious as they had 
been with the earlier alphabet reform, the tenor of discourse among delegates to the 
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congress was telling of the importance accorded language as key instrument in the 
actualization of nationalist ideology (Heyd 1954, Landau 1993, Lewis 1999). 
Convened just nine years after the founding of the Turkish republic, during a 
period in which Atatürk and his advisors, having completed core reforms centered around 
the secularization and Westernized modernization of Turkish society, had turned to the 
cultural sphere (Landau 1993), the First Language Congress was an integral part of 
state’s nationalizing project, and hence focused almost exclusively on Anatolian Turkish.  
Influenced by Herderian notions of “the folk” as the wellspring of the nation, delegates 
extolled the virtues of the Turkish language as emblematic of the Turkish nation and 
advocated its adoption, in place of Ottoman Turkish, as the national language of the 
Turkish republic.  Encouraging Turkish patriots to eschew the difficult, contrived and 
elitist Ottoman language in favor of the pure and simple elegance of Turkish, congress 
participants moreover called for the liberation of Turkish from Ottoman’s pernicious 
influence, proposing the creation of öz Türkçe, a purified Turkish free of grammatical and 
lexical influence from Arabic and Persian.     
The Turkish language itself was furthermore glorified by reference to studies in 
historical and comparative linguistics, which sought to grant it authority and authenticity 
within the framework of Kemalist ideology by depicting it as Western, primeval, and 
proto-linguistic.  Thus, several delegates offered morphological and lexical data derived 
from comparative analysis that suggested the inclusion of Turkish in the Indo-European 
language group, albeit on the basis of often questionable criteria, while other presenters 
used similar methods to draw connections between Turkish and such ancient languages as 
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Sanskrit, Hittite, and Sumerian.  From the latter research was derived the goropist claim 
that Turkish was the “original” language from which all other languages derived, which, 
after being forwarded at the congress, was to gain state sanction under the rubric of the 
“sun language theory” (güneş dil teorisi21).   
What united these diverse lecture topics was that they each served to bolster the 
driving force of the Kemalist agenda--rapid modernization of the Turkish state in 
accordance with the principles articulated by Atatürk’s Six Arrows (Altı Ok) doctrine--
republicanism (cumhuriyetçilik), populism (halkçılık), nationalism (milliyetçilik), 
secularism (laiklik), etatism (devletçilik), and reformism (inkılapçılık).  In keeping with 
the much publicized goal of bringing the written language in line with the spoken 
language of the people, populism constituted a particularly strong theme of congress 
presentations, as indeed it did throughout the language reform process.22  The guiding 
principle of the congress was, however, reformism.  Reformism had been identified as an 
essential component of Kemalism--the last element of Atatürk’s Six Arrows doctrine--
just a year earlier, at the 1931 party congress of the Republican People’s Party 
(Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, or CHP), and its addition to the CHP’s party platform 
implicitly served to justify the previous eight years of far-reaching, often controversial, 
                                               
21 I have always been amused that the appellation of this goropist theory includes the 
Western (Latin-derived) loanword “theory” (teori), but the cognitive dissonance implied 
is explained away by the theory itself--if Turkish constitutes the original language, then 
even foreign loanwords are Turkish-derived.   
22 Populism was a guiding principle throughout the language reform process.  As such, all 
Turks were considered members of the TDTC (Landau 1993), plans were drawn up to 
establish branches of the TDK in all regions and possibly all districts of the country, and 
language recommendations were solicited from the public (Landau 1993). 
 96 
reforms and reinforce the necessity of pushing forward with the remaking of Turkish 
society.   
Thus, with the single exception of a lecture by distinguished journalist Hüseyin 
Cahit Yalçın who opposed language reform as an unnecessary and potentially harmful 
means of artificially managing the natural course of linguistic development, the 
participants’ lectures all supported language reform as an essential component of 
Kemalist restructuring.  Yalçın’s anomalously unorthodox address was subjected to sharp 
criticism by fellow participants who accused him of fatalistic and reactionary thinking.  
The vehemence with which Yalçın’s viewpoint was attacked by other participants 
suggests that the 1932 congress, although ostensibly convened for linguistic purposes, 
simultaneously sought to promulgate a politico-ideological perspective on the nation’s 
future to its citizens.  Thus, in keeping with Atatürk’s goal to publicize, and thereby gain 
popular support for language reform and related TDTK activities, participants gave 
lectures that intentionally portrayed language reform “as one of the ways in which 
Kemalism would secularize and modernize Turkey and the Turks.” (Landau 1993:287).   
At this juncture it is important to note that insofar as the primary focus for Atatürk 
and his advisors was the Turkish nation rather than the Turkic ethnie (Smith 1995), little 
attention was paid to the related languages of Soviet Turkic peoples.  While some 
congress participants presented lexical examples from the Turkic languages in aid of 
demonstrating a link between Turkish and Indo-European languages, and others 
suggested deriving replacements for Arabic and Persian loanwords from Turkic roots, 
virtually no substantive attention was devoted to an examination of the Turkic languages 
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in their own right (Landau 1993).  Thus, in much the same way that early republican-era 
Kemalists made reference to the historic Turkic empires of Central Asia as a means of 
demonstrating the greatness of the Turkic peoples--and, by extension, the Turkish nation-
-yet eschewed contact with the Soviet Turkic peoples out of concern over complicating 
Turkey’s international relations and endangering the security of the nascent state, 
references to the Turkic languages were likewise pragmatic, serving to reinforce claims 
regarding the richness of the Turkish language without entangling Turkey in 
unnecessarily complex relations with the Turkic peoples.  Insofar as the Kemalist state 
had made it abundantly clear that its focus was on defending and enriching the Turkish 
nation within contemporaneous borders rather than seeking to expand such boundaries 
though ill-advised adventurism amongst the Soviet Turkic peoples, detailed discussion of 
the Turkic languages would undoubtedly have been misplaced.  In short, linguistic and 
orthographic reform were viewed as handmaidens to the overarching nationalizing 
agenda of the Turkish state. 
 
NATIONALISM AND PAN-TURKISM IN THE EMERGENT POST-COLD WAR TURKIC 
WORLD 
And so, for the next sixty years, the Turks of Turkey and the Turkic peoples of the 
Soviet Union suffered the enforced separation of the Cold War era causing their 
analogous, yet already separate, histories to diverge even further, and their respective 
languages to follow suit.  By the fall of 1990, however, the Soviet Union was in crisis 
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following the liberation of Eastern Europe, the impending abrogation of the Warsaw pact, 
and the cascading declarations of sovereignty among the union republics.  Moreover, 
Moscow’s repressive and often brutal measures against incipient nationalist movements 
during the final months of Soviet power served to galvanize nationalist sentiment in 
many of the union republics and autonomous regions.  Freed from strict oversight by the 
Soviet state, the republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus found themselves in need of 
a new, independent national identity and at no loss for regional and international actors 
ready to offer assistance in this regard with the hope of influencing the course of national 
development in the region in ways beneficial to their own interests (e.g., Fuller 1992).   
As Russia, despite being hobbled by domestic concerns, worked to reassert its 
influence over its former dominions, Turkey, Iran, China, and the U.S. all rushed to 
establish influence in the region, their rival efforts leading scholars, journalists, and other 
observers to dub this period the “New Great Game” after the historic “Great Game” 
rivalry for dominion in Central Asia played out in the 1800s between the Russian and 
British Empires.23  As Winrow however, notes, the “problem with the great game analogy 
is that it erroneously assumes that the Central Asians themselves are mere passive 
bystanders” (1998:107).  As noted in chapter one, not only were the Turkic peoples 
actively engaged in choosing among “models” for development proselytized by their 
powerful neighbors, but were also proactively involved in shaping their own futures 
through the process of post-Soviet nation-building.  Within this endeavor, issues of 
language and orthography played an early and important role.  
                                               
23 For a detailed history of the Great Game, see Hopkirk (1994). 
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In the intervening decades, the Turkic republics had become fully integrated 
constituents of the Soviet Union, subject to later stage Soviet linguistic policies that, in 
privileging Russian, had led to linguistic diglossia, which spawned a generation of 
urbanites unfamiliar with their native languages and paved the way for the entry of 
numerous Russian loanwords into the Turkic languages.  Savvy, nonetheless, to the 
central proposition of linguistic nationalism--the one language/one people principle--one 
of the first orders of business in each of the post-Soviet Turkic republics was the 
rehabilitation of the titular language and restoration of its privileged status vis-à-vis 
Russian (Landau and Kellner-Heinkele 2001).  If Russian, as the language of “inter-
republican” communication, was the marker of the Soviet state, the titular languages were 
then symbols of the newly independent nations and the authority of their fledgling states.  
As it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to offer a comprehensive account of the 
politics of language and sociopolitical dimensions of linguistic nationalism in the ex-
Soviet Turkic republics--a topic which has already been ably addressed by Landau and 
Heinkele (2001)--I will simply note that among the ex-Soviet Turkic peoples, issues of 
language and orthography, including the attitudes they were rooted in and the policies 
they wrought, were intricately entwined with the forging of independent nationhood and, 
hence, the broader politics of identity in the post-Soviet era.  
In contrast to the prevailing turmoil within the newly-minted former Soviet 
republics, the Turkish nation was, by the early 1990s, well-established within the 
international community and had entered a period of relative stability.  In the intervening 
years, Turkey had largely consolidated its national character, weathering three military 
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coups yet emerging the only Western-style democracy in the Islamic Middle East, and a 
well-respected international actor.  A valuable member of NATO and official applicant to 
the EU, Turkey had exploited its geopolitical role as a bulwark against the Soviet bloc to 
firmly affiliate itself with the West.  In a virtual demonstration of this burgeoning 
affiliation, the Turkish language had also shifted westward.  Having replaced the Arabic 
script with a Latin-based alphabet and expelled Arabic and Persian borrowings during the 
early republican era, Turkish speakers had, over the decades, absorbed countless 
loanwords from the West into their language, as will be detailed at greater length in 
chapter five.  At the same time, however, partially as a result of an intense period of 
economic and sociocultural liberalization in the late 1980s and early 1990s (e.g., Heper 
and Sayarı 2002) that precipitated Turkey’s greater exposure to the increasing pressures 
of globalization and partially as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and Turkey’s 
consequent loss of its defining status as a Cold War “buffer state,” there was also an 
incipient, but palpable, sense of an impending shift in Turkey’s relationship with the 
Western world, which was to color domestic post-Cold War era identity politics and 
impact the politics of rapprochement within the Turkic world.   
Nonetheless, at the time of the Soviet Union’s collapse, Turkey’s relative stability 
and firm international standing rendered the country reasonably well-placed to offer itself 
as a developmental “model” to the ex-Soviet Turkic peoples and “bridge” to the Western 
world.  Although political pan-Turkism within Turkey had been effectively incorporated 
into and subsumed by the nationalizing project of the early republican period, and kept in 
check in later years by the reality of international relations in the Cold War era, the 
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ideology of cultural pan-Turkism had nonetheless survived in the ranks of various 
organizations and their associated media organs.  Thus, while pan-Turkism seemed 
effectively dead as a political movement, the fate of cultural pan-Turkism remained far 
less clear.  In an article published just before the collapse of the Soviet Union, noted 
Turcologist Jacob Landau (1988) opined that “one may indeed determine that Pan-
Turkism has failed.  After all, even if the idea is kept alive by a handful of adherents, its 
current political impact is hardly noticeable.”  This assessment, he continues, holds true 
only for political pan-Turkism, for it is “nearly impossible to evaluate the success of a 
cultural Pan-movement, particularly cultural Pan-Turkism, over an entire century and 
such vast territory (1988:1-2). 
Within a year of Landau’s assessment, events in Soviet lands seemed to offer the 
first inkling that Atatürk’s prediction of eventual collapse of the Soviet Union and 
liberation of the Turkic peoples was at hand.  This was the precise moment that those 
with pan-Turkist sympathies had anxiously awaited for nearly seventy years and they 
eagerly seized the opportunity to reestablish lapsed affiliations with the soon to be ex-
Soviet Turkic peoples.  In the early days of the post-Soviet era, those with pan-Turkist 
leanings were, however, not alone in their interest in the ex-Soviet Turkic peoples.  The 
progressive disintegration of the Soviet Union had awakened a burgeoning nostalgic 
interest in the Turkic peoples within Turkish society at large, and linguistic kinship was 
the variable that most captured the public imagination.  Turks, who had long been forced 
to learn English or French to function outside Turkish borders, were now captivated by 
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the promise of traveling eastward to the Great Wall of China speaking their native 
tongue.   
No longer, it seemed, was interest in the Turkic peoples of the former Soviet 
Union the purview of marginalized political groups in Turkey, it had become an abiding 
preoccupation in the society at large.  An editorial written for the center-left daily 
newspaper Cumhuriyet by Haluk Şahin deftly captured the prevailing mood, during a 
time in which it appeared as though interest in the Turkic peoples could no longer be 
neatly aligned with deep-seated, left-right divides in Turkish politics--divergent 
approaches to the Turkic world that Şahin termed the “sentimental racism” of the right 
and the “intellectual terrorism” of the left. 
 
Since the collapse of the bi-polar world, we are forced to think about from scratch 
a number of topics with which we are faced in this uncertain environment…. One 
of these is the topic of relations with the people and states of Turkic origin [Türk 
kökenli] living outside of Turkey.  
Formerly, namely in the bi-polar world in which everything was divided into 
black and white, it would have been necessary to keep an eye on a person accused 
of Turanism for discussing relations with the Turks outside of Turkey. Perhaps 
out of fear of such a reaction, no one apart from Turanists dared touch on these 
topics, thereby proving the truth of the accusation.  
Nonetheless like any number of other taboos, this taboo has collapsed in the past 
few years. In a period of conditional reflex, many things that defy comprehension 
are becoming possible. In the meantime, relations with the Turkish-speaking 
[Türkçe konuşan] peoples living in countries other than Turkey can be addressed 
in a more rational manner. 
The topic, divorced from the right's sentimental monopoly that supports its racist 
approach and the left's intellectual terrorism, turns into an agenda item over which 
intelligent discussions can be held.  In this period in which the winds of war are 
blowing in the Caucasus and the Turkish-speaking peoples in the Soviet Union 
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are making very important decisions, there is an urgent need for such a new 
approach.24   
 
Thus, whereas a succession of former Turkish governments had officially abjured 
pan-Turkism (Landau 1995a), as interest in the “outside Turks” emerged from the 
shadows and swept the nation, Turkish state actors joined in embracing this fundamental 
aspect of pan-Turkism.  While categorical in disavowing any interest in establishing the 
greater Turkic empire envisioned by radical pan-Turkists, largely out of fear of provoking 
Russia or rousing unease in the West, Turkish officials could not long resist co-opting 
pan-Turkist rhetoric in speaking of Turkey’s relations with its “brother nations.”  Such 
was the case, for example, when Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel, during a 1992 visit 
to the region, suggested a possible union of Turkic States, thereby giving a state-like 
gloss to an essentially pan-Turkist vision (Aydın 2003a, Başlamış 2001).25  Even 
Demirel’s attempts to dismiss allegations that Turkey’s interest in the Turkic peoples was 
pan-Turkic, were tinged with cultural, if not political, pan-Turkist imagery: 
 
Turks, no matter where they are, are our brothers; no matter what name they go 
by.  Kirghiz Turks, Uzbek Turks, Turkmen Turks, Azeri Turks, Meshketi Turks 
are all our brothers….  In short, the country known as Turkey belongs to all 
Turkdom and we the Turkic world consider ourselves one big family.  No one 
should take offense at this, this is not a pan-Turkist movement.  Because, in the 
end, what offense can possibly be taken from fraternal peoples saying “we are 
brothers”?  We say: “Let each country govern itself, let each stand upon its own 
feet.  (Turgut 2001:78) 
                                               
24 This article appeared in Cumhuriyet, 27 November 1991, p.3. 
25 An article on this topic appeared in Cumhuriyet, 19 January 1990, p.140. 
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Given such rhetoric, Turkish officials’ denials of any pan-Turkist influence in 
Turkey’s relations with the Turkic peoples rang false to many long-time Turkey 
observers, including political scientist Gareth Winrow, who asked:  “[I]n underlining 
common Turkic ethnic ties, is the current Turkish government not actually playing the 
Pan-Turkist card?” (1992:108).  Focusing in particular on the ortak alfabe project, 
Winrow goes on to ask:  
 
Is not Ankara’s concern for…language reform in Central Asia through the 
proposed reintroduction of the Latin script an attempt to reverse the earlier forced 
magnification of dialectical differences into separate languages?”  Is this not an 
attempt to realize one of the dreams of Gasprinsky, arguably the most famous of 
the Pan-Turkists? (1992:108).   
 
More importantly, the pan-Turkist undercurrent in the rhetoric of Turkish 
officials--not to mention diplomats, businessmen, and scholars--was also not lost on the 
Turkic peoples and their leaders.  Although the collapse of the Soviet Union had roused 
equal levels of interest and curiosity in their Turkish brothers among the Turkic peoples, 
it is important to note that where pan-Turkism had been subsumed to national ideology in 
Turkey, it had been vilified as “bourgeois” and “chauvinistic” and all but expunged 
among the Soviet Turkic peoples.  As a result, Turkic officials, while expressing an 
interest in rapprochement with Turkey, were not only far more measured in their rhetoric, 
but also careful to distinguish between pragmatic cultural rapprochement and pan-
Turkism.  Thus, in the words of President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev: 
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In this part of the world, pan-Turkism becomes a political current only in reaction 
to the Soviet rule and 70 years of neglect… I am against the idea of putting people 
into solid frames by espousing the cause of pan-Turkism or pan-Islamism.  These 
have no chance of success.  What we are witnessing now is a Turkic 
rapprochement due to the fact that sharing common values is easier among the 
Turkic-speaking peoples. But this cannot lead to dangerous chauvinism.26   
 
Such a stance was in the pragmatic best interests of the leaders of the Turkic 
republics, who, as ex-Soviet figures transformed into newly-minted nationalists, had 
pinned their futures to national development and feared losing control over their 
respective nations to such competing ideologies as pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism in the 
struggle over post-Soviet identity politics.  Furthermore, as Landau and Kellner-Heinkele 
(2001) point out, the republics these Turkic rulers had inherited were far from ethnically 
homogenous, and there was, as a result, a real need to maintain at least the appearance of 
liberal pluralism if destabilizing inter-ethnic conflict were to be avoided.  Nonetheless, 
the relative success of these leaders in curbing pan-Turkist impulses through reference to 
“dangerous chauvinism” is largely due to this perspective having already gained 
widespread acceptance within the populace during the Soviet era.  Thus, while the 
various Turkic leaders were each known to employ the rhetoric of pan-Turkism in their 
dealings with Turkish counterparts, particularly when it suited their purposes, in practice, 
they pursued, almost exclusively, the particular interests of their respective nations (e.g., 
Landau 1995b).  
                                               




SOME THOUGHTS ON IMAGINING THE NATIONAL AND THE SUPRANATIONAL 
Having described the role of pan-Turkism and nationalism in the historical 
development of the Turkic world as well as the linguistic cultures of its respective 
members, it may also prove analytically useful, before proceeding to an actual 
examination of the dynamic tension between the two ideologies that characterized efforts 
to promote linguistic and sociocultural rapprochement among the Turkic peoples, to 
consider the ways in which the imagined parameters of the supranational concept of a 
post-Cold War era Turkic world intersect with the ways in which the nations that 
comprise its constituent parts are imagined.  In describing the driving ideological force 
behind efforts aimed at contemporary rapprochement among the Turkic peoples, Winrow 
(1998) uses the phrase “broader Turkish nationalism” while Landau suggests the term 
“pan-nationalism,” which he describes as “a more intensive or, anyway, a more 
comprehensive form of nationalism [that] aims at promoting the cohesion of people of the 
same origin, culture, or territory, with the ultimate objection of establishing some sort of 
political union among them” (1995b:75, emphasis mine).  While it is not surprising, 
given the hegemony of the nation as both the predominant identity construct and basic 
political unit of the modern age, that both descriptions would define the supranational in 
terms of the national, I would, nonetheless, argue certain important distinctions between 
the two constructs.  Moreover, I would suggest that while Turkish state and non-state 
actors may, indeed, have conceived of the Turkic peoples as belonging to the same 
 107 
nation, in the sense of ethnie,27 and may hence have envisioned relations within the post-
Soviet Turkic world as a simple expansion of their own local brand of nationalism with 
an emphasis on its pan-Turkic undertones, this was a vision often not shared by their 
Turkic counterparts--a reality that, in turn, speaks volumes regarding the failure of a 
cohesive Turkic world to coalesce in the post-Cold War era.   
As a result, I have chosen to identify the Turkic world as a “supranational” entity, 
and post-Cold war relations within the putative Turkic world as “supranational,” as 
opposed to “broadly national” or “pan-national,” in an attempt to convey the sense of a 
collective conceptualized as a “whole that is greater than the sum of its parts” in the 
emergent structural-functionalist Durkheimian sense (1972), for in both historical and 
contemporary times, the notion of the Turkic world has, for at least some of its 
proponents, coalesced around the belief that the Turkic peoples’ collective survival in the 
face of aggressive expansionism espoused by neighboring peoples depended on uniting 
the “natural,” “inherent” or “preexistent” Turkic ethnie into a federation or confederation 
of Turkic states that would supply not only “strength in numbers,” but also beyond 
numbers, by providing the basis for the transformation in sociopolitical consciousness of 
the Turkic peoples themselves.  This, indeed, was the main thrust of the jadidist 
(reformist) movement among the Turkic peoples of imperial Russia in the late nineteenth 
century (Bennigsen 1985).   
                                               
27 The term ethnie is borrowed from the French and defined by Anthony Smith as “named 
units of population with common ancestry myths and historical memories, elements of 
shared culture, some link with a historic territory and some measure of solidarity, at least 
among their elites” (1995:57). 
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Moreover, my selection of the term “supranational” follows in part from its usage 
within the field of international relations to refer to organizations--mostly economic or 
defense-related, but occasionally political in nature28--which, by requiring members to 
give up autonomous decision-making in select domains of joint interest, allows for a 
“pooling of sovereignty” that thus accords the collective greater influence than could be 
exercised by any of the member states acting alone (c.f., Gruber 2000).  In this sense, I 
argue, that while Turkish politicians and diplomats were quick to deny any influence 
from territorial irredentism or political pan-Turkism in the abiding interest they showed 
toward the Turkic peoples, and, at least ostensibly, eschewed any desire for political 
union, there nonetheless emerged a palpable sense that any actualization of the notional 
Turkic world, even if only in activities, such as linguistic rapprochement, that were 
limited to the sociocultural sphere, would require member states to cede some measure of 
sovereignty to the collective.  That this was, to say the least, a controversial notion will 
become clear in subsequent chapters.  Thus, my selection of the term “supranational” is 
meant to highlight my argument that the Turkic world is imagined at a level above, or 
“supra” to, the “nation,” in both senses in which the term is commonly used, i.e., to 
describe an ethnie, or non-politicized ethnic group, or to designate a country or sovereign 
state.   
 
                                               
28 The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC), the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), and the European Union (EU) offer examples of supranational 
economic, defense-related, and political organizations respectively.  
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IMAGINING THE CONTEMPORARY TURKIC WORLD 
Having thus described the historical development of nationalism and 
supranationalism in Turkey and among the Turkic peoples and argued the theoretical 
distinction between the two ideologies, it may, in this final section, prove useful to 
compare the imaginative process by which the supranational and the national are 
constituted, with a particular eye for explicating how the contemporary Turkic world has 
been imagined in ways that are sometimes convergent with and sometimes divergent 
from conceptualizations of the nation, as a means of elucidating the basis behind the 
ideological negotiations that lie at the heart of the language ideological debates explored 
in subsequent chapters.  While the notion of a Turkic world provides the framework for 
the reconceptualization of the diverse Turkic peoples as a broader cohesive entity, this 
construction is now, as it has been throughout history, based largely on a notional sense 
of communion, or kinship, rather than tangible, lived connections among the Turkic 
peoples.  In seeking to delimit the dimensions of both the historic and contemporary 
Turkic world, Benedict Anderson’s notion of ‘imagined communities” thus proves 
analytically useful.  In his groundbreaking study, Anderson puts forth the proposition that 
“all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps 
even these)” are imagined social entities in which members “will never know most of 
their fellow-members, meet them or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the 
image of their communion” (1983:6).  Arguing that communities are distinguished “by 
the style in which they are imagined,” Anderson identifies three characteristics which he 
argues collectively define the style of imagining apropos to modern nations: 
 110 
boundedness, sovereignty and fraternity.  He writes: “The nation is imagined as 
limited…[possessing] finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations, …as 
sovereign…[insofar as] nations dream of being free…[and] the gauge and emblem of this 
freedom is the sovereign state, …and as a community…[defined by] a deep, horizontal 
comradeship…regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail” 
(1983:7).   
Although Anderson’s interest lies in the birth of national consciousness from a 
collection of localized cultural groups situated within a geographically-bounded territory 
and united through print capitalism, there is nothing inherent to the concept that would 
gainsay its being applied to the formation of supranational consciousness from a 
collection of discrete and dispersed cultural groups that transcend national borders yet 
share a sense of their intrinsic communion.  While translocal and transregional groupings 
undoubtedly preexisted the formation of modern nation-states, it is nonetheless fair to say 
that the supranational collectives of the modern age have emerged against the backdrop 
of national imagining and have, as a result, been profoundly influenced by the ideological 
underpinnings of nationalist thought, even when they hearken back to a pre-nationalist 
era.   
Given the shared ideological roots of nationalist and supranationalist 
consciousness, it is only natural that certain similarities in the “style of imagining” 
apropos to the two entities will emerge.  Thus, for example, it is not surprising that the 
Turkic world appears to be conceived of as a “deep horizontal comradeship” in much the 
same way that nations are envisioned.  Indeed, this notion of fraternity is evident in 
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historical depictions of the Turkic world from Gapirali’s slogan of “Unity in language, 
thought, and action,” to Atatürk’s oft-repeated 1933 description of the Turkic peoples as 
“brothers of shared origin.”  Furthermore, a sense of fraternity has likewise pervaded the 
public discourse of Turkish politicians in the early post-Soviet era, as evident in the ever-
present Turkic world slogans which proclaimed the Turkic peoples to be brothers (“Biz 
kardeşiz!”), fellow Turks (“Biz hep Türküz!”), and one nation divided into multiple states 
(“Bir millet, iki devletimiz!”).  The following quote from a speech delivered by then 
president Süleyman Demirel at a September 1992 conference entitled “The Past and 
Present of the Turkic Republics and Turkey” leaves no doubt as to the fact that the Turkic 
world, at least from the perspective of Turkey’s foremost politician at the time, is 
conceived in fraternal terms: 
 
[The Turkic] peoples’ lullabies, folk songs, and epics are all the same.  If these 
people are not brothers, then who is?  When we say this, let no one take offense 
or come to another conclusion.29  What other conditions could there be for 
brotherhood?  We are brothers by language, religion, blood and soul.30  This is 
not something that can be custom ordered.  This is the inheritance bequeathed us 
by our ancestors (as quoted in Turgut 2001:154, translation and emphasis mine). 
 
                                               
29 Demirel is implying here that the assertion of the inherent “brotherhood” of the Turkic 
peoples should not be mistaken for pan-Turkism, with its potentially explosive political 
implications.  
30 The sentence “We are brothers by language, religion, blood and soul” has a poetic 
harmony in Turkish which cannot be duplicated in English.  It reads: “Dili, dini, kanı, 
canı bir kardeşleriz.” 
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In considering Anderson’s suggestion that the nation is imagined as a “deep 
horizontal comradeship,” however, it is important to acknowledge scholarly dissent over 
his disregard for the structural significance of inequality and exploitation operant within 
its borders.  In particular, his theory has been criticized as utopian in the sense that “the 
imagined version is an idealization, embodying values like fraternity, equality or liberty, 
which the societies profess [but]… have utterly failed to realise” (Pratt 1987:50).  Such 
critiques are undoubtedly just as relevant to “imagined” supranational communities as 
they are to national communities, and must therefore be addressed in any attempt at 
defining the Turkic world, the dimensions of which have clearly been imagined in 
utopians terms.31  Indeed, there are strong indications that the actuality of relations 
between the Turkic peoples does not accord with idealized depictions of the Turkic world 
as a “community of brothers,” which may, in turn, go a long way toward explaining the 
lack of universal agreement over both the dimensions of the Turkic world and the 
benefits of coalescing under its rubric. 
Writing of the fallacy of “so-called brotherhood” as the foundation for early 
diplomacy between Turkey and the Turkic republics, Cenk Başlamış notes that the “main 
mistake of Turkey…[was that it] failed to take [the] initiative with a full programme and 
with full coordination between state organizations in [its] attempt to establish a ‘Turkic 
world’…. Instead, it tried to reach the target by using such an obscure motto as 
                                               
31 One interesting acknowledgement of the utopian nature of notions of the Turkic world 
can be found in reference to the youth wing of Turkey’s ultra-nationalist National Action 
Party, Grey Wolves (Bozkurtlar), whose platform calls for the establishment of greater 
Turkistan, or Turan and whose members, inspired by the writings of renowned pan-
Turkists Ziya Gökalp and Nihal Atsız, have adopted the moniker “idealists” (ülkücüler). 
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“brotherhood of Turks’” (2001:150).  Başlamış’ critique echoes a larger trend toward 
national introspection on the part of Turkish politicians, scholars, and journalists seeking 
to understand the clear preference among the Turkic peoples for national over 
supranational identification.  This discussion of “what went wrong” was ongoing 
throughout my fieldwork, with contributors suggesting that not only did the notion of a 
“brotherhood of Turks” raise concerns within the Central Asian republics where pan-
Turkism had been discredited as a “bourgeoise” and “racist” ideology by the Soviet state 
(e.g., Landau 1995b), but also that Ankara’s emphasis on “Turkic brotherhood” in its 
foreign relations with the Turkic republics of Central Asia evoked a sense of “familial 
hierarchy” which was even more troubling to Central Asian leaders and their publics.  As 
contacts between the governments of Turkey and the Turkic republics, as well as their 
respective peoples increased, Central Asian statesmen soon began to suspect that implicit 
within Turkish rhetoric of kardeşlık (brotherhood) was the notion of ağabeylik (elder 
brotherhood) and hence the concept of “first among equals”--a concept with which they 
were all too familiar from Soviet times.  This was particularly clear in Turkish 
politicians’ efforts to rally support for the notion that their country might serve as a 
“model” for democratic development within the Turkic republics (e.g., Mango 1993, 
Aydın 2003a).   
Although the Turkic leaders initially seemed to accept a sense of kinship based on 
common cultural values between their citizens and those of the Turkish republic, and thus 
a limited notion of the Turkic world as a “wider ethnic Turkic umbrella” (Winrow 
1998:108) and even joined in expressions of kinship with Turkey, particularly when it 
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served their purposes (Landau 1995b, Winrow 1998, Başlamış 2001), they were 
nonetheless leery of once again falling prey to the “‘elder brother’ chauvinistic attitude 
which presented Russians as the leading ethnic group of the Soviet Union” (Glenn 
1999:79).  Furthermore, the concept of ağabeylik carries the connotation of patronage, or 
otherwise stated, the expectation that the elder brother will take responsibility for the 
welfare of the younger brother, assisting him financially and introducing him into the 
appropriate social networks to ensure his future success.  With increased contact between 
Turkey and the Turkic republics, it quickly became clear that not only had Turkey over-
obligated itself financially (Turan and Turan 1998), but also that Ankara’s access to and 
influence within the international community had been overstated.  Thus, Ankara’s 
persistent efforts to extend and expand its influence in the region was disproportionate to 
its means and the promise Turkey represented for leading the Turkic republics toward 
economic prosperity and Western integration was exaggerated.  In response, Turkic 
leaders reacted against perceived demonstrations of Turkish ağabeylik by questioning 
Ankara’s authority and ability to guide their development and expressing their 
unwillingness to once again play subaltern to a more powerful state (Başlamış 2001, 
Aydın 2003a).  This reaction is best summed up by a catchphrase I often heard repeated: 
“Russia played the big brother to us more than enough. We have no desire for another big 
brother” (“Rusya bize yeterince ağabeylik yaptı. Biz artık ağabey istemiyoruz”).   
Thus, although the Turkic world is notionally conceived in utopian terms as a 
“community of brothers,” it has become increasingly clear that this notion of brotherhood 
is perceived differently by its constituent peoples and hence poses a number of practical 
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problems as a basis for Turkic rapprochement.  Within the putative Turkic world, the 
term brotherhood raised, by turns, notions of fraternity, but also of racial chauvinism, and 
of equality, but also familial hierarchy.  Such disparities in interpretation, in turn, may 
serve to explain why attempts at unifying the Turkic peoples, culturally or politically, ran 
aground as utopian ideals and their pragmatic implications for modern relations were 
questioned, contested, and reconceived.  In the end, however, the notion of brotherhood 
remains relevant insofar as fraternity, and such related concepts as mutual intelligibility, 
whether asserted or contested, permeated all aspects of relations within the Turkic world 
from state-level diplomatic and economic relations to private-sector business deals and 
academic negotiations over linguistic and orthographic reform. 
Despite the entwined nature of the emergence of nationalist and supranationalist 
ideology, however, it nonetheless stands to reason that in extending a paradigm 
developed to describe national groupings to supranational groupings, certain differences 
in the “style of imagining” will emerge.  Thus, while the sense of fraternity which lies at 
the heart of a supranational Turkic identity accords well with Anderson’s notion of 
nationalist imagining, other features Anderson identifies, while still salient, require some 
reconceptualization when applied to supranationalist imagining.  Thus, for example, 
while supranational groupings, like nations, are undoubtedly limited insofar as they are 
not imagined as “coterminous with mankind” (1983:7) given that they cannot, by 
definition, be limited by national borders “beyond which lie other nations” (1983:7), 
other parameters must substitute.  In this sense, the defining characteristics of the 
supranational group imagined on the basis of shared ethnicity, or its component 
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attributes--language, race, history, religion and culture--which are likewise frequently 
mobilized singly or in various combinations in the formation of national identity, and 
which Blommaert and Verschueren (1998) identify as a “feature cluster” underpinning 
national distinctiveness and separability, must assume the full burden of defining the 
group and distinguishing the imagined “self” from the imagined “other.”  Thus, as noted 
above, although the imagined geographic extent of the Turkic world has remained 
relatively consistent over the centuries, it is the shared sociocultural attributes of the 
peoples occupying that geographical expanse, rather than the territory itself, that lie at the 
heart of conceptualizations of the Turkic world and that, therefore, constitute its limits.   
Insofar as I have already suggested that the Turkic world has largely been 
conceived of as a broad language community, I would, at this juncture, take the 
opportunity to reinforce this position by pointing to Blommaert and Verschueren’s (1998) 
suggestion that language plays a key role in the national “feature cluster,” such that 
shared language automatically implies all other attributes and, hence, avows nationhood.  
This presumption, while discovered to be a key feature of European nationalist ideology, 
nonetheless seems to accord well with the incredible sociocultural diversity extant within 
the supranational Turkic world in which, for example, the Shi’ite Azerbaijanis, animistic 
Yakuts, and Christian Gagauz--all marked exceptions from the overwhelming prevalence 
of Sunni Islam among the Turkic peoples--are nonetheless included by virtue of linguistic 
pedigree, because, as I was told time and time again: “A Turk is anyone who speaks a 
language or dialect belonging to the Turkic language family.”  The perception of 
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linguistic kinship, then, plays a key role in delineating the limits of the imagined Turkic 
world as, indeed, shared language defines the bounds of the individual Turkic nations.  
Since nationality forms the hegemonic political-ideological system of the modern 
age in much the same way that religious community and dynastic realm did in centuries 
past (Anderson 1983), such defining attributes of national consciousness resonate with 
potential members of an ethnicity-based supranational community who, as citizens of 
modern nations, are already familiar with their unifying potential.  Nonetheless, in aid of 
fostering supranational consciousness, the attributes chosen to delimit such a 
supranational collective must be detached from their accepted role in nationalist 
imagining and imbued with an alternate, albeit parallel, meaning that enables their 
reconceptualization in the service of imagining a broader supranational identity.  In 
essence, then, I suggest that because national and supranational communities derived 
from the same broad ethnie employ the same attributes as building blocks, these attributes 
become floating signifiers32--in the sense that a single signifier is understood to have 
multiple or shifting signifieds depending on time, place and the idiosyncrasies of 
individual perception.  As such, these attributes can be invested with differential 
meaning, thereby allowing them to be rallied in the service both of nationalism and 
supranationalism.   
Thus, in the case of the Turkic world, the possibility exists for prospective 
members of the putative supranational community to encourage supranational 
                                               
32 For a more detailed description of the genesis of the concept of a “floating signifier,” 
please see footnote 117 on page 403. 
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consciousness by characterizing shared attributes broadly, in order to highlight 
commonality across difference in service of the supranational ideal, or narrowly, in order 
to eschew supranational consciousness by highlighting difference across commonality in 
service of national distinctiveness.  In this sense, even the act of naming their national 
languages, which will discussed at greater length in chapter four, offers the Turkic 
peoples, as prospective members of the Turkic world, a choice between naming 
conventions that emphasize similarities--e.g., Azerbaijan Turkish (Azerbaycan Türkçesi), 
Kazakh Turkish (Qazaq Türkçesi), and Uzbek Turkish (O‘zbek Türkchesi)--or highlight 
differences--e.g., Azerbaijani (Azerbaycanca), Kazakh language (Qazaq tili), and Uzbek 
(O‘zbekcha)--across the supranational collective.  In the first set of examples, the Turkic 
languages are each understood to be subsets of Turkish, thereby suggesting supranational 
consciousness, whereas in the second series, this connection is elided and the languages 
appear autonomous, as befits the distinctiveness of individual nations. 
Returning now to Anderson’s paradigm, it is in the third feature that Anderson 
identifies as constituent of the style of imagining apropos to modern nation-states, 
namely sovereignty, that the style in which supranational and national communities are 
imagined most differs.  While decision-making power in supranational collectives is 
delegated to central institutions on defined matters of joint interest and some measure of 
sovereignty is thus ceded, true sovereignty continues to reside with the independent 
member nations, as is enshrined in Article two of the United Nations Charter.  In this 
sense, while advocates of a unified Turkic world, both in its historical and contemporary 
incarnations, have no doubt “dream[t] of [its] being free” (Anderson 1983:7), there have 
 119 
been only four brief windows during which time the Turkic world might have achieved 
sovereignty as a (supra)national collective, and sovereignty has proven ever more elusive.   
Bennigsen describes the seven months following the overthrow of the czar in the 
February Revolution of 1917 and just prior to the Bolsheviks’ seizure of power in the 
October Revolution of the same year as the period when the Turkic world came closest to 
achieving sovereignty.  It was during this interlude in governance, when “the wildest 
dreams of autonomy or even independence were possible” (1985:42), that the All Russian 
Muslim Congress of May 1917 was convened for the purpose of allowing some 800-900 
delegates from throughout the empire to discuss issues of collective identity and address 
the matter of state administration.  Debates pitted the “unionist” camp, led by the Tatars, 
which advocated cultural autonomy in the form of a single unified Turkic nation (a 
federation) existing within a centralized Russian state against the “localist” camp, headed 
up by the Azerbaijanis, which championed the notion of a single Turkic nation composed 
of several states (a confederation).  In the end, the localists prevailed, but an important 
concession to the notion of a unitary Turkic nation was made in the form of a decision to 
create a central federal administration that would ensure unity within the Russian Turkic 
world.  The Central National Council (Milli Merkezi Shura) and several associated 
administrative bodies were quickly formed, but these nascent efforts were quashed by the 
outbreak of the October Revolution which effectively dashed all hopes of political 
autonomy for the Turkic peoples of Russia for the next seventy odd years.   
In addition to this liminal period in the history of the Turkic peoples, Landau 
(1988) identifies two further lost opportunities for the Turkic world to achieve 
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sovereignty.  He argues that cataclysmic changes wrought by the first and second world 
wars upset the international order to such an extent that pan-Turkists in Turkey might 
have been able to realize their irredentist ambitions in the creation of a territorially vast 
and politically sovereign union of Turkic peoples.  Pan-Turkism was very much a part of 
the political milieu in the Ottoman empire in the years leading up to the outbreak of 
World War I, and the ruling Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) counted a number 
of prominent pan-Turkists in their ranks dedicated to the notion of Turkish manifest 
destiny over the Turkic lands of Central Asia.  This vision of creating a sovereign Turkic 
empire reportedly influenced Ottoman military strategy, resulting in successful 
engagements on the eastern (Russian) front, but the empire’s demise ultimately thwarted 
any ambitions to territorially unite the Turkic world.   
In the aftermath of World War I, pan-Turkism faded in importance as members of 
the CUP were court-martialed and attention quickly turned to salvaging the nation from 
partition by the Allied Powers.  Victory in the Turkish war of independence and the 
subsequent establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 further solidified this trend, 
and elements of pan-Turkist ideology were co-opted into Turkish nationalist thought, 
thereby sidelining pan-Turkism (Landau 1995a).  Thus, while the outbreak of World War 
II offered a second opportunity for the creation of a sovereign Turkic world, which pan-
Turkists in Turkey sought to capitalize on by “calling loudly for Turkey’s intervention in 
the war, with the declared intent of destroying the Soviet Union, liberating the Turks and 
creating a far-flung new Turkish state with a vast population” (Landau 1988:3), the 
Kemalist state abjured.  In September 1944, 23 individuals accused of disseminating 
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racist and pan-Turanist ideas and plotting to overthrow the Turkish government were put 
on trial for treason (Henderson 1945), effectively spelling the end of political pan-
Turkism in Turkey and hence the dream of a sovereign Turkic state.   
The progressive disintegration of the Soviet Union beginning in 1989 likewise led 
certain politically peripheral groups in Turkey and among the Turkic peoples to revive 
the dream of uniting the Turkic world in a sovereign geopolitical union.  For the most 
part, however, the emphasis on post-Soviet rapprochement among the Turkic peoples has 
been on “cultural cooperation rather than on political irredentism” (Landau 1995a:4).  To 
a large extent, this is a pragmatic decision.  Ankara’s first contacts with the Turkic world 
were circumspect, indicative of a hard-earned respect for Soviet power, and within a 
relatively short time, and certainly before a consolidated foreign policy toward the ex-
Soviet Turkic peoples could be formulated, Turkish officials were faced with the fait 
accompli of independent nations.  Even had these fledgling nations been willing to cede 
their nascent sovereignty for a place in a larger union of Turkic peoples, it is unlikely that 
the international community, in which race-based politics raises the unpleasant specter of 
Nazism, would have brooked it.   
The notion of a unified, sovereign Turkic world was thus forsaken in the name of 
sovereignty for its constituent nations, political cooperation, and cultural solidarity--the 
last of which has itself proved contentious insofar as even the prospect of sociocultural 
union, pursued first through language and orthography, seemed to demand that the 
nascent Turkic nations cede some measure of control over these crucial symbolic 
components of national identity formation.  In the end, this proved to be a concession that 
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they were largely unwilling to countenance, thereby contributing to the failed realization 
of the Turkic world concept.  In this sense, the notion of sovereignty, while more fully 
actualized in the national context, nonetheless remains important, if only within a more 
limited scope, to the imagining of the supranational.  Moreover, while contestation over 
issues of sovereignty have been highlighted in accounts of political and economic 
relations in the post-Cold War era Turkic world and play an important role in linguistic 
and sociocultural relations, I would nonetheless argue that contestation over sovereignty 
is largely prefigured by disparities in the ways in which the national and the supranational 
are imagined as fraternal and limited.   
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Chapter Three:  The Early Turkic Language Congresses: Politics and 
Ideology in the Quest to Create a Common Turkic Alphabet and Lingua 
Franca 
 
Since the collapse of the bi-polar world, we are forced to rethink a number of topics with 
which we are faced in this uncertain environment.  We begin by approaching them here 
through the business of alphabet, or alfabe (although you could just as easily say Abece 
or Elifba)33….  We can look at alphabets from the perspective of avenues that open the 
way to cultural assets.  The adoption of an alphabet resembling our own by the Turkish 
speaking peoples would expand Turkey’s cultural field of influence.  This is a situation 
which should be the cause for both celebration and preparation. (İki kutuplu dünyanın 
yıkılmasından sonra karşımıza çıkan belirsizlik ortamında birçok konuyu sil baştan 
yeniden düşünmek zorunda kalıyoruz.  Birçok konuya işin alfabesinden (Abece yada 
Elifba’sından da diyebilirsiniz) başlıyoruz…. Alfabelere kültürel malların üzerinde yol 
alacakları caddeler gözüyle bakabılırız. Bizimkine benzer bir alfabenin Türkçe konuşan 
halklar tarafından evrensel olarak kabul edilmesi, Türkiye’nin kültürel etki alanını 
genişletecektir. Bu sevinilmesi ve hazırlanılması gereken bir durumdur.) 
 
Haluk Şahin 
The Alphabet for the Job (İşin Alfabesi)34 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1990-1991, as the Soviet Union teetered on the verge of collapse and the 
Turkic republics were on the cusp of declaring independence, a series of Turkic linguistic 
congresses were organized in Turkey which sought to expand the notion of social 
                                               
33 Abece (phonetic for ABC) is another term for alphabet employed in Turkish.  Elifba 
(phonetic for AB) is the Arabic word for “alphabet” employed in many of the Turkic 
languages of Central Asia and the Caucasus peoples, although some employ the Russian 
term алфавит (“alfavit”).  Despite their origins in different languages, alphabet, alfabe, 
elifba, abece, and alfavit all derive either from the pronunciation of the first two or three 
letters of the alphabet or from the names of those letters in the respective languages. 
34 The article from which this quote was taken appeared in Cumhuriyet November 27, 
1991, p.3. 
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consolidation through linguistic means from its more traditional role in the nation-
building process to a broader function in the service of supranational affiliation, through 
the formulation of a common Turkic alphabet (ortak alfabe) which would serve as the 
foundation for the creation of a common Turkic language (ortak dil) designed to 
linguistically unite the Turkic peoples.  Although the Turkic world had been conceived of 
as a “linguistic community” for nearly a century, albeit largely in abstentia and in the 
hearts and minds of its transnational and expatriate elite, the political dynamics of the 
Cold War era had not only prevented contact of any kind between Anatolian Turks and 
the Soviet Turkic peoples but had also contributed to the development of systemic 
differences among the Turkic languages that ultimately called into question the very basis 
for imagining the Turkic world as a language community.  The ortak alfabe and ortak dil 
projects were thus designed to overcome patent communication divides, bringing the 
“real” in line with the “ideal” and reconstituting the Turkic peoples as a “proper” 
language community.  
Although the ostensible goal of the paired linguistic projects was thus to improve 
both written and spoken communication among the various Turkic peoples, and Turkish 
organizers mostly steered away from issues of a political nature in a deliberate effort to 
avoid framing linguistic rapprochement as a political enterprise lest the still extant, albeit 
much diminished, Soviet machine take umbrage or the effort fall victim to infighting bred 
of disparate political agendas among its participants, the larger political nature of the 
enterprise was lost on neither the organizers nor the delegates, as emerged in their 
discourse both directly and indirectly.  In this sense, although sociolinguistic research has 
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long since demonstrated that sharing linguistic form and structure does not necessarily 
entail a mutual understanding of use conventions, and thus does not a “community” 
make, the “identification of a language with a people and a consequent diagnosis of 
peoplehood by the criterion of language” (Woolard 1998:16), is such a powerful 
construct and so “globally hegemonic” that possession of a shared language is generally 
perceived as sufficient evidence of status as a distinct ethnic group with the presumed 
commonalities of descent, history, culture, and religion thereby implied (Bloomaert and 
Verscheren 1998).  Thus, the organizing presupposition of the early linguistic congresses 
was that standardization of orthographic and linguistic structure among the Turkic 
languages would allow latent linguistic congruences to emerge thereby clarifying the 
basis of the Turkic peoples’ claim to supranational peoplehood. 
 
THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THE ORTAK ALFABE AND ORTAK DIL PROJECTS 
From an analytical perspective, the ortak alfabe and ortak dil projects can be 
approached in several different ways which, in combination, enable an explication of 
both the initial objective of linguistic rapprochement and the larger overarching goal of 
eventual sociocultural, and even geopolitical, union within the Turkic world and thus 
provide a deeper understanding of the broader dynamics of relations in the post-Soviet 
era.  First, the paired linguistic projects must be situated within complementary academic 
and activist discourses on language planning and language policy.  Within language 
planning scholarship, the body of research that is most salient to an exploration of the 
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ortak alfabe and ortak dil projects takes as its subject what has been dubbed “the ‘first 
congress’ phenomenon” in the belief that this “earliest stage of language planning” 
provides valuable insights into the entire language planning process.  Much of the 
research in this vein is collected in a volume solicited and edited by language planning’s 
foremost figure Joshua Fishman who, in introducing the volume, writes: 
 
The various models of the language planning flow-chart… all posit a beginning 
stage at which time no authoritative policy decisions have yet been reached.  First 
congresses pertain to just such a ‘pre-natal’ or embryonic stage…. It is primarily 
because of its explicit recognition of this early and formative stage, indeed, 
perhaps even just the beginning of this earliest stage, that the study of first 
congresses may constitute a conceptually and strategically worthwhile step ahead 
in the ongoing efforts to better understand the entire language planning process 
flow-chart.  The decisions and the errors that constitute this stage may long 
remain to guide and to complicate the subsequent stages of the entire process… 
(1993a:2-3).   
 
While Fishman’s explicit purpose in examining the first congress phenomenon as 
an entrée to a deeper understanding of later stages of language planning and hence the 
language planning process as a whole is undoubtedly a worthwhile theoretical endeavor 
unto itself, there are, as I see it, several ways in which insights derived from the study of 
first linguistic congresses can be positioned within and thus usefully contribute to broader 
academic discourses on the nature and social purposes of institutional and oppositional 
language management and linguistic intervention (Williams 1992, Blommaert 1996).  To 
do so, it is first necessary to identify some areas in which extant literature on language 
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planning and policy might be undertheorized or too narrowly focused and could thus be 
usefully expanded upon.   
To begin with, I would emphasize that as presently theorized, the study of 
language planning, and certainly that of first congresses, tends to focus on linguistic 
purification and standardization efforts organized at the national or subnational stratum.  
In fairness, this theoretical focus follows from reality, insofar as most language planning 
efforts and first congresses are themselves organized by state actors in the name of 
nation-building or national consolidation or by activists representing subnational groups 
that aspire to ethnic autonomy or recognition as independent “nations.”  Here we see the 
influence of the “globally hegemonic” equation of a language with a people on 
theoretical paradigms (Le Page 1988, Romaine 1989), such that language activists 
operating within the purview of the nationstate or on behalf of subnational groups, as 
well as those who study their efforts, conceive of language planning as based in the 
identity politics of nationhood.  As a result, the dynamics of transnational or 
supranational language planning, based on a concept of peoplehood that transcends 
national borders, is left unexplored.  In this sense, analysis of the early Turkic linguistic 
congresses offers a hitherto unexamined look at the dynamics of a series of early 
linguistic congresses aimed at promoting supranational ethnolinguistic, sociocultural, and 
geopolitical consolidation.   
Second, I would suggest that that an approach to first congresses that defines them 
as the “earliest” stage of language planning tends to presume that there will be 
subsequent stages, or, put another way, that the “decisions and errors” made at this initial 
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stage are not so grave as to bring the entire endeavor to an abortive halt.  Indeed, if not 
from a language planning standpoint, then from the broader perspective of linguistic 
anthropology, the failure of a first congress to achieve its declared aims makes it no less 
worthy of study than first congresses that succeed in this regard, for if putative success 
speaks to the social environment that permitted the first congress to reach its objectives, 
so too failure speaks to the sociocultural, historical and political conditions that mitigated 
against such objectives being reached.35  Third, and relatedly, because language planning 
is a socially embedded practice in which not just language, but also aspects of the social 
world that are implicitly or explicitly linked through beliefs and attitudes to language, are 
actively negotiated, I would argue that it is possible for “decisions and errors” made in 
the earliest phase of language planning to influence not just subsequent stages of the 
language planning process, but also the course of the ambient sociopolitical dynamics 
that contributed to this situated (re)examination of linguistic practice and policy.  This, 
then, is true regardless of whether the congress failed to achieve its ostensible goal.  
In the following analysis of the early Turkic linguistic congresses, I suggest just 
that, arguing that not only did the “decisions and errors” that emerged in the discourse of 
delegates fatally complicate the continuation of any concerted language planning efforts 
                                               
35 Although Fishman does mention the “question of ‘success,’” he does so only in the 
context of tentatively (given the inability to prove causality) establishing a typology that 
correlates success with “type of first congress sponsorship,” noting that whereas nearly 
all first congresses convened by oppositional nationalists must be counted as successful 
by some measure, more than half of those organized by governments have “been 
overtaken by negative events.” 
 129 
to unite the Turkic world36 and bring a halt to official and explicit linguistic 
rapprochement,37 but that these initial misunderstandings and missteps, rather than simply 
reflecting the fate of subsequent broader efforts toward sociocultural and geopolitical 
rapprochement with the Turkic world, profoundly influenced their course, direction, and 
dynamics.  While ultimate causality is difficult to prove in an environment characterized 
by the conjuncture of sociocultural and political upheaval such as marked the realignment 
of the world order in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse--and I should 
emphasize that I do not here seek to suggest absolute causality, only robust influence--the 
study of situated linguistic politics emerging during bounded discursive events set within 
the context of a major realignment in the ambient sociopolitical milieu nonetheless offers 
a largely undertheorized, locally salient, micro-level understanding of events that serve to 
dispute facile social, political, and economic explanations of broader macro-level 
geopolitical forces.  In particular, I suggest that the insights into the relationship between 
localized linguistic conflicts and broader sociopolitical discourses gleaned from an 
analysis of the metalinguistic dynamics of the early Turkic linguistic congresses poses a 
hitherto unprecedented challenge to prevailing explanations, that tend to depict Turkey’s 
                                               
36 Although there have been sporadic and scattered continued discussions of creating an 
ortak alfabe and ortak dil at various linguistic and Turkic world congresses, conferences, 
and symposiums, it can no longer be said to be a concerted effort. 
37 Although some measure of de facto linguistic rapprochement has been accomplished 
through Turkish media, Turkish schools, Turkish businesses, and Turkish government 
programs to bring exchange students from Central Asia to study in Turkey, the influence 
is limited and rapprochement is constrained to the Turkic peoples’ becoming more 
familiar with the Turkish spoken in Turkey and thus cannot be said to have brought about 
the kind of linguistic rapprochement envisioned by the ortak alfabe and ortak dil projects.  
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failure to effect the consolidation of the post-Soviet Turkic world in ways initially 
envisioned as both psychosocially desirable to Turkish ethnonationalist sentiments and 
politically beneficial to the country’s regional image and international prestige, as 
revolving around a lack of political will or financial wherewithal.   
The ability for this earliest stage of language planning to transform aspects of the 
social environment in which it emerges, whether positively or negatively, is, I argue, 
largely attributable to the inherently ideological nature of the first language congress 
which is convened under the presumption that addressing what ails language will 
ultimately contribute to resolving society’s own ills.  Although scholarship on this 
earliest stage of language planning (Fishman 1993c) offers detailed descriptions of the 
sociopolitical context in which first congresses are convened and the social and political 
uses to which they are put that implicitly recognize linkages between language and the 
social world, such scholarship does not generally take an explicitly linguistic ideologies 
approach, and the specific ways in which language attitudes and beliefs mediate between 
linguistic usage and broader sociopolitical discourses consequently remains 
undertheorized.  One notable exception, discussed at greater length below, is Errington’s 
(1998) analysis of the First Javanese Language Congress.   
Nonetheless, a comparative perspective on first language congresses does lend 
itself to certain generalizations which ultimately enable Fishman to postulate a broad 
ideological precept that underpins all first congresses, as indeed it does the early Turkic 
linguistic congresses.  Reexamining the widespread assertion within the language 
planning literature that language planning is pursued with the aim of resolving 
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“problems” within a language (e.g., Fishman 1974b, Jernudd and Das Gupta 1971, 
Weinstein 1980), he writes:   
 
[With regard to first congresses], it may be desirable to stress that not only are we 
dealing with languages with self-declared problems but that, in most cases, we are 
also dealing with problematic languages vis-à-vis stronger neighboring languages 
and that the latter, let us call them Y languages in order to distinguish them from 
the X languages themselves, although not always officially on the agenda of the 
“First Congress for Language X”, are never unrecognizably far in the background, 
never so far behind the scenes that their problem-causing presence is not felt by 
one and all… (1993b:334, emphasis in orginal). 
 
Fishman goes on to argue that as a result of the latent focus on Language Y, first 
language congresses, even if ostensibly convened to address issues of corpus planning 
within Language X (i.e., prescriptive intervention in the structure of a language that 
generally takes the form of graphization, standardization, or modernization), are also 
invariably, if sometimes latently, concerned with status planning (i.e., establishing 
language status, generally through the allocation of languages to different functional 
domains of use).  In Fishman’s own words:   
 
It is no tautology, therefore, to point out that [first congresses deal with] status 
planning, even when corpus planning is officially on the agenda, and that [they] 
are generally among the means by which contextually problematic languages are 
straining toward societal solutions to the larger-than-language problems that 
surround them (1993b:335). 
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Fishman’s suggestion that an underlying concern among participants in first 
congresses with the “Language Y” factor ultimately reframes corpus-related issues as 
status-related concerns thus opens the way for conceptualizing the problems of linguistic 
form and structure “faced by language X, its speech community or its authorities” 
(1993b:334) as perceived problems informed by values, attitudes, and beliefs toward 
language and language usage which ultimately have more to do with ambient social 
problems that have been mapped onto language than putative corpus-related problems 
with the language per se.  Put another way, in first congresses, we see a projection of 
ambient identity politics onto linguistic form.  
While this apparently universal “Language Y” precept that characterizes first 
congressed is abundantly evident in the early Turkic linguistic congresses, as will be 
addressed below, other historically, socioculturally, and politically more specific 
ideologies of language also emerge in the discourse of delegates and participants, which 
collectively contribute to an understanding of the specific ways in which the early Turkic 
linguistic congresses, in attempting to address the “problems” faced by the Turkic 
languages simultaneously sought resolution of the “larger-than-language problems” that 
had emerged in the post-Soviet era.  In terms of formulating these more specific links 
between putative linguistic problems and the broader social context of their emergence, 
work within the field of language ideology offers useful inroads.  Within this theoretical 
perspective, Errington’s (1998) study of the First Javanese Language Congress convened 
during an era of Indonesian national development marked, in particular, by the 
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“miraculous” development of the Indonesian language as a national lingua franca and 
explicit index of the nationalizing project of the Indonesian state is particularly salient. 
Noting the ways in which language development, once considered of “marginal” 
concern when juxtaposed against such “core” problems of development as technological, 
political, and economic modernization, is now foregrounded in contemporary ethno-
nationalist struggles for autonomy, Errington examines the continuing salience of 
discourses of development in Indonesia’s ongoing nationalizing project within a 
challenge to the status of the state-sanctified, non-ethnic national lingua franca posed by 
“a concerted, institutional effort to mitigate putatively pernicious side effects of 
Indonesia’s successful development in Javanese linguistic and cultural heritage” 
(1998:278).  In particular, he argues that within the context of state control over linguistic 
aspects of Indonesian national development, the concluding resolution of the Javanese 
Language Congress to grant the Department of Education and Culture the mandate to 
develop a standardized version of the Javanese language appropriate for school 
instruction brought the ethnic language of the country’s colonial nobles and 
contemporary military, business, and political elite under the aegis of the state and hence 
positioned it for “a new symbolic role as neotraditional source of legitimacy for New 
Order goals and decisions” (1998:279).  The salience of the Javanese Language 
Congress, Errington concludes, lies in its occupying and constituting  
 
…an intermediate space, mediating between the ‘individualized, habitual’ sphere 
of talk, on one hand, and ‘solemn and higher institutions’ of the New Order state, 
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on the other.  If it offers a convincing entrée to broader issues of Development, 
writ small and large, then it suggests the salience of ‘language’ for understandings 
of ‘discourse’ and the critical study of the ideological framings through which 
global forces called Development or Modernization impinge on and are mediated 
in communities and lives (1998:282, emphasis in original).  
 
By exploring the process by which the linguistic ideologies informing institutional 
language-oriented events serve to link macro-level concerns of institutions to the micro-
level concerns of linguistic practitioners and activists, Errington’s analysis suggests a 
useful approach to exploring the influence of overarching sociopolitical discourses on 
locally situated linguistic politics.  From the perspective of the early Turkic linguistic 
congresses, such an approach provides a means for unpacking broad discourses of 
nationalism and pan-Turkism by exploring the complexities of their local interpretation 
as embodied within a series of bounded, yet interlinked, discursive events dealing, 
explicitly, with language rapprochement and, implicitly, with sociocultural affiliation and 
geopolitical unification within the post-Soviet Turkic world.   
Complementary to scholarship in language ideology that explicitly explores the 
role of language values, attitudes, and beliefs in mediating between linguistic practice and 
the social world, as well as to literature pertaining to the social and political nature of 
language planning, is Harold Schiffman’s work on language policy, particularly his 
concept of “linguistic culture,” which while not specifically grounded in the language 
ideologies perspective, is defined in much the same terms as “the set of behaviors, 
assumptions, cultural forms, prejudices, folk belief systems, attitudes, stereotypes, ways 
of thinking about language, and religio-historical circumstances associated with a 
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particular language” (1998a:5).  Schiffman’s approach to language policy is theoretically 
grounded first, in a rejection of the general tendency to equate language policy and 
language practice (i.e., the assumption that official language policy accurately reflects the 
reality of on-the-ground linguistic usage) and second, in a belief in the congruence of 
policy and polity, or the notion that the language policy which applies within any given 
polity is in keeping with the historical, social and political development of that polity, 
albeit not in a deterministic Whorfian sense.   
In developing his overarching theory that “language policies do not evolve ex 
nihilo; they are not taken off a shelf, dusted off, and plugged into a particular polity; 
rather they are cultural constructs, and are rooted in and evolve from historical elements 
of many kinds” (1998a:280, emphasis in original), Schiffman notes that “language policy 
seems to be dichotomized into overt (explicit, formalized, de jure, codified, manifest) 
policies and covert (implicit, informal, unstated, de facto, grass-roots, latent) aspects of 
the policy” (1998a:13, emphasis in original).  Arguing that overt and covert language 
policies often do not coincide, Schiffman makes specific reference to tsarist Russia, 
noting that while the de jure policy was of “Russian only,” the de facto situation was 
quite different.  Thus, although the Potemkin illusion of “Russian only” prevailed on the 
surface, varied applications of the policy abounded (e.g., exemptions granted to the 
Finnish and Swedish languages, while even more restrictive policies were applied to the 
Turkic languages) and local deviations from the policy were rampant (e.g., school 
teachers in Poland taught covertly in Polish while overtly toeing the “Russian only” party 
line).   
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Despite shifts in political ideology and linguistic policy, similar rifts in policy and 
practice appear to have prevailed under Soviet rule, and the subsequent failure of the 
Soviet language policy seems to reinforce Schiffman's assertion that an overt policy 
“never succeeds in superseding the underlying ideas about language” (1998a:74).  Here, 
however, I would suggest a more nuanced reading of the effects of linguistic policy on 
linguistic culture among the Turkic peoples of the former Soviet Union.  While agreeing 
with Schiffman’s assessment that language use in the former Soviet Union was often at 
variance with overt policy--although the extent to which this was the case varied from 
republic to republic and was subject to elite/masses and rural/urban divides--I would 
suggest that this ought not be taken for evidence of the untouched persistence of local 
linguistic culture.  
In short, numerous conversations over many years of fieldwork lead me to argue, 
that despite the emphasis placed on the “national” languages during the first phase of 
Soviet linguistic policy, the Central Asian elite chose to send their children to Russian-
language schools not only as a result of a pragmatic calculation that knowledge of 
Russian would provide them better opportunities but also out of a sense that Russian was 
an “international” and “cultured” language and therefore superior to the local Azerbaijani 
language--a perspective which rings of contemporary Russian claims, held over from the 
Soviet era and smacking of unvarnished racism, that the Central Asians had been 
“civilized” by their introduction to the Russian language.38  Thus, although many in post-
                                               
38 During stints of fieldwork in rural Azerbaijan in the mid 1990s, where Azeri was the 
unchallenged mode of communication, I was nonetheless struck by the respect and 
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Soviet Central Asia now tout the superiority of their eponymous tongues, Russian 
continues to hold sway as a language of culture even among the younger generations who 
have had ample opportunity to develop facility in and language loyalty toward their 
respective national languages.   
The more important effect of Soviet linguistic policies on the linguistic culture of 
the Turkic peoples was, however, in changing local understanding of the role of language 
planning and overt policy in broader social processes.  In short I would argue that Soviet 
linguistic policy, both overt and covert, eradicated pan-Turkic notions of ethnolinguistic 
commonality, replacing them, via the nationalities policies, with an ideological belief in 
the distinctiveness of the republican languages, which had been carefully developed by 
Soviet linguists to evince maximal distance from one another both linguistically and 
orthographically (c.f., chapter two).  This notion of bounded ethnolinguistic identity 
contrasted with the pan-Turkic ethnolinguistic consciousness purveyed by Gaspirali’s 
Tercüman during the pre-Soviet era, but has nonetheless persisted in the post-Soviet era, 
despite overt interest in the creation of a pan-Turkic ortak alfabe, as evinced in the deep 
concern of Turkic delegates to the early linguistic congresses over the loss of national 
linguistic distinctiveness entailed in the creation of a common Turkic alphabet.  Here I 
am reminded of a similar point about the subconscious adoption of dominant language 
ideologies by those subjected to them made by Alexandra Jaffe in a study of language 
                                                                                                                                            
deference shown those who spoke Russian.  Even though my Azeri was demonstrably 
better than my Russian, these individuals were inevitably trotted out to talk with me as an 
“honored foreign visitor” as if to prove that even in the backwaters they too were 
“cultured.”  This point thus proven, we all, my assigned ambassador included, inevitably, 
and quite relievedly, could revert to speaking Azeri.  
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politics on Corsica, in which she argues that Corsican language activists, in resisting the 
linguistic domination of the colonial French language, nonetheless adopted “its structures 
of value” (1996:23) in championing native language use.  Thus, for example, in 
organizing and introducing the Second Annual Corsican Spelling Contest, Corsican 
activists sought not only to promote a standardized orthography over regionally-
diversified spelling conventions but also to dismantle diglossia by demonstrating the 
capacity of a largely oral language to function respectably in institutional contexts (e.g., 
education, media) defined by literacy and hence generally reserved for French as the 
accepted high language.   
Regardless of the question of whether the overt can ever trump the covert, 
Schiffman’s concept of “linguistic culture” as the locus of language policy suggests a 
means of analyzing the ways in which conflicting language ideologies, or linguistic 
cultures, within a society--or, extrapolating beyond national borders, between societies--
may lead to disagreements concerning language-related issues that ultimately render 
pragmatic consensus over language policy and use difficult to achieve.  Seen from this 
perspective, it is possible to imagine that the “decisions and errors” of the early Turkic 
linguistic congresses, rather than simple misjudgments or missteps, may have derived 
from misalignments in perception and purpose attributable to divergent language 
ideologies, or the different linguistic cultures of Turkey and the Turkic republics, which 
became explicit, even if not always explicitly recognized, upon coming into contact, and 
hence conflict, in the context of attempts at establishing an ortak alfabe and ortak dil.   
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More broadly, then, the early linguistic congresses represent organized instances 
of first linguistic contact, indeed some of the first quasi-official contact of any kind, 
between the Turkish people and the Turkic peoples of the then soon-to-be-former Soviet 
Union.  Language contact has long been a topic of particular interest within the fields of 
linguistic anthropology and sociolinguistics where investigations of the dynamics of 
linguistic contact, particularly in multilingual communities in which struggles over 
identity politics are enacted through language, have demonstrated the salience of 
language values, attitudes, and beliefs by exploring the specific ways in which they are 
linked to broader social and political constructs, including, most notably, notions of 
ethnicity and nationalism (e.g., Woolard 1989a).   
More recent scholarship has positioned language contact within a language 
ideologies perspective, demonstrating the ways in which language is not only 
transformed by, but also transforms social relations (Silverstein 1998) and how changes 
in “linguistic structures, practices, and values” reflect, reinforce, and potentially 
revolutionize “presuppositions about social relations and social relations themselves” 
(Makihara and Schieffelin 2007:5).  In introducing a volume dedicated to investigating 
the effects of various forms of cross-cultural, often global, social contact on languages 
and their respective speakers in the Pacific islands from a language ideologies 
perspective, Makihara and Schieffelin argue that “processes of historical change have 
shaped and been shaped by linguistic ideologies” which she defines as “reflexive 
sensibilities about languages and language use, held by [native] peoples themselves” 
(2007:4).  They go on to suggest that linguistic ideologies are particularly developed in 
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the Pacific islands not only because language is an especially salient construct, playing a 
central role in the construction of self and the social world through the negotiation and 
maintenance of political and interpersonal relationships, but also by virtue of the 
extraordinary diversity of languages within the societies that comprise the Pacific islands, 
bringing languages, linguistic traditions, and language ideologies into continuous contact 
and frequent conflict.  The Pacific islands thus constitute a rich site for the study of 
language ideologies and sociocultural transformations, for, as Makihara and Schieffelin 
argue:   
 
Contexts in which language ideologies are in conflict often give rise to a higher 
degree of explicitness about underlying views and beliefs.  These are also the sites 
in which language ideologies are recalled or produced, made visible and audible, 
and their naturalness questioned, bringing us to what Giddens (1984) would call 
“discursive consciousness.” This is where processes of reconfiguration are often 
initiated (2007:15-16).   
 
Although the recent history of the Turkic world is defined more by lack of 
contact, linguistic or otherwise, than by the density of continuous linguistic contact that 
characterizes Pacific island communities, I would suggest that language nonetheless 
constitutes a “core value” (Smolicz 1979) in the imagination of the Turkic world--a belief 
in linguistic kinship being the primary means by which the notion of a great supranational 
collective of Turkic peoples survived for decades in the absence of social intercourse 
(c.f., chapter two).  Furthermore, I suggest that it is this decades-long gap in relations, 
which mitigates against any gradual mediation of divergent linguistic ideologies, 
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combined with a presumption, born of the absence of contact, that shared language 
attitudes of the past remain unchanged, that renders the early linguistic congresses such a 
potent site for studying the sociopolitical ramifications of conflicts in language ideology.  
In short, contact, whether of the sustained, centuries-long type observed in the 
Pacific islands, or the focused, event-driven type seen in the early Turkic linguistic 
congresses, brings language ideologies into conflict, making them explicit in ways that 
are generally masked in the absence of contact.  In this sense, the Birinci Türk Dili 
Kurultayı (First Turkish Language Congress) hereafter FTLC, the Milletlerarası Çağdaş 
Türk Alfabeleri Sempozyumu (International Contemporary Turkish Alphabets 
Symposium) hereafter ICTAS, and the Sürekli Türk Dili Kurultayı (Permanent Turkish 
Language Congress), hereafter PTLC, were instrumental not only in bringing together 
Turkish scholars and their Turkic counterparts for the purposes of creating an ortak 
alfabe and an ortak dil which was to pave the way for the eventual sociocultural and/or 
geopolitical unification of the Turkic world, but also in revealing differing approaches to 
language and orthography and conflicting understandings of their role in social 
consolidation, thereby creating the conditions by which the realization of a great 
ethnolinguistic, sociocultural, and geopolitical union of Turkic peoples envisioned by 
congress organizers and participants was ultimately precluded.  Seen from this 
perspective, it is possible to imagine that the “decisions and errors” of these early 
linguistic congresses, rather than representing simple misjudgments or missteps, may 
have been derivative of misalignments in perception and purpose attributable to divergent 
language ideologies, or different linguistic cultures, which upon coming into contact and 
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conflict and are hence made explicit, even if not explicitly recognized within the context 
of their emergence.   
 
OVERVIEW OF THE EARLY LINGUISTIC CONGRESSES OF THE POST-SOVIET TURKIC 
WORLD 
By 1989, the rapid opening of the Soviet Union under the twin policies of 
glasnost and perestroika39 allowed for renewed contact between the Turks of Turkey and 
the Turkic peoples of Central Asia, the Caucasus, and other regions of the U.S.S.R. for 
the first time in over seventy years.  In addition to enabling the cautious resumption of 
political, economic, and diplomatic relations between the Anatolian Turks and their 
Soviet Turkic cousins, this era of openness once again presented the opportunity for both 
sides to entertain the notion of sociocultural unification of Turkic peoples under the 
rubric of the “Turkic world.”  Language once more became a key aspect of sociocultural 
rapprochement, and linguistic divergences among the Turkic languages, which emerged 
at first contact and presented as patent barriers to effective communication, seemed to 
                                               
39 Glasnost is translated from the Russian as “openness.” It refers to a new government 
policy of transparency instituted by then General Secretary of the Communist Party and 
de facto leader of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, in an attempt to rein in endemic 
corruption within the top echelons of the Communist Party and Soviet government. 
Because it resulted in a decline in censorship, it is often popularly associated with 
freedom of speech.  Perestroika is translated from the Russian as “restructuring” and 
refers to the reorganization of the Soviet political and economic system introduced by 
Gorbachev and often identified as a main contributing factor to the collapse of 
communism.   
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render linguistic unification a key precursor to greater cultural and political 
rapprochement.   
While the Turkish Language Society (Türk Dil Kurumu, TDK) with its official 
mandate to regulate the Turkish language and support linguistic research on Turkish and 
the Turkic languages would have seemed the obvious choice to take the lead in 
negotiating matters of linguistic rapprochement with the Turkic peoples, it was actually 
the Ministry of Culture that seized the initiative, thereby further emphasizing the broader 
sociocultural dimensions of the ortak alfabe and ortak dil projects.  In September 1990, 
declaring that as an “organization with good intentions” (“iyi niyetli bir organizasyon”) it 
was taking up an issue which had long been a point of interest and great debate within the 
social life of the nation, Turkey’s Ministry of Culture convened the Birinci Türk Dili 
Kurultayı (FTLC) with the stated aim of fostering discussion over the “Turkish language 
and related issues” (“Türk dili ve meseleleri”).40   
As the first of the three early linguistic congresses, the First Turkish Language 
Congress set the tone for future events by revealing the ways in which assumptions about 
language and orthography revealed through the metalinguistic discourses of its organizers 
and participants were ideologically linked to social constructs that reflected broader 
ambient discourses about the Turkic world then current within Turkey.  Forty-one 
Turcologists and language experts from 37 Turkic regions were invited to join roughly 
450 Turkish participants at the congress in Ankara.  Only nine of the Turkic invitees 
                                               
40 The article from which these quotes were taken appeared in Millî Kültür November 
1990, No.78, p.2. 
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accepted, however, due, it seems, to the chaos of the era and an understandable reticence 
among some invitees who, having long endured the suspicion of the Soviet authorities for 
their interest in Turcology, later privately admitted an understandable concern over the 
potential ramifications of attending a Turcology congress in Turkey while the future of 
the Soviet Union remained uncertain.   
Although a good portion of the congress was devoted to issues related exclusively 
to Turkish, the Turkic peoples and their languages were spotlighted to a far greater 
degree than during the congress on the Turkish language convened in 1932 and also 
dubbed the First Turkish Language Congress (c.f., chapter two).  My focus here is on the 
“Turkic world” aspect of the congress.  Declaring in his opening address, that the Turkic 
world faced a “happy problem, fortunate affair” (“mutlu sorun – mesut mesele”), Minster 
of Culture Namik Kemal Zeybek defined the “happy” side of the conundrum as the 
opportunity afforded by developments in the Soviet Union to establish relations with the 
Turkish-speaking peoples, while suggesting that its “problematic” aspect sprang from the 
unwelcome discovery that current systemic differences in alphabet and writing posed a 
considerable impediment to communication amongst the Turkic peoples.  The “problem” 
that necessitated language planning was thus identified as disparities in orthographic 
usage among the Turkic peoples which masked the mutual intelligibility of the “Turkish 
language” (“Türkçe”) and the FTLC was thus cast as the first step toward resolving this 
problem and linguistically unifying the Turkic peoples. 
It is important here to emphasize that in this initial foray at characterizing the 
linguistic milieu of the post-Soviet era, as befit the title under which the congress was 
 145 
convened, Minister Zeybek cast the many Turkic languages spoken throughout the Turkic 
world as a single language--which he referred to by the name given the language spoken 
in modern-day Turkey, i.e., Turkish (Türkçe)--rather than a family of related Turkic 
languages (Türk dilleri).  The implication of this discursive choice was that the Turkic 
languages, much like the vernaculars of Turkey itself, were simply dialects of modern 
standard Turkish, with all the assumptions of authenticity, originality, authority, and 
primacy of the Turkish language thus entailed.  Although the import of Zeybek’s lexical 
choice was not to become clear until after the early linguistic congresses, and will thus be 
addressed in the following chapter, I mention it now because this early quasi-official 
characterization of their languages was to become a major grievance among the ex-Soviet 
Turkic peoples, by whom it was perceived as not simply a linguistic estimation, but also a 
social and political assessment, and hence constitute one of “decisions and errors” that 
ultimately resulted in the failure marked of the early linguistic congresses to effect 
linguistic rapprochement in the post-Soviet era. 
Aside from broadly identifying the issues of particular import in effecting 
linguistic rapprochement within the Turkic world and establishing commissions charged 
with investigating these issues--e.g., Türk Dünyasında Alfabe, İmla, Yazı Dili Meseleleri 
(Issues of Alphabet, Spelling, and Written Language in the Turkic World), Terim 
Meseleleri (Issues of Terminology), Türkçenin Araştırılması Meselesi (Issues of 
Researching Turkish)--little in the way of actual language planning was accomplished 
during the FTLC.  Nonetheless, this initial post-Soviet Turkic linguistic congress was 
instrumental in setting the stage for subsequent discourse about language, orthography, 
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and the politics of identity in the post-Soviet Turkic world, in which issues of mutual 
intelligibility first implied in Minister Zeybek’s opening remarks were to figure centrally.   
The following year, the Turcology Research Institute (Türkiyat Araştırmaları 
Enstitüsü) at Marmara University in Istanbul convened the Milletlerarası Çağdaş Türk 
Alfabeleri Sempozyumu (ICTAS).  From 18-20 November 1991, language professionals, 
including linguists, literature professors, writers, and literary critics, from each of the 
Turkic republics and many of the autonomous regions were invited to collaborate with 
Turkish counterparts in an initiative aimed at creating a common alphabet.  Twenty eight 
representatives of the Turkic republics and Turkic peoples41 participated in four sessions 
each hosted by a Turkish linguist.  The participants in each session presented 
communiqués on issues associated with alphabet in the Turkic world, after which the 
floor was opened to discussion.   
By restricting participation to language professionals, the symposium maintained 
a more rigorous academic tone which, in conjunction with its smaller size, ultimately 
fostered greater interaction and discussion amongst the delegates.  Paper presentations 
focused on the individual phonological characteristics of the many Turkic languages and 
the specific injury they had suffered from the imposition of an alphabet inadequate to 
represent their full phonological range.  The relative merits of various orthographic 
systems and their capacity to serve as a base for a common Turkic alphabet were debated, 
                                               
41 The Turkic republics are: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan.  The Turkic peoples are ethnically Turkic peoples who live under the 
auspices of a larger state, in this case, generally Russia or Soviet successor states--e.g., 
Gagauz, Tatars, Bashkurds, Chuvash, Ahıska, etc.   
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and several specific orthographic proposals were presented and discussed.  At the 
conclusion of the symposium, a vote was held on the adoption of a common alphabet and 
a decision on its proposed format reached.  Throughout the, presentations and follow-on 
discussions among delegates revealed many shared ideological assumptions about the 
nature of language and linguistic rapprochement, however differences of opinion also 
emerged, offering insight into several issues that not only bedeviled the ortak alfabe and 
ortak dil projects themselves but also foreshadowed difficulties encountered in broader 
efforts to unite the Turkic world culturally and politically.   
Of the three early linguistic congresses, ICTAS is, moreover, the one that most 
recalled an earlier watershed moment in the history of linguistic pan-Turkism, the 1926 
Baku Turcology Congress, not simply due to its professionally restricted attendance and 
greater representation from the Turkic peoples, but also by virtue of the general tenor of 
debate and the clear commitment among the delegates to achieving tangible results.  In 
three days of discussion, its organizers and participants, like those to the 1926 Baku 
Congress, sought to take the initial steps toward linguistic unity by establishing the need 
for a common alphabet, choosing the orthographic system upon which it would be based, 
and deciding the form it would take.  The symposium was hailed as a seminal moment in 
the linguistic unification of the Turkic people and widely reported on in the press, 
including the Turkish nationalist daily, Tercüman, which, in an article by Bekir 
Türkmenoğlu that recalled Turkic reformer Ismail Gaspirali’s efforts to unite the Turkic 
world through a turn-of-the century newspaper of the same name published under the 
banner “Unity in language, thought, and action” (“Dilde, fikirde, işte birlik”) (c.f., 
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chapter two), heralded the imminent achievement of Gaspirali’s goals declaring: “The 
Turkic world experienced an historic day. The ideal of unity in language, action, and 
thought is at last materializing” (“Türk Dünyası, tarihî bir gün yaşadı. Dilde, işde, fikirde 
birlik ulküsü artık gerçekleşiyor”).42   
Six months later, the Ministry of Culture, seeking to capitalize on the momentum 
achieved by ICTAS, convened roughly 1000--predominantly Turkish--linguists, literary 
figures, and politicians for the Sürekli Türk Dili Kurultayı (PTLC).  Held in Ankara from 
4-8 May 1992, the declared aim of the PTLC was to continue the work begun at ICTAS 
and ensure further progress toward a common alphabet and Turkic lingua franca by 
“researching issues of alphabet, spelling, and the written [form] of the Turkish language 
in the republics of Turkic origin and Turkic societies, seeking paths toward a common 
solution, and taking decisions that [would] create a program to delineate the topic.”  
Curiously, or perhaps tellingly of the by then already fractured consciousness of the 
Turkic world, despite the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union and recognized 
independence of its former vassal states in Central Asia, representation from the Turkic 
world remained relatively sparse.  Opening statements were followed by presentations 
from “foreign” (Turkic) and “local” (Turkish) invited speakers after which the floor was 
opened to comment from guests and local attendees.  The final three sessions were 
devoted to reports from the Alphabet, Spelling, and Written Language Commissions, 
established during the FTLC, after which the floor was again opened to comment from 
                                               
42 The article appeared in Tercüman, November 19, 1991, p.1. 
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guests and local participants, closing remarks were made and a summary of the 
congress’s findings presented to those in attendance.   
Despite differences in size, attendance, and format, these three congresses 
collectively represent the initial push toward supranational linguistic unification among 
the Turkic peoples.  Thus, although the following analysis will largely focus on ICTAS, 
as the most substantive and interactive of the congresses, I seek to weave insights gleaned 
from an examination of relevant metalinguistic discourses emerging from the other two 
congresses, as well as media discourses surrounding the events, into an analytical 
narrative that explores the dynamic tension between Turkish/Turkic nationalism and pan-
Turkic supranationalism, which colored the dimensions of the overarching debate over 
the creation of a common Turkic alphabet and lingua franca and ultimately constrained 
the ability of the ortak alfabe and ortak dil  projects to unite the Turkic peoples either 
linguistically or sociopolitically.   
 
TRANSCRIPTION AS PROCESS AND PRODUCT 
Before proceeding to an analysis of the enabling presuppositions that informed 
the early language congresses and the conflicts in linguistic ideology that emerged during 
these early instances of metalinguistic contact within the Turkic world, it is perhaps 
useful to first mention some key issues regarding the discursive data to be analyzed.  To 
begin with, it is important to note that despite my very best efforts, I was unable to obtain 
recordings of the proceedings of the congresses--they appear no longer to exist.  As a 
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result, the analysis of language ideologies emerging from delegate discourse that follows 
is based largely on transcripts of the proceedings compiled along with supplementary 
material and published as proceedings booklets, augmented, in turn, by newspaper and 
journal report of the events, personal interviews and informal discussions with many of 
the delegates and attendees, participant observation at later Turkic world and linguistic 
congresses in which the issue of linguistic rapprochement and revised proposals for an 
ortak alfabe and ortak dil were suggested, historical research, and a deep, if somewhat 
ineffable, “lived sense” of the subject developed over years of regularly attending to 
issues of language and orthography within the Turkic world.  Nonetheless, since the 
mainstay of discursive analysis lies in transcribing naturally occurring discourse from 
audio recordings and analyzing the specific forms it takes, the lack of an audio recording 
presents certain analytical challenges.   
This however, is the hazard of analyzing historical discursive events.  As 
Makihara and Schieffelin remark in reference to the linguistic specificities of historically 
salient moments of contact: “The role of language and the forms it takes, though central 
to cross-cultural contact situations is rarely written about and remains undertheorized.  
Historical accounts, for example, often are vague about verbal interactions, failing to 
indicate languages used in contact moments, much less what might have been said or 
heard when partially shared languages were used to establish rudimentary forms of 
communication” (2007:5).  In this sense, the existence of transcripts of the proceedings 
that include not just the text of prepared presentations, but also the extemporaneous 
discourse of open discussion during these transformative moments of first contact, albeit 
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of the “everyday” type that might be produced in court or other discursive institutional 
settings rather than the “academic” type suitable to scholarly analysis, should be counted 
as extremely fortuitous, although it may not seem so in an age of YouTube and 
cellphones with built-in video recording capacity that have radically democratized control 
over the technological means of capturing and sharing live audio and video in the years 
since the congresses were convened.  In the end, I have decided that despite the loss of 
detail that could have been gleaned from a closer analysis of the actual discursive 
dynamics had audio recordings of the events been available, there remains great benefit 
to be gained in terms of understanding the dynamics of these first moments of organized 
discursive contact within the post-Soviet Turkic world from an analysis of even just the 
propositional content of discourse emerging within the early Turkic linguistic congresses. 
Moreover, while the lack of a transcript suitable to a more detailed analysis of 
discursive dynamics closes some avenues of investigation, it simultaneously opens 
others.  Although I did not personally transcribe the audio recordings of the congresses, it 
is important to note that they were, in fact, transcribed.  That, in itself, is instructive of the 
value placed on the event by its organizers, who, at the very least, clearly thought it 
advisable to produce a record of this presumably transformative moment in the history of 
the Turkic world for posterity.  Furthermore, there is much in the way of parsing the 
ideological presuppositions that informed the congresses to be gleaned from the manner 
in which the events were transcribed.  Elinor Ochs first explicated the ideological nature 
of the transcription process in a 1979 article in which she suggests that “transcription is a 
selective process reflecting theoretical goals and definitions” (1979:44).  Although her 
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essay primarily serves as an injunction to researchers who base their analysis and 
theoretical conclusions on naturalistic speech behavior rather than on native-speaker 
intuition concerning language use to pay close attention to the transcription process and 
make clear the basis for the selectivity they necessarily impose, by revealing the ways in 
which the transcription process embodies the ideological assumptions of the researcher, 
Ochs’ theoretical approach to the transcription process, as well as the expanded 
paradigms offered in more recent scholarship (Jaffe 2007, Bucholtz 2007, Hammersley 
2010), offer a constructive means of thinking about the transcription process in general 
and the ways in which it creates an authoritative discursive text that “frames” interaction 
(Goffman 1974) and ultimately defines a discursive event in ways that are useful to the 
transcriber.   
Thus, although Ochs’ focus is thus on the processural side of transcription, for 
present purposes, I would emphasize the socially constructed product of the transcription 
process.  Viewing the transcripts of the early Turkic linguistic congresses from this 
perspective, they become “texts” embodying important ideological assumptions which, 
insofar as transcription was undertaken by the organizers or under their auspices, speak 
volumes about their intent in convening the congresses and the ultimate aims they hoped 
to achieve.  I am here reminded of Makihara and Schieffelin’s directive that “[t]he 
inherent complexity of communication in cross-cultural encounters must be kept in mind 
as we investigate the different interpretive strategies, translation conventions, and 
encoding procedures as well as the broader language ideologies which may converge in 
moments of contact” (2007:6).  Although Makihara and Schieffelin were referring 
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specifically to the strategies, conventions, and procedures employed at the moment of 
linguistic contact, I would argue that it applies equally to the production of written 
records of those moments of contact.  In this sense, the apparent destruction of audio 
recordings of the early linguistic congresses with the publication of the congress 
proceedings allows for the establishment of definitive narratives of the events and 
effectively eliminates the possibility for disparate or oppositional readings of the event.  
Nonetheless, insofar as the “frame” thus imposed on the early linguistic congresses by 
their respective organizers were subsequent to their conclusion, I will follow suit and 
reserve analysis of the congress proceedings as “text” until after examining the 
metadiscursive dynamics of the congresses themselves. 
 
PAN-TURKIC LINGUISTIC CULTURE AND THE “MYTH” OF MUTUAL INTELLIGIBILITY: 
THE IDEOLOGICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF LINGUISTIC COMMONALITY  
Although the extant literature in language planning is restricted in scope to 
examining efforts at the national or sub-national level and hence provides no sure guide 
for parsing the odd supranational language planning initiative, a careful reading of the 
discourse surrounding and emerging from the early linguistic congresses suggests, I 
would argue, that attempts at linguistic standardization or unification within a kindred 
group whose respective languages, while belonging to the same linguistic family, 
nonetheless exhibit significant divergence, are necessarily based first and foremost on 
simultaneous adherence to two seemingly opposing propositions--a deep-seated 
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ideological belief in the fundamental kinship of the languages in question coupled with a 
pragmatic recognition of the existence of superficial, or even systemic, differences that 
hinder communication.  Taken together, these two propositions revolve around 
perceptions of mutual intelligibility, on the one hand explicit and on the other latent.  As 
such, efforts toward creating a common alphabet and lingua franca across the post-Soviet 
Turkic world were premised on a shared hegemonic belief in a common linguistic root 
which persisted in the face of general acknowledgment of the difficulties in 
communication that necessitated linguistic and orthographic reform.  In this sense, the 
notion of mutual intelligibility serves both an enabling presupposition of the early Turkic 
linguistic congresses and a “problem” to be resolved by them.  By contrast the “problem” 
to be addressed in national or subnational language planning efforts generally revolves 
around asserting difference rather than claiming commonality.  
Mutual intelligibility is an inherently subjective, and hence slippery, concept, 
perceptions of which often fail to accord with actual lived experience, rendering it 
particularly given to interpretation, negotiation or overt manipulation.  John Gumperz 
addresses this point in describing the link between social sensibility and the assertion or 
denial of mutual intelligibility that often manifests as language loyalty.  He writes: “The 
conflict in language loyalty may even affect mutual intelligibility, as when speakers’ 
claims that they do not understand each other reflect primarily social attitudes rather than 
linguistic fact.  In other cases, serious linguistic differences may be disregarded when 
minority speakers pay language loyalty to a standard markedly different from their own 
vernacular” (Gumperz 1971:124).   
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Despite indisputable linguistic similarities that justify the Turkic languages’ 
categorization as a family of languages, academic disagreement persists over the degree 
to which the Turkic languages and dialects were ever mutually intelligible during the 
modern age.  Most serious scholarship has suggested that the geographic isolation of this 
ethnically-related peoples divided by great mountain ranges and vast steppes was 
reflected in the development of immense diversity amongst their languages which 
prevented easy communication.  In his history of the Soviet Turkic peoples, Olaf Caroe 
argues that by the early twentieth century, the eastern Turkic languages spoken in Central 
Asia were already sufficiently divergent to hamper communication.  He writes: “In 
speech the difference is great enough to cause difficulty of understanding between even 
native speakers… [thereby rendering] the path of the reformer seeking to establish one 
language as current coin for all Turkistan… [not] so easy as has often been suggested.” 
(1967:221 as quoted in Fierman 1991a:70).  Such claims clearly resonate with Gaspirali’s 
late eighteenth/early nineteenth-century efforts to foster a common language amongst the 
Turkic peoples which were premised on the principle that while the Turkic intelligentsia 
were able to communicate across linguistic divides using the Common Language (Lisan-ı 
umumî) employed in Tercüman (Landau 1995a), linguistic divergence had largely robbed 
common persons of Turkic ethnic background of the ability to understand one another.   
Although largely in agreement with Caroe’s assertions regarding divergence in 
the spoken languages of pre-Soviet Turkistan, William Fierman nonetheless suggests that 
distance between written languages was not as wide, noting that patent dialectical 
differences were partially obfuscated in writing by use of the Arabic script.  He argues 
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that although the Arabic letters created ambiguities and redundancies when applied to the 
Turkic languages, making it more difficult to learn to read and write, “[b]ecause vowel 
sounds varied considerably from dialect to dialect, the ambiguity served to unify Turkic 
dialects… [and] reinforced the cultural and linguistic unity both among the Turks and 
between the Turks and the Arab and Persian worlds” (1991a:59).  In essence, Fierman 
suggests the existence of two separate, but interrelated and often conflated, aspects of 
mutual intelligibility--written and spoken--and argues that a shared alphabet, particularly 
one that elides phonetic differences between related languages and dialects, serves to 
enhance ease of communication and social cohesion even across patent linguistic divides.   
Whether superficial or systemic, what distinctions amongst the Turkic languages 
and concomitant difficulties in spoken and written communication existed in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century, were amplified during the Soviet era, as detailed 
in chapter two.  With respect to spoken language, this was accomplished through 
“nationalization” of the Turkic languages of Central Asia, which standardized local 
dialects within a defined geographic span into distinct languages in aid of creating 
distinct nationalities.  In terms of written language this was accomplished, largely 
through implementation of first the Latin and then the Cyrillic orthography, both of 
which, by marking vowels where the Arabic alphabet had not, emphasized phonetic 
differences between the languages.  Thus, for example, the word for “world” became 
dünya in Azeri, dunyo in Uzbek, düniye in Kazakh and dön’ya in Tatar.  The introduction 
of different Cyrillic alphabets for each of the Turkic languages further served to separate 
them, particularly after each of the republic alphabets had been revised several times.   
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The success of Soviet language planning in deepening what orthographic and 
linguistic differences did exist among the Turkic languages was especially evident in the 
early years of post-Soviet Turkic rapprochement, as suggested by the many anecdotes 
circulating at the time that detailed misunderstandings based on lexical or orthographic 
divergences.  One oft-repeated such sketch, which recounts an Azerbaijani man’s visit to 
Uzbekistan during the Soviet era, is particularly illustrative of the divisive effects of 
incompatible alphabets on mutual intelligibility amongst the Turkic peoples.  At the time 
of the Azeri man’s visit, the U.S.S.R. was gearing up for a holiday and a banner had been 
hung from the main government building which read: “Communism is the main 
principle.”  The Azeri was reportedly confused by the banner because the word for 
“main” had been spelled in proper Uzbek as boş instead of baş, as it was spelled in Azeri.  
Given that boş means “empty, meaningless” in Azeri, this minor difference in vowels 
changed the meaning entirely for the Azeri visitor who read the message: “Communism 
is a meaningless principle.” 
Mutual intelligibility not only among the Turkic languages but also between those 
languages and Anatolian Turkish was also compromised by Soviet linguistic policies 
which “nationalized” the republic languages, russified their lexicons, and imposed 
Cyrillic-based alphabets once Ankara had embraced a Latin-based orthography.  On the 
other side of the Iron Curtain, Turkish linguistic reforms likewise widened the gap with 
the Turkic languages first through the adoption of a national alphabet, which, while 
similar to the Unified Turkic Alphabet (Birləşdirilmiş Jeni Tyrk Әlifbasь) in use among 
the Turkic peoples until the late 1930s, nonetheless differed in key aspects, and then 
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through language reform, particularly the invention of neologisms and adoption of 
Western loanwords for Arabic and Persian loanwords commonly used across the Turkic 
languages.  As such, communicative difficulties and misunderstandings during the early 
years of rapprochement within the Turkic world were especially pronounced in 
interactions between Anatolian and Central Asian Turks, and nearly every Turk, when 
asked, could cite at least one example of a humorous or discomforting misunderstanding 
resulting from an attempt to communicate across the Turkic languages.   
Many such anecdotes were repeated so often that they eventually entered the 
public lexicon to be recounted by individuals with no personal experience of the 
communicative gaffe they described.  Thus, one of the more common stories involved a 
Turkish passenger traveling to Baku aboard Azerbaijan Airlines who became mistakenly 
alarmed that the plane was about to crash when the stewardess calmly announced that 
passengers should prepare for landing, using the word düşmek, meaning “to descend, 
land, or alight” in Azeri but “to fall” in Turkish.  Another, more apocryphal but similarly 
favorite, anecdote involves an Azeri man who, when asked about his profession, replies 
that he manages a karxana (meaning “factory, mill, workshop” in Azeri, but sounding 
homologous to the Turkish word kerhane meaning “brothel”) where his wife and 
daughter are also employed.  A variation of the story has the Azeri man being asked 
about the profession of his parents, to which he replies that his father manages a karxana 
where his mother is likewise employed.   
Despite verging on urban legends, such anecdotes are nonetheless telling of 
sociolinguistic attitudes revolving around the issue of mutual intelligibility.  While it 
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would be absurd to suggest that these amusing vignettes, involving the small matter of 
homonyms and non-homologous vowels, called into question the mutual intelligibility of 
the Turkic languages any more than it would make sense, as many Turks have pointed 
out, to claim that differences in the meaning of the slang term “fag” should be taken as 
evidence that American and British English are not mutually intelligible, they are 
nonetheless instructive not simply because they point to differences in the Turkic 
languages which harbor the potential for misinterpretation and confusion, but because 
these communicative difficulties arise precisely as a result of expectations of seamless 
mutual intelligibility.  In short, miscommunications of this type are noteworthy for 
breaking the frame, thereby introducing the jolt of a sudden heterodoxic recognition of 
difference to an otherwise prevailing doxic sense of similarity (Bourdieu 1977).   
Regardless of scholarly dissent over the actual degree of mutual intelligibility and 
contemporaneous evidence of patent difficulties in communication, the romantic belief in 
mutual intelligibility across the Turkic languages nonetheless possessed strong popular 
appeal and permeated Turkish public discourse on the Turkic world during the early 
years of rapprochement.  On a personal note, my first fieldworks trips to Turkey were 
punctuated by friends, acquaintances, and complete strangers from all walks of life 
assuring me, in terms borrowed from the political rhetoric of the time, that the Turkic 
languages were sufficiently similar to allow one to travel from the Adriatic Sea to the 
Great Wall of China on Turkish alone.  Although I frequently questioned such assertions, 
citing my own experience of the Turkic languages and that of fellow linguists and other 
professional contacts who had spent time in Central Asia, I rarely succeeded in shaking 
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my interlocutors’ faith in mutual intelligibility across the Turkic languages.  At most, 
they would concede that the “accent” took a little “getting used to,” but invariably insist 
that the languages were no more different than American and British English.  I often 
pointedly countered with an account of my father’s experience asking for driving 
directions while on vacation in Wales, emphasizing the trouble locals had comprehending 
his questions and the equal difficulty he had understanding their answers, despite the fact 
that both parties were speaking English, but this too had little effect in dampening 
confidence in the imagined reality of linguistic homogeneity across the Turkic world.   
Among Turks with more direct experience in the Turkic world and/or a more 
sophisticated understanding of language, this romantic belief in the mutual intelligibility 
of the Turkic languages was likewise evident, but appeared based not on actual ease of 
communication, but rather a sense of deep familiarity that superseded patent 
communicative difficulties.  One Turkish writer described this sense of the Turkic 
languages as follows: 
 
The sounds of speech, the cadence and manner of speaking, it all sounds terribly 
familiar to me at a primal level, as if I’ve heard it in the distant past or in a dream, 
as if the words are coming to me on the wind and every third word rings clear as a 
bell.  Despite all my straining, I can’t quite make out the rest, and yet I have the 
sense that I could understand if I simply set my mind to it.43   
 
The sense of mutual intelligibility across the Turkic languages persisted in even 
more rarefied form among Turkish linguists and language professionals, who appeared to 
                                               
43 Interview with the writer on December 28, 2000. 
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base their assertions of mutual intelligibility on expert assessments of linguistic distance 
rather than actual ease of communication in speech or writing.  In discussing mutual 
intelligibility among the Turkic languages, linguists and Turkologists pointed to 
systematic phonological variations between the Turkic languages, such as shifts between 
voiced and unvoiced consonants (e.g., dil vs. til) and between bilabials (e.g., ben vs. 
men), or the reversal of order in common consonant clusters (köprü vs. körpü).  Such 
variation, while understood to hamper communication, was nonetheless offered as 
evidence of the Turkic languages’ diffusion from a common linguistic root.  This sense of 
linguistic proximity furthermore offered grounds for the belief among linguists and other 
language professionals that careful language planning involving reforming and unifying 
the alphabet as well as standardizing lexical inventory and meaning across languages--
beginning with the elimination of long-standing borrowings from Arabic and Persian as 
well as more recent loans from Russian and the Western languages--could bridge the 
distance between the Turkic languages and restore full mutual intelligibility.   
 
MUTUAL INTELLIGIBILITY AND THE IDEOLOGICAL FRAMING OF SUPRANATIONAL 
LINGUISTIC UNIFICATION 
Given the prevalence with which the perceived existence of mutual intelligibility 
across the Turkic languages was asserted within the public sphere and among language 
professionals, it was only natural that such assumptions should inform official discourse 
framing the early linguistic congresses.  Indeed, in the opening statement at the First 
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Turkish Language Congress, head of the Ministry of Culture’s Publications Department, 
Alâeddin Korkmaz, spoke to this very point:   
 
Millî kimliğimizin başlıca ayır-
dedici unsuru olan Türkçe, bilinen 
en eski zamanlardan beri yaşayan; 
mahiyet değiştirmeden devam eden 
bir dildir. Türkçe bugün gerek 
yayıldığı sahalar, gerekse konuşan 
nüfus bakımından dünyanın beş 
büyük dilinden biridir. Fakat, bu 
büyük Türk dünyası üç ayrı kökene 
dayalı yirmi yedi farklı alfabe 
kullanmaktadır. Bu bir dehşettir.   
Turkish, the main distinguishing 
element of our national identity, is a 
language that has continued without 
changing its essence from time in 
memoriam.  Today, whether from 
the perspective of the regions across 
which it has spread or the 
population that speaks it, Turkish is 
one of the world’s five greatest 
languages.  However, this large 
Turkic world makes use of 27 
different alphabets rooted in three 
separate orthographic systems.  
This is a catastrophe.   
 
By asserting the underlying immutability of the family of related Turkic 
languages which he refers to as Turkish (Türkçe), and hence its essentially unitary nature, 
Korkmaz’ statement elided patent distinctions in its many named varieties, effectively 
presuming, and therefore eliminating any question of, spoken mutual intelligibility across 
the Turkic languages.  His hyperbole with regard to spoken language was, however, 
tempered by a description of “catastrophic” orthographic chaos endemic to the Turkic 
world, with the implication that written mutual intelligibility amongst the Turkic peoples 
had thus been compromised.  By tacitly asserting spoken mutual intelligibility and 
simultaneously highlighting the lack of written mutual intelligibility, Korkmaz thus 
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implied that orthographic unity need only be redressed to restore complete linguistic 
mutual intelligibility amongst the Turkic peoples.   
While Korkmaz stopped short of explaining the emergence of orthographic 
divergence amongst the Turkic languages or admitting any influence on spoken language 
from the unfortunate profusion of alphabets he describes, delegates to the FTLC and the 
other early language congresses did address these issues.  In their discourse, 
orthographic, and indeed linguistic, variance was attributed not simply to the vicissitudes 
of time or parallel (d)evolution resulting from historical isolation, but rather to pernicious 
outside influences.  Conquest and colonialism had subjected the Turkic peoples to more 
alphabets than any other, distancing them first from the Turkic proto-language preserved 
in runic inscriptions and believed to represent the common linguistic legacy of the Turkic 
peoples and then from the Common Language believed to have linguistically united the 
Turkic world merely a century past.   
Deliberate interference in the form of alphabet reform and language planning 
during the Soviet era was deemed particularly harmful to mutual intelligibility insofar as 
the nationalities policies had forced the Turkic alphabets and languages apart, with the 
specific intent of dividing the Turkic peoples from their Turkish cousins and from one 
another.  This general sentiment was cogently expressed in a comment by Uzbek delegate 
Holcigit Sanagulov during an ICTAS discussion period.  While advocating the need for a 
union of Turkic peoples to protect against their once again falling victim to divisive 
external influences, Sanagulov pointed to the ease with which Moscow had been able to 
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isolate the Soviet Turks from one another linguistically through simple manipulation of 
their alphabets.  He argued:   
 
Türkî halkların birbiriyle anlaşması 
basit-adi dilde mümkündür. Kril 
harflerinin kabul edilmesinden 
sonra biz diğer Türkîleri yazıda 
anlayamaz duruma düştük….   
It was possible for the Turkic 
people to understand one another in 
a straightforward patois.  After the 
Cyrillic letters were adopted, we 
fell into a situation in which we 
were unable to understand other 
Turkic peoples in writing…. 
 
Echoing and building upon Sanagulov’s claim, Kazakh delegate to ICTAS Erden 
Kacibekov likewise asserted spoken mutual intelligibility among the Turkic peoples but 
suggested that it was not simply the adoption of the Cyrillic alphabet, but rather the 
deliberate imposition of different Cyrillic alphabets that divided them linguistically.  He 
also made reference to the success of the Soviet policy of divide et impera that produced 
“thirty nationalities” (“otuz boya”) from the “thirty different alphabets” (“otuz çeşit 
alfabe”) they imposed, arguing:   
 
Sovyetler Birliğinde bugün Kril 
esaslı otuz çeşit alfabe var…. 
Konuşmada hiçbir güçlük yok ama 
yazıda birbirimizi anlayamıyoruz. 
Türkistan’da dil çalışmaları Stalin 
zamanında durdu. Bizi otuz boya 
böldü ve amacına ulaştı.   
Today in the Soviet Union there are 
thirty different Cyrillic-based 
alphabets….  In speaking there is 
no hardship, but in writing we are 
unable to understand one another.  
In Turkistan, work on language 
came to a halt in Stalin’s time.  It 
divided us into thirty tribes and 
accomplished its objective.  
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While the focus among delegates who espoused mutual spoken intelligibility 
remained fixed on orthographic difference as the primary obstacle to full mutual 
intelligibility, others recognized that distinctions in orthography had brought about 
divergences among the Turkic languages which had also compromised spoken mutual 
intelligibility.  If, as Fierman (1991a) argues, the Arabic alphabet served to obfuscate 
phonetic differences between the Turkic languages, thereby emphasizing linguistic 
commonality among the Turkic peoples (c.f., above), the discourse of delegates to the 
early linguistic congresses clearly suggested that the Cyrillic alphabet imposed linguistic 
and cultural distance on the Turkic peoples by causing existing linguistic differences to 
reemerge and introducing others.   
In an interview for Millî Kültür Dergisi, that was included in a special report on 
the First Turkish Language Congress and that provides a cogent review of many of the 
issues addressed during the congress, professor of history and literature, Enver Mahmut 
addressed this point, emphasizing the way in which codification of separate Cyrillic 
alphabets for each of the Turkic peoples had harmed Turkic unity.  Placing responsibility 
for linguistic and cultural distance that has resulted in persistent difficulties in 
understanding amongst the Turkic peoples squarely at the feet of Soviet planners, 
Mahmut suggested that Turkic orthography was deliberately overhauled as a means of 
targeting pan-Turkic unity and the threat it posed to Soviet power, citing as evidence the 
fact that other non-Slavic peoples who represented no such threat to the Soviet 
authorities--e.g., the Georgians and Armenians--had been allowed to retain orthographic 
independence.  Mahmut argues:   
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Sovyetler, her Türk 
Cumhuriyeti’nde değişik bir alfabe 
kullanmak suretiyle sunî 
ayrıcalıklar yaratmıştır. Bunlar 
sistemli ırk politikanın ürünüdür. 
Niçin Türklerin dışındaki halklar 
kendi alfabelerini kullanıyorlar da, 
Türk Cumhuriyetleri değişik 
alfabeler kullanıyor? İşte bu yüzden 
Türk toplumu arasıdaki kültürel 
iletişim daralmakta ve lehçeler 
arasındaki farklılıklar 
büyümektedir.   
The Soviets, by using a different 
alphabet in each of the Turkic 
republics, created artificial 
distinctions. These were a product 
of systematic racial politics. Why 
were the [Soviet] peoples other than 
the Turks using their own alphabet 
while the Turkic republics were 
using different alphabets?  It is for 
this reason that cultural 
communication between the Turkic 
communities shrank, while 
differences between the dialects 
grew (Mahmut 1990:20).   
 
If external forces had divided the Turkic peoples, however, the belief among 
organizers of and delegates to the early linguistic congresses was that linguistic 
differences were not so wide as to defy remedy and that concerted, collective, and 
cooperative action, beginning with the adoption of a common alphabet, could 
successfully reunite them.  In the same Millî Kültür Dergisi article, Mahmut emphasizes 
that:   
 
Konuşma dilinde anlaşabiliyoruz 
fakat yazı dilinde birbirimizi 
anlayamıyoruz. Bunun da sebebi 
farklı alfabeler kullandığımız 
içindir.  Bir alfabe kullanırsak 
bunların hepisinden kurturuluz….  
Kültürel iletişimin artması ve büyük 
bir homojen birlik oluşturmak için 
Latin Alfabesi’nde birleşmeliyiz.  
We can understand one another in 
our spoken language, but we are 
unable to understand one another in 
our written language.  The reason 
for this is the different alphabets we 
use.  If we were to use one alphabet, 
we would be saved from such 
difficulties….  In order to increase 
cultural communication and create a 
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Zaten Sovyetler’deki Türk 
Cumhuriyetleri’nde bunu istiyorlar, 
bu doğrultuda karalar alıyorlar.   
vast homogeneous union we must 
unite in the Latin alphabet. The 
Turkic republics in the Soviet 
Union already want this, and are 
making decisions in this direction 
(Mahmut 1990:20).   
 
Finally, Mahmut adroitly explains patent linguistic rifts among the Turkic 
languages and the consequent need for linguistic standardization and purification not as a 
problem of inherent mutual intelligibility, but of orthography, suggesting that given the 
linguistic differentiation that has occurred in the Turkic languages as a result of the 
divergent alphabets imposed on them, the creation of a common alphabet must be 
followed by linguistic reform, beginning with the expulsion of Russian loanwords and the 
creation of a common Turkic lexicon.  Thus, the need for creating a common lexicon is 
related to orthography, for it is the borrowing of foreign terms and the differences in the 
ways in which these loanwords are written and hence pronounced that is responsible for 
much of the pernicious differentiation in the spoken languages of the Turkic peoples.  
 
Herşeyden önce ortak bir alfabe ve 
ortak bir terimler sözlüğü 
oluşturmamız gerekmektedir. 
Çünkü Türk lehçeleri arasındaki 
farklılıkları derinleştiren zemini 
oyan bu iki yapay parazittir.  Bunlar 
ortadan kaldırılmalı ve bu olumsuz 
gidişin önüne geçilmelidir.  
Türkiye Türkçesi 1860’lı yıllardan 
itibaren yoğun bir şekilde çeviriler 
yoluyla terimler almaktadır.  Bunlar 
Above all else, we must create a 
common alphabet and a common 
dictionary of terminology.  Because 
they act as the foundation that 
deepens differences among the 
Turkic dialects these two creations 
are parasites. They must be lifted 
away and this negative way of 
going must be hindered. 
Since the 1860s, Turkey’s Turkish 
has adopted terms in a dense 
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alınırken Türkçeye uyarlanmadan 
aynen alınmıştır.   
Sovyetler Birliği'ndeki Türk 
Cumhuriyetleri’de Rus dilinden 
iktibas yoluyla terimler almaktadır.  
Bunların yazılış ve okunuşları farklı 
farklıdır.  Böyle devam ederse 
farklılıklar daha da büyüyecektir. 
Tek çare söylediğim gibi ortak bir 
alfabe ve ortak bir terimler 
sözlüğünün hazırlanmasıdır.   
fashion through translations. When 
these are adopted, the same are 
eliminated from Turkish unheeded.   
The Turkic republics in the Soviet 
Union took terms from the Russian 
language through citation.  The way 
in which they are written and 
pronounced are completely 
different. If things continue in this 
fashion, the differences will grow 
even greater.  The only solution is, 
as I have suggested, to prepare a 
common alphabet and a common 
terminological dictionary (Mahmut 
1990:20).   
 
Thus, as emerges in the metalinguistic discourses of the early linguistic 
congresses as well as ambient scholarly discourses on the issue of linguistic 
rapprochement within the Turkic world, the belief that linguistic divergences were, in 
essence, both artificial and superficial carried with it the implication that they could be 
reversed.  By this logic, alphabet could be reformed to rectify the deleterious effects of 
external influence, rendering Turkic orthography more directly representational of 
phonetic inventory and setting the stage for the Turkic languages to be purified of 
external influence and for mutual intelligibility to thus be restored.  As such, the 
assumption of latent mutual intelligibility serves as an organizing and enabling 
presupposition of the early linguistic congresses. 
Moreover, as suggested above, the establishment of latent mutual intelligibility 
was key to claims of the Turkic world as a cohesive and recognizable entity and therefore 
critical to attempts at uniting the Turkic peoples under its rubric.  In their belief that 
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mutual intelligibility could be restored and the Turkic peoples united through the medium 
of alphabet standardization and language purification, the delegates to the early linguistic 
congresses thus recalled the efforts of Gaspirali and other reformers laboring for Turkic 
linguistic unity under the czarist regime as well as the work of delegates to the 1926 Baku 
Turcology Congress, who advocated the adoption of a common alphabet, purging of 
foreign loanwords, and creation of a shared lexicon in much the same terms.  There were, 
however, other ambient linguistic presuppositions that emerged in the discourse of the 
early linguistic congresses which were to mitigate against supranational linguistic 
unification.  
 
ORTHOGRAPHY, NATIONALISM, AND SUPRANATIONALISM: THE IDEOLOGICAL 
DIALOGISM OF ORTHOGRAPHIC UNIFICATION AND SOCIOPOLITICAL ORIENTATION 
Once the path to achieving Turkic linguistic unification had been sufficiently 
envisioned through the discourse of mutual intelligibility, which cast patent difficulties in 
communication as externally-imposed, superficial, and, above all, remediable, it 
remained to bring the real in line with the ideal, uniting the Turkic world by restoring 
presumed latent mutual intelligibility through corpus-related orthographic and linguistic 
reform.  Given that alphabet had been suggested as the original and fundamental source 
of linguistic divergences among the Turkic peoples, the first order of business was to 
develop a concrete ortak alfabe proposal.  Development of such a proposal was a two-
step process.  The first step involved determining which orthographic system would best 
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serve as a foundation for the common alphabet, while the second step necessitated 
deciding the specific form it should take.  These two interrelated issues generated 
significant discussion and debate, as they touched on matters of both a pragmatic and an 
ideological nature.  Together, these discourses revealed a dynamic tension between 
nationalist and supranationalist concerns which ultimately lay at the heart of Turkic world 
identity politics in the post-Soviet era.   
The caution the delegates exhibited in approaching the business of developing a 
common alphabet was rooted first and foremost in a shared awareness of the symbolic 
capacity of orthography to index aspects of the social world and hence in an underlying 
ideological assumption that posited orthography, as a symbolic representation of 
language, as both a nexus and vector of national identity.  That this postulate should 
inform the metalinguistic discourses of the early linguistic congresses is not surprising, as 
the notion of a “natural” connection between language and nation is one of the great 
ideological assumptions of the modern era. Rooted in late eighteenth century 
romanticism, and particularly in the work of Johann Herder who spoke of language as an 
essential element of volksgeist--the term he coined to describe the “special genius” 
specific to each nation--the presumptive link between language and nation profoundly 
influenced European notions of nation-building and quickly spread throughout the world 
via colonialism and intellectual commerce.  Although orthographic systems as a whole 
are not generally specific to a single nation, the precise form of an alphabet, as it 
represents the language of a particular nation, is often highly specific, and hence, 
emblematic of both the language and the people who speak it.  It is for this reason that the 
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Latin-based Turkish alphabet was deliberately referred to not as the Latin alphabet for 
Turkish but as the Turkish alphabet by the founder of the Turkish republic, Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk (Mango 1999).  Thus, while language is primary, orthography, as a 
graphic representation of language, is likewise implicated in the symbolic process by 
which a nation is defined.   
As detailed in chapter two, this hegemonic assumption linking language and 
nation was at the heart of the Turkish language reform as well as the nationalities policies 
of the Soviet state in Central Asia.  Thus, insofar as it had informed the language 
ideology, or shaped the “linguistic culture,” of both the Turkish and Turkic peoples, it 
was only natural that the “one language equals one people” presumption should likewise 
form the ideological backdrop against which efforts at linguistic and orthographic 
unification would take shape in the post-Soviet era.  In this sense, the creation of a Turkic 
world was dependent on successfully extending the volksgeist of the Turkic peoples from 
a narrow nation-bound awareness of identity--i.e., the sense of being Turkish, Uzbek, 
Azeri--to a broad supranational, pan-Turkic consciousness in which a common alphabet 
and language were to figure prominently.  This, anyway, was the perspective on the 
relationship between nationalism and supranationalism held by the Turkish organizers of 
and participants in the early linguistic congresses, whose linguistic culture was informed 
by an ethnolinguistic brand of nationalism which had grown out of pan-Turkist thought, 
absorbing aspects of its ideological assumptions in the process (Landau 1995a nd 1995b, 
Poulton 1997).   
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As emerges in the discourse of Turkic delegates to the early linguistic congresses, 
however, particularly in discussions of national alphabet debates and descriptions of the 
distinctive peculiarities of the respective Turkic languages that required representation 
within an ortak alfabe, this vision of an expansive volksgeist encompassing all of the 
Turkic peoples was often in direct conflict with the more bounded volksgeist at the heart 
of contemporary national identity politics amongst the ex-Soviet Turkic peoples, hence 
calling into question this notion of supranational consciousness as an extension of 
national consciousness.  Thus while the early Turkic linguistic congresses were 
ideologically premised on the shared notion that the first step toward ensuring that a new 
or newly-revived supranational consciousness would take root in the Turkic world was 
the creation of a common Turkic language--the most obvious precondition of which was 
a common Turkic alphabet--pragmatically speaking, the notion of an ortak alfabe uniting 
the many Turkic peoples into a vast Turkic world bumped up against the desire among 
the ex-Soviet peoples to retain a sense of national distinctiveness and nurture a nascent 
nationhood, revealing differences in respective understandings of the nature of 
nationalism and supranationalism.   
Largely freed from the repressive oversight of the Soviet state during the chaos of 
its slow, spiraling collapse, the Turkic republics had quickly demonstrated a keen desire 
to shed the effects of russification and forge first an autonomous, and then an 
independent, national identity distinct from their Soviet past.  That linguistic issues 
figured centrally in discussions of nation-building throughout the ex-Soviet Turkic world 
is not surprising, given the global hegemony of the “one language, one people,” precept, 
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not to mention the Turkic peoples’ localized experience of this ideological precept under 
the application of the Soviet nationalities policies.  In their comprehensive examination 
of language politics in the Central Asian republics in the months leading up to and the 
years following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Landau and Kellner-Heinkele 
point to the passage of language laws designating the titular language as the official 
“state”44 language in each of the republics between 1989 and 1990 as an early indication 
of the importance of language to emerging nationalism in the region.  Thus, although the 
specifics of their respective language declarations differed, the Turkic republics were 
nonetheless united in their “determination that the titular language was to be revived, 
developed and improved in status and corpus as a state language common to all the 
inhabitants, that is, a national language” (2001:73).   
Naturally, one of the first issues addressed in efforts at de-russifying the titular 
languages, improving their status, and rendering them a proper symbol of their respective 
nations was that of orthographic reform.  As a result, proposals for reforming national 
orthographic systems were developed and debated across the Turkic republics.  These 
proposals generally revolved around four distinct orthographic options: (1) retaining the 
Cyrillic, (2) resuscitating the Arabic, (3) adopting the Latin, and (4) reviving the Orhun-
Yenisey.  A brief examination of the arguments mustered in support of each of these 
options demonstrates the ideological linkage between orthography, language, culture, and 
                                               
44 The term “state” is enclosed in quotation marks because as Landau and Kellner-
Heinkele point out, it refers not to the central state, represented by Moscow, but rather to 
an emergent local sense of state, represented by the governing apparatus in each of the 
republics. 
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politics already extant within the Central Asian republics at the time the early Turkic 
linguistic congresses were convened in Turkey.   
Proponents of retaining the Cyrillic alphabet emphasized progress in science and 
literature made during the Soviet era, warning that knowledge of such achievements, 
catalogued in Cyrillic for the past half century, would be lost were the alphabet to be 
abandoned and reminded their fellow countrymen that facility in the Cyrillic alphabet 
eased access to Russian, which offered both the pragmatic advantages and the 
international prestige associated with knowledge of a recognized world language.  
Supporters of resuscitating the Arabic alphabet, by contrast, emphasized the Turkic 
people’s Islamic identity, forecast their inclusion in the great Islamic umma, and held out 
the prospect of direct access to the Koran and other important Islamic texts, as well as 
early Turkic literary works written in the Arabic script.  Proponents of the Latin alphabet 
meanwhile stressed the Turkic peoples' historic use of a Latin-based alphabet (c.f., 
chapter two), recycled arguments from the Baku Turcology Congress concerning the 
comparative ease with which the script could be learned, and depicted it as a vehicle of 
modernization which would facilitate the learning of Western languages and the 
establishment of ties to Turkey and the West, emphasizing the social, political, and 
economic advantages that would accrue from such strategic relations.  Finally, supporters 
of the Orhun-Yenisey characters,45 argued that the ancient runic script used to inscribe 
                                               
45 As the first known script of the Altaic language family, Orhun-Yenisey is claimed by 
all Turkic peoples.  A segment of writing in the script is represented on the back side of 
the “new” Azerbaijani five manat bill that was first issued in 2006.  Its inclusion on the 
bill is meant to represent Azerbaijan’s connection to the ur-Turkic Göktürks and hence 
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the Turkic ursprache spoken by the Göktürks offered the only true Turkic alternative--
i.e., the only alphabet linguistically and culturally suited to the Turkic languages insofar 
as all other proposed alphabets were based on orthographic systems developed by, and 
hence tied to, other cultures--and suggested that its adoption would constitute a fitting 
                                                                                                                                            
both its long history and the ethnic ties it shares with the other Turkic peoples.  The 
“upside down e” (ǝ) that also appears on the bill was adopted on May 16, 1992 in place 
of the character ä from the original post-Soviet Latin-based Azerbaijan alphabet adopted 
on December 25, 1991. The character ä was part of the ortak alfabe proposal approved 
during ICTAS, so replacing it with the character ǝ was considered to be an assertion of 
Azerbaijan’s national distinctiveness by the linguists advising the government who 
recommended this change. The image of the five manat bill was found at: 
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/ab/5_manat_G%C3%BCl_Tigin_Yaz
%C4%B1lar%C4%B1.jpg, last accessed on August 2, 2011. 
 
Figure 2.3  Image of the “new” Azerbaijani five manat bill 
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tribute to the Turkic peoples' historical greatness which would further serve to “put them 
on the map” once again.46  
As such arguments clearly suggest, each of the national alphabet proposals were 
thus ideologically linked to not only the languages but also the societies indexed by the 
respective orthographic systems, and hence represented four divergent perspectives 
regarding the sociopolitical orientation the fledgling nations ought to adopt.  Should the 
Turkic peoples carry on within the Russian sphere of influence or revive their pre-Soviet 
Muslim identity and seek entry into the broader Islamic umma?  Should they ally 
themselves with Turkey and the Western world, or carve out a uniquely Turkic pre-
nationalist identity among themselves?  Thus, the ideological link between orthography 
and social identity which had characterized nineteenth and early twentieth century efforts 
at uniting the Turkic peoples through a common alphabet and now defined attempts at 
creating a contemporary Turkic world by the same means was also at the heart of Soviet-
era nationalities policies as well as contemporary nation-building efforts within the 
Turkic republics, creating a dynamic tension between nationalism and supranationalism.   
It should come as no surprise, then, that direct reference to the national alphabet 
proposals and the discourses surrounding them were made by delegates to the Turkic 
linguistic congresses, many of whom had taken part in national alphabet debates in their 
home countries, as they sought to reconcile the dialectic within post-Soviet identity 
                                               
46 The majority of the information presented here regarding the various arguments in 
favor of the four scripts is based on personal interviews conducted in the field with 
scholars from across the Turkic world, however Landau and Kellner-Heinkele (2001:131) 
also discuss various of these discourses to a limited degree. 
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politics between nationalist self-determinism and supranationalist collectivism in creating 
a common Turkic alphabet.  ICTAS delegate Köbey Husainov, for example, remarked:   
 
Bizde dört çeşit görüş vardır. (1) 
Yazarlar, tarihçiler (altmışını 
geçenler) Arap alfabesi tekrar 
canlandırılmalıdır demektedir. 
Sebep olarak altmış yaşına gelenler 
kendi tarihini bilmemektedir. (2) 
İhtilâlden önce kaç tane gazete, 
dergi, ve kitap (Arapça eser) var 
diye baktığımızda, Kazak 
medeniyetinin esas eserlerinini Kril 
harfleriyle çıktığı anlaşılmaktadır.  
Dolayısıyla aydınların bir kısmı da 
Kril harfleri kalsın şeklinde bir 
görüş ileri sürüyorlar.  (3) Bir ay 
önce Ana Tili gazetesinde Kaydrov 
Abduali… Latin’in gerekliliğini 
ilmi, siyasî, ve ekonomik yönden 
inceleyen bir makalesi yayınladı.  
Kazakıstan’da durumun (Latin 
hususunda) ne olduğunu söylemek 
zor.  Gelecekteki 
münasebetlerimizin nasıl olacağını 
bilemeyiz.  Latin hakkındaki 
görüşmeler daha yeni başladı. 
Kazak Kril alfabesinde kırk iki harf 
var. Rus çocukları iki-üç, Kazak 
çocukları dört-beş ayda öğreniyor.  
(4) Prof. Dr. Cumusbekov on yedi 
harfli Orhun-Yenisey alfabesine 
geçme taraftarı.   
Amongst us [in Kazakhstan], there 
are four different perspectives: (1) 
writers and historians over the age 
of 60 say that the Arabic alphabet 
must be resurrected. The 
justification is that those under 60 
years of age don’t know their own 
history. (2) When we look at how 
many newspapers, journals, and 
books (Arabic works) there were 
before the revolution, it becomes 
clear that the Kazakh civilization’s 
foundational works were produced 
in the Cyrillic alphabet.  As a result 
a faction of intellectuals forwarded 
the notion that the Cyrillic letters 
should remain.  (3) A month ago an 
article by Abduali Kaydrov… 
investigating the necessity of the 
Latin from a scientific, political, 
and economic perspective was 
published in Mother Tongue 
newspaper.  In Kazakstan it is 
difficult to say what the situation is 
(in terms of Latin).  We can’t know 
how future discussions will go.  
Opinions about Latin are still new.  
The Kazakh Cyrillic alphabet has 
42 letters.  Russian children learn it 
in 2-3 months, Kazakh children in 
4-5 months.  (4) Prof. Dr. 
Cumusbekov is a supporter of 




ICTAS delegate Alaeddin Aliev likewise remarked on the dimensions of 
orthographic debate in his native Azerbaijan, noting that although discussion revolved 
around four varying propositions, most Azeris preferred the Latin orthographic system.   
 
Bizde de dört akım var: (1) Orhun-
Yenisey alfabesine dönelim, (2) 
Arap alfabesine dönelim, (3) Kril 
afabesini destekliyenler, ve (4) 
(bunlar %90-95) Latin alfabesini 
destekliyenler.   
With us there are also four currents: 
(1) let’s return to the Orhun-
Yenisey alphabet, (2) let’s revert to 
the Arabic alphabet, (3) those who 
support the Cyrillic alphabet, and 
(4) (and these are 90-95%) those 
who are in favor of the Latin 
alphabet. 
 
Other delegates also noted that clear penchants for a particular orthographic 
system were in evidence in their respective republics, although such preferences were not 
always the same.  Thus, while Aliev reported that his countrymen were leaning toward 
the Latin alphabet, Husainov’s compatriot Amantay Torgaev reported that proponents of 
resuscitating the Arabic alphabet had made significant inroads in Kazakh public opinion 
and suggested that if a Latin-based ortak alfabe were to stand a chance of being adopted 
in Kazakhstan, the case for the Latin alphabet ought to be made to the Kazakh people 
without delay.  He noted:   
 
Kazakıstan’da Latin’den fazla Arap 
harflerini propaganda işi güçlüdür. 
Bu konuda televizyonda, dergi, ve 
gazetelerde çok şeyler 
yazılmaktadır.  Hatta bazı okullarda 
In Kazakhstan, propaganda in favor 
of the Arabic letters is far stronger 
than for Latin. A great deal has 
been written about this topic on 
television, and in journals and 
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Arap alfabesi eğitimi yapılmaktadır. 
Latin alfabesi ile tek bir makale 
çıktı (Akademik Kaydarov). Bu işin 
propagandasının yapılması gerekir.   
newspapers.  In fact, instruction in 
the Arabic alphabet has been 
undertaken in some schools. With 
the Latin alphabet, a single article 
has come out (by the scholar 
Kaydarov).  It is necessary to carry 
out propaganda on this business. 
 
Within the context of the early linguistic congresses, discussion of the four 
options under consideration in national orthographic debates across Central Asia, 
mention of the respective supporting arguments, and assessments of their relative degree 
of popular support was thus not simply informative, but suggested an array of 
orthographic options and served as a template for decisions regarding the best 
orthographic system upon which to base the ortak alfabe.  Recalling Fishman’s (1993b) 
notion of the “Language Y” factor lurking behind corpus-related language planning 
discussions and thus reframing them as status-related calculations, we thus find not a 
single “language Y,” but several, suggesting both the complexity and relative 
unboundedness of identity politics in the post-Soviet era.  Thus, rather than addressing 
the linguistic appropriateness of the Latin, Arabic, Cyrillic, and Orhun-Yenisey scripts 
for representing the Turkic languages, these ostensibly corpus-related discussions 
revolved, instead, around status-based considerations concerning the relative value of 
establishing relations with the societies in which these orthographic systems were in use.  
In this sense, such discourses offered a clear indication that the Turkic republics 
both individually and collectively remained undecided about national orthographic 
reform and, by extension, the politics of post-Soviet identity.  On the one hand, this 
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liminal period thus seemed to offer the best opportunity for realizing orthographic unity 
across the Turkic world, insofar as the public will for alphabet reform was high (Landau 
and Kellner-Heinkele 2001), but concrete steps had not yet been taken.  On the other 
hand, the unresolved nature of national identity politics in the Turkic republics offered 
significant challenges to orthographic unification, for it was self evident in an 
environment so long saturated by the symbolism inherent to orthographic choice, that the 
creation of an ortak alfabe had clear implications for the national orthography debates 
and hence the politics of post-Soviet identity within the individual Turkic republics.   
As such, some delegates expressed concerns that potential conflicts between 
nationalist aspirations burgeoning within their home countries and the supranationalist, or 
pan-Turkist, sentiments guiding the early linguistic congresses might derail the adoption 
of a common Turkic alphabet.  Amantay Torgaev hinted at this possibility in his 
suggestion, cited above, that the advantages of a Latin-based alphabet for the Kazakh 
language needed to be spelled out to the Kazakh public if a Latin-based ortak alfabe were 
to stand a chance of being accepted in Kazakhstan.  ICTAS delegate representing 
Tataristan, Kenesbay Musaev, however, spoke more directly to the potential effect that 
conflict between nationalist and supranationalist sentiment might have on the success of 
efforts to create a common Turkic alphabet, presciently remarking that regardless of the 
orthographic system chosen as the foundation of the ortak alfabe project and the specific 
orthographic proposal adopted by delegates to the early linguistic congresses, the 
decision was quite likely to face criticism within the republics from those not in 
attendance.  Recalling the success of the 1926 Baku Turcology Congress in creating a 
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common alphabet that was collectively approved by the Turkic peoples, Musaev warned 
his fellow delegates against underestimating the power of nationalist, or in his terms, 
“ethnic,” thinking, reminding them of the importance of extralinguistic factors of a 
pragmatic as well as an ineffable psychosocial nature in establishing a legitimate and 
enduring orthography.  He argued:   
 
Bu işin etnik bir yönü de var. 
Burada bir karar alsak da 
ülkelerimize dönünce “biz senin 
fikrine katılmıyoruz, bizim kendi 
görüşümüz var” demeleri kuvvetle 
muhtemeldir. Bu konunun 
psikolojik, pedagojik, fizyolojik, 
yönleri düşünülmelidir. 1926’da 
kabul edilen alfabede ise bu konular 
düşünülmüştü ve iyi bir alfabe 
ortaya çıkmıştı. 
There is also an ethnic side to this 
business. If we take a decision here, 
when we return to our country, 
there is a strong probability they 
will say “we don’t agree with your 
opinion, we have our own 
perspectives.”  It is necessary to 
consider the psychological, 
pedagogical, and physiological 
aspects of this topic.  These matters 
were considered in relation to the 
alphabet adopted in 1926 and a very 
good alphabet resulted.   
 
Thus, although none of the Turkic delegates explicitly raised the issue of conflicts 
of interest between national and supranational orthographic planning efforts--indeed this 
may have been precluded within the context of an congress devoted to the actual corpus-
planning involved in creating a common Turkic orthography--through their descriptions 
of the dimensions of orthographic debate within their home republics, a picture of 
prospective conflicts of interest begins to emerge.  By raising the specter of “ethnic,” or 
national, difference and suggesting that an ortak alfabe agreed upon by ICTAS delegates 
might receive little consideration among those who wrestled with issues of national 
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orthography in each of the respective republics, Musaev comes closest to the edge of this 
“lacuna of the unspoken.”  Peering inside, we begin to understand, as was made clear to 
me in retrospective interviews with former delegates, that even among those ostensibly 
dedicated to the supranationalist goal of creating of an ortak alfabe, as most delegates 
were, it was widely understood that adoption of a common alphabet would inherently 
limit the possibilities for national expression.   
Thus, despite a shared conviction in the essential mutual intelligibility of the 
Turkic languages and an attendant belief in the need to overcome patent communication 
divides through the creation of a common Turkic alphabet, the specifics of the endeavor 
itself proved surprisingly difficult insofar as the dimensions of debate were complicated 
by the fact that orthography had already become an issue of national debate in the Central 
Asian republics during the waning days of the Soviet Union and first blush of 
independence (Landau and Kellner Heinkele 2001).  In this sense, while the ortak alfabe 
and ortak dil projects were premised on an extended concept of volksgeist that 
incorporated all of the Turkic peoples as ethnolinguistic kin, national language and 
orthography debates raging in the respective Turkic republics likewise drew upon notions 
of volksgeist in addressing issues of social consolidation through language, but in a 
bounded, national sense that was in stark counterpoint to the expanded Turkic 
consciousness the ortak alfabe project aimed to foster.  
This same sense of a conflict of interest between the goals of nationalism and 
supranationalism also emerges in the discourse of Turkic delegates during discussions 
over the form the ortak alfabe should take, for it was generally recognized that adoption 
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of a common alphabet would limit the available characters to those most commonly 
found in the Turkic languages--since no single alphabet could truly represent the full 
phonetic inventory of any one language, let alone a family of languages47--and thereby 
further constrain the ability of the Turkic republics to express national identity through 
orthographic representation.  As such, the adoption of a common alphabet that failed to 
account for the distinctiveness of the national languages, it was feared, would serve to 
exacerbate the damage that many delegates felt had already been done to their respective 
languages with the imposition of Cyrillic in the 1930s--which they blamed for 
precipitating the loss of critical phonological features not represented by the alphabet and 
hence weakening their languages--by once again confining representation of those 
features to an alphabet that “sacrificed the individual in the name of the collective,” or the 
distinctive national in the name of the (pan-)Turkic supranational.   
Thus, with the specific injuries visited on their individual Turkic languages by the 
imposition of Cyrillic characters still fresh in their minds, many of the delegates 
recognized the unprecedented opportunity to remedy their respective linguistic 
grievances with the creation of a new alphabet and were keen that such considerations be 
taken into account in the creation of an ortak alfabe.  Recounting the deleterious effect of 
Cyrillic on the Turkmen language, ICTAS delegate from Ashgabat, Cebbar Göklenov 
noted:   
 
                                               
47 Turkish delegate Hasan Eren makes this explicit when he notes: “No one alphabet is 
perfect… not one can provide [representation] for all the sounds in a language” (“Hiçbir 
alfabe mükemmel değildir… hiçbiri dildeki bütün sesleri vermemektedir”).   
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1940’ta Krile geçmekle hata 
yapıldı. Noksanlıkları söylendi. 
Türkmen alfabesindeki sekiz harf 
gereksizdi…. Yaşlılarımız Nevaî, 
Gencevîleri rahatça okuyorduk, 
şimdi ise onları çervirmek gerek 
diyorlar… Mesela, ñ, ä (açık), h(x), 
dudak sesi (w) var, ayrıca 
uzunluklar, bunların mutlaka 
gösterilmesi lazım. Şimdiye kadar 
Kril’de kullanılmıyordu. 
Dolayısıyla da nerede uzun, nerede 
kısa söyleneceği bilinmiyordu. 
Bazen anlaşma problemleri ortaya 
çıkıyordu. Türkmen olmayanların 
ise doğru konuşmaları imkânsız 
hale geliyordu.   
With the passage to Cyrillic in 
1940, a mistake was made. 
Imperfections it was said.  Eight of 
the letters in the Turkmen alphabet 
were [deemed] unnecessary….  We 
were easily able to read our elders, 
the Nevais and the Gencevis, but 
now they say it is necessary to 
translate them…  For example, 
there are ñ, ä (open), h(x), and the 
labial sound (w), furthermore the 
long vowels, these most assuredly 
must be represented.  Thus far, they 
have not been represented in 
Cyrillic. And therefore it is 
unknown where they should be 
pronounced long and where short.  
Sometimes difficulties in 
understanding have emerged.  It has 
even come to the point where it is 
impossible for those who are not 
Turkmen to speak correctly.   
 
ICTAS delegate Berdiyar Yusupov likewise noted the harm done to his native 
Uzbek by the introduction of Cyrillic:   
 
Bizim alfabemiz Türkî halklar 
arasında en zayıf alfabe sayılıyor.  
Rus alfabesindeki gibi aynı 
işaretlerle karşılanan altı tane sesli 
harf var, ama ağızda sekiz-dokuz 
tane sesli var.  Bir harf (y) ile iki 
fonem (/o/ and /ö/) ifade 
edilmektedir; /u/ ve /ü/ fonemleri de 
tek harflidir.  Bu da ağızın 
özelliğini tam olarak ifade etmekten 
uzak kalıyor.  Gençler yanlış 
Our alphabet is regarded as the 
weakest alphabet amongst the 
Turkic peoples.  There are six 
vowels represented by the same 
characters as are found in the 
Russian alphabet, but in speech 
there are eight or nine vowels.  Two 
phonemes (/o/ and /ö/) are 
represented by one letter (y); the 
phonemes /u/ and /ü/ are also 
represented by one letter.  This is 
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telaffuz ediyorlar.  Başka Türkî 
dillerinde olmayan, sadece 
Özbeklere mahsus bir yuvarlak “a” 
sesi var, bunu karşılayacak bir 
işaret bulamıyoruz.  Bu da yanlış 
anlamalara yol açabiliyor.  Mesala, 
ana (işte), âna (anne); ata (isim, ad 
ver) âta (baba); sal (azıcık), sâl 
(vur); kam (az) kâm (maksat).  
Bunları değişik harflerle 
belirtmemiz gerekecektir.  Mesala 
üstüne bir işaret konularak 
halledilebilir….  Konsanantlarda da 
bazı problemler var; [j], [c], [n] sesi 
gibi.   
also far from representing exactly 
the characteristics of speech.  
Young people pronounce them 
incorrectly.  There is a rounded “a” 
sound that is peculiar to the Uzbeks 
and not found in the other Turkic 
languages; we can’t find a character 
to represent this.  And this can open 
the door to misunderstandings.  For 
example, ana (there) âna (mother), 
ata (name), âta (father), sal (a bit), 
sâl (hit); kam (few), kâm (purpose).  
We will need to indicate these with 
different letters.  For example, it 
can be resolved by placing a 
diacritical over it….  There are also 
some problems with consonants, 
such as the sounds [j], [c], and [n].   
 
While of obvious importance to national orthography debates, such detailed 
discussions of the unique phonetic features of the individual Turkic languages not only 
called into question the presumption of mutual intelligibility across the languages, but 
also ran contrary to the goals of the ortak alfabe project, which sought orthographic 
commonality rather than diversity.  As a result, a number of delegates, afraid that 
excessive concern with orthographic representation of the specific features of each of the 
individual Turkic languages would ultimately derail efforts to create a common alphabet, 
sought to quell such discussions.  For example, Turkish linguist Ahmet Bican Ercilasun 
cautioned:   
 
Benim fikrim diğer Türk boyları 
lehçeleri, şiveleri için de çok 
In my opinion, it’s better not to go 
too far into the details of the 
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teferruata gitmemek. O zaman 
bizimki dialektoloji alfabesi olur…. 
Buna hiç lüzüm yok…. O kadar 
variyantları göstermek de lazım 
değil; mümkün olduğu kadar sade, 
basit bir alfabe kabul etmeli. 
dialects and vernaculars of the 
different Turkic peoples.  In that 
case, our alphabet will become a 
dialectology alphabet … There is 
no need for that….  There is no 
need to show the variants to that 
degree; insofar as is possible, a 
simple, basic alphabet should be 
adopted.   
 
Echoing Ercilasun’s sentiments, Turkish linguist Zeynep Korkmaz likewise 
argued that the need for delegates to maintain a pragmatic focus on adopting a common 
Latin-based alphabet across the Turkic world rather than being distracted by the details of 
linguistic peculiarities or political distinctiveness.  Korkmaz’ mention of the many 
objections and numerous naysayers that had to be overcome between when the Latin-
based Turkish alphabet was first proposed in 1923 and finally adopted in 1928 
furthermore served as a reminder to Turkic delegates that linguistic reform is always 
contentious and that compromises of a pragmatic nature must necessarily be made, in 
supranational as in national contexts, in the name of a social consolidation.  She argued: 
 
Fazla teferruata gitmemek lazım….  
Alfabe kolaylaştırıcıdır, fonetik 
değerler esasları üzerinde 
durmayalım….  Türkiye’de 1923’te 
İzmir’de İktisat Kongresinde Latin 
harfleri teklif edilmişti ancak 
itirazlar çoktu, belli bir hazırlık 
süresinden sonra ancak 1928 
yılında kabul edilebildi. 
It is not necessary to go into 
excessive detail….  Alphabet is a 
facilitator; let us not dwell on the 
roots of phonetic values….  In 
Turkey, the Latin letters were 
proposed in 1923 at the Izmir 
Economic Congress, but opponents 
were many; only after a certain 
preparatory period was it able to be 
accepted in 1928.  
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Here it is important to note that it was Turkish delegates, for whom national 
identity was far more solidified and the issue of national orthography had long since been 
settled, who expressed concerns over the divisive effects of focusing too closely on the 
linguistic peculiarities of the individual languages in the drive to create a supranational 
ortak alfabe rather than the Turkic delegates for whom the issue of national identity was 
still under active negotiation.  In this sense, while the dimensions of the ortak alfabe 
debates were defined in large part by a shared recognition among the many delegates to 
the early linguistic congresses of the importance of a common alphabet to the 
development of a supranational ethnolinguistic consciousness, the way in which 
supranationalism was conceptualized, particularly in its perceived relationship to 
nationalism, was different for Turkish and Turkic delegates.  Ideologically speaking, 
while Turkish organizers and participants tended to see supranational affiliation as 
expanding national identity, Turkic delegates tended to view it as constraining national 
identity.  Although these differences in perspective were largely attributable to their 
different stages of national development, they were also an artifact of different localized 
experiences with the broad institutionalized discourses of nationalism and 
supranationalism and the attendant effects on their respective linguistic cultures. 
Thus, while in the pre-Soviet era, the Turkic peoples had nurtured a sense of 
ethnolinguistic consciousness that cut across proto-national boundaries and in which the 
supranational was conceived of as an extension of the national (i.e., pan-Turkism as an 
extrapolation of the local Turkic tribe), this broad sense of supranational ethnolinguistic, 
or pan-Turkic, consciousness had been lost during the Soviet era.  While in Turkey, pan-
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Turkic consciousness was absorbed into national identity during the Republican period 
(c.f., chapter two) and manifested in foreign policy decisions, such as the 1974 invasion 
of Cyprus, that sought to protect the interests of “outside Turks” (“dış Türkler”) in 
Central Asia, it was demonized as “chauvinism”, or racism, by the Soviet authorities, 
who labored to replace this broad sense of ethnic consciousness with both a republic-
based “national” consciousness that served to divide the Turkic peoples from one 
another, on the one hand, and a class-based “supranational” consciousness that served to 
unite disparate elements under the rubric of the multi-ethnic Soviet state, on the other.  
Furthermore, these objectives were accomplished through the modality of language and 
orthography: “national” languages and orthographies were created in each of the Turkic 
republics on the principle of introducing maximal distance from the related Turkic 
languages and alphabets, and the Cyrillic alphabet was imposed as a means of easing 
acquisition of Russian, the “supranational” unifying language.   
The fundamental difference in perspective regarding the role of language and 
orthography in national consolidation and supranational affiliation developed as a result 
of their different historical engagements with such constructs, was thus to have a 
profound effect on the linguistic cultures of the Turks and the Central Asian Turkic 
peoples and hence their respective understandings of ortak alfabe project.  Thus, while 
under the Soviet system “national” identity, as a product of the Soviet nationalities 
policies, served the interests of supranationalist identity, it did so in a way that allowed 
for, indeed encouraged, the retention of national distinctiveness--albeit as defined by the 
central Soviet state and their local proxies rather than the “nationals” themselves and thus 
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criticized as “false” nationalism--rather than its complete subsumption under the aegis of 
the “supranational.” This, then, was in stark contrast to the formulation of the relationship 
between the national and the supranational underpinning the ortak alfabe project, which 
required national distinctiveness in the form of phonological repertoire to be sacrificed in 
the name of supranational orthographic unity, except, of course--and this was to become 
an important point of contention in the dynamics of orthographic and linguistic 
rapprochement in the aftermath of the congresses--for the Turks, for whom the creation 
of an ortak alfabe entailed no sacrifice in national orthographic identity, that is, as long as 
a Latin-based alphabet devised around the existing Turkish alphabet were chosen as its 
base.  
Thus, for many Central Asian delegates, this limitation of the individual in the 
name of the collective, at the very moment when the opportunity to expand the notion of 
national distinctiveness encouraged under Soviet rule into a “proper” sense of national 
identity presented itself, was a serious consideration with implications that transcended 
concerns over linguistic distinctiveness and spoke directly to larger issues of national 
sovereignty.  In the words of one such former delegate:  
 
Turkey chose the Latin alphabet because Ataturk wanted to orient the country 
toward the West.  After decades under Soviet rule we didn’t want to be limited in 
how we chose to orient ourselves.  We wanted to chose our own path, form our 
own national identity, and create our own affiliations.  In the end, the ortak alfabe 
decided upon, regardless of its form, would have hemmed us in.   
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ORTHOGRAPHIC AGENCY IN THE PRODUCTION OF SOCIOPOLITICAL IDENTITY 
Behind such concerns over the potential loss of linguistic distinctiveness and 
national identity from the adoption of a common Turkic alphabet lay another of the 
shared organizing presuppositions of the early linguistic congresses, namely the notion 
that orthography possesses not simply the symbolic capacity to index social identity but 
also actual agency in its production.  In essence, this notion derives from the belief that 
orthography is an organic outgrowth of the worldview professed by the people who speak 
the language it encodes and therefore acts both as a mechanism of its continuing 
hegemony and an agent in the ongoing socialization of those who espouse it.  Thus, when 
orthographies are transplanted, as they are wont to be, so too is the attendant worldview.  
In this sense, extrapolating from Mikhail Bakhtin's assertion that there are no neutral 
words, that “[a]ll words have the ‘taste’ of a profession, a genre, a tendency, a party, a 
particular work, a particular person a generation, an age group, the day and hour. Each 
word tastes of the context and contexts in which it has lived its socially charged life…” 
(1981:293), it would seem that for the Turkic peoples who have been served a veritable 
“alphabet soup” of alphabets, there are no neutral letters--each ostensibly arbitrary 
orthographic character carries whispers of past lives which contribute to the social 
production of the new contexts of its use.   
Locating the belief that orthography acts not simply as a symbol of social identity 
but also as an agent in its production in the historical context of its instantiation, we find 
that this presupposition has different derivations for the Anatolian Turks versus the ex-
Soviet Turkic peoples.  Among the Turks, the notion of orthographic agency is rooted in 
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the national alphabet reforms of 1928, by which the introduction of a Latin-based Turkish 
script was designed to divorce the Turkish peoples from their Ottoman past and create a 
new ethnolinguistic consciousness in keeping with the goals and objectives of the nascent 
nationalist state (c.f., chapters two, five).  Among the Turkic peoples, on the other hand, 
the notion of orthographic agency is an artifact of Soviet linguistic policy which, as part 
of the assimilationist strategy employed by Soviet authorities against their Central Asian 
subjects, held that the application of the Cyrillic script to the Turkic languages would 
pave the way for the eventual wholesale adoption of Soviet identity (c.f., chapter two), 
which would ultimately render “nationalism” obsolete.  The difference here is that where 
orthographic agency in the Turkish context served the purposes of nationalism, freeing 
the Turks from foreign influence and allowing a native national consciousness to 
develop, in the Soviet context orthographic agency was the means of imperial 
domination, stifling native modalities of national identity.  Given the national origin of 
the organizers of the ortak alfabe project, it is the former, Turkish, sense of orthographic 
agency that served as the primary enabling presupposition for the early Turkic linguistic 
congresses--namely, the notion that a common orthography would serve to unite the 
Turkic peoples linguistically, socioculturally, and geopolitically.  In the words of Turkish 
linguist Zeynep Korkmaz: “A unifying, unified alphabet must be created” (“Birleştirici, 
birlik yaratıcı alfabe yaratılmalıdır”).  That said, I will focus here on the latter, Turkic, 
sense of orthographic agency, as it is this oppositional agentive construction that called 
into question, and thus ultimately served to stymie, the aims of orthographic 
rapprochement within the Turkic world embodied by the ortak alfabe project.   
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The power, among the Turkic peoples, of the belief in the presumptive role played 
by orthography in the production of social identity first became clear to me during a trip 
to Azerbaijan in the mid 1990s.  I was in the beginning stages of studying Russian at the 
time, and my imperfect knowledge of the language was in stark contrast to my facility in 
Turkish and Azeri, prompting frequent comments from Azerbaijani friends and 
acquaintances that learning Russian would have been far easier for me had I learned my 
first Turkic language in the Cyrillic rather than the Latin alphabet.  Assuming that this 
was a comment on the difficulty of the Cyrillic script, I responded that learning the 
alphabet had been the easy part, it was mastering the language itself that was difficult and 
time-consuming.  This, however, was a misunderstanding of the original comment, 
which, after further discussion, I finally understood to mean that had the first Turkic 
language in which I gained fluency been written in the Cyrillic script, I would have 
acquired a sense for the “psychology” of Russians which would have eased my study of 
their language.   
Of particular significance here is the perception that orthography provides an 
entrée into the “psychology” of the speakers of the language for which it was developed.  
This notion seems to suggests an elaboration of the Whorfian principles of linguistic 
determinism which implies that the ways in which orthography organizes the phonemic 
features of a language reflect the cultural categories inherent to that language and hence 
the ways in which its speakers classify the experienced world.  By extension, the only 
script appropriate to a language would be one that was developed by its speakers, and that 
script, when applied to or imposed on a language for which it was not designed, would be 
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unable to adequately reflect the cultural categories inherent to the borrowing second 
language.  Furthermore, insofar as it carries an association with the cultural categories of 
the first language and is unable to reflect the cultural categories inherent to the second 
language, the “foreign” orthography imposes the worldview or mindset of the speakers of 
the first language on those of the second.  While in aid of foreign language learning, this 
may be considered a desirable outcome, in the service of identity politics it is perceived 
to bespeak cultural imperialism with the associated implication of loss of cultural 
identity.   
Regardless of its theoretical soundness, this hegemonic belief in the agency 
exerted on social identity by orthography appears to have significantly influenced the 
manner in which Turkic linguists and language professionals thought about orthographic 
reform in the post-Soviet era, as was reflected in the statements of several delegates to the 
early linguistic congresses, including Uzbek delegate Holcigit Sanagulov, who, during 
one of the ICTAS discussion periods, recalled the colonizing effect of the Cyrillic 
alphabet on Turkic culture, arguing:   
 
Arap alfabesi tarihimizde bin yıllık 
bir dönemi kapsamaktadır….  
Ancak bu harfler Özbeklerin ve 
genel olarak Türkî halklara Arapça 
(dili) öğretmemiştir. Bin yıl 
kullanılan Arap harfleri bize Arap 
dilini öğretmediyse de, elli yıldır 
kullanılan Kril alfabesi biz Türkleri 
Ruslaştırdı. Biz Rus dilinde 
konuşan topluluklara dönüştük.   
The Arabic alphabet encompasses a 
thousand-year era of our history….  
However, these letters were unable 
to teach the Arabic language to the 
Uzbeks or more generally the 
Turkic peoples.  Yet, whereas the 
Arabic letters used for a thousand 
years were unable to teach us the 
Arabic language, the Cyrillic letters 
used for 50 years Russified us 
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Turks.  We turned into a Russian-
speaking society.   
 
Sanagulov’s assertion that the Cyrillic alphabet turned the Turkic peoples into not just 
Russian speakers, but a Russian-speaking society, affords social agency to the Cyrillic 
orthography in not just effecting linguistic assimilation, but also promulgating cultural 
imperialism.  This line of reasoning, however, begs the question as to the Arabic 
alphabet’s earlier failure to produce a similar effect.  Although I initially assumed that 
this was attributable to the disparity in literacy rates of the two eras in which the 
orthographies were imposed, a far more nuanced explanation emerged in interviews with 
Turkic linguists.   
From a historical perspective, the transhumant nature of Turkic society tended to 
preclude the locational stability necessary to establish high rates of literacy.  Thus, the 
process by which Arab missionaries had sought to spread Islamic ideology in the 7th and 
8th centuries generally entailed promulgating the daily rituals and accepted practices of 
Islam rather than a familiarity with the Koran as a text, and hence did not necessitate a 
direct knowledge of Arabic or the Arabic script among the masses.  Communist ideology, 
on the other hand, was aimed at the masses and required not only an adherence to its core 
values but also an understanding of its guiding principles in order to effectively 
assimilate the Central Asians into a centralized and modernized state.  Towards that end, 
Soviet administrators, tasked with promulgating communism in Central Asia, set forth a 
program heavily dependent on education, and hence literacy, to achieve their goal--in 
essence, relying on the medium of language encoded in the Cyrillic alphabet as a conduit 
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for the inculcation of Soviet culture and the creation of the “Soviet man” (c.f., chapter 
one).  Thus, it was arguably the modality of the two ideologies, Islamic and communist, 
that determined the role of their respective alphabets in the propagation of cultural 
imperialism, for while the adoption of the Arabic script was largely incidental to the 
spread of Islam, enabling the Central Asian masses to became Muslims without 
becoming writers, or even speakers, of Arabic, education was at the center of communist 
ideology and orthography thus at the vanguard of Soviet imperialism.   
Given their shared personal experience of orthographic imperialism and common 
perception of its harmful effects on their national cultures, Turkic delegates to the early 
linguistic congresses were understandably concerned about the potential implications of 
adopting a new orthographic system on the dynamics of post-Soviet identity formation 
and Turkic unification.  This very point was taken up by ICTAS delegate representing 
Tataristan, Kenesbay Musaev, who expressed some doubt as to whether a Latin-based 
alphabet, championed by the majority, offered the best alternative to Cyrillic.  Arguing 
that the social aspects of alphabet reform ought to be carefully considered, given that 
orthography was not simply a collection of abstract symbols, but a gateway to culture, 
Musaev opined:   
 
Latin’e geçmek kolay iş değil. 
Ülkenin psikolojisi konusu 
mühimdir.  Kril’e geçerken 
Ruslaşma olmuştu. Şimdi Latin’e 
geçersek Avrupalaşacak mıyız?   
Switching to the Latin alphabet is 
not an easy business.  A country’s 
psychology is an important 
consideration.  When we switched 
to the Russian alphabet, we were 
Russified.  Now if we switch to the 
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Latin alphabet will we be 
Europeanized?  
 
Musaev’s unease regarding the wisdom of abandoning one orthographic system in 
favor of another and concern over the potential implications of such a decision on Turkic 
culture thus serves as evidence of the relevance of a hegemonic belief in the agency 
exerted by orthography over social identity to the question of orthographic unification in 
the Turkic world.  This, in turn, may serve to explain why some advocates of adopting a 
Latin-based common orthography were at pains to suggest that the Latin alphabet was not 
“foreign” to the Turkic peoples.  This was predominantly accomplished by recalling early 
nineteenth century movements among the Azeris and other Turkic peoples.  Thus, 
Kazakh delegate to ICTAS Kenesbay Musaev, for one, characterized the adoption of the 
Latin script as returning to an old alphabet rather than implementing a new one: “Bu 
Latin alfabesine geçmek değil, eski yazıya geri dömektir.” (“This not passing to the Latin 
alphabet, it is returning to the old writing”).  Other attempts were, however, made to 
reach even further back in history in an effort to prove that the Latin alphabet was organic 
to the Turkic languages.  Thus, as the momentum toward the adoption of Latin-based 
alphabets across the Central Asia republics appeared to be waning, Turkish delegate to 
the PTLC, Ahmet Temir, argued:   
 
Tarihte Latin harfleri Türk dillerine 
tamamiyle yabancı değildir. Meselâ 
1303 tarihinde Karadenizin 
kuzeyinde Kıpçak bozkırlarında 
Historically, the Latin letters are not 
completely foreign to the Turkic 
languages.  For example, we have 
come across some works written 
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kaleme alınmı- olan Codex 
Cumanicus gibi Latin harfleriyle 
yazılmış olan bazı eserlere de 
rastlanmaktayız.   
with the Latin letters like the Codex 
Cumanicus which was written in 
1303 [sic] in the Qipcaq steppes 
north of the Black Sea.   
 
While true that the Codex Cumanicus, which described the language of the 
Cumans, a nomadic Turkic people belonging to the western Eurasian Turkic tribes, was 
written in the Latin script, it is also true that the text was prepared by non-Cumans, 
predominantly German missionaries, to aid religious, political, and trade relations.  Thus, 
it is hardly accurate to equate the Latin script with the Cuman people, who in fact relied 
on variants of a Turkic runic script resembling the Orhun-Yenisey script of their eastern 
counterparts for their literary needs (Golden 1992).  Nonetheless this brief mention of an 
ancient text in which the language of a Turkic peoples was rendered in a Latin-based 
script served to suggest that the script was not “foreign” but rather “natural” to the Turkic 
peoples and, as such, its adoption would not entail “Europeanization” or the concomitant 
loss of Turkic culture.  In other words, the Latin letter would not exert “foreign” 
orthographic agency on the Turkic peoples. 
The notion that orthography acts both as a symbol of social identity and an agent 
in its production was furthermore evident in the interest among some delegates to the 
congresses in reviving the runic Orhun-Yenisey script of the ancient Göktürks, and 
indeed the language itself.  Despite being recognized as impractical, this uniquely Turkic 
orthography was appealing insofar as it represented a return to the script of the ancient 
Turkic peoples and, by extension, the essence of Turkic culture, thereby allowing the 
effects of intervening linguistic and cultural imperialism to be shed, while simultaneously 
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preventing the further loss of linguistic and cultural integrity perceived to be the foregone 
conclusion of voluntary adoption of another foreign script.  Noting that different 
alphabets had served the Turkic languages at various historical junctures, ICTAS delegate 
from Kazakhstan Erden Kacibekov recommended adoption of the Latin alphabet for the 
foreseeable future for reasons of expedience and practicality, but also suggested that 
work should begin as soon as possible to prepare for the eventual adoption of the Orhun-
Yenisey script.  Specifically, he argued that:   
 
Bir zamanlar Arap alfabesi bizim 
için en uygun alfabe oldu ama 
şimdi Latin alfabesinden başka çare 
yok.  Bunu çok çabuk halletmemiz 
gerek.  Kazakıstan, Tatarıstan, 
Özbekistan 1992-1995 arasında 
Latin alfabesine geçmeyi başaracak 
ama çok daha ilerde Orhun 
alfabesine geçmek şart.  Bunun için 
şimdiden çalışmalara başlamak 
lâzım.   
At one time the Arabic alphabet 
was the most appropriate alphabet 
for us, but now there is no option 
other than the Latin alphabet.  We 
must resolve this very quickly.  
Kazakhstan, Tataristan, and 
Uzbekistan will succeed in passing 
to the Latin alphabet by between 
1992 and 1995, but in the distant 
future, we must pass to the Orhun 
alphabet.  We must start working on 
this now. 
 
Kacibekov’s compatriot Amantay Torgaev expanded on this point, noting that the 
decision to support one alphabet over another was political rather than pragmatic in 
nature and implying that true unity among the Turkic peoples would come only from 
teaching the Orhun language--and by implication, its associated script-- rather than 
continuing to school children in the modern Turkic languages, which served only to 
divide them from one another.  He argued:   
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Latin harflerini çok methettik.  
Başka alfabe olsa onu da 
methederdik. Kırk-elli yıl çok eser 
Rus harfleri ile verildi. Kazaklar 
için tâ 1901’de bile Rus alfabesi 
yaratılmıştı.  Bunun siyasetle ilgisi 
vardır.…  Mekteplerde değişik Türk 
dilleri okutmak yerine (çok ders 
olur idi) eski Orhun dilini okutsak 
daha yerine olurdu.   
We have greatly praised the Latin 
letters.  Had it been another 
alphabet, we would have extolled 
that.  In 40-50 years many works 
have been produced with the 
Russian letters.  Even as far back as 
1901 a Russian alphabet was 
created for Kazakhs.  This is related 
to politics….  It would be much 
more fitting if in place of teaching 
the various Turkic languages in the 
schools we taught the ancient 
Orhun language.  
 
At the root of such arguments lay the notion that the only orthography around 
which the Turkic world could ultimately coalesce was the uniquely Turkic Orhun-
Yenisey script and the concomitant belief that until the Turkic peoples could muster the 
collective social, political, and economic strength to support transition to such an 
orthographic system, they would be consigned to using a foreign alphabet to express 
themselves in writing, and it mattered little which of the remaining options were adopted 
for the meantime.  This sentiment once again reflects the notion of orthographic agency--
i.e., the belief that use of the Orhun-Yenisey script, insofar as it represented the 
worldview of the original Turkic peoples, could evoke a wider Turkic consciousness, 
reviving the unity of the contemporary Turkic peoples and restoring them to their former 
greatness.  While the great Orhun-speaking Turkic society Torgaev envisioned stood in 
contrast to the Russian-speaking Turkic society Sanagulov decried, however, it also stood 
in contrast, pragmatically, if not ideologically, to the Turkish-speaking (Türkçe-konuşan) 
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Turkic world that organizers of the linguistic congresses hoped to establish, for while the 
Turks were equal inheritors of the Orhun legacy, and the very idea of a common Turkic 
script, regardless of the particulars of orthographic form, evoked notions of a great union 
of Turkic peoples, in pragmatic terms, any alphabet but one based on Latin characters 
would have realistically excluded the Anatolian Turks for whom the issue of alphabet had 
long since been settled and who, in the absence of domestic upheaval and a shift in 
political paradigm of the sort then faced by the Turkic peoples, were unlikely to entertain 
a wholesale revision of their over sixty-year-old script.   
Among the Turkish delegates, who mostly observed a self-imposed limit in 
refraining from overtly recommending a specific orthographic system out of concern that 
it might be perceived as imposing a Turkish vision on the Turkic peoples, Turkish 
linguist Ahmet Temir came closest to recommending adoption of a Latin-based 
orthographic system when he predicted that Turkey’s long-standing utilization of the 
Latin alphabet, as well as the script’s widespread international use, would ultimately 
persuade the Turkic peoples to adopt it as well.  Although insisting that his prediction 
should, in no way, be construed as an attempt to impose the Latin-based alphabet, Temir 
noted that he and his fellow countrymen nonetheless cherished the hope that the Turkic 
peoples would see the value of adopting the Latin alphabet.  He argued:   
 
[K]anaatimizce Türkiye’nin Latin 
alfabesi kullanması diğer Türk 
Dünyasını da Latin alfabesi 
üzerinde etkileyecektir.  Ama biz 
[I]n our opinion, Turkey’s use of 
the Latin alphabet will have an 
effect on the rest of the Turkic 
world also using the Latin alphabet.  
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burada bunu zorla empoze 
etmiyoruz.  Yalnız her bakımdan, 
bütün dünyanın kullanmış olması 
bakımından, Türkiye’de de Latin 
alfabesi hala devam ettiğine göre, 
diğer Türk boylarının da herhalde 
bu istikamette bir karara 
varacaklarını tahmin ediyoruz, 
ümid ediyoruz.   
But we are not here imposing this 
by force.  It’s just that from every 
perspective, insofar as the whole 
world already uses it, and 
considering that the Latin alphabet 
is still going strong in Turkey, we 
predict that the other Turkic peoples 
will also likely arrive at the same 
conclusion, indeed we hope so.   
 
Thus, despite the care with which Turkish organizers and participants avoided 
giving the impression that the early linguistic congresses were convened with the purpose 
of compelling the Turkic peoples to accept a Latin-based alphabet, it nonetheless became 
increasingly clear that the Latin orthography, although originally foreign, had become so 
integral to Turkish national identity that, practically speaking, it represented the only 
orthographic system among those forwarded by the delegates that possessed the 
necessary agentive power to bring about the creation of a cohesive Turkic world that, in 
encompassing Turkey, could truly be considered pan-Turkic.  That this unspoken notion 
did, nonetheless, represent an underlying presumption behind the organization of the 
early linguistic congresses, does, however, become apparent in the fact that all seven of 
the ortak alfabe proposals presented as ICTAS drew to a close, six of which had been 
prepared by Turkic delegates, recommended Latin-based scripts.  Indeed, it is fair to say 
that the delegates who presented such proposals had been invited to the congress 
precisely because they were working on Latin-based alphabet proposals in their 
respective countries, the hope being that these atomized efforts could be married up in 
creating a common Turkic alphabet.   
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In essence, then, the early linguistic congresses were not about linguistic and 
orthographic rapprochement among the Turkic peoples, but rather about effecting the 
rapprochement of the Turkic peoples with Turkey through the adoption of a Latin-based 
orthographic system that took Turkey’s alphabet as its base.  Returning then to Fishman’s 
(1993b) “Language Y” factor, we find that more than Russian, Arabic, Orhun, or the 
“European languages” and their associated scripts, it is Turkish and the Latin-based 
Turkish alphabet that lurk behind discussions over the structure and form of a common 
Turkic alphabet.  While within the context of the wider Turkic world, the Turkish 
language and alphabet were ostensibly just another of the “X” languages, equally 
involved in the mutual constitution of linguistic and sociocultural unification across the 
Turkic world, Turkey’s established orthography, not to mention its sociopolitical 
stability, not only lent its orthography special status among the “X” languages, but also 
put it into the “Y” language category, rendering the Latin orthography, and, by 
implication, the Turkish alphabet, the unspoken “standard” against which ortak alfabe 
options were measured.  The special status accorded the Turkish alphabet, became 
particularly clear during discussions surrounding the seven ortak alfabe proposals that 
were focused on reaching final consensus on the official form the ortak alfabe would 
take, in which a recognition of the unspoken hierarchies of power that lay beneath the 
putative “commonality” of the Turkic peoples began to emerge.   
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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF A COMMON ALPHABET 
At this juncture it is logical to ask how, given such deep ideological divides over 
the creation of a common Turkic orthography, it was conceivable that the delegates to 
ICTAS could come to consensus on an actual ortak alfabe proposal.  The answer to this 
question, I would argue, lies in the overarching political economy of linguistic unification 
in the post-Soviet Turkic world during its early days, for, as the discourse of delegates to 
the early linguistic congresses makes clear, in addition to being invested with symbolic 
power and social agency in the production of identity, orthography was believed to 
possess both mediated and unmediated political and economic power in the material 
world, by virtue of granting privileged access to more powerful nations and their political 
and economic resources.  In so arguing, I am drawing from Bourdieu’s (1991) 
suggestion, as well as elaborations on his theory (Gal 1989, Irvine 1989), that language 
choices and linguistic practices are symbolic capital that can be converted to social, 
political, and economic capital.  In this sense, the dimensions of orthographic choice in 
the post-Soviet Turkic world reflected an implicit understanding of differences in social, 
political, and economic standing hidden beneath explicit discourses of commonality 
amongst the Turkic peoples.  More to the point, it reflected an understanding on the part 
of the Turkic delegates that Turkey occupied a unique position among the Turkic nations 
by virtue of its status as an established and respected independent modern nation-state, 
thereby granting Turkey prestige within the Turkic world derived largely from its 
economic footing as well as its social and political standing within the broader 
international community. 
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In exploring the overarching political economy of the post-Soviet Turkic world in 
its early days, it is thus expedient to return to the question of what the Turkic delegates 
hoped might be achieved from their involvement in the early linguistic congresses.  
Beyond nostalgic feelings of kinship, there was an initial hope among the Turkic 
delegates that a union of Turkic peoples along the lines of the European Union would 
give weight to the notion of their belonging to a broad peoplehood distinct from the 
collective Soviet identity they had been ascribed and thus, although in a seemingly 
contrary sense, bolster their nascent national claims.  As ICTAS delegate from 
Kazakhstan Erden Kacibekov noted: “Unity is necessary in economic, scientific, 
political, and cultural areas.  Even Europe united.  We’re late in this regard.  The matter 
of alphabet must be resolved as quickly as possible” (“Ekonomik, ilmî, politik, kültür 
sahasında birlik gerek.  Avrupa bile birleşti.  Biz bu konuda geç kaldık.  Alfabe meselesi 
en kısa zamanda halledilmeli”).   
As such, while largely preoccupied, as described above, with concerns of an 
existential nature that bespoke an engrossing engagement with issues of national identity 
formation within a supranational context, the Turkic delegates also demonstrated an 
underlying concern for pragmatic political and economic issues also perceived to impinge 
on national autonomy, especially as the conference wore down and the time drew near for 
deciding on an actual ortak alfabe proposal.  In this sense, despite the unresolved status 
of national orthographic reform and identity politics in the Central Asian republics, and in 
spite of concerns over the potential for foreign orthographic systems to extend cultural 
hegemony and stymie independent identity formation among the Turkic peoples, there 
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was palpable feeling among the Turkic delegates to the early linguistic congresses that 
orthographic rapprochement and eventual linguistic unity amongst the Turkic peoples, 
particularly a union that included Turkey, would provide some measure of protection of 
their national autonomy by acting, if not as an antidote to Soviet linguistic manipulation, 
then at least as a prophylaxis against future Russian attempts at linguistic, social, and 
political intrigue within a region that Russia still considered its “backyard.”   
By extension, it was generally acknowledged by Turkic delegates that arriving at 
consensus on a common alphabet and finding a way to implement it as quickly as 
possible was of paramount importance.  In this sense, even Erden Kacibekov, whose 
statement in favor of the eventual adoption of the Orhun-Yenisey script is discussed 
above, in recognition of the conflict between the time, effort and economic resources 
required to resuscitate the ancient runic script and the need to adopt a common alphabet 
as quickly as possible to mitigate against immediate political exigencies, recommended 
implementing an interim Latin-based orthography.  Fellow ICTAS delegate Rafael 
Muhammetdinov, however, best summarized this political perspective on the necessity of 
devising a common script and urgency of adopting it, arguing:   
 
Sovyetler Birliği adlı imparatorluk 
dağıldı.  Şimdi Rusya adlı yeni bir 
imparatorluk var ve henüz ayağa 
kalkmadı.  Bunun tekrar 
canlanmasına kadar çok az vaktimiz 
var.  Şu fırsattan faydalanarak bize 
derhal, kısa vakit içinde bir 
unifikasyonlu (ortak) alfabe kurmak 
The empire known as the Soviet 
Union has collapsed.  Now there is 
a new empire known as Russia and 
it has not yet risen.  We have very 
little time before it again comes to 
life.  Using this opportunity, it is 
necessary for us to establish a 
unifying, common alphabet at once 
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lazımdır.  Eğer biz şimdi 
yetişemezsek sonra Yeltsin 
imparatorluğu sağlamlaşacak, 
kuvvetlenecek ve [Türk 
cumhuriyetler] bihassa Rusya 
içindeki muhtar cumhuriyetler çok 
ağır durumda kalacaklardır.  Bunun 
için çok acele etmemiz 
gerekmektedir.… Türk alfabesi 
lokomotif gibi değişik Türk 
boylarını peşinden çekmelidir.   
and within a short period of time.  If 
we don’t achieve this now, then the 
Yeltsin Empire will gather its 
strength, become more powerful 
and [the Turkic republics] 
especially those autonomous 
republics inside Russia, will remain 
in a very difficult situation.  For 
these reasons, we must make great 
haste….  The Turkic alphabet must, 
like a locomotive, pull the various 
Turkic tribes behind it.   
 
Thus, with the understanding that the Latin-based alphabet was the sole viable 
option for pan-Turkic unity and with the creation of a common Turkic alphabet explicitly 
recognized as politically beneficial, the only question that remained as ICTAS drew to a 
close was whether the ortak alfabe should, in view of post-Soviet exigencies, simply 
replicate Turkey’s alphabet, or in a nod to nationalist sentiment, allow for different and/or 
additional characters and hence some measure of national distinctiveness.  In such 
deliberations, economic considerations were key, as many delegates noted, because 
switching to a new alphabet was an expensive proposition and one which none of the 
Turkic peoples had the financial wherewithal to accomplish independently, at least in the 
short term.  In that sense, adopting the Turkish alphabet set the stage for the Turkic 
peoples to most effectively benefit from direct material aid the Turkish state could 
provide in the form of not only typewriters, printing presses, etc., but also educational 
materials, literature, and newspapers--in short, the panoply of interrelated equipment and 
materials necessary for the Turkic peoples to successfully abandon the Cyrillic alphabet 
and free themselves from Russian linguistic imperialism.   
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As a result, some delegates did suggest outright adoption of the Turkish alphabet, 
at least for an initial transition period, arguing that it would ensure the availability of 
material resources necessary to effect the primary goal of Latinization.  As the argument 
went, once Latinization had been achieved and the independent Turkic republics had 
found their financial footing, correctives to the individual Turkic alphabets could then be 
made to better represent the unique phonology of each language.  One such proposal was 
advanced by Turkmen delegate to ICTAS, Cebbar Göklenov, who, in spite of earlier 
comments asserting the need for an alphabet that would remedy the damage done to the 
Turkmen language by the Soviet-imposed alphabet’s inability to represent key features of 
Turkmen phonology, nonetheless suggested that, in light of economic exigencies, the 
Turkish alphabet should be adopted for an interim period, arguing: “In passing to the 
Latin alphabet, we must pass to the Latin alphabet in use in Turkey, because we have no 
material opportunities.  We can make use of those from Turkey” (“Latin alfabesine 
geçerken Türkiye’deki Latin’e geçmek şart, çünkü bizim maddî imkânımız yok.  
Türkiye’den yararlanabiliriz”).  Thus, arguments in favor of accepting the Turkish 
alphabet, if only on a temporary basis and for reasons of expediency, hinged on an 
explicit recognition of Turkey’s superior economic power and the material aid it could 
supply.   
Nonetheless, there were indications among other Turkic delegates of alternate 
assessments of the political economy involved in adopting the Turkish alphabet.  For 
these delegates, the issue of national autonomy was of sufficient significance to dictate 
against, if not the Latin-based orthographic system itself, then at least against adopting 
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the Turkish alphabet as the ortak alfabe.  Azerbaijani linguist/parliamentarian Feridun 
Celilov, for one, was unequivocal in recommending against adopting the 29-letter, Latin-
based Turkish alphabet in deference to national distinctiveness, arguing: 
 
Alfabe ince meseledir.  Türklerle 
bir halk olsak dahi söyleme 
farklılıklarımız var ve biz bunları 
muhafaza etmek isteriz.  Türk 
alfabesinin aynısını kabul 
edemeyiz.   
Alphabet is a delicate matter. If we 
are one people with the Turks, it is 
also fair to say that we have 
differences and we want to protect 
them. We cannot adopt an identical 
Turkish alphabet.   
 
That it was an Azeri delegate who took this stand is not surprising, for 
preservation of national orthographic distinctiveness was of particular importance to 
many Azerbaijani delegates, who, like most Azeri linguists and language professionals, 
regarded their country, rather than Turkey, as the historic vanguard of alphabet reform.  
Specifically, Azerbaijan’s 1919 adoption of the Latin-based son Türk alfabesi, its 1922 
implementation of the Latin-based yeηi Turq əlifbası, and its role in hosting the 1926 
Baku Turcology Congress the Latin-based Unified Turkic Alphabet (Birləşdirilmiş Jeni 
Tyrk Әlifbasь) it promoted was officially adopted by the Turkic peoples were points of 
national pride, and Azerbaijani scholars and politicians rarely missed an opportunity to 
highlight the role their country had played in the history of linguistic unification amongst 
the Turkic peoples and to emphasize that Azerbaijan’s involvement in orthographic 
reform predated that of Turkey.  In the words of Azerbaijani delegate to the ICTAS, 
Alovset Abdullaev:   
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Türkiye bu alfabeye bizden sonra 
katıldı….  Demokratik Azerbaycan 
Cumhuriyeti zamanında (1918-
1920) 1919’da Abdulla Bey 
Efendizade’nin projesi ile onu 
parlemento kabul etmişti.  “Son 
Türk Alfabesi” adını taşıyor ve 
1919’da Bakü’de basıldı.  Bize 
Türkiye demedi biz Türkiye’den 
önce Latin’i kabul ettik.   
Turkey joined in on this [Latin] 
alphabet after us….  During the 
Democratic Azerbaijan Republic 
(1918-1920), parliament accepted 
[the Latin alphabet] with Abdulla 
Bey Efendizade’s project.  It carried 
the name, “The Final Turkish 
Alphabet” and was printed in 1919 
in Baku.  Turkey didn’t tell us [to 
do so], we adopted the Latin before 
Turkey.   
 
Moreover, of all the Turkic republics, Azerbaijan was best positioned to assert its 
desire to forge an independent orthographic future.  Proponents of reprising Azerbaijan’s 
former Latin alphabet had effectively appealed to nationalist popular sentiment which 
was especially high in the wake of a brutal January 1990 crack-down on mass protests 
demanding independence from the Soviet Union, and hence public support was largely 
behind the effort.  In fact, the Azerbaijani parliament had been poised to bring the issue 
of national alphabet to an official vote in March of 1991 (Landau and Kellner-Heinkele 
2001), but the parliamentary decision was postponed in deference to Azerbaijani scholars 
wishing to take part in the ortak alfabe discussions.  In the minds of the Azeri delegates, 
the path had been set for the adoption of a modified Azeri alphabet, as Alaeddin Aliev 
implied when he stated that the vast majority of Azeris wished “to return to the alphabet 
that was used between 1928 and 1940--the 29 letters of Turkish with three additional 
letters tacked on” (“1928-1940'ta kullanılan alfabeye dönmek istiyoruz--Türkçe'de 29 
harf ilavesiyle.”), and their participation in the early linguistic congresses was simply to 
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designed to assess whether Azerbaijan could reprise its 1926 role at the vanguard of 
orthographic reform.  Thus, in Celilov’s words: “The decision to wait for the results of 
the present symposium was made in view of the probability that the Tatars, Turkmen, and 
other Turkic peoples would adopt that which the Azeris had adopted” (“Azerilerin kabul 
ettiklerini Tatar, Türkmen ve başkaları kabul etmemeleri ihtimali yüzünden buradaki 
sempozyumun neticelerinini beklemeye karar verildi.”).  In this sense, as confirmed in 
later interviews, Celilov and his fellow Azerbaijan delegates had made the calculation 
that the social and political capital that would accrue domestically by capitalizing on 
nationalist sentiment in reinstating a former symbol of Azerbaijan’s brief period of 
independence in the pre-Soviet era and the social and political capital that might thus be 
translated into within the international sphere (for Western interest in Azerbaijan’s 
reputed petrocarbon reserves had already begun) outweighed what economic benefit 
might result from material aid from the Turkish state.  Indeed, by participating in the 
early linguistic congresses, Azerbaijani delegates had merely hoped to increase 
Azerbaijan’s national prestige by reprising their role at the orthographic vanguard of a 
broader Turkic world.   
In the end, of the seven ortak alfabe proposals presented by delegates to ICTAS, 
it was the one presented by a Turkish linguist, Ahmet Temir, that was accepted.  Whereas 
the other six proposals presented included letters not found in modern Turkish (e.g., ä, ñ, 
č, š, ž, é, ĭ, and қ), some of which replaced letters already in use in Turkish (e.g., š was to 
replace ş and č to replace ç) while others sought to account for extant phonological 
variance among the Turkic language, to greater or lesser degrees, by representing sounds 
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not represented in the modern Turkish alphabet, Temir’s proposal was for a thirty-four 
character alphabet, based on the 29-letter Turkish script with five additional characters (ä, 
x, q, ñ, and w) that represented phonemes common to many of the Turkic languages but 
absent in modern standard Turkish.  This, then, was to be the official ortak alfabe, which 
was to be taught across the Turkic world as a “lingua franca of Turkic orthography,” and 
from which the various Turkic peoples were to choose appropriate letters in creating their 
individual national languages.   
Thus, while the Latin-based common alphabet did allow for a measure of national 
distinctiveness, it was nonetheless to unite the Turkic peoples largely under the rubric of 
an alphabet that had long been associated with Turkish national identity.  Given the 
understanding of orthographic agency prevalent among the Turkic peoples, it was only 
natural that this was to raise concerns that adoption of the ortak alfabe would result in 
their “becoming” Turks and hence losing their national distinctiveness.  Although this 
concern remained unvoiced, as such, during the early linguistic congresses, it was to play 
a key role in the fate of the ortak alfabe in their aftermath.  In short, as several Turkic 
delegates to ICTAS later opined, while the agreed-upon alphabet proposal, in accounting 
for extant sociopolitical exigencies, may have offered the soundest linguistic solution to 
the difficulty of linguistic variance, it ultimately fell short in satisfying existential 
concerns over national distinctiveness.  In a sense, then, this compromise solution traded 
the long-term ambition of true orthographic unity for the short-term objective of 
Latinizing the Turkic alphabets around the already established Turkish alphabet.  As a 
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result, it proved insufficient to encourage the Turkic peoples to adopt national alphabets 
in keeping with the ortak alfabe.  
The months subsequent to the congresses saw the proposed ortak alfabe fail to 
gain traction in national deliberations over orthography among the Turkic peoples, 
thereby consigning the ortak alfabe to the dust bin of history, and effectively halting all 
incipient work toward the more complicated, and thus sure to have been even more 
fractious, effort to create an ortak dil.  Although the first Latin alphabet adopted in 
Azerbaijan a month after the conclusion of ICTAS on 25 December 1991 was, in fact, 
based on the ortak alfabe proposal (the twenty nine letters of the Turkish alphabet plus ä, 
x, and q), the desire for national distinctiveness evident in the discourse of the country’s 
delegates to the early linguistic congresses led the Azerbaijani government’s language 
advisory board to recommend replacing the letter ä with the letter ǝ in what was 
described to me as a move designed not only to mark Azerbaijan’s orthographic 
independence but also, in a nod to history, to demonstrate the country’s continuing 
position at the vanguard of orthographic issues, it being a character from the Latin-based 
“new Turkish alphabet” (“yeηi Turq əlifbası”) implemented in Azerbaijan in 1922 and 
that served as the base for the Unified Turkic Alphabet (Birləşdirilmiş Jeni Tyrk 
Әlifbasь) adopted at the 1926 Baku Turcology Congress.48  Thus, it quickly became clear 
that nationalist impulses had trumped supranationalist sentiment in national deliberations 
                                               
48 Note here that the inclusion of the letter ǝ on the reverse of the contemporary 
Azerbaijani five manat bill is meant to represent Azerbaijan’s national distinctiveness, 
alphabet and currency both being symbolic of the nation (c.f., footnote 43). 
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over alphabet and that the Turkic peoples would chart their own orthographic course in 
the post-Soviet era.   
 
IDEOLOGICAL PRESUMPTIONS IN THE FRAMING THE CONGRESSES IN THEIR 
AFTERMATH 
At the outset of this chapter, I made initial mention of some issues regarding the 
production of the transcribed “text” upon which the proceeding analysis of the discursive 
dynamics of the early Turkic linguistic congresses would be based.  Returning to that 
issue, let me now make a few relevant points concerning the congresses proceedings as 
“text,” particularly with regard to the audio recordings having been transcribed in modern 
standard Turkish, that will both expand our understanding of the unspoken enabling 
presuppositions of the early linguistic congresses which ultimately led to the failure of 
the ortak alfabe and ortak dil projects.  From this perspective, transcription of the 
proceedings in Turkish was striking because although, as Turcologists, many of the 
Turkic delegates would, at that time, have possessed a “book” knowledge of Turkish, 
from interactions and interviews with them, I can attest that their spoken facility in 
modern Turkish, even several years after the congresses, was not at the level represented 
in the conference proceedings.49  Indeed, my own experience would suggest that even 
                                               
49 This, then, may account for a second peculiarity of the transcripts, namely the 
numerous lacunae […] in the transcriptions, presumably where the Turkish-speaking 
transcriber was unable to understand what was being said and hence translate/transcribe it 
into Turkish. 
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when speaking Turkish instead of their native Turkic language, the speech of delegates 
was punctuated by native expressions, archaic terms, and Russian loanwords, which were 
generally attributable to an incomplete knowledge of modern Turkish.   
Occasionally, however, such lexical or syntactical choices seemed deliberate, 
marking, for example, a preference for an Arabic loanword still in use in their native 
languages but “artificially” purged from modern Turkish, which thus served as 
ideological commentary on the political, and hence “linguistically haphazard,” nature of 
the Turkish linguistic reforms and the consequent “superiority of their respective native 
languages.  While from the perspective of discourse analysis, such “disfluencies” would 
have allowed for a detailed examination of the ways in which language ideology was 
instantiated in actual discursive practice, from the perspective of producing a historical 
record of the events, they served only to detract from a general understanding of the 
propositional content of the discourse.  In this sense, the decision to erase the accidental 
or deliberate “disfluencies” of “non-native” speakers by transcribing /translating their 
discourse in/to standard Turkish, although reflective of an “assumption that utterances are 
pieces of information [which], in turn, assumes that language is used to express ideas” 
(Ochs 1979:46), and hence a pragmatic decision insofar as the proceedings were 
published in Turkey and aimed at a Turkish audience, also represented an ideological 
choice that served to perpetuate one of the enabling presuppositions of the early linguistic 
congresses, namely a conviction in mutual intelligibility among the Turkic languages 
(“after all, they speak just like we do”), but in a way that once again suggests that, from a 
Turkish perspective, linguistic rapprochement in the Turkic world was largely conceived 
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of as unidirectional, involving the rapprochement of the Turkic languages and their 
speakers toward Turkish.   
Moreover, the decision to transcribe/translate in modern standard Turkish speaks 
volumes about the issue of language status, suggesting an unspoken, and perhaps largely 
unacknowledged, belief in the “superiority” of Turkish that echoes Minister Zeybek’s 
choice, in his opening remarks to the FTLC, to refer to the Turkic languages all as 
Türkçe.  This presumption of “superiority,” which I was to encounter frequently in both 
overt and covert form throughout my fieldwork, was understandably distasteful to the 
Turkic peoples, who, as became increasingly clear in the aftermath of the congresses, 
harbored their own notions of the “superiority” of their native Turkic languages to 
Turkish.  As such, it served as a “disenabling” presupposition which mitigated against not 
only the ultimate success of the ortak alfabe and ortak dil projects, and hence linguistic 
rapprochement, but also the sociocultural union of Turkic peoples envisioned by the 
organizers of the projects.    
 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, let us return for a moment to the main enabling presuppositions 
around which the early linguistic congresses were organized, namely a conviction in the 
underlying mutual intelligibility of the Turkic languages, a belief in the linguistic, social, 
political, and even economic advantages to supranational unification among the Turkic 
peoples, and a certainty in the power of the agency inherent to orthography to unite the 
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Turkic peoples under the rubric of the “Turkic world.”  Seen from a historical 
perspective, these are the very same linguistic beliefs that underpinned earlier efforts by 
Ismail Gaspirali to promote “unity in language, thought, and action” (“dilde, fikirde, işte 
birlik”) among the Turkic peoples in the pre-Soviet era.  In the absence of contact 
between the Anatolian Turks and the Soviet Turkic peoples during the Cold War era, 
these potent linguistic ideologies had taken on an almost mythologized stature, and it was 
thus under their auspices that the Turkic peoples convened to discuss the creation of a 
common Turkic alphabet and lingua franca in the early days of the post-Soviet era. 
Given that conflicts in language ideologies are most evident when they are 
“embodied by overtly contending groups” (Kroskrity 2000a:8), it would seem to follow 
that a series of discursive events ostensibly organized around shared principles and a 
commitment to cooperation, such as the early Turkic congresses, would manifest 
relatively little ideological conflict.  In actuality, however, these events, convened with 
the intent of removing what was commonly understood to be artificial and externally-
imposed barriers to written communication, proved surprisingly fraught with ideological 
divides.  As became increasingly clear during the course of the congresses, particularly in 
the discourse that emerged during discussion and debate over the form the ortak alfabe 
should take, the root of such conflict lay in varying interpretations of ostensibly shared 
ideologies that had shifted in the absence of contact, taking on a hue specific to the 
divergences in the respective historical experiences of the Anatolian Turks and ex-Soviet 
Turkic peoples. 
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The intense metalinguistic contact fostered by the early linguistic congresses, as 
bounded discursive events focused on issues of linguistic planning, was thus key to the 
emergence of ideological conflict that revealed evolving differences in the “linguistic 
cultures” of the Anatolian Turks and the ex-Soviet Turkic peoples, including, most 
potently, their respective understandings of the role of language in social consolidation 
and the relationship between nationalism and supranationalism.  In moments of contact, 
Makihara and Schieffelin suggest, “[i]t is often not only difference in codes and problems 
in translating between them that make understanding difficult, but ideas about the nature 
of language itself or its functions which, when taken for granted on one side and 
unimagined or even unimaginable on the other lead to the misrecognition of meaning and 
even intentions” (2007:13-14).  In this sense, conceptualizing the various Turkic 
languages as one language through discourses of mutual intelligibility proved insufficient 
to overcome emergent, discrepant language ideologies which, while rooted in the 
divergent histories of the Turkic peoples, simultaneously informed their contemporary 
sociopolitical yearnings and objectives.   
In the end, then, the one “shared” presupposition that remained intact at the 
conclusion of the congresses was the conviction in the latent mutual intelligibility of the 
Turkic languages, although even this hallowed belief was to come under question in their 
aftermath.  Thus, although concerns of a pragmatic nature that bespoke calculations 
concerning the political economy of the post-Soviet environment in its early days allowed 
the delegates to come to consensus regarding the orthographic system upon which the 
ortak alfabe should be based and the form it would take, discrepancies in ideology and 
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intent between the Anatolian Turks and the ex-Soviet Turkic peoples ultimately dictated 
the abandonment of the ortak alfabe and ortak dil projects and the failure of broader 
efforts to effect the eventual sociocultural and political rapprochement among the Turkic 
peoples envisioned by the organizers of the early linguistic congresses.  
Returning then to the notion that linguistic ideologies are not only constituted by 
but also constitutive of the social world and that changes in linguistic attitudes, values, 
and beliefs thus have the potential to reflect, reinforce, and potentially revolutionize 
“presuppositions about social relations and social relations themselves,” (Makihara and 
Schieffelin 2007:5), I would note that since language ideologies mediate between 
linguistic practice and the social world, their revelation  bespeaks the existence of the 
broader social ideologies in which they are rooted.  In the case of the Turkic world, the 
emergence of discrepant linguistic ideologies masked by explicit discourses of mutual 
intelligibility highlighted unspoken notions of sociocultural “superiority” which were to 
plague broader efforts aimed at fostering sociocultural and geopolitical rapprochement 
and unification among the Turkic peoples and thus call into question the notion of a 
cohesive “Turkic world.” 
Finally, in summarizing the larger contribution of this chapter to scholarship in 
language ideologies, I would point to an article by Blommaert that, in laying out “target 
domains for the analysis of language ideological debates,” suggests that we consider 
language policy and planning, the role of language in nation-building processes, language 
and symbolic power, language change, the nature of politics as a discursive process, and 
the historical processes that contribute to the articulation of ideology and ideological 
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processes (1999:30).  In this sense, through an exploration of the ideological dimensions 
and political economy considerations of a collective attempt to create a common Turkic 
alphabet and lingua franca which, in countering the effects of linguistic shift, was to 
supersede nationalist divisions between the Turkic peoples with supranationalist 
unification among them, with a particular focus on the emergent discrepancies in 
interpretation of ostensibly shared linguistic attitudes, values, and beliefs upon which the 
endeavor ultimately foundered, this study offers salient insights into each of these 
important domains of interest in language ideology scholarship. 
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Chapter Four:  Language or Dialect? Turk or Turkic?: Negotiating the 
Dimensions of Shared Identity in the Turkic World 
 
The competing ideas [within the Turkic world] of local territorial nation versus common 
shared identity as Turks find their resonance today in the attempts by many newly-
independent states to revise or (re)create their national myths, while at the same time 
other groups reexamine the shared linguistic, cultural, and historical heritage that is 
readily apparent to most Turks….  It must be said that while the newly-independent states 
tend to focus on (re)building their new nations, they are sometimes resentful of the 
message that there is no difference between the Turks of Turkey and the Turks of Central 
Asia, the Caucasus, and other regions, or that the Turks of Turkey should play a role of 
leadership among all the Turks.  For this reason communication between members of all 
the various groups of Turks is all the more important. 
Uli Schamiloglu 
Introduction to Turkistan news and discussion group, 199750 
 
A language is a dialect with an army and navy. 
Max Weinreich 
 
Language is an instrument of communication as well as ex-communication. 
Lynda Mugglestone (1995:70) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In previous chapters, I have described the enthusiasm with which the collapse of 
the Soviet Union was met by the Turkic peoples on both sides of the Iron Curtain and the 
subsequent reinitiation of contact between the Anatolian Turks and their Turkic 
counterparts in early quasi-official, bilateral efforts aimed at unifying the Turkic peoples 
linguistically and culturally through the creation of a common Turkic alphabet.  While 
                                               
50 Quote taken from Uli Schamiloglu’s Introduction to Turkistan.Newsletter found at: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19990117000239/http://www.euronet.nl/users/sota/turkistan.h
tm, last accessed August 2, 2011. 
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the ortak alfabe project initially seemed to hold the promise that the Turkic peoples 
would unite linguistically and coalesce socioculturally under the rubric of a Turkic world, 
this promise was to remain unfulfilled, as the zeal evinced on both sides fell victim, in 
relatively short order, to considerable controversy over the shape the imagined Turkic 
world community would take and in whose hands its stewardship would rest.  As a result, 
progress toward linguistic, sociocultural, and geopolitical unification among the Turkic 
peoples, had effectively stalled by the mid-1990s.  This chapter, then, explores the many 
issues involved in answering the question that members of the community of practice still 
committed to negotiating the dimensions of the Turkic world asked one another in the 
meeting halls of Turkic world events, the digital space of internet forums, and the pages 
of newspapers and journals during this phase of post-euphoric sobering, namely “What 
went wrong?”   
Toward the end of the previous chapter, I noted that the orthographic decisions of 
the Turkic peoples in the wake of the early language congresses--whether to retain the 
Cyrillic, as in Kazakhstan, or to adopt a Latin-based alphabet that differed from the 
agreed-upon ortak alfabe, as in Azerbaijan--clearly demonstrated that nationalist 
impulses had trumped supranationalist sentiment in national deliberations over alphabet, 
and that independent orthographies would thenceforth serve as a symbol of the 
sovereignty and autonomy of the Turkic republics in the post-Soviet era.  This clear 
demonstration of the Turkic peoples’ commitment to national distinctiveness 
notwithstanding, it is important to note that debate over issues of orthography and 
language, in particular, and the future of linguistic and sociocultural rapprochement 
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among the Turkic peoples, more broadly, did not suddenly cease with the conclusion of 
the early linguistic congresses or the announcement of national orthographies by the 
Turkic peoples.  Within the putative Turkic world at large, as well as the self-selected 
community of practice actively engaged in promoting Turkic rapprochement, such 
discussion continued apace, as the dimensions of relations among the Turkic peoples 
were renegotiated in light of earlier misunderstandings and missteps during this second 
stage of Turkic world relations.   
While it is not difficult to conceptualize the series of early linguistic congresses 
discussed in the preceding chapter, collectively involving Turkish and Central Asian 
politicians, Turkish policy makers affiliated with the TDK and Central Asian members of 
their respective nations’ language advisory boards, as well as linguists, Turcologists, and 
language professionals from throughout the Turkic world, as together constituting a 
prototypical example of “debate,” or, more specifically, a language ideological debate, it 
is less immediately evident that the discussions, disputes, and verbal interplay revolving 
around related issues of language and orthography that emerged in the wake of the early 
linguistic congresses can be as easily captured within this paradigm.  In arguing that such 
discursive and metadiscursive interactions can and, indeed, should be conceptualized as a 
diffuse and attenuated, but nonetheless loosely cohesive, debate, I return first to the 
widely accepted definition of “debate” Blommaert offers while initially proposing the 
advantages of focusing on language ideological debates as an entrée into developing a 
historiography of language ideologies:   
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In the field of politics, discursive struggle and contestation are generically 
captured under the label of debate.  The political process develops through a 
series of exchanges involving a variety of social actors: politicians and policy-
makers themselves, academic and non-academic experts, interested members of 
the public, the media. Debates are, politically-ideologically, the points of entrance 
for civil society into policy-making: they are (seen as) the historical moments 
during which the polity gets involved in shaping policies (1999:8).   
 
Notwithstanding the obvious utility of such a classic definition of the debate 
process in providing a framework for studying the more formal aspects of linguistic 
rapprochement in the post-Soviet Turkic world, I would suggest that the above 
description of the debate process, or the specific ways in which the “polity gets involved 
in shaping policies,” represents an idealized, even utopian, perspective on the power 
dynamics inherent to formal debate, particularly as regards the means by which and the 
degree to which interested parties are empowered to partake and certain topics are either 
sanctioned or proscribed.  Thus, for example, in the previous chapter’s examination of the 
dynamics of the early linguistic congresses, I suggested that the dimensions of debate 
over a common Turkic alphabet, particularly as concerned the development of a concrete 
ortak alfabe proposal, were influenced, if not largely determined, by certain unspoken, 
ideological presumptions not only about orthography itself, but also about orthography’s 
role in uniting the Turkic world, that were held by the Turkish organizers of the early 
linguistic congresses and ultimately influenced who was invited to participate in the 
debate.  In this sense, although many of the delegates alluded to ongoing debates within 
their respective countries over four separate orthographic systems (Arabic, Cyrillic, 
Latin, and Orhun-Yenisey), even mentioning by name some of the scholars working on 
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proposals based on alternatives to a Latin-based script, such scholars were not in 
attendance, and arguments in support of such alternatives were thus not represented, at 
the early linguistic congresses, largely because they conflicted with the overarching 
Turkish objective of effecting the implementation of Latin-based alphabets across the 
Turkic world as a means of both drawing the Turkic peoples figuratively into Turkey’s 
sphere of influence, and also thereby increasing Turkey’s standing within the 
international community.   
Moreover, casting further back in the history of orthographic reform in the Turkic 
world, I would suggest that although it is not possible from the historical record to 
determine with absolute surety whether the selection of participants in the 1926 Baku 
Turcology Congress was influenced by underlying ideological presuppositions, the 
overwhelming support for adopting a Latin-based alphabet as a first ortak alfabe for the 
Turkic peoples suggests it likely was.  Turkish historian of the event, Bilâl Şimşir (1991) 
does indeed note that the intent of the Azerbaijani organizers of the congress was to 
highlight the benefits of a Latin-based script as a means of rallying support among the 
other Turkic peoples for an alphabet resembling that which the Azerbaijanis had 
themselves recently adopted, thereby presenting a fait accompli and a fortified front 
against prognosticated Bolshevik meddling.  Thus, while admittedly neither a conclusive 
nor exhaustive survey, from these two exemplars of formal language ideological debate 
can nonetheless be abstracted the provisional thesis that involvement of “the polity” in 
formal debate is both limited and selective, which, in turn, begs the question as to the 
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degree to which “civil society,” or the public writ large, is able to influence overt policy 
decisions within the framework of formal debate.   
Although participant selectivity is the most obvious level at which ideologically 
“non-preferred” discourse was precluded from the early language congresses, I would 
argue that additional factors likewise contributed to limiting the emergence of diverse 
ideological perspectives.  In this sense, while divergent viewpoints were hinted at, and, in 
some instances, even prefigured in the discourses of the early linguistic congresses, they 
were often explicitly voiced only retrospectively.  With this in mind, I would like to 
recall a concept I alluded to at the end of the previous chapter and termed “the lacuna of 
the unspoken” to suggest here that the very fact that certain issues remained unvoiced 
during the early linguistic congresses implicitly reveals the power of interrelated political, 
pragmatic, and ideological forces in shaping the dimensions of debate.  Thus, for 
example, the general discontentment of Turkic delegates with the contours of the Turkish 
alphabet was never explicitly voiced because, as was explained to me in retrospect, 
pointing to the deficiencies of the Turkish alphabet threatened to fracture the illusion of 
Turkic unity and cooperation and thus seemed to contravene the overarching ideological 
tenor of the congresses.  Nonetheless, such dissatisfaction did exist and clearly played a 
role in the failure of the ortak alfabe to gain traction in national orthographic debates 
within the Turkic world that followed on the heels of the early language congresses, with 
the result that although the congresses concluded on a successful note, the consensus they 
fostered was a false consensus and hence failed to translate into actual adoption of the 
agreed-upon ortak alfabe proposal.    
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In this sense, I suggest that while the discourses of the early linguistic congresses 
offer a view into the pan-Turkic ideological presuppositions that underpinned their 
convention, the inability of the ortak alfabe to further linguistic rapprochement among 
the Turkic peoples, was largely rooted in, and is thus best understood from the “lacuna of 
the unspoken,” or what was left unsaid, rather than what was said during the early 
linguistic congresses, and that, in turn, the “lacuna of the unspoken” is itself best 
discovered in the ambient discourses about issues of language, orthography, and identity 
in the Turkic world that emerged in the aftermath of the early linguistic congresses.  In 
this sense, I suggest that, in contrast to the discourse of the congresses themselves, the 
ambient discourses that followed in their wake, not only enabled greater participation 
from civil society, but also, by virtue both of their less structured format and more diffuse 
nature, also allowed for greater freedom of participation, thereby encouraging the 
emergence of a range of divergent perspectives generally absent in more formal contexts.  
Thus, I argue that while less easily defined as a debate in the classic sense of the term, 
such ambient discourses nonetheless collectively constituted another influential, if 
atypical, instance of language ideological debate, which, in clarifying contentious issues 
of language, orthography, and identity generally left unsaid in more formal contexts, 
lends critical insight into broader issues of identity politics in the post-Cold War era 
Turkic world.  In this sense, I expand on Blommaert’s description of the often 
indeterminate nature of even prototypical examples of debate, of which he writes:   
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Though there may be a prototypical perception of political debates, it is hard to 
provide conclusive criteria for identifying them, both in terms of discourse event-
type (identities of participants, genres, time span, setting, etc.) and in terms of 
their relation to the outcome of decision-making procedures.  They are patterns of 
interrelated discourse activities…often with a fuzzy beginning and end, of which 
we usually only remember the highlights, the most intense and polarized episodes 
(1998:9). 
 
In depicting debates as “interrelated discourse activities” lacking in distinct onset 
and conclusion, Blommaert’s description is reminiscent of Turan and Turan’s 
characterization of the three phases in Turkic world relations (c.f., chapter one) as 
“fluctuations on a continuum” which nonetheless “reflect transformations of the outlooks 
that have given direction to the relationship” (1998:179).  Although the two descriptions 
are of discrete phenomena and drawn from entirely different sources, the congruity 
between them is, I would suggest, not accidental, for when do debates arise but in times 
of social transformation, and what do they address themselves to but the dimensions of 
such transformation.  In this sense, conceptualizing language ideological debates as 
indeterminate, blurred, or “fuzzy,” around the edges suggests parallels between debates 
over language form, status, and usage that emerge during periods of transition 
(Annamalai 1979) such as prevailed following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the 
broader sociopolitical milieu that not only frames such debates, but that is also 
constituted, at least in part, through the instrumentality of debate.  Expanding on this 
notion, I would furthermore suggest that the ambient level of debate that exists within the 
interstices between “the most intense and polarized” and hence most memorable, episodic 
instances of debate on a particular topic, or, in other words, the indistinct, often unmarked 
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and unnoticed, periods of negotiated transformation that occur before metamorphosis into 
a new state is complete, may indeed constitute the best opportunity for discovering the 
unvarnished opinions and attitudes as well as the divergent interpretations of even shared 
ideological presuppositions that arise from the contestation and conflict inherent to the 
transformative process, yet, for a variety of reasons, often remain unspoken within the 
bounds of more formal contexts. 
In this sense, it is essential to note the importance not only of explicit 
metadiscursive commentary on issues of language, orthography, and identity--represented 
throughout the chapter in carefully selected quotes culled from formal and informal 
discussions and interviews--but also of iterative, situated discursive and metadiscursive 
interaction--a phenomenon I have attempted to capture below through detailed 
description as well as the judicious inclusion of pertinent vignettes--in advancing not only 
my theoretical argument, but also the dynamics of ambient-level debate.  Although 
necessarily limited in scope, and hence in their explanatory reach, not only are vignettes 
that elucidate explicit language attitudes held by Turks toward their Turkic counterparts 
exemplary of the dynamics of the ongoing debate, but, more importantly, they also 
played a key role in its progression in two key ways.   
First, the interactions, misunderstandings, and overt contestation such vignettes 
describe were instrumental in creating a conducive environment for the broader 
ideological issues underpinning them to come to the fore in an explicit manner.  In short, 
the sheer volume of interactions created a synergism by which the meaning extracted 
from each instance was extrapolated into abstracted axioms, or truisms, that were 
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generally believed to encapsulate the nature of linguistic and sociocultural relations in the 
Turkic world.  Thus, by extension, it is important to note that I was by no means alone in 
my interest in vignettes of discursive and metadiscursive relations in the post-Cold War 
Turkic world.  In their quest to discover where their vision of Turkic world unity had 
gone awry and gain insight into what might be done to correct course, members of the 
Turkic world community of practice likewise constituted interested observers of such 
interactions and, in discussing such issues amongst themselves, and with me, were often 
wont to offer vignettes of their own observation as a means of supporting their respective 
perspectives.  In this way, the ambient discursive and metadiscursive interplay that 
characterized this second stage of Turkic world relations was reiteratively recycled in 
metalinguistic assessments of the state of linguistic rapprochement among the Turkic 
peoples, becoming part of the debate and thus enabling the public, even those members 
who claimed no special “interest” in the debate, to contribute, albeit indirectly, to its 
progression.  It is in this way that the polity truly became involved in the parameters of 
debate, insofar as those in an actual position to participate in the debate over linguistic 
rapprochement in the Turkic world were a part of the polity and hence subject to its 
perceptions and prejudices.   
 
THE INTERSECTING POLARITIES OF DEBATE 
Given the difficulties inherent to making sense of diffuse “patterns of interrelated 
discourse activities” transcending national borders, emerging in disparate sites, spanning 
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many years, and involving individuals from across the social spectrum as a relatively 
cohesive and coherent debate over issues of language, orthography, and sociocultural 
identity, I suggest that organizing analysis of its various dimensions around a secondary 
theoretical paradigm may provide some relevant structure.  Insofar as such ambient 
discourse activities largely revolved around linguistic rapprochement, or, language 
planning writ large, and its role in promoting social consolidation among the diverse 
Turkic peoples, the language planning literature, and in particular, Joshua Fishman’s 
work in elucidating the ideological dimensions of language planning provides a useful 
inroads.   
In a ground-breaking ethnology of corpus planning projects pursued throughout 
history and across the globe that reveals the hidden status agendas within even those 
aspects of language planning long considered to be purely linguistic, Fishman (2006) 
explores the underlying ideological breadth of extant language planning efforts, opposing 
and clustering the various dimensions he identifies to come to the conclusion that all 
language planning efforts are, at their ideological core, driven by one of two fundamental, 
yet contrasting, motivations--the desire for “independence” or the need for 
“interdependence.”  Although Fishman’s model is based on the dynamics attendant to 
formal corpus planning efforts, it is my contention that the same ideological dimensions 
he describes are enacted, both metalinguistically and in praxis, within less formal 
contexts in the course of more mundane interactions in which language attitudes toward 
linguistic classification, identification, and management are revealed and that such 
interactions, in turn, inform the “more intense and polarized episodes” of debate that 
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surround more formal language planning efforts.  In this sense, I take Fishman’s model to 
a greater level of theoretical abstraction than he intended in developing it, while 
nonetheless remaining, I believe, within the “spirit” of his intent, namely to attend to the 
ideological valence inherent to efforts to negotiate social relationships through judicious 
language management.  Furthermore, although Fishman’s model of bipolar complexes 
describes separate and contrasting language planning efforts rather than opposing 
tendencies within the same putative effort, the broad ideological dimensions he identifies 
are indicative of approaches commonly taken in discursive negotiation and contestation 
over language and identity, and his paradigm thus serves as a springboard from which to 
examine the push-pull dynamics of linguistic and sociocultural rapprochement within the 
post-Cold War era Turkic world in which the dynamic tension between national 
“independence” and supranational “interdependence” is negotiated.   
Of the individual ideological dimensions Fishman identifies, the bipolar complex 
comprised of the opposing tendencies of Ausbau (“building away”), or efforts by the 
“weaker” of adjacent related languages to emphasize dissimilarities in aid of linguistic 
“independence,” and Einbau (“building toward”), or efforts, usually by the “stronger” of 
adjacent related languages, to emphasize similarities between the languages in aid of 
fostering “interdependence” is most directly relevant to the negotiation of linguistic 
rapprochement in the post-Cold War era.  Ausbau efforts, which Fishman describes as 
widespread, often emerge in “cases in which the weaker of two neighboring languages 
that are very similar to one another undertakes…making itself as different from its 
neighbor as it ever can be” (2006:91).  Of the opposing Einbau dimension, Fishman 
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offers no concrete examples, which seems to suggest that true Einbau efforts, are far less 
common, and that Ausbau efforts, rather than responding to an active Einbau campaign, 
are generally initiated on the basis of a perception by speakers of the “weaker” language 
that speakers of a closely related “stronger” language are attempting to incorporate or 
subsume the neighboring “weaker” language to their own.  Ausbau efforts thus represent 
“a kind of ‘autonomy motivated distancing’ that believes that all of its problems [as] a 
weak language are derived from a ‘big brother’51 to which it is structurally, lexically, and 
in writing system very similar, indeed, so similar that its own independent status is 
thereby threatened” (Fishman 2006:91).   
In this sense, the ideological tension between Ausbau and Einbau most commonly 
emerges in the perennial debate over “language versus dialect,” in which it is to the 
advantage of speakers of the “stronger” of related languages to depict the “weaker” as a 
“dialect” either because, on the basis of the “one language/one nation” principle, to do so 
lays the foundation for speakers of the “stronger” language to incorporate the speakers of 
the “weaker” language and their territories under the rubric of the nation, or because, 
working on the “bigger is better” theorem, or the presumption that languages with greater 
numbers of speakers, even scattered across national boundaries, enjoy greater world 
standing, to claim related languages as “dialects” enhances the status of the “stronger” 
                                               
51 The apparently widespread metaphor of the ‘big brother’ relationship of speakers of a 
“stronger” language to a “weaker” related language is certainly reflected in discourse 
over the dimensions of linguistic and sociocultural rapprochement in the Turkic world, in 
which Turks employ the term “ağabey” to demonstrate their willingness to take the 
Turkic peoples under their wing, and the Turkic peoples interpret the term as 
presumptuous and indicative of a Turkish sense of superiority (c.f., chapter two).  
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language.  By contrast, in the drive for self-determination under the “one language/one 
nation” principle, it is to the advantage of speakers of the “weaker” of the two languages 
to resist efforts by the speakers of the “stronger” to depict their language as a dialect, or 
proactively preempt such attempts by declaring it an independent “language,” thereby 
trading, from a political economy of language perspective, any boost in standing from 
association with a recognized world language for what status may accrue from being 
acknowledged as an admittedly small, but nonetheless sovereign, language.   
Within the context of Turkic world relations, however, the debate over language 
versus dialect was more nuanced and complicated largely because the notion of linguistic 
rapprochement among the Turkic peoples seemed itself to be premised on the notion that 
the Turkic world could enjoy the international prestige associated with an emergent world 
language by boosting inherent similarities among the individual Turkic “languages” and 
collectively nudging them toward a common language which would then serve as a 
linguistic umbrella for the many distinct “dialects” that contributed to its creation.  This 
was, however, a rather abstruse understanding of the relationship between “language” 
and “dialect” and popular use of the respective terms as well as language attitudes that 
underpinned them were more in keeping with traditional definitions, while even “expert” 
usages were wont to a certain degree of ambiguity and slippage.  
In this sense, the post-Cold War Turkic world offers an unusual case study in the 
Ausbau-Einbau dynamic, not only because it commenced with an explicit Einbau effort, 
but because that effort itself, even if conceived, initiated, and organized by speakers of 
the “stronger” language, was, at least initially, bilateral in nature and spirit.  Based on the 
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fundamental assumption of latent mutual intelligibility among the Turkic languages, 
participants in the early language congresses set about the process of creating a common 
Turkic alphabet which was to lead to the eventual formulation of a Turkic lingua franca 
designed to unite the Turkic peoples linguistically, socioculturally, and perhaps even 
geopolitically under the rubric of the Turkic world, and it was only after the reality of 
divergent understandings of the nature of the Einbau objectives surfaced that Ausbau 
reactions began to emerge.  In this sense, an examination of the dimensions of Turkic 
world relations in the post-Cold War era enables a more nuanced theorization of the 
understudied Einbau dimension, by suggesting that Einbau efforts may not always be 
“cooptive,” to neighboring languages, as suggested by its opposition to Ausbau, but also 
may be “cooperative” by nature, as were initial efforts to promote linguistic 
rapprochement within the Turkic world.  In other words, to borrow the terms of high 
finance, Einbau efforts may, in some instances, be aimed at effecting a “merger” between 
the two parties rather than a “hostile takeover,” and may thus be based in a sense of 
“equality” among partners rather than a sense of superiority over them.   
It nonetheless remains possible, however, that an ostensibly “cooperative” Einbau 
effort might provoke an Ausbau reaction if speakers of the “stronger” language were to 
adopt a more “cooptive” attitude, or speakers of the “weaker” language were to perceive 
a covert “cooptive” intent behind a seemingly “cooperative” Einbau effort.  The latter, I 
argue, was indeed what occurred vis-à-vis efforts to promote linguistic and sociocultural 
rapprochement in the post-Cold War era Turkic world, and the degeneration from a 
“cooperative” Einbau effort to a conflictual Ausbau-Einbau relationship in evidence 
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during the course of ambient-level debate that followed in the wake of the early linguistic 
congresses, was what ultimately spelled the failure not only of the ortak alfabe project, 
but also of the broader effort to unite the Turkic peoples under the rubric of the Turkic 
world.   
 
LANGUAGE OR DIALECT: THAT IS THE QUESTION 
While sociolinguists have long concerned themselves with developing theories 
and methodologies for distinguishing between languages and dialects (e.g., Ferguson 
1966, Kloss 1967, and Stewart 1968), my concern in addressing the question as to 
whether the native tongues of the ex-Soviet Turkic peoples should be classified as 
languages or dialects lies less with the theoretical nuances of scientific classification than 
with exploring divergent speaker attitudes that surround local ideologies of linguistic 
taxonomy and the influence of such ideological preconceptions of linguistic status on 
emergent relations within the post-War era Turkic world.  Working from a basic 
presumption in the fundamental arbitrariness of linguistic classification, I follow 
Chomsky in pointing to the sociopolitical nature of sociolinguistic “abstractions” and 
“idealizations” that, for example, encourage us to define Chinese as a language of many 
dialects while referring to French, Italian, and Spanish as separate languages, even 
though the degree of distance between the Romance “languages” and the Chinese 
“dialects” is roughly comparable (2005[1980]: 217).  Millar, summarizes the inherently 
sociopolitical nature of linguistic classification nicely when he writes that there are 
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“many languages [that] could have been perceived as dialects of a larger language if the 
historical development of particular societies had been different; by the same token, there 
are a number of language varieties considered dialects, which, if the history of the 
territories involved had been even slightly different, might now be perceived as 
languages” (2005:57).   
Thus, my goal in addressing the debate over whether the ex-Soviet Turkic 
languages constituted distinct languages or “mere” dialects, and if dialects, then dialects 
“of what,” is not to weigh in on the question, though I was often pressured to make a 
pronouncement by ideologues on both sides of the debate, but rather to explore the ways 
in which overt declarations regarding status by such ideologues, as well as more 
“innocent,” or at least less intentionally politically charged, discursive use of terms that 
nonetheless suggest implicit ideological presuppositions concerning language status, and 
hence social hierarchy, were employed and interpreted in relations within the post-Cold 
War Turkic world.  The terminology in question includes such general terms as “dil” 
(language), “lehçe” (dialect), “ağız” (vernacular or tongue), and “şive” (patois or 
accent)52 as well as the more specific terms “Türk dili” (Turkish language), “Türk dilleri” 
                                               
52 Within Turkey, the term lehçe (dialect) has generally been used to refer to Turkish 
dialects--e.g., İstanbul lehçesi (the Istanbul dialect).  A dialect deemed less distinct, or 
accorded less status, was generally referred to as a şive (accent, patois). The term ağız, 
also the Turkish word for “mouth,” carries the connotation of a purely spoken language 
much like the term “tongue” does in English.  Interestingly, the Turkish word dil, 
meaning a language that is both written and spoken, is also the word for the actual 
physical organ. 
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(Turkic languages),53 “Türk lehçeleri” (Turkish/ Turkic dialects), “Türkçe” (Turkish), and 
“Türkçeleri” (Turkishes).54   
As noted in chapter two, not only did the Soviet nationalities policies endeavor to 
create separate languages within the Turkic republics by choosing dialects that were 
maximally distant from one another as the foundation for new republican languages, but, 
                                               
53 In Turkish and the Turkic languages, the term Türk in its adjectival form has both the 
narrow meaning of “Turkish,” referring to that which is associated with the Republic of 
Turkey or its people, and the broader meaning of “Turkic,” referring to that which is 
associated with the Turkic peoples.  Thus, term Türk dili can be translated either as 
“Turkish language,” meaning the specific language spoken in Turkey, or “Turkic 
language,” meaning the family of languages spoken by the Turkic peoples, or the proto-
language form which their various languages as descended.  It should be noted that the 
dual meaning of the term not only leads to analytical confusion, but pragmatic 
difficulties, for by its very indeterminacy, any meaning can be laid on the term, with the 
result that it has become an important nexus of negotiation over issues of language and 
identity politics in the post-Cold War era Turkic worlds.  I have chosen here to translate 
the term Türk dili as “Turkish language” for two reasons--first, in acknowledgement of 
the fact that many Turks, and some among the Turkic peoples, believe the term “Turkic” 
to be a foreign concept designed to divide the Turkic peoples who think of themselves as 
one people and hence make no linguistic distinction between them (as will be addressed 
later in this chapter), and second, because even when intended in its broader sense, the 
narrower sense seems to be either subconsciously implied (on the part of Turks) or 
consciously interpreted (on the part of the Turkic peoples).  Although the term Türk 
dilleri can also be translated either as “Turkish languages” or “Turkic languages,” I have 
chosen here to contrast it to Türk dili by translating it as “Turkic languages,” since Türk 
dilleri was the term suggested by the Turkic peoples themselves as an acceptable 
alternative to Türk dili which they generally objected to because of its implicit 
association with the Turkish language [Türkçe].  By contrast, many Turks resisted using 
the term Türk dilleri because this plural form suggested that the Turkic languages might 
be separate languages as opposed to branches, or “dialects” of the same proto-language.  
It is my contention that the controversy over Türk dili versus Türk dilleri lies at the heart 
of the negotiation over Einbau and Ausbau thinking in the post-Cold War Turkic world, 
and I have thus chosen to highlight this distinction by translating the terms differently. 
54 Türkçe (Turkish) is enshrined the Turkish Constitution as the name of the Turkish 
language, the official language of Turkey. It is thus synonymous with the narrower 
meaning of the term Türk dili.  
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in support of these policies, the Turkic peoples were also then conditioned to think of 
their respective languages as distinct from one another, and, more importantly, to think of 
them as languages, for to countenance the view that they were “dialects” would have 
encouraged the notion that the Turkic peoples, like their languages, were related.  Given 
the pan-Turkic implications of such a proposition, Moscow chose to avoid fostering any 
such supranationalist inclinations by granting the republican languages equivalent legal 
status with Russian as official languages of the individual Turkic republics.55  Thus, 
where there had been some shift in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries away 
from linguistic loyalty to local dialects toward allegiance to a broader common Turkic 
language through the publication of Ismail Gaspirali’s Tercüman and the adoption of a 
common Turkic alphabet, in subsequent decades, the linguistic culture of the Turkic 
peoples developed in such a way as to privilege, and encourage loyalty to, the discrete 
languages of the titular republics.   
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the initiation of Turkic world relations, 
the seemingly settled issue of the linguistic status of the Turkic languages was, however, 
resurrected by the widespread, often unreflexive, Turkish presumption that the ex-Soviet 
Turkic languages constituted dialects rather than languages.  This notion existed at both 
the overt and covert level, was both declared and implied in the discourse of Turks, and 
was generally intended as an expression of a “cooperative” Einbau spirit in the sense that 
it depicted all Turkic peoples as sharing in a great Turkish language spoken across a vast 
                                               
55 The only exception was the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic which had no officially 
designated republican language.  
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territory stretching from the Aegean to the Great Wall of China.  Thus, as noted in the 
previous chapter, implicit inclusion of the mother tongues of the Turkic peoples under the 
umbrella of Türkçe (Turkish) or the Türk dili (Turkish language) abounded in the 
discourse of noted scholars, politicians and government bureaucrats in the opening 
remarks delivered at the outset of each of the early linguistic congresses.  That said, 
because both terms, even as they purported to represent the Turkic languages collectively, 
were also strongly identified with the official language of the Turkish Republic, 
references to a single Türkçe or Türk dili spoken by many millions within a dispersed 
ethnie implicitly created the impression among the Turkic peoples that their mother 
tongues were derivative from, or “dialects” of the Turkish language.   
More explicit reference was also made to the derivative status of the Turkic 
languages through widespread reference to the “dialects” or “vernaculars” (lehçeler) 
spoken within the ex-Soviet sphere and use of the term “Turkish dialects” (Türk 
lehçeleri) as opposed to “Turkic languages” (Türk dilleri).  For example, in a speech 
delivered during the opening ceremonies of the PTLC, head of the Publications 
Department of the National Library, Ayla Kutlu, not only referred alternately to Turkish 
(Türkçe) and the Turkish language (Türk dili) as the language spoken by the Turkic 
peoples writ large, but also spoke of the “various dialects of the Turkish language” 
(“Türk dilinin çeşitli lehçeleri”) in noting need to focus on the common difficulties they 
faced and made mention of the “Turkish language and its dialects” (“Türk dili ve 
lehçeleri”) in opining that “[t]hose who discuss the Turkish language and its dialects, 
who remove their differences, and who propose a solution [for uniting them] will not be 
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forgotten” (“Türk dili ve lehçelerini tartışanlar, ayrılıkları kaldıranlar, cözüm önerenler 
unutulmayacaklardır”).   
 
Popular Assessments of and Attitudes toward the Turkic Tongues  
Among the general populace, use of the term lehçe to refer to the Turkic 
languages was near universal.  In pointing to its widespread use, it is, however, important 
to note that for most Turks, especially non-specialists, lehçe was simply the hegemonic 
term for referring to the native tongues of their Turkic brethren.  The term Türk lehçeleri 
had its origins in research conducted on the Turkic dialects prior to and during the Cold 
War, often by those with pan-Turkist sympathies, and had been adopted quickly 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union, when the dearth of terms for referring to the 
soon-to-be ex-Soviet peoples became patently obvious, and the need for such terms was 
immediate.  Türk lehçeleri thus entered the public lexicon and was, generally speaking, 
employed unreflexively as an uninflected referential term.   
That is not to say that the terms were, in fact, neutral or uninflected, for words, as 
Bakhtin (1981) notes, are always dialogic, carrying traces of past lives into the new 
contexts of their use.  In this sense, the widespread adoption of a term that had long 
referenced the nonstandard, low variant, purely oral dialects within the Turkish Republic 
to the fully-fledged literary languages of the Turkic peoples could not but have created an 
unconscious perception within the Turkish public at large that the Turkic languages, like 
regional dialects of Turkey, were of lower status than modern standard Turkish.  
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Moreover, the term lehçe, which carried a similar connotation of regional dialect in the 
Turkic languages and was often used to refer to regional dialects within their own 
republics, was not perceived as semantically neutral by the Turkic peoples, many of 
whom were wont to ask rhetorically and quite pointedly, when the issue was raised, 
whether it was linguistically possible to have a dialect of a dialect.   
The impression that the Turkic languages were somehow akin to the linguistic 
“regional color” of the Turkic world both informed explicit language attitudes toward the 
Turkic languages and was reinforced by them.  In speaking to Turkish laypersons about 
issues of language in the Turkic world, I found the frequent tendency to romanticize and 
essentialize the Turkic languages with descriptions ranging from “simple” (sade) “sweet” 
(tatlı) “unaffected” (samimi) and “pure” (saf) to “true” (öz), “natural” (tabii), “fresh” 
(taze), and even “child-like” (çocuk gibi) abounding.  Such assessments were generally 
based on very little, if any, actual contact with the Turkic peoples or exposure to their 
languages.  Instead, they were derived from a deep sense of kinship with the Turkic 
peoples and affinity for their languages which had been fostered through the Ministry of 
Education’s official primary school curriculum and was further reinforced by media 
reportage, brief encounters, hearsay during the first “euphoric” stage of Turkic world 
relations.   
One of the more expansive descriptions related by a Turkish writer friend of mine 
recounting an early encounter with a scholar from Kyrgyzstan during a symposium in 
Turkey, remains with me.  She recalled:  “When she opened her mouth, it was as if I had 
travelled back in time.  It was like an earlier ‘proto’ Turkish--simple, harmonious, and 
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sweet, so sweet.  Sweet like a child’s Turkish.  I was enthralled.” She continued:  “She 
seemed embarrassed, covering her mouth and giggling bashfully, but I kept encouraging 
her, telling her how it thrilled me to hear her speak.  I spent all night talking with her, 
getting her to say this and that.  I just couldn’t seem to let her go, poor thing, and she was 
too well-mannered to excuse herself.”  The Turkic peoples were generally aware of, and 
often even subject to, such depictions of their languages and found it disconcerting to 
have their languages simultaneously romanticized and infantilized by ill-informed, if 
well-intentioned, Turks.  “At first it’s interesting to catalogue the differences between the 
languages.  You say this, and we say that--how interesting.  But after a while, you grow 
tired of the interest Turks show in the way you speak,” an Azerbaijani graduate student 
enrolled in a Turkish university confided to me one day.  “The Turks have all these 
romanticized notions about the Central Asian Turks and their languages they learned in 
school, and they have trouble separating myth from reality.  They treat you like a 
curiosity, or a child.  They can’t seem to see you as a person.”   
To make matter worse, the uninflected meaning of lehçe when used in reference 
to the Turkic languages was not universally agreed upon, and I was not infrequently told, 
sometimes quite emphatically, that while Turkish was a language, the Turkic “languages” 
could only be defined as dialects.  Upon my posing the question “language or dialect” to 
a Turkish writer with whom I was speaking one day, he replied: “They are, of course, 
dialects.  What separates a language from a dialect is the level of refinement of the 
language and the settings in which it is used.  One does not use Turkey’s regional dialects 
on television, in educational establishments, or in carrying out bureaucratic business.  
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They are not appropriate in those settings and are inadequate to such tasks.  These 
dialects are used primarily in the home.  Similarly, in the Turkic republics, the local 
Turkic dialects were not used in official settings.  Russian served this purpose and before 
Russian, Persian.  The local dialects were used at home; they were ‘kitchen languages’ 
(mutfak dilleri).  As result they never developed the ability to serve in an official 
function, the way Turkish has.  This is why we find so many Russian words in the Turkic 
dialects.  A language must be able to serve in all settings and fulfill all functions for its 
speakers, otherwise it is a dialect.”   
This not uncommon assessment of the Turkic languages as dialects in the sense of 
“kitchen languages” was troubling to the Turkic peoples, who countered that no language 
employed as the language of instruction in university-level studies, as many of the Turkic 
languages were, could be considered a “kitchen language.”  Over breakfast one morning 
at one of the many Turkic world congresses I attended, I listened as a Turkish journalist 
attempted to explain in a neutral and impartial manner, using pseudo-scientific terms to 
refer to the existence of different language domains, why he considered the mother 
tongues of the Turkic peoples to be dialects instead of languages, as the Azerbaijani 
scholar with whom he was speaking became increasingly agitated.  Finally unable to stay 
silent any longer, the Azerbaijani broke in to counter that, in fact, the opposite was true.   
While it was true that the Azerbaijani language had suffered second-class status 
under the Soviet regime, his native tongue had greater claim to language status than 
Turkish, he argued, emphasizing that literature in the Azerbaijani language stretched back 
to the 15th and 16th centuries under such renowned authors as Nasimi and Fizuli, while 
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the Turkish language had remained the province of illiterate villagers and so-called 
Turkish literature was written in the Ottoman language until centuries later.  The 
Azerbaijani scholar then added, nodding at me, that when touting Turkish and the Turkic 
world to outsiders, Turks had a penchant for claiming such works as the Dede Korkut56 as 
evidence of the grand history of the Turkish language, yet they seemed to “forget” such 
contributions when assessing the Turkic languages as dialects.  This was not the first time 
I had heard reference to Azerbaijan’s august literary figures offered as tangible proof that 
the Azerbaijani language was a fully fledged language of literature rather than a spoken 
“dialect,” for such retorts and rebuttals tended to circulate throughout the community in 
waves, but the dismissive comparison to contemporaneous Turkish as a “dialect” was 
both novel and ironically apropos, serving to turn the table on Turks who would dismiss 
the Turkic languages as dialects by emphasizing the rather short history of the Turkish 
literary tradition in contrast to the long and venerated, history of “classical” Azerbaijani 
literature.   
Used in the sense of “kitchen language,” the term lehçe was thus more in keeping 
with language attitudes commonly-held among Turks with more direct experience of the 
Turkic languages that described them as “rude” (kaba), “uncultured/impolite” 
(terbiyesiz), “uncouth/ without refinement” (inceliksiz), “uncivilized” (medeniyetsiz), and 
“simplistic” (basıt).  Such assessments were so commonplace as to be almost 
                                               
56 Dede Korkut is a compilation of epic stories (destan) that tells of the heroic adventures 
and struggles for freedom of the nomadic Oghuz Turks in and around Azerbaijan, Iran, 
and Anatolia.  The oral epic stories, which describe the history, traditions, and mores of 
the Oghuz Turks were written down around the 14th century in the Azerbaijani language 
(for more information, see Lewis 1974, Meeker 1992).  
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unremarkable, although one instance does remain firmly ensconced in my memory.  One 
evening at a popular bar in Baku, I was introduced by an Azerbaijani friend to a young 
Turkish diplomat who had arrived in Azerbaijan several months earlier.  We shouted 
some pleasantries at one another in Turkish over the din, until she motioned for me to 
follow her out to the deck for a “civilized conversation.”  After several minutes 
exchanging background information and our respective reasons for being in Baku, she 
complimented my Turkish, commenting on how pleasant it was to speak with someone 
“who actually knew the language.”  “The way these Azerbaijanis speak is just so rude,” 
she confided by way of explanation, “I just can’t get over it.  It’s like the worst village 
Turkish, completely uneducated.  If the country’s so-called elite speaks so crudely, I can’t 
imagine what it must be like in the regions.”   
Astonished that an official representative of the Turkey’s Azerbaijan mission had 
been so unabashedly contemptuous in her characterization of her host country’s language 
and people, I quickly glanced around to make sure that no Azerbaijanis within earshot 
had heard what she’d said and taken offense.  Noting my embarrassment and concern, she 
remarked dismissively: “Don’t worry.  They wouldn’t have understood anyway.”  Given 
that attitudes toward language are always entwined with perceptions of its speakers and 
their society, the Turkish diplomat went on the remark, in a compendium of complaints 
too long to be justified by her short time in the country, that it was difficult to take 
Azerbaijan seriously, because the education, infrastructure, institutions, goods and 
services, food, and everything else was so substandard in comparison to Turkey, and so 
“very Russified.”  “It is said that they are Turks, but their culture is nothing like ours… 
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they don’t even have their own culture, it’s all just Russian culture” she noted 
dismissively.   
Although troubled by her lack of discretion, her words in no way surprised me.  
By that time, I had frequently heard similar assessments--solicited and unsolicited, overt 
and covert, condescending and matter-of-fact--of the Turkic languages, which often cast 
them as “bad” Turkish in much the same way that African American Vernacular English 
(AAVE) has long been disparaged as “bad” English (e.g., Labov 1982a, Lanehart 1999).  
This was particularly true of Azerbaijani, which, by virtue of being linguistically more 
proximate to Turkish, and certainly its regional dialects, than the Central Asian 
languages, was more easily assessed as “bad” Turkish, for the closer the languages in 
linguistic terms, the stronger the illusion, or subconscious ideological presumption, that 
they are the same and thus the greater the tendency to reject the related language as an 
inferior version of “self” than to see it as a separate but equal “other”.   
The realization of how easy it was for the Turkic languages in general, and 
Azerbaijani in particular, to be dismissed as “bad” Turkish (kaba Türkçe) was driven 
home to me in a discussion concerning the differences between the Turkish and 
Azerbaijani languages one evening with a Turkish scholar who had spent his formative 
years in Turkey before moving to the United States, completing his doctorate, and 
returning to the region as a professor.  He was living in Baku when I was conducting 
research and asked me one evening how my study of the Azerbaijani language was going.  
I replied that it was going well, but that because Azerbaijani was so close to Turkish, I 
found myself frequently battling interference from my Turkish.  He laughed knowingly 
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and then confided that he had an even more entrenched difficulty.  Having grown up in 
Turkey, he had internalized his grandmother’s directives on how to speak “properly” and 
her constant admonitions for him to do so.  Coming from this perspective, he said, 
hearing an Azerbaijani, for example, ask for a hıyar, or “cucumber,” instead of a salatalık 
at the market made him recoil.57   
Similarly, the Azerbaijani use of sağ ol for “thanks” and “yok” for “no,” instead 
of teşekkür ederim and hayır, grated at his nerves.58  He explained that the use of such 
expressions so violated his sense of propriety that he couldn’t help but think of the 
Azerbaijani language as crude and the people themselves as uncouth and uncultured, 
even as, in more rational moments, he knew this assessment to be untrue.  Because his 
overseas studies had made him self-reflexive about such culture-borne prejudices, he was 
able to consciously make sense of his visceral subconscious reaction, but even so, he 
said, he had to continually remind himself that his response was simply an enculturated 
prejudice and that it had no actual relationship to the linguistic sophistication of the 
language or the manners, educational-level, or intelligence of the people who spoke 
                                               
57 Hıyar is an Arabic-derived word for “cucumber” which has been replaced by the 
English-derived term salatalık, literally “that which goes in a salad.” In modern Turkish, 
salatalık is preferred largely because of its origin in Western rather than Eastern 
languages, but hıyar also has a secondary crude slang meaning.  
58 Both “sağ ol” and “yok” exist in Turkish, but are less formal and certainly less polite 
than their respective equivalents “teşekkür ederim” and “hayır.” In Turkish, the term sağ 
ol, meaning “thanks” is generally considered less formal and more “villagey” than 
teşekkürler (“thanks”), which is the less formal form of teşekkür ederim.  These days, 
however, many educated, western-leaning Turks prefer the French loanword merci.  The 
politics of lexical choices such as this, and their role in Turkish identity politics, will be 
discussed at greater length in chapter five. 
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differently than he, as a native speaker of a closely related language, felt that they should.  
Nonetheless, whether romanticized as the “regional color” of the Turkic world, dismissed 
as “kitchen languages,” or disparaged as the uneducated patois of a country bumpkin, 
hegemonic assumptions or unreflexive assessments of the Turkic languages as “dialects,” 
as compared to the Turkish “language,” inevitably contributed to the widespread belief 
among the Turkic peoples that the Turks perceived their own language to be “superior.”   
 
“Expert” Assessments of the Turkic Tongues 
As might be expected, most Turkish linguists and language professionals with 
whom I spoke of the language/dialect question had a greater knowledge of, and hence, 
respect for the Turkic languages and thus a more specialized understanding of the term 
lehçe, albeit one that justified, rather than precluded, its usage to refer to the native 
tongues of the Turkic peoples, and it is largely their understanding of the term that 
informed the approach of Turkish members of the Turkic world community of practice 
took toward the Turkic languages.  By lehçe, most Turkish linguists claimed to mean 
distinct variants belonging not only to the same language family or descended from the 
same proto-language, but belonging to the same branch of related languages in much the 
way that Italian, Spanish and French--all descended from, and might thus be understood 
to be “dialects” of Latin--belong to the Romance languages branch of the Indo-European 
language family.  By this definition, the native tongues of all Turkic peoples, including 
the Turkish spoken in Turkey, were understood to be related “dialects” all belonging to 
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the Turkic branch of the Altaic language family.  Thus, advocates of this perspective 
insisted, use of the term lehçe was not intended to disparage or belittle the Turkic 
languages as “dialects” and certainly not to contrast them to the Turkish language, 
indeed, just the opposite.  It was meant to demonstrate the natural affinity among the 
languages, and hence the speakers of these languages, by emphasizing their shared 
ancestry.  Used in this sense, it is evident that the intent behind classifying the Turkic 
languages as dialects was in keeping with “cooperative” Einbau efforts to promote 
linguistic rapprochement within the Turkic world, and hence consonant with the 
ideological preconceptions of Turkish organizers of the early linguistic congresses.   
The problem with this perspective for their Turkic counterparts, many of whom 
had been enthusiastic participants in the early linguistic congresses and subscribed to the 
linguistic classificatory scheme that held the Turkic languages had all descended from an 
ancient Turkic proto-language appeared to be practical rather than theoretical.  In 
particular, it seemed to revolve around the fact that the Turkish spoken in Turkey was 
rarely, if ever, overtly referred to as a dialect by its native speakers, even among those 
who considered Turkish and the ex-Soviet Turkic languages to all comprise dialects of a 
Turkic proto-language.  Turkish was thus implicitly excluded from the term Türk 
lehçeleri, and if collective reference was made to the Turkic languages as a whole, when, 
for example, referring to efforts to create an ortak alfabe, the phrase “Türkçe ve Türk 
lehçeleri” (“Turkish and the Turkic dialects”) was generally employed.59  Thus, the 
                                               
59 This parallels use of “Türkiye ve Türk cumhuriyetleri” (Turkey and the Turkic 
republics) to refer collectively to the constituent countries of the Turkic world. 
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“cooperative” Einbau intent of even those Turks who, in using the term lehçe to refer to 
the Turkic “dialects,” meant thereby to suggest a primordial unity among the Turkic 
peoples was belied by the cognitive dissonance inherent in the subconscious 
“exceptional” status accorded Turkish.  This, in turn, was interpreted by the ex-Soviet 
Turkic peoples as an indication that the Turks privileged their own “dialect” and regarded 
it as “superior.”  In this sense, the objection among the Turkic peoples to having their 
languages referred to as dialects had to do not only with the “lesser” linguistic 
classification--after all the Romance languages were not explicitly referred to as 
“dialects” of Latin but as languages in their own right--but also with the implicit 
comparison to Turkish and the attendant hegemonic presumption among Turks that the 
Turkish spoken in Turkey, whether dialect or language, was somehow “superior” to the 
Turkic languages.   
The degree to which the ex-Soviet Turkic peoples were troubled by the 
subconscious exceptionalism accorded Turkish is clear from an interaction I observed 
between an older Turkish Turcologist lecturing on issues of language and orthography 
within the Turkic world during a symposium on the cultural basis for commonality 
among the Turkic peoples and an Azerbaijani scholar in the audience.  During the 
question and answer period after the lecture, the Azerbaijani scholar stood up to ask why 
“the professor” had made continual reference to “Türk lehçeleri ve Türkçe” (reversing 
the usual order of the phrase as if to suggest that the exceptionalism of Turkish equated to 
a secondary rather than primary status in relation to the broader group).  “If, as you argue, 
the Turkic languages are all dialects of the same Turkic proto-language,” he asked, “why 
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then refer separately to Turkish [Türkçe].”  “Young man,” the professor replied, “If you 
paid attention to the content of my speech, you would know that I consider all Turkishes 
[Türkçeleri] to be dialects of proto-Turkish.”  “But why then do you say ‘and Turkish’ 
[ve Türkçe]?” the Azerbaijani scholar persisted.  “Because, dear sir, Turkish [Türkçe] has 
been the name of the language of the Republic of Turkey for over seventy years now.”   
From his answer, it is clear that the inherent contradiction in declaring all 
“Turkishes” to be dialects of equal standing yet separating Anatolian Turkish when 
speaking of them collectively simply did not compute for the professor, nor did it for 
most Turks.  It was, however, an issue of great import to the Turkic peoples for it seemed 
to suggest an implicit, or covert, belief in the superiority of Turkish and, hence, in 
Turkey’s “natural” leadership role within the Turkic world.  During a break between 
lectures, I asked an Azerbaijani acquaintance whom I had seen in the audience what he 
thought about the exchange.  “It was actually quite typical,” he responded.  
“Theoretically the professor may consider all the Turkic languages to be dialects of 
proto-Turkish, but at a gut level, he still thinks of Turkish as separate and superior.  He’s 
not even aware of it, it’s subconscious.”  Relating the story several days later to a Kazakh 
colleague, I found him to be less generous in his assessment.  “The Turks know what they 
are supposed to say,” he replied, “they just don’t actually believe it, and that comes out in 
how they say it.  They think that by simply declaring Turkish to be a dialect along with 
the Turkic language, it will appease our “sensitivities,” but then why not just call them all 
languages?”   
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The answer as to why those Turks actively engaged in efforts to promote 
linguistic rapprochement among the Turkic peoples persisted in calling the native tongues 
of the Turkic peoples “dialects” rather than “languages” and preferred to ostensibly 
include the Turkish language in a list of Turkic dialects rather than grant the Turkic 
“dialects” equal status as languages, lies, I believe, in local ideological presuppositions 
about the nature of the putative Turkic world and the ultimate objectives of those 
insisting on such terms in seeing it actualized.  Within the context of Turkic world 
relations, granting the Turkic “dialects” status as languages would have implied the 
Turkic peoples’ autonomy and independence, their ability to “go it alone” in the post-
Cold War era at a time when most Turks actively involved in issues pertaining to the 
Turkic world, and certainly the Turkish government, still cherished the hope that the 
Turkic peoples would choose the Turkish “model” and hence tie their futures to the 
Turkish republic.   
In this sense, while was depicted as a “scientific” means of emphasizing the 
inherent similarities among the Turkic peoples and promoting a unified sensibility among 
them, and hence consonant with “cooperative” Einbau intent, Turkish insistence on the 
term lehçe rather than dil simultaneously suggested an ideological interest in shaping 
Turkic world relations in such as way as betrayed a certain “cooptive” Einbau intent.  By 
contrast, the Turkic peoples’ resistance to the Turkish characterization of their native 
tongues as dialects, even when Anatolian Turkish was itself depicted as such, suggested 
an emerging perception of a covert “cooptive” intent lurking behind the ostensibly 
“cooperative” Einbau project of uniting the Turkic peoples linguistically and a 
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developing Ausbau sentiment based not only on a rejection of the implication that their 
languages were somehow “inferior” to Turkish, but also a burgeoning sense of their own 
linguistic distinctiveness and recognition that the absence of a distinct language called 
into question their respective claims to independent nationhood (Blommaert and 
Vershuren 1998).   
Despite the increasing Einbau-Ausbau tenor to Turkic world relations, there were 
occasional attempts to reach across the widening divide to understand the “other” side, 
negotiate misunderstandings which were hindering rapprochement among the Turkic 
peoples, and hence restore a sense of “cooperative” Einbau.  In a speech entitled “The 
Turkish Language in the World: A Sociopolitical Approach” delivered at the Turkish 
Language Society, Timur Kocaoğlu, a Turkish professor of linguistics of Uzbek ancestry 
and especially astute observer of the role of language politics in the ongoing debate over 
linguistic rapprochement in the Turkic world, sought to do just that.  Arguing that a 
simple misalignment of understandings among Turks and the Turkic peoples of the use of 
the term lehçe to refer to the Turkic languages was the cause of much consternation for 
which Turks and the Turkic peoples shared mutual blame, he noted: 
 
[As a result], from time to time friendly disputes and misunderstandings emerge 
between Turkish [Türkiyeli]60 linguists and linguists trained in the former Soviet 
system.  Linguist representatives of the Turkic peoples in the former USSR 
                                               
60 Kocaoğlu’s use of the newly-coined “national” term Türkiyeli (literally “one from 
Turkey”) instead the usual ethnic moniker Türk was meant as conciliatory to the Turkic 
peoples, many of whom resented that Turkey had “usurped” the broader ethnic term for 
use in the narrow national sense. 
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sometimes in a slightly touchy manner give voice to their concerns, saying: ‘You 
belittle our language by reducing it to a dialect [lehçe] (in other words a 
vernacular [ağız]).’ Of course, here the blame lies somewhat with them and also 
mutually somewhat with us.  We in Turkey, boldly using only the term 
“language” [“dil”] for our own spoken and written language, introduce Turkey's 
Turkish as the Turkish language abroad.  However, should an Azeri, an Uzbek, or 
a Tatar apply the terms “Azeri language” [“Azeri dili”], “Uzbek language” 
[“Özbek dili”] or “Tatar language” [“Tatar dili”] to their own mother tongue 
[ana dili], we jump in hastily, insisting: “No, this is incorrect.  There is no Azeri 
language; Azeri is a Turkish dialect.”  This, however, like it or not, promotes the 
impression among the Turkish tribes [Türk boyları] outside of Turkey that we 
consider ourselves “superior” [üstünlük]. It’s as if ours is the “Turkish language” 
[Türk dili] and theirs are “respective dialects of ours” [“bizim birer lehçemiz”]!61   
 
As Kocaoğlu adroitly points out, in the final analysis, for both “sides” to the 
debate, the issue of linguistic classification was based less on objective data and more on 
subjective sensibility and ideological orientation.  In this sense, I am reminded of a 
discussion I had with an Azerbaijani writer on the essential nature of the Azerbaijani 
language and its relation to the other Turkic languages.  Waxing philosophical, he 
queried, “Where does the distinction between language and dialect rest?  This linguist can 
offer this or that linguistic criteria to convince us that Azerbaijani is a dialect, not a 
language, but that linguist, offering different linguistic criteria and supporting examples 
that sometimes seem indistinguishable from those offered by the first, will convince us 
that Azerbaijani is a language, not a dialect.”  He went on to note: “For me, Azerbaijani is 
a language because it allows me to express things I am unable to express in Russian, a 
recognized language of world literature.  In this sense, it serves not simply a 
communicative, but also an expressive function.  Nevertheless, in the end, the distinction 
                                               
61 The text of this speech was also put online and can be found at http://www.turkiye.net/ 
sota/tdaskon.html, last accessed August 2, 2011.  The translation is mine. 
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between language and dialect can’t be found in science or literature, it is found in our 
hearts.”  To this poetic assessment, I would add, that the distinction also lay in the 
ideological presumptions and sociopolitical considerations of the day and bespoke 
divergent visions of the imagined Turkic world community under whose rubric the 
Turkic peoples were to unite.   
 
WHAT’S IN A NAME? 
From the Turkic peoples’ perspective, the covert “cooptive” nature of Einbau 
efforts to promote rapprochement within the Turkic world that was manifest in the 
politics of linguistic classification was also evident in other ways.  Returning now to the 
professor’s answer that Türkçe had a seventy-year history as the name of the official 
language of the Republic of Turkey to the young Azerbaijani scholar’s query as to why 
he persisted in using the phrase “and Turkish” described above, I would note that the 
debate over whether the mother tongues of the Turkic peoples ought to be classified as 
dialects or languages was also reflected in the debate over the proper name to be given 
them both individually and collectively.  In the professor’s unreflexive response, the 
power inherent to naming is suggested, wherein the bestowal of a name grants 
materiality, moral weight, and status to the person or thing thus named.  Although 
generally conceived to be the essence of linguistic arbitrariness, proper names are imbued 
with indexical relations to other people, places, and events, as well as to the history and 
location of their emergence and thus constitute succinct narratives that bespeak the past, 
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present, and future (e.g., Basso 1984, Rymes 1996).  As such, they act as powerful 
symbolic resources.  In this sense, the Turkish language, as a named variant, is accorded 
status that recalls the Turkish struggle for independence, the birth of the Turkish nation, 
and the creation of a unified language, and hence embodies the “national” characteristics 
that Turks most pride themselves on--courage, independence, and self-sufficiency.   
While the Turkic languages were also inheritors of distinct language names as 
befit their official status within the respective Soviet Socialist Republics, such names had 
been bestowed under a colonial system and thus, in the minds of most Turks, bespoke the 
deliberate attempt to eradicate pan-Turkic sentiment by atomizing the Turkic peoples 
and, hence, the domination and subjugation of the Turkic peoples under the Soviet 
regime.  In this sense, the names given the native tongues of the Turkic peoples were not 
only the very antithesis of the national characteristics upon which the Turks prided 
themselves, but also the total repudiation of pan-Turkic sentiment, revival of which was 
the foundation upon which contemporary visions of Turkic world unity rested.  For the 
Turkic peoples, however, the inherited names for their respective languages were 
invested with positive associations that generally outweighed any negative associations 
with Soviet hegemony.   
Regardless of explicitly ideological Soviet involvement in their standardization, 
the mother tongues of the Turkic peoples had become fully-fledged national languages 
under the Soviet Union, turning a smattering of related dialects into appropriately 
unifying symbols of the respective Turkic republics, and distinct national identities and 
linguistic cultures had grown up around them, in much the same way that the Turkish 
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language reform had unified and standardized Turkish dialects in aid of creating and 
consolidating the Turkish nation.  Thus, while eager to forge an independent national 
identity in the post-Soviet era, the Turkic peoples were no more ready to shed their 
languages’ names than they were to abandon the languages themselves solely on the basis 
of their having been standardized and granted official status during the Soviet era.  It 
should, however, be noted that their willingness to alter the alphabets imposed by the 
Soviets suggests that the lack of good alternatives for renaming their languages may also 
have been a factor in their collective decision to retain the names bestowed under Soviet 
rule, as suggested in the following description by an Azerbaijani linguist of the process 
involved in choosing a name for the Azerbaijani language:   
 
There really was no other choice than Azerbaycan dili.  We are Turks and our 
language is Turkish.  By all rights, our language should be called Turkish 
language [Türk dili], as President Elçibey initially wanted, but Atatürk took the 
name Turk [Türk] and Turkish [Türkçe] when he founded the Turkish Republic 
[Türkiye Cumhuriyeti].  The Turks weren’t pleased with Türk dili because they 
thought it should be a general name for all the Turkic languages.  They 
recommended Azerbaijani Turkish [Azerbaycan Türkçesi] in its place, but that 
gives the impression that our language is a dialect of Turkish.  If the Turks were 
to call their language Turkey Turkish [Türkiye Türkçesi] or, better yet, Anatolian 
Turkish [Anadolu Türkçesi], then it might be acceptable, but the Turks have called 
their language Türkçe for many decades and they’re attached to this name.  Now 
they criticize us, asking why we would want to keep a name given us by the 
Russians, but they don’t understand that we’ve used that name for years.  
Azerbaycan dili is part of our heritage just as Türkçe is part of theirs.   
 
Not only were the language names inherited from the Soviet era part of their 
“national” heritage, but they furthermore seemed best suited to the Turkic peoples’ 
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interests in establishing an independent national identity in the post-Soviet era.  Although 
a seemingly counterintuitive proposition that symbols established under colonial rule 
could be repurposed in aid of the national identity-making projects of the newly 
independent Turkic republics, this is not an uncommon phenomena, and for the Turkic 
peoples, the continuing appropriateness of the languages names inherited from the Soviet 
era to the nascent national endeavor was fully in keeping with the explicitly “nationalist” 
purpose they served in creating distinctive Turkic republics under the Soviet system (c.f., 
chapter two).  In essence, the nationalities policy of the Soviet state had created 
languages where there had been only dialects and nations where there had been only 
tribes which, within a global order in which the “one language/one nation” proposition 
reigns supreme, thus served as the very basis for international recognition of the Turkic 
republics as independent nations.   
Thus, within relatively short order the Turkic peoples had each settled on 
retaining the language names inherited from the Soviet state, and Azerbaycan dili, Kazak 
dili, Kırgız dili, Özbek dili, and Türkmen dili62 were duly designated the official 
languages of the newly independent Turkic republics.  In terms of the implications for the 
language-dialect debate and, thus, broader Turkic world relations, the important point to 
note about these language names is that they plainly reinforce the status of the native 
tongues of the Turkic peoples as languages through inclusion of the word dil.  In this 
sense, then, the chosen language names serve essentially the same purpose of suppressing 
                                               
62 This is the Turkish for the language names of the Turkic peoples.  In their native 
languages, they were: Azərbaycan dili, O‘zbek tili, Qazaq tili, Kyrgyz tili, and Türkmen 
dili.  
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a broader pan-Turkic sentiment they did during the Soviet era, even if the Turkic peoples 
are now in the role of sender rather than receiver of the implied message.   
The issue of language names was, however, far from settled within the broader 
context of Turkic world relations, as many Turks, apparently blindered by their own 
ideological drive to unify the putative Turkic world, either questioned the “linguistic” 
validity of such names, claiming they were not, in fact, languages, as Kocaoğlu noted, or 
simply chose to use other names.  In this sense, the names Azerbaycan Türkçesi, Kırgız 
Türkçesi, Özbek Türkçesi, etc. were, and still are, favored by the Turkish Language 
Society and Ministry of Culture, which, along with the Ministry of Education, Winrow 
describes as being “attracted to what may be identified as cultural Pan-Turkism” 
(1998:108-9).  Such usage is evident in the title of a two volume Comparative Dictionary 
of Turkish Dialects (Karşılaştırmalı Türk Lehçeleri Sözlüğü), published in 1992 by the 
Ministry of Culture and compiled by a commission headed up by the director of the 
Turkish Language Society from 1993-2000, which compared vocabulary from the 
Turkish, Azerbaijani, Bashkurd, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Tatar, Turkmen, and Uighur 
“Turkishes” (Türkçeleri).  A more contemporary searchable version of the same 
dictionary which allows the user to “choose a dialect” (“lehçeyi seçiniz”) has recently 
been made available online through a joint endeavor between the Turkish Language 
Society, the Turkish-founded Ahmet Yesevi University in Kazakhstan, and the Turkish 
Culture and Tourism Ministry.63   
                                               
63 The webpage can be viewed at http://www.tdk.gov.tr/lehceler/, last accessed August 2, 
2011.  It is interesting to note that while the other “Turkishes” are listed in alphabetic 
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The appeal of this naming convention for those Turks who adopted it was that by 
creating a compound noun that included “Turkish” (Türkçe), it indicated the broader 
ethnolinguistic affiliation of the speakers of the languages thus named, thereby 
highlighting the fundamental basis for supranational affiliation among the Turkic 
peoples.  In this sense, it was the ideological equivalent of declaring the Turkic languages 
all dialects (lehçeler) of proto-Turkish, as indeed the title of the comparative dictionary 
suggests.  By contrast, such names were problematic for most of the Turkic peoples 
because they accorded their languages a lesser status, seeming to suggest that the Turkic 
languages were simply derivative from, or variants of the Turkish spoken in Turkey, 
much like the Ankara dialect of standard Turkish might be referred to as Ankara 
Türkçesi.  Thus, although there was no disagreement over the fact that the native tongues 
of the Turkic peoples belonged to the Turkic language family, the term Türkçe had 
become too closely associated with the named variant of Turkish spoken in Turkey to be 
applied generically across the Turkic languages, even when modified by the narrower 
“national” identity. 
Among the general Turkish populace, language names ending in –ce/ca/çe/ça 
were preferred, particularly the shorter Azerice-type forms, largely because of the 
economy of effort they represented, but also because they conformed to Turkish 
morphological rules (ethnic name + suffix) for designating languages, as in Ingilizce 
(English), Francızca (French), and Çince (Chinese).  While this form was thus more 
                                                                                                                                            
order, Turkey’s Turkish tops the list and appears as the default, again suggesting the 
enduring sense among Turks in the “superiority” of their language or its “rightful” status 
as a language of wider communication among the Turkic peoples. 
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acceptable to some of the Turkic peoples, and indeed the Uzbeks and the Turkmen 
identified Özbekçe and Türkmence as suitable alternates to Özbekçe dili and Türkmence 
dili, others nonetheless felt that the –ce/ca/çe/ça recalled the –çe ending in lehçe, thereby 
implying that the Turkic languages were no more than dialects.  Although this opinion 
was expressed to me directly by Turkic friends, colleagues, and professional contacts, as 
with many other such issues having to do with language, orthography, and identity 
politics in the Turkic world, it was also increasingly represented by Turkish members of 
the community of practice engaged in promoting Turkic world relations who, in 
attempting to correct “what went wrong,” gradually adopted a perspective on Turkic 
world relations informed by discussions with Turkic friends and colleagues.  Thus, as a 
means of demonstrating the ways in which insights gleaned from informal bilateral 
discussions over linguistic rapprochement and identity politics were recycled in wider 
negotiations over the linguistic and sociocultural dimensions of the Turkic world as part 
of a broader effort to correct course on the basis of lessons learned from past mistakes 
and missteps, I would highlight one such exchange that took place within the digital 
space of a Turkic world internet forum.   
The exchange began when a Turkish professor of Turkish Literature, breaking 
ranks from the Turkish Language Society’s approved naming convention for the 
Türkçeleri of Central Asia wrote in to the Turkoloji-L news and discussion group to 
advocate use of the –ce/ca/çe/ça suffix to refer to the Turkic languages--e.g., Azerice, 
Özbekçe, Kırgızca, etc.--as the most economical and effective means of ensuring proper 
recognition of their status as languages.  In reply to this “classic point of discussion,” a 
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Turkish student of Turcology wrote back to question whether the professor truly believed 
that referring to the Turkic languages in this manner indicated language status.  
Admitting that for economy’s sake, he too was prone to abbreviate the names of the 
Turkic languages in daily speaking, he nonetheless noted that his Turkic friends 
interpreted such abbreviations as tantamount to referring to their native tongues as 
dialects (lehçeler) or patois (şiveler) of Turkish rather than fully-fledged languages 
within the Turkic language family.  In this sense, the Turcology student argued, using the 
–ce/ca/çe/ça suffix to designate the Turkic languages was no different than referring to 
them as Azeri Türkçesi, Özbek Türkçesi, or Kırgız Türkçesi, a naming convention that he 
likewise criticized as tainted by political considerations.  In conclusion he suggested that 
while people uneducated on the topic of the Turkic languages were in the habit of using 
such contentious forms unreflexively, it was infinitely more problematic when well-
respected professors in well-known departments of Turkish Literature advocated such 
usages, as their professional status not only generated interest in their opinions but also 
conferred authority to their words, thereby fostering the adoption of discursive practices 
that further served to a alienate the Turkic peoples.   
Paralleling Einbau-Ausbau debates over linguistic classification, such discursive 
and metadiscursive negotiation over naming conventions for the Turkic languages, thus 
constituted a sociolinguistic site for contestation over the twin poles of national 
“independence” and supranational “interdependence” within Turkic world relations writ 
large.  In this sense, there is one additional point about language names which is relevant 
to the negotiation of Turkic world relations, namely that the language names chosen by 
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the Turkic peoples themselves clearly identified a distinctive “national,” or narrowly-
defined “ethnic,” identity for their speakers separate from their broader, collective ethnic 
identity as Turks.  Thus whereas in the naming convention favored by the Ministry of 
Culture and the Turkish Language Society (e.g., Kırgız Türkçesi, Özbek Türkçesi, and 
Türkmen Türkçesi), the national, or narrowly-defined ethnic, identity of the various 
Turkic peoples (e.g., Kırgız, and Özbek, Türkmen) served solely as a modifier of their 
broader ethnic identity as Turks, as befit a broader Turkic world consciousness, in the 
naming convention chosen by the Turkic peoples, the narrowly-defined ethnic or national 
designation applied under the Soviet system served as the sole designation of identity.   
In this sense, contestation over naming conventions for the Turkic languages 
recalled parallel debates over naming conventions for the Turkic nations and peoples 
themselves.  Thus, for example, Turkish members of the Turkic world community of 
practice generally suggested using both the narrower “national” and broader “ethnic” 
terms when referring to the Turkic peoples individually (e.g., Özbek Türk) and including 
the modifier Türk in addition to the “national” designation when referencing the 
individual republics (e.g., Özbek Türk Cumhuriyeti) since, as suggested by Turkish 
ICTAS delegate Osman Fikri Sertkaya: “The term Uzbek has existed since the 16th 
century [but even] today Uzbeks living in the steppes far from cities and in the mountains 
call themselves Turks.”  Isolated pockets aside, the Turkic peoples, however, chose to 
refer to themselves solely by their narrow “national” identity (e.g., Özbek), and not only 
omitted the recommended modifier Türk in referring to their countries, but also chose to 
employ the Latin-derived Russian term respublika, adopted into the Turkic languages 
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during the creation of the Turkic republics under the Soviets, rather than the Arabic-
derived Turkish term cumhuriyet, which also existed in various spellings within the 
Turkic languages, as the term for “republic,” thus opting for Azerbaycan Respublikası, 
Kazakstan Respublikası, Kırgız Respublikası, Özbekistan Respublikası, and 
Türkmenistan.   
Thus, in the names chosen by the Turkic peoples themselves to refer to their 
languages, their republics, and themselves--and here it is important to note that I speak 
not only of formal government-level decisions concerning such official names, but the 
continual informal defense of these names enacted iteratively in more mundane 
interactions between Turks and the Turkic peoples--we find an explicit Ausbau rejection 
of the broad Turkic identity that lay at the very heart of an imagined Turkic world, even 
as that meant the retention of names and Russian loanwords held over from the Soviet 
era.  In this sense, I am reminded of Fishman’s (1993b) “Language Y” factor discussed in 
the previous chapter.  While Russian may have constituted the greatest threat to the 
continued survival of their native languages during the Soviet era, in the post-Soviet era, 
the greater perceived “Language Y” (and, by extension, “Culture Y”) threat originated 
from Turkey.  As Turkish language and culture was progressively associated with the 
negative connotations of “cooptive” Einbau, Russian language and culture became 
increasingly less threatening, to the point that it could be, and often was, employed by the 
Turkic peoples as an explicit symbol of their difference.  In this sense, while Turks 
critiqued the use of respublika as evidence of the russification of the Turkic peoples and 
their languages, for the Turkic peoples, the term was an expression of their shared history 
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under the Soviet Union, and, more abstractly, their collective distinctiveness from the 
Turks.   
The Turkic peoples’ use of the Russian language for broader communicative 
purposes also became a means not only of avoiding being subjected to potentially 
condescending assessments of their native Turkic language or of their facility in Turkish, 
but also a mark of distinction from the Turks.  Indeed, it seemed that the more Turks 
criticized the Turkic peoples as “russified,” the more the Turkic peoples circled their 
wagons around Russian, creating distinct language barriers by, for example, clustering 
together with other Turkic peoples in Russian-speaking groups at Turkic world events, as 
Turks gathered separately in opposing corners. 64  This, in turn, was misunderstood by 
Turks, who interpreted it as further evidence of the Turkic peoples’ russification.  
Moreover, it was the decidedly Ausbau sentiment involved in the Turkic peoples’ marked 
choice to use Russian that, much to the dismay of the Turks, prompted the not infrequent 
suggestion that Russian, rather than Turkish, or even a mutually formulated Turkic ortak 
dil, might best serve as a lingua franca for communication within the Turkic world.  As a 
Kazakh delegate to one of the Turkic world conferences I attended noted, “Tell me, why 
are the Turks so resistant to learning Russian?  They’ve had no problem learning English 
to communicate with the West.  They say that we’re speaking the language of the 
                                               
64 Indeed, it was my knowledge of Russian that granted me access to the groups of 
Central Asians clustered in their separate corners at Turkic world congresses which my 
Turkish counterparts often seemed unable, or unwilling, to break into.  Nonetheless, I did 
generally find that the Central Asians, upon recognizing that I was better able to 
communicate in Turkish than Russian, were willing to speak to me in Turkish, since, as a 
non-native speaker myself, I was less likely to have a pejorative opinion of their facility 
in Turkish. 
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conqueror, and that we should return to our mother tongues, but this doesn’t solve the 
problem of how we would communicate with one another.  Wouldn’t it be less trouble for 
the Turks to learn Russian than for all of us to learn Turkish?”   
In the final analysis, it was to the enduring detriment of Turkic world relations 
that the Turks were never quite able to comprehend the amicable, if sometimes 
complicated, relationship the Turkic peoples maintained with their Soviet past.  Where 
the Turks saw domination and passive assimilation, by and large, the Turkic peoples 
accepted remnants of Russian language and culture as an integral part of their respective 
historical narratives.  Although this was not always the case for those Turkic peoples, like 
the Tatars, whose countries still lay within Russia’s borders, the Central Asians had a 
more burnished attitude toward their Soviet past, which fondly recalled the birth of their 
nations and the creation of their national languages.  In this sense, the near enemy, 
linguistically and culturally, had become Turkey rather than Russia, for while the latter 
had failed in its attempt to forcibly assimilate the Turkic peoples, the latter was now 
perceived as attempting to absorb them into a Turkish-led Turkic world.   
Where the Turkic peoples resisted the Turks’ increasingly “cooptive” Einbau 
efforts through recourse to Russian, the Turks saw further evidence of their russification 
and an even greater need to help them rediscover their “lost” Turkic identity.  In the 
Turks’ defense, it was often difficult to determine whether recourse to Russian within the 
general Turkic publics, and even among Turkic members of the Turkic world community 
of practice, was rooted in reliance or resistance, for genuine reliance on Russian among 
the Turkic elite was an indisputable artifact of the Soviet era, which, in the early days of 
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Turkic rapprochement, before Ausbau sentiment had taken hold, the Turkic peoples 
themselves had been wont to bemoan.  Ultimately, however, regardless of the Turkic 
peoples’ underlying purpose, for the Turks, the real sticking point vis-à-vis Russian was 
ideological, as it belied the very basis of an imagined Turkic world unity and dashed 
dreams of its eventual fruition to have the Turkic peoples seem to demonstrate a 
preference for Russian over their native Turkic languages. 
 
WOULD THE “REAL” TURK PLEASE STAND UP? 
The proper way by which to refer individually to the respective Turkic peoples 
and nations aside, the larger question of how to refer to the ex-Soviet Turkic peoples 
collectively remained--a debate that paralleled the larger question of language 
classification and went to the very essence of negotiation over the nature of the putative 
Turkic world and relations among its constituent peoples.  I was first introduced to the 
politics of naming conventions for referring collectively to the Turkic peoples in an early 
interview with an erstwhile scholar employed by the Turkish government at the Turkish 
International Cooperation and Development Agency (Türk İşbirliği Kalkınma ve İdaresi 
Başkanlığı--TİKA), a branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs founded in 1992 to 
promote economic, commercial, technical, social, cultural and educational cooperation 
with the new Turkic republics, who insisted that the term “Turkic” (and the analogous 
construction of “Tiurkskii” in Russian) had been devised by Britain and Russia during the 
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“Great Game”65 era as a means of dividing Turks from one another by introducing a false 
linguistic distinction which ultimately changed the way the Turkic peoples, writ large, 
thought about one another.  Drawing on popular linguistic misconceptions about the 
correlation between the existence of multiple words for a concept within a language and 
the worldview of its speakers,66 he argued that the ultimate design in creating such a term 
was to divide, and hence rule, the Turks, who having no separate word to distinguish 
between Turks of Turkey and those of Central Asia, had always conceived of themselves 
as one people.  The divisive effect of such policies, he argued, was reflected in the recent 
advent of numerous Turkish neologisms for the word “Turkic.”  This was an argument I 
was to hear repeatedly throughout my fieldwork. 
Leaving aside accusations regarding the Great Game rivals’ attempts to hinder 
Turkic unification and separate the Turks of Central Asia from their Turkish cousins by 
introducing a term to distinguish between the two groups where none existed, the absence 
of an equivalent term for “Turkic” in Turkish or the Turkic languages was the cause of 
some consternation in the post-Soviet era among both the Turkish and Turkic peoples, for 
largely pragmatic, but also existential, reasons.  Thus, while many Turks within the 
community of practice actively engaged in promoting linguistic and sociocultural 
rapprochement among the Turkic peoples insisted that Türk was the only appropriate and 
“linguistically correct” adjectival and nominal form by which to refer to the Turkic 
                                               
65 The term Great Game refers to the strategic rivalry waged from 1813 to 1907 between 
Victorian Britian and Tsarist Russia for supremacy in Central Asia. For a detailed history 
of the Great Game, see Hopkirk (1994). 
66 See, for example, Martin (1986) and Whorf (1940). 
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peoples, recommending and employing such phrases as Türk cumhuriyetleri (Turkish 
republics), Türk halkları (Turkish peoples), Türk boyları (Turkish tribes), Orta Asyalı 
Türkler (Central Asian Turks), etc. to refer to the Turkic republics and peoples, 
journalists and the general Turkish public were more concerned with the pragmatic need 
for a less ambiguous term by which to refer to the Turkic peoples.  As a result, such 
modifiers as Türkî, Türksel, and Türkik, Türk asıllı, (of Turkish origin), Türk kökenli 
(with Turkish roots) were devised to refer to the Turkic republics and peoples.   
Although the urge to speak separately of the Turkic peoples would, at first glance, 
seem to suggest an emergent recognition of their distinctiveness, in actual practice, it 
appeared to be more of an artifact both of the unexamined Turkish belief in Turkey’s 
leading role among the Turkic peoples and of the Turkish tendency, as noted by Turan 
and Turan, “to view other Turkic states as constituting a reasonably homogeneous whole, 
not harbouring significant conflicts of interest among themselves” (1998:188).  In other 
words, where it seemed strange to speak of Turkey’s foreign policy toward the Turks, it 
seemed equally unnecessary to speak of Turkey’s foreign policy toward Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, etc., when that approach was largely based on their all being 
“Turks.”  In this sense, Turkish interest in a term by which to reference the Turkic 
peoples seemed to suggest a concern in separating the “other” from “self,” while 
nonetheless retaining the “other” as akin to “self,” and was hence indicative of the 
exceptionalism accorded Turkey, best captured by the phrase “Türkiye ve Türk 
cumhuriytleri.”  And yet, those with a vested interest in maintaining the notion of broader 
unified Turkish identity as the foundation upon which the Turkic world rested abjured.  
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In an editorial for Cumhuriyet newspaper entitled “Türk Cumhuriyetleri mi, Türki 
Cumhuriyetler mi, Türksel Cumhuriyetler mi?”67 professor of literature and linguistics, 
Yusuf Çotuksöken, argues the inappropriateness of such neologisms in referring to the 
ex-Soviet Turkish republics, writing:  
 
In newspaper and journal publications, radio and television broadcasts, when 
presenting news regarding the Turkic republics, various qualifiers are used, such 
as: Turkish republics [Türk cumhuriyetleri], Turkic republics [Türki 
cumhuriyetler], republics of Turkish origin [Türk asıllı cumhuriyetler], republics 
with Turkish roots [Türk kökenli cumhuriyetler].  In the announcement of the 
1992 Milliyet Awards, even the word Turkic [Türksel] was used….  Earlier in one 
of my articles, I suggested that from among these choices, the most correct, in my 
opinion, was Turkish republics [Türk cumhuriyetleri] because of its brevity and 
direct representation of the concept….  
Given the existence of the word Turkish [Türk], the revitalization of Türkî 
(alienating from its inception) which is already archaic in Turkey’s Turkish must 
be some sort of passing fancy.  Terms such as ‘republics with Turk origins/roots’ 
[Türk asıllı/kökenli cumhuriyetler] serve no other purpose than prolonging the 
discussion.  I also wonder about this: are we to say… the Azerbaijan Republic 
with Turk origins/roots [Türk asıllı/kökenli Azerbaycan Cumhuriyet]?  Utter 
nonsense.  As for the word Türksel, it is rooted in the anxiety of Turk(ish)ifying 
the word Türkî.  A misplaced and unnecessary neologism….  I tend to think that 
those in favor of alternate usages have a lot to say on the subject.  To tell the truth, 
I am also curious about their explanations.  In the meantime, some person among 
us who is an admirer of the Ottomans and Ottoman language might get up and ask 
why we don’t use “Republics of Turkey” [cemahir-i Türkiye].  I say that ensuring 
full communication depends on us making the right choice [for referencing the 
Turkic peoples].68   
 
                                               
67 Çotuksöken has chosen to omit the circumflex over the final letter i in Türkî.  
68 Çotuksöken’s article appeared in Cumhuriyet September 22, 1992, p.2.  The translation 
is mine. 
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Although Çotuksöken was, no doubt, correct in his assessment that finding a 
mutually acceptable means of referring to the Turkic republics, peoples, and languages 
was of the utmost importance in ensuring open communicative channels that would allow 
the disparate Turkic peoples to coalesce under the rubric of a unified and cohesive Turkic 
world, this was no easy task within a context in which the linguistic field of meaning was 
already so ideologically charged.  By arguing that Türk cumhuriyetleri (Turkish 
republics) was the “most correct” means of referring to the Turkic peoples because of “its 
brevity and direct representation of the concept” and that “those in favor of alternate 
usages have a lot to say on the topic,” Çotuksöken depicts the various neologisms for 
“Turkic” as politically and ideologically driven and Türk cumhuriyetleri as the unmarked, 
neutral choice.   
But this is not how it was perceived by the Turkic peoples.  While many of the 
Turkic peoples did entertain a sense of their broader ethnic identity as Turks, the term 
Türk, used both as a noun and an adjective, had, like Türkçe, become so associated with 
the Turkish republic (Türkiye) and its citizens (Türkler), that its application to the Turkic 
peoples seemed to subsume their identity to the Anatolian Turks rather than uniting all 
Turks on equal terms under a broad ethnic umbrella.  By thus seeming to suggest 
Turkey’s “superiority” or “natural” leading role in the Turkic world, application of the 
term Türk to the Turkic peoples could thus hardly be considered non-ideological.  In this 
sense, use of the term had a decidedly “cooptive” Einbau feel that, in suggesting a 
hierarchy of membership in the imagined Turkic world, clearly contradicted the more 
egalitarian, EU-like supranational community favored by the Turkic peoples. 
 272 
By the same token, however, many of the Turkic peoples felt that they had an 
equivalent, if not greater, claim to the ethnonym Türk, as suggested by Azerbaijan’s 
initial interest in naming their language Türk dili, and resented its having been usurped by 
the Anatolian Turks.  In this sense, the artificially constructed neologisms invented to 
reference the Turkic peoples, although praiseworthy for recognizing the Turkic peoples’ 
distinctiveness from their Turkish cousins, were criticized for seeming to imply a 
derivative or lesser status.  Although this was particularly evident in the terms Türk asıllı 
and Türk kökenli, which, while meant to suggest descent from a common proto-Turk 
ancestor, like Türk dili, could not help but imply a status derivative of contemporary 
Turks, other neologisms were similarly problematic.  Writing as a representative of the 
ex-Soviet Turkic peoples, Enver Mahmut describes the Turkic peoples’ objections to the 
term Türkî in an article published in Millî Kültür Dergisi and entitled “Some Thoughts on 
the Present-Day Problems of the Turkic Dialects” (“Türk Lehçelerinin Bugünkü Sorunları 
Hakkında Bazı Düşünceler”).  He writes:  
 
As is known, in modern Turcology, the word Turk is used [both]…in the narrow 
or special sense when speaking of the Turkish citizen, the Turkish people, and the 
Turkish language… [and in the broad sense] as a general noun for the brethren 
people who are very close to one another and who are in possession of an 
enormous territory stretching today from the Balkans to the interior of Mongolia 
and China as well as for the dialects they speak….  From this perspective 
Turcologists of Turkic origin in the Soviet Union regard the use of the derivative 
Türkî in place of Türk (for example when speaking of the Turkic people and 
languages) as misplaced and wish to make clear that the formation of this Turkish 
word is completely contrary and it not at all acceptable.  As is known, the –î 
suffix being of Arabic origin, entered the Turkic dialects along with Arabic 
words. We would like to make clear that there is no logic to attaching this suffix--
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which has yet to be attached to a word of Turkic origin to form a single 
neologism--to the Turkic dialects and the name of the people who speak these 
dialects.”69 
 
It is furthermore important to note that not only did it strike many of the Turkic 
peoples as linguistically incongruous and illogical to attach an Arabic suffix to the term 
Türk in aid of distinguishing them from the Anatolian Turks, as Mahmut argues, but to do 
so also seemed to call into question the “purity” of the Turkic peoples.  Although the 
Turkic peoples were generally not troubled by Arabic influence on their languages 
(Arabic, like Russian, was not a problematic “Language Y” as it was for the Turks), they 
were nonetheless well aware of the Turkish campaign to “purify” their language of 
Arabic influence, and suspected that the application of an Arabic suffix to the term Türk 
in referring to the Turkic peoples carried, whether consciously or unconsciously, the 
implication that they had been “corrupted” by Arab influence, thereby insinuating that the 
Turkic peoples were not “real” Turks in the manner of their Turkish cousins.  As the 
Kazakh scholar who broached this issue remarked, it seemed impossible that one letter 
could carry so much meaning, and yet that particular suffix not only suggested that the 
Turkic peoples were somehow lesser versions of Turks, but called into question their very 
Turk-ness.   
At the same time, other, more artificially fabricated neologisms constructed from 
foreign-sourced suffixes were even more egregious.  In short, there seemed to be no 
solution that was generally tolerable to the Turkic peoples.  To use the term Türk as a 
                                               
69This quote is taken from an article that appeared in Millî Kültür November 1990, 
No.78, p.22. The translation is mine. 
 274 
modifier to refer to the Turkic peoples was unacceptable to most, because, in failing to 
recognize the distinctiveness of the Turkic peoples and using a term associated with 
Turkey’s Turks, it implied a derivative status, but to use Türkî or another fabricated 
neologism was likewise unacceptable to most, because it seemed to suggest that they 
were not “real” Turks in the manner of Turkey’s Turks and hence implied a lesser 
standing.  The rampant dissatisfaction with all available options associated with this 
crucial issue of identity suggests the incipient reactive nature of Ausbau tendencies 
among the Turkic peoples, whereby attempts either to “include” or “exclude” the Turkic 
peoples under a broader Turkish ethnic identity were perceived as “cooptive” and thus 
resisted or rejected automatically.  
By the same token, there were indications that the majority of Turks involved in 
negotiating the dimensions of Turkic world relations were becoming increasingly 
intransigent, unable or unwilling to examine their ideological presuppositions concerning 
Turkic world relations in aid of correcting persistent misunderstandings that hindered 
linguistic and sociocultural rapprochement among the Turkic peoples.  This was 
particularly apparent in negotiations over another term coined to refer to the Turkic 
peoples that was ostensibly designed to be less politically divisive.  The phrase Türkçe 
konuşan (Turkish speaking), used as a modifier when referencing the Turkic 
republics/countries/peoples of the former Soviet Union (as in Türkçe konuşan 
cumhuriyetler/ülkeler/insanlar), was a solution that appealed to many Turks not only 
because it sidestepped the ideologically fraught practice of fabricating neologisms, but 
also because it highlighted linguistic, rather than ethnic, kinship as the essential 
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commonality shared by the Turkic peoples, thereby rebuffing international and domestic 
critics who claimed that interest in a Turkic world was racist and revanchist in nature.  In 
addition, the term seemed to provide a means of referring to the Turkic peoples as a 
whole, as it could be applied equally, and hence collectively, both to the Anatolian Turks 
and to the ex-Soviet Turkic peoples, thus avoiding phrases such as Türkiye ve Türk 
cumhuriyetleri than seemed to suggest Turkish exceptionalism.  Finally, in addition to its 
use as a modifier, it could also be used as an adjectival noun to refer to the Turkic 
peoples themselves, as in Türkçe konuşan (Turkish speaker).   
Given these many advantages, the phrase was viewed almost as a panacea to 
persistent misunderstandings that hindered Turkic rapprochement, and was quickly 
adopted in state-level discourse, most notably in the name given the bi-annual gathering 
of heads of state from Turkey, and the five Turkic republics, which was dubbed Türkçe 
Konuşan Ülkeler Devlet Başkan Zirvesi (Summit of Heads of State of the Turkish 
Speaking Countries).70  By this point it should, however, be clear that from the 
perspective of the ex-Soviet Turkic peoples, the conspicuous problem with the phrase 
was that it suggested that the Turkic peoples all spoke Türkçe, the official language of 
Turkey.  As a result of such criticism, the phrase Türk dili konuşan (Turkish language 
speaking) was eventually adopted in its stead, and the name of the summit changed to 
Türk Dili Konuşan Ülkeler Zirvesi (Summit of Countries Speaking the Turkish 
                                               
70 While originally conceived as a bi-annual meeting, in actuality meetings have become 
more or less frequent, often based on the state of relations among the countries. To date, 
the summit has been convened ten times--in 1992, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2001, 
2006, 2009, and 2010. 
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Language), which it remains to this day.  That this change was made, despite the fact that 
Türk dili carries the same connotation as Türkçe for the Turkic peoples, is emblematic of 
the blind adherence on the part of Turkish ideologues to the Einbau notion that the Turkic 
world rested on the foundation of a single, unitary language and their associated lack of 
understanding, or deliberate misunderstanding, of the Turkic peoples’ discontent with 
having their languages referred to by a name long associate d  with the specific brand of 
Turkish spoken in Turkey.  This was all the more troublesome given how simple it would 
have been to change Türkçe konuşan to Türk dilleri konuşan (Turkic languages speaking) 
instead of Türk dili konuşan (Turkish language speaking), which would have struck the 
right balance for the Turkic peoples between national “independence” and supranational 
“interdependence,” but was unacceptable to Turkish ideologues for reasons described 
above.   
That Türk dili, even when intended in its more expansive meaning to include the 
Turkic “dialects,” was indeed synonymous with Türkçe in the minds of most Turks is 
apparent in media coverage of the summits.  Thus, reporting on the summit generally 
revolved around the cognitive dissonance between the Türk dili in the official name of the 
summit and the inability of its participants to speak Türkçe.  For example, CNN Türk’s 
coverage of the most recent summit focuses on the need for simultaneous translation 
during the event--a fact which was implicitly attributed not to a lack of mutual 
intelligibility among the Turkic languages, but rather to the continued “insistence” of the 
Türk dili konuşanlar on speaking Russian rather than their “native” Türkçe.  To 
demonstrate this point, the Turkish reporter is shown repeatedly approaching staff of the 
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visiting Turkic dignitaries to ask: “Türkçe konuşuyor musunuz?” (“Do you speak 
Turkish?”), as the camera zooms in on the reactions she receives in response: the initial 
blank stares, the embarrassed, and almost inaudible, attempt to respond in a Turkic 
language, and the final annoyance with which the cameraman is waved off in Russian.  
No attempt was made to determine if these staffers, in fact, spoke a Turkic language, and 
the Turkish reporter seems oblivious to their initial attempts to respond in their native 
languages. 71  This then confirms the Turkic peoples’ fear that Türk dili is synonymous 
with Türkçe in the minds of most Turks and justifies their discontent with the term.  
Furthermore, within the Turkish public, such media coverage serves to reinforce not only 
the naturalized connection between Türk dili and Türkçe but also the notion that the 
Turkic peoples are somehow deficient for relying on Russian rather than speaking their 
“native” Turkish.  And thus the Einbau-Ausbau rift widens.   
Interestingly, as disputes within the public sphere over the proper way in which to 
refer to the Turkic peoples ultimately revealed, and simultaneously contributed to, a 
widening Ausbau-Einbau rift in the putative Turkic world community, the same question, 
taken up within the confines of a Turkic world online news and discussion group, 
resulted in the mutual spontaneous development of a more acceptable, albeit lesser 
known and less widely applicable, term for referring to the Turkic peoples. The term was 
Turk*, “where * is the Unix *,” as noted by Turcologist Uli Schamiloglu, who 
appropriated the term and expanded its use to refer to the Turk* languages in outlining 
                                               
71 Please see: http://video.cnnturk.com/2010/haber/9/16/turk-dili-zirvesi-ama-turkce-
bilen-az, last accessed August 2, 2011. 
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directives on language use for participation in the news and discussion group.72  In other 
words, it was a term that employed an asterisk or “wildcard” character common to the 
UNIX operating system in which the “asterisk matches any number of characters in a 
filename, including none.”73  Extrapolating from this definition, the use of the asterisk 
enables users of Turk* to sidestep the divisive ideological issues associated with 
employing the term Türk or any of the Turkish neologisms revived or contrived to 
designate “Turkic” (e.g., Türkî, Türkik, and Türksel), allowing both the writer and the 
reader to imagine what they will.   
In this sense, Turk* not only implicitly acknowledges the dispute between those 
who make no distinction between the Turkic peoples and those who insist on a 
distinction, but in so doing also suggests an über-category of Turk, from which all Turkic 
peoples can be independently specified.  As such, it offers a more egalitarian and 
“cooperative” means of representing relations within the Turkic world that imagined all 
Turkic peoples united under a broad “umbrella” identity, the very premise behind notions 
of a greater “Türk* dünyası,” or Turk* world.74  Although widely adopted within the 
online forum, Turk* never caught on more widely.  This can likely be attributed to the 
fact, that despite being an elegant circumvention of ideological divides, it was not only 
                                               
72 Quote taken from Uli Schamiloglu’s Introduction to Turkistan.Newsletter found at: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19990117000239/http://www.euronet.nl/users/sota/turkistan.h
tm, last accessed August 2, 2011. 
73 Please see: http://unix.t-a-y-l-o-r.com/USwild.html, last accessed August 2, 2011.  
74 Turk* also works in English, where it avoids ideological contestation by allowing both 
the writer and the reader to imagine the appropriate adjectival suffix (i.e., -ish or -ic) for 
the root word “Turk.” 
 279 
not applicable within spoken language, but also relied on a referential link to rather 
specialized knowledge about computer programming not commonly possessed by 
average computer users, let alone the general public.  Nonetheless, the spontaneous 
emergence of the term, particularly within the context of a Turkic world forum with 
broad bilateral membership suggests a genuine, if limited, attempt to reach across the 
widening Einbau-Ausbau divide in Turkic world relations.   
 
CONCLUSION 
In concluding this chapter, it is important to step back for a moment to reiterate 
the inherently ideological nature of the diffuse debate that marked the second stage of 
post-Cold War relations in the Turkic world, by noting what was self-evident to those 
involved, both within the Turkic world community of practice and the general publics of 
the respective republics, namely that issues of linguistic classification and naming 
conventions were contentious precisely because it was implicitly understood by all 
parties that attitudes and perceptions concerning language forms and usage were 
intimately linked with values and belief structures about the material world.  More 
particularly, perceptions of language status were understood to equate to perceptions of 
speaker status and to thus bear important implications for the ordering of relations within 
the imagined Turkic world.   
Thus, to refer to the Turkic languages as “dialects,” with the intended or 
unintended implication that they were dialects of contemporary Turkish--i.e., to accord 
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them a lesser linguistic status by designating them with a lesser linguistic category--was 
tantamount to declaring the Turkic peoples a “lesser” peoples than their Turkish 
counterparts.  Likewise, to revive or contrive fabricated neologisms to distinguish the 
Turkic peoples from their so-called Turkish cousins was no different than declaring them 
somehow “derivative” of the “original.”  Moreover, to insist on calling the Turkic 
languages “X Türkçesi” and the Turkic peoples themselves “X Türk” was to seek to coopt 
their distinct identities into a broader Turkish identity defined by, and hence epitomized 
by, the Turks of Turkey, within which the Turkic peoples would never measure up to 
their Turkish cousins and thus could never be considered equal partners.  In this sense, 
the Turkic peoples’ rejection of the linguistic classificatory schema and naming 
conventions proposed by their Turkish counterparts constituted an explicit Ausbau 
response to the perceived “cooptive” Einbau intent of the latter and was thus tantamount 
to repudiating not only their inclusion under a broad umbrella of Turkish identity, the 
very basis upon which the Turkic world was imagined, but also Turkey’s self-appointed 
leadership role in the creation of this unified Turkic world and hence Turkish 
“superiority” within it.   
The Turkic peoples’ resistance to being linguistically and socioculturally 
subsumed to their Turkish cousins during this second phase of post-Soviet Turkic world 
relations was, however, most evident in the failure of the ortak alfabe to take hold within 
the Turkic republics.  In retrospective discussions and interviews with delegates to, 
participants in, and interested observers of the early linguistic congresses, the composite 
picture that emerged of the conundrum as to how it was that the Turkic delegates could 
 281 
have come to a consensus with their Turkish counterparts and ratified an ortak alfabe 
proposal on the one hand, and then, on the other, returned to their respective countries to 
participate in national orthographic debates that ultimately settled on alphabets which 
diverged from the ortak alfabe proposal they had endorsed, revealed a deep-seated, 
although then still nascent, concern over not only the resulting linguistic effects on their 
respective languages, but also the long-term implications for Turkic world relations of 
adopting the Turkish alphabet as a base for their respective national orthographies.  More 
specifically, the budding discontent that simmered just under the surface at the time of 
the early language congresses appears to have been rooted in the nagging suspicion 
among the Turkic delegates that while the Einbau project of creating a common alphabet 
was billed as an exercise in supranational interdependence, its ostensibly “cooperative” 
spirit nonetheless masked “cooptive” tendencies on the part of its Turkish organizers 
which threatened the independence of their languages and fledgling national identities.   
While the Turkic delegates’ unease about the linguistic and social ramifications of 
accepting a common orthography based on the Turkish alphabet--implicit both in 
concerns over inclusion in the ortak alfabe of graphemes for the phonetic features 
distinctive to their respective languages as well as in the inclusion within the ortak alfabe 
proposals presented by Turkic scholars of several letters represented by a different 
character in the Turkish alphabet--remained unspoken during the course of the early 
linguistic congresses, largely in deference to the ostensibly “cooperative” Einbau spirit of 
the proceedings, the explicitly “cooptive” Einbau Turkish approach to related issues 
surrounding linguistic rapprochement among the Turkic peoples, that became manifest in 
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the aftermath of the congresses through ambient-level debate over linguistic classification 
and naming conventions, created a widespread impression of the Turks’ sense of their 
own “superiority” within the hierarchy of Turkic world relations that caused the delegates 
to reevaluate the implicit nature of the ortak alfabe project.  In response, not only did the 
delegates forsake the ortak alfabe, choosing to support national orthographies in its stead, 
but they also struck back at the very ideological presupposition behind the convention of 
the early linguistic congresses that had been laid bare by the ambient level discourses that 
ensued, by openly asserting the flawed nature of the Turkish alphabet from a “scientific” 
standpoint.  Thus, in the words of one eminent Azerbaijani linguist, whose views typified 
this increasingly common assertion:  
 
It’s true that the Cyrillic alphabet imposed on us by the Russians did great damage 
to our languages, but we were forced to accept these letters.  The Turks, by 
contrast, were free to devise whatever alphabet they wanted, and yet wound up 
adopting an alphabet that violates the basic sound symmetry that is the foundation 
for all Turkic languages.  In the same way that you need front vowels /i/, /ø/, and 
/y/ to complement back vowels /ɯ/, /o/, and /u/, if you have /k/, /e/, and /h/, then 
you need their counterparts /q/, /ӕ/, and /x/.  Villagers in Turkey still have these 
sounds, but they’ve been lost in standard Turkish because there aren’t any letters 
to represent them.  We saw a new alphabet as an opportunity to correct the 
deficiencies of the old alphabet, but the Turks wanted us to adopt their alphabet 
with all its problems.  Even today, Turkish linguists admit that there are many 
problems with the Turkish alphabet.  It got pushed through too quickly and the 
problems overlooked.  The Turks could have used this as an opportunity to correct 
their own alphabet, but instead they simply tried to push their alphabet on us.  
Why would we want to adopt an alphabet with so many admitted problems?   
 
Had the ortak alfabe debates been undertaken within a national context, a new 
alphabet could have been implemented, despite objections on the part of parties whose 
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interests it did not represent, through the efforts of central government and then 
legitimized by a host of state institutions as Bourdieu (1991) describes, in much the way 
that both the Turkish alphabet reform and the republican alphabet reforms among the 
Turkic peoples were accomplished.  Resistance to its hegemony, if not precluded by 
misrecognition, would at least have been much slower to emerge.  By contrast, within the 
supranational context of the Turkic world, the absence of a single central authority and 
lack of shared social institutions meant that successful implementation of the ortak alfabe 
relied on generating genuine consensus rather than institutionalized misrecognition.  
Where the ortak alfabe effort foundered was in failing to foster true consensus as befit 
the “cooperative” Einbau effort it purported to be, attempting instead to perpetuate a 
misrecognition of the Turkish alphabet as the “natural” choice for orthographic unity 
among the Turkic peoples.   
Without the institutional means to effect this misrecognition, however, the Turks 
were unable to effectively disguise the underlying ideological presumption in the 
“superiority” of their alphabet and sociopolitical interest in seeing it adopted across the 
Turkic world from the Turkic peoples, who responded, in Ausbau manner, by creating 
their own idiosyncratic alphabets, just as they insisted on referring to their native tongues 
as languages rather than dialects, naming themselves, their languages, and their republics 
by reference to a narrow “national” identity rather than a broad “ethnic” identity, and 
speaking Russian when it suited them as patent markers of their collective distinctiveness 
from their Turkish cousins.   
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Thus, coming full-circle, I end this chapter by returning to the argument 
concerning the nature of debate I laid forth at its beginning in order to suggest that the 
adoption of an ontology of debate that focuses exclusively on the more formal and 
discrete instances within what, I would argue, amounts to a continuum of debate types 
may ultimately preclude the development of an understanding of the ways in which 
language policies and procedures generally agreed upon in formal debate contexts 
inevitably represent the interests of certain parties over others (Tollefson 1991) and, in so 
doing, frequently contradict local linguistic culture (Schiffman 1998a), thereby 
occasioning active or passive resistance--discursive or metadiscursive contestation--that 
ultimately works to mitigate their successful implementation (Hornberger 1998).   
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Chapter Five: Linguistic Ideology and the Political Economy of 
Orthographic Practice in Turkey 
 
The Turkish people who know how to protect their country, their lofty independence, 
must also rescue their language from the yoke of foreign languages (Ülkesini, yüksek 
istiklâlini korumasını bilen Türk milleti, dilini de yabancı diller boyunduruğundan 
kurtarmalıdır).   
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
September 2, 193075 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The focus of this dissertation thus far has been on the political and ideological 
dimensions of cooperation and conflict inherent to efforts aimed at creating a common 
Turkic alphabet and otherwise effecting linguistic rapprochement amongst the Turkic 
peoples, particularly the ideological tension between an initial shared belief in 
supranational ethnocultural solidarity and linguistic mutual intelligibility that inspired the 
ortak alfabe and ortak dil projects during the first “euphoric” stage of post-Soviet 
relations in the Turkic world and the emergent sense of national distinctiveness and 
concerns over perceived Turkish “superiority” that subsequently hindered linguistic and 
sociocultural rapprochement under the rubric of the Turkic world during the second 
“sobering” phase of post-Soviet relations among the Turkic peoples.  By contrast, this 
and the following chapter focus on domestic language ideological debates within Turkey 
proper that emerged as issues of language and orthography took on an expanded 
significance within Turkey following the collapse of the Soviet Union, embedded not 
                                               
75 As quoted in Çelik (1990:30). 
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only in the reawakening of pan-Turkist sentiment that heralded linguistic rapprochement 
and a mutual “return” to the essentials of Turk-ness, but also in the burgeoning 
opportunities of the post-Cold War era for further integration with the West, including 
accession to the European Union, that reanimated long-standing domestic struggles 
between cultural conservatives and social progressives, frequently waged through the 
instrumentality of language, over the nature of the Turkish nation and its geopolitical 
place in the global order.   
Although it goes without saying that the collapse of the Soviet Union inaugurated 
a new chapter in the history of the Turkic republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus, 
more overlooked in studies of Turkic world relations is the social and political upheaval 
that the end of the Cold War era spelled for the Turkish Republic.  The sudden demise of 
the Soviet Union precipitated a crisis in Turkey’s foreign policy orientation, which had 
long been based on its role as a “buffer state” between the USSR and the West (Fuller 
and Lesser 1993, Mango 1994, Rittenburg 1998), amplifying fears, particularly among 
conservative elements within Turkish society, that the emergence of the United States as 
the sole remaining superpower would spell heightened American cultural imperialism 
and increased Western influence, even as it afforded the promise of expanded ties with 
the Turkic world and the possibility of parlaying such ties into enhanced international 
standing.  Meanwhile, on the domestic political front, the late 1980s and early 1990s 
were marked by an economic and sociocultural opening triggered by the relaxation of 
long-standing statist traditions under President Turgut Özal (Heper and Sayarı 2002), 
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which provided average Turks easier access to the wider world and enabled their greater 
participation in the increasingly technologically-linked global community.   
Given that issues of language and orthography have broadly served as a 
bellwether for much of the social and political upheaval and transformation that defines 
Turkish history, it should come as no surprise that shifts in orthographic practice emerged 
during the liminal period following the collapse of the Soviet Union when the possibility, 
indeed the necessity, of forging new sociopolitical alliances was palpable, and efforts at 
uniting the Turkic world through an ortak alfabe bore the symbolic power of orthography 
in indexing national identity and international affiliations into the limelight.  This chapter, 
then, explores the ideological underpinnings and political economy of recent 
orthographic practice in Turkey, focusing on orthographic innovations and associated 
metalinguistic discourses emerging within the context of shifting global relations in the 
post-Cold war era which, in explicitly rejecting orthographic purism and embracing 
Western orthographic influence, constituted an ideological challenge to the foreign policy 
orientation favored by cultural conservatives, including the community of practice of 
linguists and language professionals actively engaged in promoting linguistic, 
sociocultural, and geopolitical rapprochement within the Turkic world.   
In this sense, I would argue that such orthographic innovations initiated as “acts 
of identity” by Turkish social progressives and rapidly adopted within the general 
populace as a creative performative choice, in conjunction with the response they evoked 
from cultural conservatives, constituted another diffuse language ideological debate.  
This debate, enacted largely through the instrumentality of orthographic praxis, not only 
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culminated in a subsequent quasi-formal online metalinguistic debate over the politics of 
Turkish orthographic practice described in the next chapter, but also served to complicate 
and ultimately hinder the dynamics of supranational linguistic and sociocultural 
rapprochement during the second stage of Turkic world relations. 
In this sense, the diffuse language ideological debate explored in this chapter, 
although ostensibly unrelated to efforts to create a common Turkic alphabet was 
nonetheless linked to the politics of linguistic rapprochement among the Turkic peoples 
in several ways:  first, through the event that precipitated the debate, namely changes to 
the global order occasioned by the collapse of the Soviet Union; second, through the 
object of interest, namely orthography; and, third, through the actors, namely the Turkish 
linguists and language professionals who, having long positioned themselves as 
“guardians” of the Turkish language, were actively pursuing linguistic, sociocultural, and 
geopolitical rapprochement among the Turkic peoples with an eye towards strengthening 
the Turkish language by not only “claiming” millions of additional speakers but also 
reintroducing “native” sources of linguistic enrichment as a counterbalance to ever 
increasing “foreign” linguistic influence from the West.  
By contrast, the Turkic members of the Turkic world community of practice came 
largely to view Turkey’s contemporary struggle against foreign orthographic influence, 
coupled with the country’s checkered history of orthographic reform, as clear proof of the 
unsuitability of the Turkish alphabet to act as the base for a common Turkic orthography.  
Thus, with Turkic members of the Turkic world community of practice suggesting that 
their Turkish counterparts might want to address the issue of Western linguistic influence 
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on the Turkish language before taking the high ground to condemn the Turkic peoples for 
allowing Russian to “contaminate” their languages not to mention resolve their own 
domestic struggles over orthography before seeking to “dictate” orthographic policy 
across the Turkic world, Turkish linguists and language professionals took stock of the 
dimensions of contemporary linguistic politics at home and set about efforts to once 
again “purify” their language and alphabet, the contamination of which they blamed not 
only on the pernicious outside influence of foreign powers, but also their perceived local 
proxies in the form of Turkish social progressives who willingly introduced foreignisms 
into the language. 
 
THE POLITICS OF “PURISM” AND “VERNACULARITY” 
Concern over the “purity” of one’s language is apparently so common throughout 
history that the Concise Oxford Dictionary makes especial mention of language purism in 
defining a “purist” as a “stickler for, affecter of, scrupulous purity, or nicety, esp. in 
language” (as quoted in Neustupný 1989:211).  It should not be surprising, then, that 
language purity movements are among the most common types of formal language 
planning efforts.  Within the language planning literature, “purism” describes the 
common tendency among language activists to seek to maintain or rediscover the 
“essence” of a particular language through efforts aimed at preventing or eliminating 
foreign elements and influence, with a particular emphasis on “intrusions” from “outside” 
languages perceived, for one reason or another, to be particularly dangerous rivals, as 
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well as the identification of “native” resources to be plumbed in aid of language 
enrichment (Annamalai 1979).  According to foremost figure in the field of language 
planning, Joshua Fishman, “[l]anguage purity efforts are examples of attempts to ‘clean 
up’ messiness in the written language and to bring even educated spoken usage into 
greater conformity with the sharpened political differences that arise between polities and 
their associated cultures” (2006:28).  Insofar as the nature of the “messiness” that 
requires “cleaning up” and the appropriate means of so doing are always interest-laden 
judgments on the part of individuals with particular sociopolitical interests, linguistic 
purism is an inherently ideological exercise.  Indeed the very notion of “purity” when 
applied to social processes cannot escape conveying explicitly ideological overtones, as 
Shapiro notes in his introduction to a volume on the politics of language purism, writing:  
 
When a term with a pointedly moral valence is put into play in social processes, it 
cannot wholly lose that valence, even when efforts are made to neutralize its 
moral force.  Every society is involved to some degree with identity politics, with 
separating peoples into groups with identities which form a hierarchy of 
worthiness, and one’s language group membership is an important part of many 
of these identity politics processes.  Clearly, then, attempts to ‘purify’ a language 
implicitly promotes those who can most closely identify themselves as belonging 
to the language base toward which the change is aimed to a position of moral 
superiority.  And because purification implies getting rid of stain and thus evil, 
purification movements imply at some level that the impure language elements 
belong to impure persons.  This impurity ascription makes it then possible to put 
people who cannot claim affiliation with the privileged language in a lesser moral 
space (1989:23). 
 
In his historical review of language purity movements across the globe, Thomas 
(1991) further reinforces the assertion that linguistic purism is inherently ideological, 
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identifying no less than seven common ways in which language purists over the centuries 
have metaphorically described their role in efforts to expunge the pernicious effects of 
foreign influence from their respective languages.  Without going into detail concerning 
the ways in which these self-described roles are applied to purifying a language, it is fair 
to say that whether the language purist conceives of him/herself as a miller, gardener, 
metallurgist, grinder, genealogist/ geneticist, physician, or priest, the implication is of a 
profession actively engaged in the separation of the “good” from the “bad” (e.g., grain 
from chaff, plant from weed, metal from mineral, disease from health).   
Although formal language planning efforts are often organized around the 
principles of linguistic purism, prevailing cultural beliefs in the moral superiority of 
“pure” languages render the variety of less formal means of managing language purity 
even more widespread.  As Fishman notes, “[t]here is a widespread popular assumption 
that proper languages are ‘clean’ or ‘pure’” (2006:25), an assumption that Cameron 
(1995) explores in great depth within contemporary British English by examining the 
ways in which popular discourses concerning “proper” grammar and other “hygienic” 
linguistic practices reflect cultural beliefs concerning public probity, order, and reason as 
well as fears that “improper” usage signals encroaching immorality, disorder, and 
unreason.  Thus, even divorced from formal language planning projects, popular attitudes 
concerning the value of language purity play an essential role in social processes, 
including the legitimization of particular languages and linguistic practices and their 
speakers over others.  As Keating notes: 
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Cultural beliefs in the possibility and value of maintaining a ‘pure’ language in 
the face of contaminating influences from ‘outside’ are common to many 
language communities.  These ideas span a wide range from an association with 
particular local political projects to an association with generalized theories of 
morality, and from a focus on a single individual’s identity to a focus on the state 
of society as a whole.  Purism discourses relate past and present, reorganizing 
historical relationships and legitimizing some voices over others (2003:349). 
 
At this juncture, I would, however, suggest that while the ideological 
underpinnings and sociopolitical contexts of linguistic purism, including the social and 
linguistic forces that precipitated the perceived necessity of purifying language, have 
been relatively well-studied, what has received less scholarly attention are the dynamics 
of resistance to language purity.  In suggesting the value of attending to what I will term 
the explicit “politics of vernacularity” within a society, I borrow the term “vernacularity” 
from Joshua Fishman’s (2006) ethnology of the hidden ideological agendas in formal 
corpus-planning projects discussed in the previous chapter.  In the course of describing, 
opposing, and clustering the ideological underpinnings of formal language planning 
projects throughout the world, Fishman identifies not only the bipolar dimensions of 
Ausbau and Einbau, employed in chapter four to explore the dynamic tension between 
Turkish efforts to position the ex-Soviet Turkic peoples under a broader umbrella of 
supranational ethnolinguistic identity and the Turkic peoples determination to resist 
cooptation in favor of an independent national identity, but also that of “purism” versus 
“vernacularity,” where purism, like Ausbau, is an expression of the desire for linguistic 
“independence” and vernacularity, like Einbau, suggests a preference for linguistic 
“interdependence.”  Thus, by contrast to purism, vernacularity describes the tendency for 
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speakers to eschew rigid and formal understandings of linguistic boundedness by 
welcoming, or at least tolerating, foreignisms and neologisms and celebrating linguistic 
heterodoxy and hybridity.  In a broad sense, then, while purism can be understood as a 
subset of linguistic conservatism, vernacularity suggests a progressive laissez-faire 
approach to linguistic issues.   
Although billed as bipolar opposites, Fishman’s actual descriptions of the purity-
vernacularity complex suggest that the two dimensions may not occupy diametrically 
opposed poles in actual practice.  Since true vernacular openness is, according to 
Fishman, a relatively rare phenomenon, the value of including vernacularity as a 
counterpoint to purist protectionism appears to lie in their existing along a continuum 
such that some societies, or, more importantly, some elements within a society, may 
tolerate or embrace greater degrees of vernacularity than others.  Thus, expanding on 
Fishman’s description, I would argue that not only can vernacularity be a characteristic of 
the linguistic culture of a society, visible both in covert linguistic presumptions and overt 
language policies (Schiffman 1998a), but may also constitute a response to, or resistance 
of, the opposing dimension of purism within a society.  In this sense, the expression of 
vernacularity, through the deliberate use of foreignisms, becomes a resource in identity 
politics and the struggle for sociopolitical power within a society.  Thus, while 
vernacularity may provoke purism, it may also be provoked by purism, suggesting a 
certain synergism between the opposing ideological poles.  In this sense, it is the very 
processes of purism that, ironically, creates the resources for vernacularists seeking to 
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oppose it, by explicitly marking foreignisms as foreign, thereby granting them symbolic 
power which they would not otherwise have carried.   
For vernacularity to become a viable resource in identity politics, however, 
necessarily suggests that the forces of “misrecognition” described by Bourdieu (1991) 
must be incomplete.  Thus, in situations in which linguistic purism is formally pursued by 
state-affiliated institutions, such as language societies, and its policies promulgated 
explicitly and implicitly through state institutions, including the public educational 
system and state-owned media outlets, one would expect, if Bourdieu’s theory of the 
political economy of language were to hold, that citizens would “naturally” accept the 
superiority of pure linguistic forms as the state-legitimated currency of linguistic 
exchange affording access to social flexibility, political authority, and economic power.  
That speakers often appear not to embrace the ideology of purism as suggested by the 
ongoing or iterative nature of purism efforts in many societies--including among the 
French (Weinstein 1989), the Tamils (Schiffman 1999), and the Turks--not only implies 
that vernacularity may constitute a relatively “natural” consequence of linguistic contact 
(Makihara and Schieffelin 2007) against which purists feel the need to remain ever 
vigilant and that notions of purity--having more to do with attitudes and perceptions that 
are, in turn, based on “socio-cultural, political and historical factors which are external to 
language,” than actual structural considerations or histories of language contact 
(Annamalai 1979:5)--are difficult to define in an abstract or global sense and must be 
continually revised as new “threats” present themselves, but also suggests the lack of full 
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integration of the linguistic marketplace and the existence of competing sources of 
valuation and legitimation of linguistic form.   
 
THE ROOTS OF “PURISM” AND “VERNACULARITY” IN THE CREATION OF THE TURKISH 
REPUBLIC 
Within the history of the Republic of Turkey, linguistic purism was instrumental 
in, and hence came to symbolize, the struggle to construct a strong, independent national 
identity out of the ashes of a multiethnic empire.  Where the path to linguistic nationalism 
was relatively clear for the minority ethnic groups within the former empire, who had but 
to shed the imperial Ottoman language and return to their national languages which had 
survived largely intact under a system of diglossia, insofar as the Ottoman language was 
based on Turkish, with significant influence from Arabic and Persian, linguistic 
nationalism was more complicated for the titular ethnic group, involving extensive 
“purification” of the imperial language to rid it of the influence of languages now 
reclassified as “foreign.”  
In short, then, issues of language and orthography have been inextricably linked 
to national identity formation and foreign policy orientation in Turkey since the 1920s, 
when Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, founder of the Turkish republic, set in motion an 
ambitious program of social reforms designed to divorce Turkey from its Ottoman past 
and transform the Turkish people into a cohesive nation of literate, patriotic, and 
cosmopolitan citizens.  Within this framework, language reforms, sought to overcome a 
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deep urban/rural linguistic divide attributable to the highly diglossic nature of the 
Ottoman state by more closely aligning the language of the new Turkish nation with that 
of the Turkish “folk.”  Orthographic reforms served the complementary purpose of 
bringing orthographic conventions in line with Turkish phonology,76 as a means of 
remedying low literacy rates.77  Together, the two reforms were designed to create a new 
Turkish polity unified at all levels by shared linguistic norms, which would, in turn, pave 
the way for further social reforms both by psychologically preparing the people for new 
reform measures and providing a medium for presenting them (Heyd 1954, Şimşir 1992, 
Lewis 1999).   
Given the primacy accorded them by the Kemalist regime, linguistic reforms were 
carried out in record time.  Such haste, while undoubtedly contributing to their success, 
undeniably cut short debate, however, with the result that certain “imperfections” in the 
alphabet as well numerous lexical neologisms contrived on the basis of dubious, or 
“unsound,” linguistic principles were codified that have since become sites for animated 
discursive and metadiscursive contestation not to mention unintentional slippage.  As a 
result, although official linguistic policies were then and have since been closely 
managed by the Turkish state and its proxies, in practice, language and orthography have 
proven perversely subject to natural language shift, deliberate political manipulation, and 
                                               
76 “The Alphabet Commission rejected in principle the idea of a transliteration alphabet, 
because they did not wish Arabic and Persian pronunciations… to be perpetuated; they 
wanted them assimilated to Istanbul speech patterns (Lewis 1999:33).   
77 Head of the Ottoman Scientific Society, “Antepli Munif Pasha blamed the paucity of 
literates on the deficiencies of the alphabet” (Lewis 1999:28).   
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persistent external influences.  As such, linguistic and orthographic choice in Turkey is 
imbued with a high degree of social meaning which provides speakers a powerful 
symbolic resource for social indexing and “acts of identity” (Le Page 1978, Le Page and 
Tabouret-Keller 1985) whereby “[t]he individual creates for himself the patterns of his 
linguistic behavior so as to resemble those of the group or groups with which from time 
to time he wishes to be identified or so as to be unlike those from whom he wishes to be 
distinguished” (1985:181).   
In particular, the political economy of orthography in Turkey is largely defined by 
the give and take between the ideologies of linguistic “purism” and concomitant policies 
of the Turkish Language Society (Türk Dil Kurumu, or TDK), on the one hand, and by 
the processes of linguistic “vernacularity,” or accommodation and appropriation of 
foreign influence, coupled with selective resistance to the TDK’s linguistic initiatives, on 
the other.  As a result, two competing, but equally powerful, sources of linguistic 
legitimation have emerged which are indexical of a broader deep-seated and long-
standing political rift in Turkish society between social progressives and cultural 
conservatives that has come to a head in the post-Cold War global environment 
occasioned by the opening up of the post-Cold War era and the blossoming of new 
foreign policy opportunities within the region.  Thus, whereas conservatives, often with 
pan-Turkist leanings, have tended to exercise control over the TDK and the Ministries of 
Culture and Education, whence the policies of linguistic purism are promulgated, 
Western-leaning progressives, the traditional “face” of the Kemalist intellectual elite, 
have largely been in charge of the country’s select foreign-founded, private and public-
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funded highschools and universities as well as elite media organizations, where the 
practice of linguistic vernacularity was born.  In this sense, linguistic acts of identity 
bespeak not only actual or coveted socioeconomic status, but also domestic sociopolitical 
identification and, by extension, foreign policy orientation.   
With specific reference to the dimensions of contemporary orthographic practice 
in Turkey, it is important to note that while contradictions between policy and practice 
have demanded that issues of language form and usage be officially revisited and 
modified over the course of the past seventy years, the Turkish alphabet has undergone 
no significant formal revisions since its adoption in 1928.  As a result, orthography 
represented a new, and hence potent, site for identity politics when, beginning in the early 
1990s, innovations in orthographic practice emerged, including the omission of 
diacriticals distinguishing the Turkish alphabet’s “special characters” (ç, ğ, ı, ö, ş, and ü) 
from standard characters (c, g, i, o, s, and u), the omission of vowels altogether, the 
introduction of a variety of foreign letter combinations that due to the operant 
orthographic logic of a one-to-one relationship between phoneme and grapheme appear 
to violate Turkish morphological rules, the increasingly widespread popular use of three 
letters not found in the Turkish alphabet and not sanctioned by the TDK, and the use of 
loanletters to spell native Turkish words.  Such orthographic innovations have become a 
new resource in the struggle over identity politics, with broader implications for the 
country’s foreign policy orientation in the post-Cold War era, causing much 
consternation among language purists and social commentators and eventually sparking 
the animated online debate over the politics of orthography in Turkey addressed in the 
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next chapter.  Before examining such orthographic innovations and their larger 
sociopolitical reverberations, however, it is important to contextualize them within a brief 
description of the ideological underpinnings of the interrelated histories of orthographic 
reform and language planning in Turkey.   
 
THE POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY OF TURKISH ORTHOGRAPHIC REFORM 
Despite being singularly ill-suited to represent Turkish phonology, the Arabo-
Persian script--based on Arabic orthography but modified to include three letters 
representing sounds peculiar to Persian--was adopted by the Turks in conjunction with 
their conversion to Islam.  Although the correlation between sound and symbol (i.e., 
phonology and orthography) is largely arbitrary in the sense that any set of characters can 
theoretically be applied to any language78, the characters of the Arabo-Persian alphabet 
already possessed a representational value--i.e., an association with a particular sound--
that was familiar to Turkish speakers from Arabic and Persian loanwords.  Given this 
pre-established denotational relationship, the Arabo-Persian alphabet proved lacking in 
characters to represent Turkish where significant differences between Turkish and 
Arabic/Persian phonology were manifest.  In his history of the Turkish language reform, 
Geoffrey Lewis describes the inherent dissonance between Turkish phonology and 
Arabo-Persian orthography as follows:  
                                               
78 That the relationship between sound and symbol is arbitrary becomes especially clear 
in the case of random characters taking the place of the “special characters” in the 
Turkish alphabet when font incompatibilities occur, as described below.   
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Its intrinsic beauty aside, there is nothing to be said in favor of the Arabo-Persian 
alphabet as a medium for writing Turkish.  All of its letters, including alif, the 
glottal stop, are consonants, some representing sounds not existing in Turkish and 
one, k, which may represent Turkish g, k, n, or y….  With the addition of 
diacritics above or below the letters, the three vowels a, i, and u can be indicated, 
whereas Turkish needs to distinguish eight… [As a result, many] equivocal 
readings were possible (Lewis 1999:27).   
 
Similarly, scholar of the Turkish language reform, Uriel Heyd, writes: 
 
In the old Arabic script, he native Turkish words had almost looked like intruders 
into the language of a common Islamic, i.e. Arabic-Persian, civilization.  Their 
orthography was difficult, inadequate and subject to frequent changes.  On the 
other hand, the thousands of Arabic and Persian words had--owing to the religious 
and cultural prestige of their languages of origin--generally preserved their 
established spelling [thus arguably favoring their selection over native Turkish 
words, many of which they eventually replaced] (1954:23). 
 
The incompatibility of the Arabo-Persian orthographic system with the Turkish 
language, particularly with regard to vowels, furthermore created ambiguities in 
comprehension that ultimately facilitated the adoption of an even greater number of 
Arabic and Persian loanwords.  For example, the difficulty in distinguishing between two 
words differentiated solely by their constituent vowels--such as olmak, to be, and ölmek, 
to die--was avoided by using the compound vefat etmek from the Arabic vefat, meaning 
“death,” in place of ölmek.  In his entry on Turks in the13th edition of Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, published in 1926, Sir Charles Eliot observed that the result of such 
orthography-derived ambiguity was “that pure Turkish words written in Arabic letters are 
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often hardly intelligible even to Turks and it is usual to employ Arabic synonyms as 
much as possible because there is no doubt as to how they should be read” (Eliot 1926, as 
quoted in Lewis 1999:28).   
Given such difficulties, the advantages of changing the alphabet to better suit 
Turkish phonology were gradually recognized.  In 1851, Western-educated bureaucrat 
and renowned reformer Ahmet Cevdet became the first to call publicly for modification 
of the Arabo-Persian alphabet.  Just over a decade later, two concrete proposals for 
adapting the Arabo-Persian alphabet to better suit Turkish were submitted to the Ottoman 
Scientific Society by its founder, Antepli Münif Pasha.  These were followed, the year 
after, by a proposal from Azerbaijani playwright Mirza Fethali Ahundzade.  All three 
proposals were ultimately rejected by the Ottoman Scientific Society, and it was another 
half century before alphabet reform was again granted serious consideration.  By then, 
however, the goals of reform had shifted and language professionals and members of the 
intelligentsia had begun advocating the adoption of a Latin-based alphabet--a solution 
that had later been championed by Ahundzade and was soon to be revived for 
consideration among the Turkic peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus (Lewis 1999, 
Öztürk 1998, Şimşir 1992, Ülkütaşır 1991).  
In briefly describing the axes of debate over these successive proposals, Lewis’ 
concise history of the Turkish alphabet reform offers insight into contemporaneous 
linguistic ideologies which, in turn, suggest parallels with the ideological underpinnings 
of present-day debates over orthography.  The justifications for repeated rejection of 
early proposals for alphabet reform from the mid 19th to early 20th century were both 
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philosophical and practical in nature, expressing concerns that forsaking or even 
modifying the sacred script of the Koran was tantamount to blasphemy and would render 
the holy book and other ancient Islamic texts inaccessible, creating a rupture with Islamic 
culture.  Here it is interesting to note that this same ideological assumption linking 
orthographic affinity and cultural rapprochement ultimately informed Ataturk’s decision 
to embrace orthographic reform as a means of reorienting the new Turkish republic away 
from the Islamic world and toward the West.  Thus whereas contemporary cultural 
conservatives tend to view Ataturk’s legacy with relation to orthography as the creation 
of a national symbol which must be protected from outside influence so as to ensure the 
well-being of the nation, progressives tend to focus on the “spirit” rather than the “letter” 
of Ataturk’s orthographic reform, particularly the way in which it sought to modernize 
the Turkish nation, divorcing it from Islamic culture and orienting it toward the West.  In 
this sense, orthography must be understood as indexical not only of domestic identity 
politics, but also of the broader struggle over national foreign policy orientation within 
contemporary Turkey, as it was in decades past.79   
While the future of orthographic reform was still uncertain, however, the same 
ideological assumption was rallied against the proposed Latin-based alphabet by an 
earlier generation of purists who sought to protect the Ottoman language from 
                                               
79 I would also note the continued persistence of the fundamental ideological 
presupposition linking orthographic affinity and cultural rapprochement within 
contemporary Turkish society can be seen both in the effort to unify the Turkic peoples 
under the rubric of a Turkic world through the creation of a common Turkic alphabet, but 
also in the Turkic peoples’ concerns, based on their experience under the Soviets, that 
adopting a foreign alphabet was tantamount to accepting a foreign culture.   
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contamination from Western letters, and, hence, Western culture.  A good example of this 
can be found in the diatribe of General Kazim Karabekir, chairman of the 1923 Izmir 
Economic Congress, rejecting a motion calling for the Latin alphabet to be adopted.  
Warning of the sociopolitical dangers inherent to accepting a “foreign” alphabet, 
Karabekir vituperated that by adopting the Latin alphabet, “we shall at once have placed 
a splendid weapon in the hands of all Europe; they will declare to the Islamic world that 
the Turks have accepted the foreign writing and turned Christian.  The diabolical idea 
with which our enemies are working is precisely this” (as quoted in Lewis 1999:32).  The 
ideological undercurrents of Karabekir’s tirade continue to resonate in contemporary 
debates over orthography, albeit in somewhat altered form.  Where Karabekir equated 
acceptance of a foreign alphabet with Christianization, modern-day purist pundits see a 
loss of “Turkishness.”  Be it for religious or national reasons, the essential concern of 
participants to both debates revolves around the loss of identity believed to proceed from 
accommodating a foreign script.80  Thus, in both cases, orthography is understood to 
stand metaphorically for the identity of the Turkish “self” in relation to the outside 
“other.”  
Furthermore, the ideological link posited between orthography and identity 
presages another theme manifest in the final line of Karabekir’s diatribe which remains as 
current today as it was then--namely the belief that Europe is engaged in a long-standing 
conspiracy to discredit and weaken, convert and thus dominate Turkey.  This suspicion of 
                                               
80 As noted in chapter three, this same concern was expressed by Turkic peoples in 
relation to adopting an ortak alfabe based on a foreign orthographic system. 
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European intentions has been a fundamental aspect of Turkish nationalism since the 
European powers attempted to divide Turkish territory amongst themselves in the 
aftermath of World War I, and remains particularly strong among socially conservative 
Turkish nationalists.  Nowadays, it is the West in general, not just Europe, and America 
in particular, that is perceived to be working against Turkey’s interest, and the concern is 
less over religious conversion--though this does crop up in discourse conflating the 
European Union with a “Christian club”--and more over Western imperialism and the 
homogenizing effects of globalization.  Nonetheless, this mistrust of Western intentions 
persists and continues to inform discourse regarding contemporary linguistic issues. 
In spite of such vehement objections to the Latin-based alphabet, reformism 
(inkılapçılık)--one of the six main principles of Kemalist thought--was the main currency 
of the early republican era, and it was only a matter of time before alphabet was to be 
subjected to its scrutiny.  This moment came during the 20 May 1928 session of the 
Grand National Assembly when, after a law mandating the use of international numerals 
was approved, the question was raised as to whether the international letters might not 
also be adopted.  Three days later, the Council of Ministers established the Language 
Commission (Dil Encümeni) to consider the mode and means of adapting the Latin 
orthography to the Turkish language.  Issues of pronunciation were central to this process 
of representation, as members of the commission were well aware that orthography 
codifies, and by extension, determines pronunciation.   
Thus, while it was felt that a phonemic alphabet, by mapping a one-to-one 
relationship between sound and symbol, speaking and writing, would best further the 
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goals of literacy, the commission deliberately shied away from adopting a transliterative 
script on the grounds that it would reinforce Arabic pronunciations.  Not only would an 
alphabet which standardized Turkish pronunciations better reflect the speech patterns of 
the people, it would offer the additional advantage of rendering Arabic loanwords more 
noticeable--as the Arabic alphabet had done with Turkish words--and hence facilitating 
their eventual removal from the language.  The Istanbul dialect was, as a result, chosen as 
the basis for the new alphabet.81  As Lewis recounts:   
 
The longest discussions took place over the question of how to show the 
palatalized sounds of k, g, and l before back vowels.  Before front vowels, as in iki 
‘two’ and gelmek ‘to come,’ this happens automatically.  Before back vowels 
there is no palatalization in native words but there is in Arabic and Persian 
borrowings….  The Commission’s proposal in its report, published in early 
August, was to write an h after the consonant, as in Portuguese….  Another 
proposal was to use the q to show the sound of palatalized k.  Many people 
preferred the latter alternative” (Lewis 1999:33).   
 
Despite the support q received from some quarters, others were opposed to 
including it out of concern that it would ultimately prevent Arabic loanwords from being 
turkified.  The addition of q was eventually rejected by Ataturk himself, who reportedly 
disliked the way it “looked” in the spelling of his name, although this ostensibly aesthetic 
                                               
81 The decision to base the Turkish alphabet on the Istanbul dialect was, and remains, 
controversial.  One of the contentious points involved the letter ğ (yumaşak g, or soft g) 
which either lengthens the preceding vowel or, when occurring between two vowels, is 
not pronounced at all.  Although this usage was in keeping with the Istanbul dialect, in 
other Turkish dialects it was pronounced as a voiced uvular fricative, thus approximating 
one of the sounds--gh ([ʁ])--represented in the Central Asian alphabets but largely lost 
from Turkish.   
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choice was likely ideologically driven, having to do with ensuring the Turkification of his 
Arabic-derived name.  After a brief trial with the Portuguese h, it was decided to indicate 
palatalization by placing a circumflex over the ensuing back vowel in foreign loanwords 
(e.g., kâtip, “secretary” and gâvur, “infidel”) which not only specified pronunciation but 
also marked such words as foreign.  Thus, where Turkish words had once seemed foreign 
in the Arabo-Persian script, Arabic and Persian words now seemed foreign in the Latin 
script.  Heyd notes:  “Designed to render the sounds of the genuine Turkish speech 
material as correctly as possible, and based on the principle of a strictly phonetic spelling, 
the new alphabet turned Arabic and Persian words which had not been completely 
turkicized into distinctly foreign elements” (Heyd 1954:23).   
This early controversy over the letter q is particularly fascinating in light of 
current debates over orthographic innovation that decry it as an agent of foreign 
influence, insofar as it suggests the arbitrary nature not only of orthography but also of 
purist ideology, which generally takes a, sociopolitically-driven, synchronic perspective 
in selecting the ideal which should be aspired to and protected.  Although this principle 
may be more explicit vis-à-vis language, it nonetheless holds true with orthography as 
well.  In other words, there is nothing about the letter q, which is the cause of such 
current consternation, that renders it explicitly incompatible with Turkish.  Indeed, it is a 
well-accepted letter within the Latin-based orthographic system, which, had it been 
adopted in 1928, would now enjoy the protected status afforded the other letters of the 
Turkic alphabet.  Since it was not, contemporary purists find it irrevocably foreign, even 
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though its rejection was on purely aesthetic grounds and the sound it represents continues 
to exist as a distinct phoneme in modern standard Turkish. 
The new, Latin-based Turkish alphabet made its debut in August of 1928 and 
soon after was introduced to academics and literary figures, who briefly, but intensely 
debated its merits before unanimously adopting the proposal, with the announcement 
that:   
 
To deliver the nation from ignorance, the only course open is to abandon the 
Arabic letters, which are not suited to the national language, and to accept the 
Turkish letters, based on the Latin.  The alphabet proposed by the Commission is 
in truth the Turkish alphabet; that is definite…The laws of grammar and spelling 
will evolve in step with the improvement and development of the language and 
with the national taste” (as quoted in Lewis 1999:32).   
 
Thus a natural, almost primordial, link between the Turkish language and its 
“true” new alphabet was established which served to stifle the clear diversity of opinion, 
forestall further debate, and render the alphabet--now enshrined by Kemalism and 
Turkish nationalism as opposed to Islam--all but immutable.  What minor adjustments 
were proposed--mostly associated with foreign loanwords and involving special 
characters (e.g., hyphens, apostrophes, etc.) as well as the pesky palatalization 
conundrum--were mostly rejected on the basis of Ataturk’s verdict, often cited by purists 
as the inspiration behind their current efforts to protect the Turkish languages, that it was 
not “proper to add letters to the Turkish alphabet for the sake of foreign words which 
have infiltrated into our language and the elimination of which is (merely) a question of 
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time” (as quoted in Heyd 1954:24, citing Maksudi 1930:275).  And, thus, but for slight 
adjustments,82 the Turkish alphabet has remained unchanged to the present day.   
 
 
Figure 5.1  Famed photograph of Atatürk teaching the Latin alphabet to Turkish citizens83 
 
After being officially adopted, the new alphabet was formalized and quickly 
implemented.  By October 1928, all public officials had been examined for competence 
in the Latin-based script, and a week later, the Grand National Assembly enacted Law 
                                               
82 One such adjustment was the TDK’s decision in 1977 to eliminate diacritical marks 
made.  This was popularly adopted and remains largely in force despite the fact that the 
TDK reversed their decision a decade later in 1988 (Lewis 1999).   
83 Please see: http://www.allaboutturkey.com/reform.htm, last accessed August 2, 2011.   
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No. 1353, “On the Adoption and Application of the New Turkish Letters.”  The speed 
with which the reforms were accomplished was indicative of Ataturk’s determination to 
avoid unnecessary wrangling over the new orthography either among members of the 
Grand National Assembly or the society at large.  While arguably critical to its successful 
implementation, however, such haste also undoubtedly contributed to the canonization of 
certain imperfections which have been the source of much subsequent discontent among 
linguists, literary figures, and other language professionals.  Some of the most 
controversial imperfections represent discrepancies between the underlying ideologies of 
orthographic reform and the actual form of the Turkish alphabet, particularly the lack of 
strict adherence to the principle of a one-to-one relationship between sound and symbol, 
and include the omission of letters representing sounds still found in the Turkic languages 
and dialects of Turkey, such as the letter q (/q/), as well as the inclusion of letters 
associated with sounds found only in foreign loanwords, such as the letter j (/ʒ/).   
Such critiques of the Turkish alphabet reform persisted even after sixty years, and 
were reanimated in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, when increased 
contact with the languages of the ex-Soviet Turkic peoples reminded linguists and 
language professionals of the phonological richness still extant in the regional dialects of 
Turkey and in the Turkic languages, but lost from modern standard Turkish as the result 
of inadequate orthographic representation.  In a 25 November 2001 editorial for Zaman 
newspaper entitled “The Lost Sounds of Turkish” (“Türkçe’nin Kaybolan Sesleri”), 
columnist Beşir Ayvazoğlu speaks of the harm done to the Turkish language by its 
imperfect script, bemoaning the omission of letters from the Turkish alphabet and 
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resulting impoverishment of the once harmonious language itself and rejoicing that 
Turkey’s ex-Soviet Turkic “brothers,” and particularly its Azerbaijani neighbors, whose 
language closely resembles some of Turkey’s regional dialects, had avoided falling 
victim to the same catastrophic by retaining sufficient characters in their new alphabet to 
represent the distinctive quality of their spoken language.  He writes:   
 
Çok kısa bir sürede hazırlanan ve 
kabul edilen modern Türk alfabesi, 
zamanla Türkçedeki bütün sesleri 
eksiksiz karşılayacak hale 
getirilmesi gerekirken mevcut 
şekliyle dokunulmazlık zırhına 
büründürülmüş ve bu yüzden birçok 
ses yok olmuştur. […] 
Yeni alfabe, dilimizdeki Arapça ve 
Farsça asıllı kelimelerin imlâsında 
büyük sıkıntılar yarattığı gibi, aslî 
seslerimizi de tam karşılamıyordu. 
Mesela, el'i él'den, geç'i géç'ten 
ayırmamızı sağlayacak kapalı e 
unutulmuş veya gözden 
çıkarılmıştı. Aynı şekilde Türkçenin 
güzel ve zengin seslerinden biri 
olan deñiz, diñlemek, añlamak gibi 
kelimelerdeki genizden gelen ñ 
sesini karşılayacak bir harf de 
düşünülmemiştir. […] 
Lâtin alfabesine geçen Türk 
cumhuriyetleri bizim hatalarımızı 
tekrarlamadılar. Mesela, Azeriler 
yirmi dokuz harfli alfabemizi 
olduğu gibi kabul etselerdi, yirmi-
otuz yıl sonra, Azeri Türkçesi, 
kulağımıza musiki gibi gelen o 
güzel sesleri kaybederek Türkiye 
Whereas the modern Turkish 
alphabet, which was prepared and 
adopted in a very short period of 
time, should in time have been 
brought to a state whereby all the 
sounds of Turkish would be 
represented without exception, it 
was wrapped in the armor of 
inviolability in its existing state and 
for this reason a good number of 
sounds disappeared. […] 
Just as words in our language 
derived from Arabic and French 
created big problems for 
orthography, the new alphabet, is 
also not able to fully represent our 
fundamental sounds. For example, 
the closed e which would ensure 
our distinguishing between el and 
él, geç and géç seems to have been 
forgotten or removed from sight. In 
the same way, a letter to represent 
one of Turkish’s most beautiful and 
rich sounds the nasal ň in such 
words as deňiz, diňlemek, anlamak 
seems to not have been thought of. 
[…] 
The Turkic republics that are 
switching to the Latin alphabet did 
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Türkçesinin yaşadığı trajik akıbeti 
yaşardı. Eski Istanbulluların 
konuştuğu Türkçenin Fransızca gibi 
son derece âhenkli bir dil olduğunu 
ayrıca belirtmeye gerek var mı? 
[…] 
Bugünkü Türkçe, tarih içinde 
kazandığı bütün incelikleri ve ses 
zenginliklerini geride bırakmıştır. 
Artık konuştuğumuz Halid 
Ziya'ların, Hamdullah Suphi'lerin 
âhenkli Türkçesi değil, ağzımızda 
geveleyip kekelediğimiz kakofonik 
bir Türkçedir. Maalesef!   
not repeat our mistakes. For 
example, if the Azeris had adopted 
our 29-letter alphabet as is, 20-30 
years later, Azeri Turkish, having 
lost those beautiful sounds that 
seem like music to our ears, would 
have experienced the tragic 
outcome that Turkey Turkish 
experienced.  Is there any need to 
further state that the Turkish spoken 
by old Istanbulites is, like French, 
an exceedingly harmonious 
language? […] 
No longer is what we speak the 
harmonious Turkish of Halid Ziya 
and Hamdullah Suphi, it is a 
cacophonous Turkish that we 
mumble and stammer in our 
mouths.  Unfortunately!  
 
Deficiencies such as those described by Ayvazoğlu notwithstanding, Lewis judges 
the Latin alphabet to be “undeniably the best that has ever been used for Turkish,” and 
suggests that it “has played a large part in the rise of literacy; according to the official 
figures, from 9 per cent in 1924 to 65 per cent in 1975 and 82.5 per cent in 1995” 
(1999:37).  Given the inherent link between language and alphabet, orthographic reform 
furthermore set the stage for subsequent reform of the Turkish language in keeping with 
the nationalizing objectives of the Kemalist government.  As remarked by Heyd:  “The 
lengthy discussions on the subject of a new script had aroused wide public interest in 
linguistic problems generally; its adoption prepared the people psychologically for 
fundamental changes in the language itself.  Such changes now seemed both natural and 
imperative” (1954:23).   
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Yet, while the necessity of language reform may have gained currency, the form it 
should take was not nearly as apparent.  Unlike alphabet, the parameters of which are 
relatively circumscribed, language, with a near-infinite performative range, proved more 
difficult to reform, and reform efforts more given to disagreement.  Thus, whereas 
alphabet has remained relatively untouched since its adoption, language has been 
subjected to successive waves of reform over the course of the past eighty years.  In this 
sense, although Turkish language reform is clearly a topic unto itself, the intrinsic 
relationship between orthography and language links the two reforms in complex ways--
for even at the most basic level, loanletters follow from loanwords in much the same way 
that technical terms accompany technological advances, although both are very likely to 
take on lives of their own soon after arrival.  As such, the following section will address 
some key points related to language reform that have bearing not only on contemporary 
innovations in orthographic practice but also on the metalinguistic discourses that emerge 
within the debate, addressed in the following chapter, over the relative value of restricting 
versus expanding the Turkish alphabet.   
 
THE POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY OF TURKISH LANGUAGE REFORM 
Conversion to Islam brought not just the Arabo-Persian script to the Turkish 
language, but also many elements of the Arabic and Persian languages, both lexical and 
grammatical.  The result was the Ottoman language--a linguistic amalgamation of 
Turkish, Persian, and Arabic which was so far removed from the language of the Turkish 
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“folk” as to be practically unintelligible.  As the language of the Ottoman elite, Ottoman 
served as both the bureaucratic language of the state and the medium of culture, art, and 
literature.  For centuries its primacy went unquestioned until the accelerated decline of 
the Ottoman Empire coupled with the increasing influence of Western civilization during 
the nineteenth century, propelled language reform into the spotlight.  During the 
Tanzimat period, lasting from 1839 to 1876, efforts to revitalize the empire brought about 
reorganization of the Ottoman administrative, legal and educational systems and the 
emergence of a Westernized middle class which, roused by nationalist sentiment, led 
calls for reform of the Ottoman language, deemed incompatible with the needs of the 
newly organized empire.   
Although some progress was made toward simplifying and purifying the 
language, it was not until after the Young Turk revolution of 1908/9 that a group of 
young nationalists writing for the periodical Genç Kalemler (Young Pens) formulated a 
concerted program of linguistic reform aimed at creating a new language (yeni lisan) free 
from Arabic and Persian grammatical elements and redundant lexical borrowings (Heyd 
1954).  Thus, as with alphabet, debate about language reform preceded by many years the 
birth of the Turkish Republic and the establishment almost a decade later of the 
organization tasked with carrying out reform of the Turkish language.  Numerous 
histories of the Turkish language reform offer in-depth treatment of these early discourses 
(Lewis 1999, Heyd 1954, Baydur 1952), but for present purposes, it will suffice to note 
the rough dimensions of debate as they informed republican-era language reform efforts.   
 314 
On the one side were those who condemned language reform in much the same 
terms as earlier critics denounced alphabet reform, fearing that it would render the Koran 
and other Islamic works less accessible, thereby divorcing Turkish society from the 
Islamic world.  These detractors were joined by those loathe to eliminate the Arabic and 
Persian elements from the Ottoman language out of concern that it would reduce the 
language to the barbarity of other Turkic languages84 and eliminate the higher social 
status afforded Ottoman speakers over the common Turkish folk (Lewis 1999).  On the 
other side were those who supported reforming the language but were divided in their 
opinions as to method.  This latter group was divided into three separate factions each 
with divergent aims:  (1) the simplifiers (sadeleştirmeciler), who aimed to replace foreign 
loanwords with Turkish equivalents; (2) the turkicizers (türkçeciler), who favored 
retaining popularly assimilated Arabic and Persian borrowings while creating Turkish 
neologisms from Turkish suffixes to replace unassimilated loanwords; and (3) the 
purifiers (tasfiyeciler), who advocated adopting words and suffixes from other Turkic 
dialects and inventing neologisms where necessary (Lewis 1999).  The fundamental 
difference between these three factions thus lay in divergent notions of what constituted 
legitimate native sources for enriching the language once it had been purged of 
unacceptable foreign loanwords, and the struggle between them was a contest over the 
authority not only to make determinations about language purity (Schiffman 1999), but 
also to thereby define the nature of essential “self” and foreign “other” and, in so doing, 
                                               
84 Note here that contrasting assessments of the Turkic languages as “barbarous” or the 
essence of “purity” from the early twentieth century are echoed in contemporary 
assessments, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
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shape, through linguistic affiliation and differentiation, the national character of the 
Turkish republic and its relations to other nations.   
In 1932, when Ataturk founded the Türk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti (Turkish Society for 
the Study of Language), which later became the Türk Dil Kurumu (Turkish Language 
Society), the purifiers prevailed to the enduring detriment, in most contemporary 
scholars’ view, of the overall language reform effort.85  With the full authority of the 
TDK, the purifiers, who, in keeping with their commitment to language purity, had 
dropped their Arabic moniker (tasfiyeciler) in favor of the Turkish özleştirmeciler, soon 
set about purging foreign loanwords and creating öztürkçe (pure Turkish) alternatives.  
The problem was, as many critics charged at the time, the work was far from scientific 
and the results far from “pure.”  Many Arabic and Persian loanwords that were well 
assimilated at all strata of Turkish society were eliminated despite a failure to coin 
acceptable substitutes, while others were replaced with alternatives often created on the 
basis of spurious linguistic principles (Hony 1947).  Thus, for example, a romantic 
preoccupation with the “purity” of the Turkic languages of Central Asia, led the purifiers 
to adopt Turkic roots or suffixes that were then paired with Arabic suffixes and roots, 
resulting in hybrid forms that clearly stretched the definition of purity.   
Such policies invited critique, even ridicule, for their lack of scientific rigor, for 
the oddly-contrived constructions produced, and for being politically motivated.  
Opponents protested that the TDK was degrading the expressiveness of the language by 
                                               
85 Even contemporary purists who agree with the linguistic ideology of their 
predecessors, have critiqued them for their methods which, by so discrediting the TDK, 
has made the job of subsequent purist reformers all the more difficult. 
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removing loanwords without providing substitutes and offering a single neologism to 
stand in the place of the full range of nuance expressed by multiple borrowings, all under 
the guise of eliminating “redundancy” (Hony 1947).  Nonetheless, it should be noted, that 
many of the neologisms created by the TDK and funneled into the schools were widely 
adopted and have successfully supplanted their foreign counterparts in contemporary 
Turkish.  By the 1940s, however, criticism of the TDK’s reform efforts had become so 
vociferous that the society made some effort to assuage opponents of purging commonly-
used Arabic and Persian borrowings by suggesting that those which conformed to 
Turkish linguistic rules might be retained.  By that time, however, much of the damage 
had been done.  At the same time, the Turkish language was coming under increasing 
pressure from new borrowings from a different source--the West.  Much as close 
relations with Islamic culture had spawned the adoption of Arabic and Persian loanwords, 
increasing contact with Western civilization had introduced a panoply of borrowings 
from Western languages, particularly in the realm of technical terms.  With the 
introduction of Western loanwords, the already extant divide in the linguistic marketplace 
between those who embraced and those who eschewed foreign loanwords was to become 
even more complicated, as it added another layer of foreign lexical resources with 
entirely different indexical meaning. 
While initial efforts were made to turkicize these new loanwords, by 1949 the 
TDK had recognized the futility of staunching the influx of international borrowings and, 
seeking simply to control it, begrudgingly set forth parameters for admitting technical 
loanwords, declaring: “Foreign-language scientific and technical terms used in common 
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by the advanced nations may be taken into our language in accordance with a specific 
method which will be studied and accepted” (as quoted in Lewis 1999:154).  This 
pragmatic adjustment to allow for foreign scientific terms--a not uncommon domain for 
slippage toward lexical internationalization in purity movements throughout the world 
(Fishman 2006)--once again redefined the parameters of Turkish linguistic purity along 
the sliding scale toward vernacularity, although it is important to note that among its 
advocates, the ideology of purism remained unchanged.  Here, then, we see the greater 
importance of attitude over practice (Annamalai 1979) in the persistence of purist 
ideology.  Nonetheless, such concessions proved too little too late for opponents to 
purism and the fortunes of the TDK took a dramatic downturn soon thereafter.  
Accusations that the TDK was forwarding political rather than scientific aims reached a 
fevered pitch, and as political power shifted hands in elections and coups, leading to 
reversals and restorations of its policies in subsequent decades, the power of the TDK 
waned.  Although reconstituted under the Atatürk Kültür, Dil, ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu 
(Ataturk High Commission on Culture, Language, and History) by a 1983 law, the TDK 
has never fully regained its former strength and influence.   
 
SOCIOLINGUISTIC PRACTICE AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY 
As a direct result of Turkey’s checkered history of linguistic reform, the 
politicization of linguistic policies has long been echoed in the linguistic practices of 
individual speakers.  Paradoxically, in the name of purifying the language by replacing 
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foreign loanwords with Turkish neologisms, reformers ultimately supplied Turkish 
speakers with lexical variants possessing innate sociopolitical associations that stood in 
stark contrast to those of preexisting alternatives, hence allowing these synonyms to be 
coopted by opposing groups as a symbolic resource in the struggle over identity politics.  
Linguistic choice thus became a deliberate act of personal identity and even 
political affiliation--use of Ottomanisms being seen as a mark of conservatism/ 
reactionaryism, while use of öztürkçe neologisms were viewed as a mark of 
progressivism/ reformism.  During my years conducting fieldwork in Turkey, I 
personally was confronted by the enduring politics of linguistic choice.  Speaking 
Turkish well but lacking the full expressive range of a native speaker, I tended to 
inadvertently privilege one of several synonyms with which I was familiar, often solely 
on the basis of having learned it first and hence ingrained it more deeply.  There were, 
however, not infrequent occasions when this entirely unintentional preference stood me 
in poor stead until I came to understand that the respective lexicons of the young 
nationalists I worked with and my liberal academic colleagues were quite divergent, and 
my use of, for example, millet versus ulus (both meaning “nation”) provided immediate 
cause for suspecting my political allegiance.  Lamenting this state of affairs in the 
introduction to his 1981 memoirs, diplomat Zeki Kuneralp wrote:   
 
[L]anguage has no party or religion.  Revolutionaries and conservatives may use 
the same language….  Language is a means, not an end; it does not take sides.  
We generally fail to realize this.  For example, if we are fanatical partisans of pure 
Turkish, when we cannot find a pure Turkish word to express the meaning we 
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want, we load that meaning on to some other word and, for the sake of our socio-
political beliefs, cast aside the Arabic, Persian, or Western word that perfectly 
meets our needs.  In this way, we impoverish our language, we obliterate its 
nuances, we deprive it of clarity and thrust it into a tasteless form (as quoted and 
translated in Lewis 1999:152).   
 
The process by which sociopolitical meaning is conferred on linguistic variants is 
further illustrated in the case of a highly-regarded U.S.-based Turkish writer and 
translator who writes in English.  After being contracted by a Turkish publishing house to 
translate her own work into Turkish and submitting the completed manuscript, she 
received a letter from the publisher declining to publish it out of concern that, despite the 
progressive nature of the story which had first attracted their attention, her older lexical 
choices, which eschewed Turkish neologisms in favor of a more nuanced Ottoman 
vocabulary, might come across not simply as old-fashioned, but as politically reactionary, 
even fundamentalist, and the book would hence fail to attract the proper readership.  For 
this writer, who had lived in the U.S. since the 1950s and was therefore absent from 
Turkey during much of the linguistic controversies of the intervening decades, employing 
the nuanced language of her youth in her translation was an aesthetic not a political 
choice, but it was nonetheless interpreted as the latter by her would-be publisher.86   
An additional consequence of the politicization of linguistic choice has been the 
accelerated pace with which Western loanwords have been adopted into Turkish, joining 
the panoply of “Turkish” choices as resources for marking personal identity and status.  
Given the extent to which lexical choice was imbued with political meaning, one option 
                                               
86 Personal interview with the writer December 2002.   
 320 
for avoiding censure was to seek out political neutrality in foreign loanwords.  However, 
as Western borrowings were eagerly adopted not simply to replace Arabic/Persian 
loanwords and Turkish neologisms or to express new concepts, but rather to substitute for 
standard Turkish equivalents, they lost what neutrality they may have once possessed and 
became status and identity markers indicative of a modern, Westernized, educated, and, 
most importantly, politically progressive outlook.  Successive waves of loanwords 
furthermore resulted in an apparent hierarchy related to the international standing of the 
language from which they were borrowed--a phenomenon that Cevdet Kudret addresses 
in a 1966 book entitled There are Languages not Resembling Ours.  Noting the 
substitution of French not just for Arabic but also Greek and Italian loanwords, he writes:   
 
Nor did it stop there; we have changed European words that entered earlier also, 
taking other European words to replace them.  Now we say müzik instead of 
musiki, restoran instead of lokanta, ajans instead of acente, fuar instead of 
panayır…If you look into it you will see that the Turkish word aşevi is used of the 
commonest and cheapest eating houses.  As lokanta began to spread gradually 
among the populace too, the top stratum sought for themselves yet another way of 
saying it and found restoran.  Aşevi is the eating place of the populace, lokanta of 
the middle class, restoran of the upper class.  Thus the further we distance 
ourselves from the populace, the further our language departs from Turkish.  The 
more we adopt European language, the more refined we think we are becoming.  
In that connection: the populace goes to the ayakyolu and the apteşhane, and the 
middle class goes to the helâ, whereas we educated folk go to the tuvalet; 
moreover the WC has recently turned up, and now and again we go there as well 
(Kudret 1966:74-5, as quoted and translated in Lewis 1999:134). 
 
In response to such trends, the Turkish Language Society embarked on a 
campaign in the 1970s designed to “rescue” and “restore” the Turkish language by 
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developing and publicizing Turkish language equivalents for Western loanwords 
(yabancı kelimelere karşılıklar).  Rampant criticism of the Society’s role in weakening 
the Turkish language with its earlier, oft misguided, program to purify the language 
through the substitution of Turkish neologisms for Arabic and Persian borrowings had, 
however, compromised its credibility, and its efforts to counter foreign language 
influence from the West thus met with little success.  As a result, the influence of 
Western languages, particularly English as it overtook French as the global lingua franca, 
was to become ever more pronounced in subsequent decades.   
The progressive deepening of this trend was particularly evident in the linguistic 
practices of Westernized, politically progressive, urban Turks, many of whom had been 
educated overseas or graduated from English-language schools and universities in 
Turkey.  By the mid 1990s, during my first fieldwork trips to Turkey, my academic 
colleagues at the Middle East Technical University (Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi) and 
Bosphorous University (Boğaziçi Üniversitesi)--two of Turkey’s oldest and most 
respected English-language universities--routinely peppered their speech with English 
borrowings (e.g., “OK, hadi bye-bye,” in place of the standard “Tamam, hadi 
görüşürüz”) and attached Turkish suffixes to English words (e.g., “okeylemek” for “to 
okay”) or created English-Turkish compounds (e.g., “aprüv etmek” for “to approve”) in a 
hybridized discursive style they laughingly dubbed “Turklish.”  Despite ironically 
chiding themselves when confronted with my native English/non-native Turkish 
speaker’s studied avoidance of such constructions, it was nonetheless clear that they in 
fact embraced this obvious indication of their facility in English and conversance with 
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Western scholarly traditions.  Here, Fishman’s description of vernacularity as the casual 
or informal style of speakers who “place much higher value on folksiness and trendiness 
than on formality and purity” (2006:34) seems to fit perfectly.   
While for such speakers the deliberate and frequent use of English loanwords had 
become a normalized practice, others were not so sanguine about the effects of English 
on their speech patterns and inveighed at length against the use of English as the 
language of instruction at the top-notch public and private universities in Turkey where 
they studied.  Among this second group, my studied avoidance of English loanwords and 
hybridized “Turklish” expressions was better appreciated, as it mirrored their own 
linguistic practices.  Their careful adherence to the principles of linguistic purity when 
speaking their native language was also mirrored in their metalinguistic discourse.  
Arguing that learning in a non-native language placed an unnecessary burden on students 
and compromised the quality of education by preventing both teachers and students from 
being able to fully express themselves as they could in Turkish, these disgruntled students 
located their concerns within a larger ideological discourse of post-colonial theory by 
suggesting that the inability to fully articulate and develop ideas, in turn, hindered the 
development of scientific research and other academic endeavors in Turkey, consigning 
Turkish scholars to forever playing second fiddle in the global market of ideas.   
Renowned poet and writer Bülent Yavuz Bakiler expresses a similar perspective 
on the use of foreign languages as the language of instruction in Turkish high schools and 
universities in an interview entitled “Our Alphabet Between Two Q’s” published in Yeni 
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Şafak newspaper on 25 November 2001.  Under the subsection entitled “National 
Education Makes Us ‘Deficient,’” the article reads:   
 
Ana okullardan üniversitelere kadar 
yayilan yabanci dille egitimin Türk 
aydinlarini Ingilizler gibi 
düsünmeye ittigini ifade eden 
Bakiler, “Türkiye'yi bunlar yakinda 
bir sömürge devleti haline getirmek 
istiyorlar” dedi.  […] 
“Edebiyatimizin ve ilim dilimizin 
batidan geride olmasinin nedeni 
Türkçe'deki tasfiye harekatidir.  
ABD'de ve Ingiltere'de ilk 
egitimden geçen çocuklarin 
kitaplarindaki kelime sayisi 71 bin 
iken, Türkiye'de ise bu sayi sadece 
7 bindir. Sonuçta müthis bir gerilik 
çikiyor.” 
Bakiler, who states that education 
in foreign languages which is 
spreading from primary schools to 
universities is pushing Turkish 
intellectuals toward thinking like 
Englishmen, said:  “They want to 
bring Turkey in the near term to the 
state of being a colony state.”  […]  
The reason for our literature and our 
science being behind western 
languages is the maneuver toward 
the purification of Turkish.  If there 
are 71 thousand total words in the 
books of children passing from 
primary education in England and 
the USA, in Turkey this count is 
only 7 thousand.  As a result, a 
terrible backwardness emerges. 
 
Such arguments in turn resonate with justifications given by the TDK for their 
initial efforts in the early 1940s to stem the tide of foreign scientific terminology into 
Turkish, before ultimately conceding the point on pragmatic grounds, as summed up in 
the following declaration:  “Indeed it is our belief that scientific terms become our own in 
so far as they are based on the pure language.  So long as they remain foreign, science in 
Turkey cannot escape being on loan from other people” (as quoted in Lewis 1999:153).  
Expressed in idioms of cultural imperialism and anti-Westernism, these interrelated 
anxieties of linguistic purists over the effects on independent, creative thought of 
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instruction in foreign languages or use of foreign scientific terms tie foreign language 
influence to broader political concerns over Turkey’s increasing integration with the 
West and the hegemonic pressures inherent to globalization in the post-Cold War era.   
Such divergent attitudes toward foreign language influence in Turkey--
enthusiastic acceptance on the one hand and bitter rejection on the other--represent the 
ideological extremes of purism and vernacularity held respectively by conservative and 
progressive factions within the Turkish elite, and thus the country’s fractured linguistic 
marketplace.  Much to the consternation of linguistic conservatives, however, the 
influence of foreign languages, particularly English, has grown beyond the progressive 
elite, making rapid inroads among those who seek to emulate them as well as within the 
general population, which remains largely unaware of and unconcerned by the foreign 
origin of new words and hence views them neither as status markers indexing a 
familiarity with Western culture nor as harbingers of Western imperialism.  This state of 
affairs was driven home to me one day in an interaction at the grocery store near my 
home in Ankara.  While picking up some shampoo, I was flagged down by a fellow 
shopper, a middle-aged Turkish woman in conservative dress, who, clearly having 
mistaken me for a Turk, asked me if I knew where to find badivaş.  Not recognizing what 
I assumed to be an unfamiliar Turkish word, I asked her to repeat it, which she did 
accompanied by a slight gesture of rubbing her forearm.  “Badivaş,” it suddenly struck 
me, might be “body wash,” but still unsure that I had interpreted her correctly, I asked 
“Vücüt şampuanı mı arıyorsunuz?” (“Is it body shampoo you’re looking for?” “Hayır, 
badivaş. Badivaş,” she replied (“No, ‘badivash.’ ‘Badivash’”).  Now questioning my 
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interpretation, but unable to think of any alternative, I asked: “Nerede kullanıyorsunuz? 
Banyo için mi?” (“Where do you use it? Is it for the shower?) in an inelegant effort to 
determine the use of the product she was seeking. “Evet,” (“Yes”) she replied. “OK, body 
wash,” I said. “Evet, badivaş,” (“Yes, ‘badivash’”) she replied.  I duly scanned the 
shelves, located the body wash, labeled “vücüt şampuanı” in Turkish, and pointed it out 
to her. “Vücüt şampuanı, bu,” (“This is body shampoo”) she said, clearly disappointed.  
“Evet, aynı şey,” I replied, “badivaş, vücüt şampuanının İngilizcesi” (“Yes, it’s the same 
thing; body wash is the English for body shampoo). “Hahhhh,” she said, thanked me 
profusely, grabbed the body wash, and proceeded to the check-out line, leaving me to 
consider that not only did she identify the product she was seeking by its English, rather 
than Turkish, name, but that she seemed to have no idea that “badivaş” was not a Turkish 
neologism, and hence did not recognize “vücüt şampuanı”87 as the Turkish equivalent.   
This increasingly widespread unwitting, and hence unmarked, use of English 
loanwords within the general populace is of obvious concern to those who take the 
conservative position of condemning foreign language influence, who in an appeal to 
Turkish patriotism, have oft beseeched their progressive foes, seen as sanguine about or 
indifferent to the issue, to support efforts to defend the Turkish language from mounting 
incursions by Western loanwords.  Thus, for example, in a 1992 academic panel 
celebrating the 60th anniversary of the Turkish language reform, advocates of linguistic 
purism addressed the “danger from the West” (“Batı’dan gelen tehlike”) posed by foreign 
                                               
87 Of course it should be noted that the compound construction “vücüt şampuanı” is also 
composed of two loanwords: vücüt, from the Arabic, and şampuan, turkified from the 
English “shampoo.”   
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language influence and stressed the need for intellectuals to transcend the traditional 
“progressive-reactionary divide” (“ilerici-gerici ayrımı”) and unite in fighting the 
“assault” (“saldırı”) of Turkish by Western languages.88  Their appeal appears to have 
gone unheeded, however, and the influx of foreign loanwords continues apace. 
 
PURITY AND POLLUTION: LINGUISTIC LIBERALISM AND THE PURIST RESPONSE 
In contrast to the widespread propensity among human societies to reject 
linguistic borrowing,89 Turkish society has been relatively open to foreign language 
influence--its citizens easily, often eagerly, adopting foreign loanwords, though 
individual speakers may eschew them.  This openness to linguistic pluralism can perhaps 
be explained, at least in part, by a receptiveness to change engendered through a long 
linguistic history characterized by the rampant adoption of Arabic and Persian loanwords 
during the Ottoman era and by subsequent republican-era linguistic reforms that 
introduced TDK-fabricated neologisms to replace them.  Paradoxically, then, although 
linguistic pluralism is clearly a long-standing trend within Turkish society, the 
unintended impact of a legacy of linguistic reform that sought to return the language to a 
pure, and therefore largely static, state was to reinforce vernacularity or “linguistic 
                                               
88 An account (synopsis) of the conference that appeared in the 29 September 1992 issue 
of Cumhuriyet newspaper reported that panel participants “stressed the need for all 
intellectuals to work together against the invasion of Western languages without regard 
for the progressive-reactionary division” (“Batı dillerinin istilasına karşı ilerici-gerici 
ayrımı yapılmadan tüm aydınların birlikte çalışması gerektiğini vurguladılar”).   
89 Sherzer (1976) and others have labeled this propensity “linguistic conservatism.” 
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liberalism” by effectively eradicating any lingering sense among the general populace 
that language was fixed and inviolate. 
Furthermore, since notions of linguistic purity inevitably hearken back to the 
simulacra of a largely static primordial Turkish language (the öz in öztürkçe having the 
same connotation as the ur in Ursprache), linguistic policies pursued by the state aimed 
at purifying (özleştirmek) the language and freeing it from foreign influence have, in the 
process, eliminated much of its lexical range and expressiveness, requiring speakers seek 
it out from other sources (Gün 1986).  As a result, the existence of significant resistance 
to top-down language management among the progressive intellectual elite as well as 
within popular culture is not surprising.  Thus, while state-sponsored linguistic reformers 
sought to eliminate diglossia by replacing the “high” variant (Ottoman) with the “low” 
variant (the Turkish of the “folk,” known to the Ottomans as kaba Türkçe), progressive 
elite speakers, in an attempt to satisfy the urge both for linguistic expressiveness and 
social indexing through language, have reintroduced an unusual form of “vernacular” 
diglossia by creating an informal “high” variant of standard Turkish out of plundered 
foreign loanwords.   
In response to such trends, the reconstituted Turkish Language Society revived its 
efforts in 1994 to reverse the influx of Western loanwords by establishing a commission 
to discuss and select Turkish language equivalents from a list of proposed alternatives 
and to publicize the results.  Each month, a list of these agreed-upon equivalents were 
included in the TDK’s monthly language and literature journal, Türk Dili (Turkish 
Language), and in 1995, a compendium was published under the title Yabancı Kelimelere 
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Karşılıklar (Foreign Word Equivalents) (Lewis 1999).  This new initiative was launched 
with an announcement in the journal Türk Dili, which mixed epidemiological and 
dramaturgical idioms to describe how foreign loanwords were like a contagion 
“infecting” (sirayet etmek) the Turkish language at such a rate that “not a day passes 
without some new Western word… making a spectacle of itself” ([g]ün geçmiyor ki 
batının yeni bir kelimesi …arziendam etmesin) (Türk Dili 507:218-221).  Here, the 
metaphorical “profession” Thomas (1991) describes of the purist as “physican,” 
eliminating the contagion that, not content with afflicting a single once-healthy host, 
seeks to progressively ravage others until felling the entire community, is recalled.  The 
“slippery slope” fallacy of a single new Western loanword bringing down the entire 
Turkish nation is palpably manifest.   
Furthermore, the choice of the archaic Persian loanword construction, arziendam 
etmek, in place of the modern Turkish, boy göstermek, in the announcement seems 
designed to unequivocally demonstrate that the TDK has abandoned its much-condemned 
efforts to eliminate Arabic and Persian borrowings, and is instead embracing their 
expressiveness, thereby divorcing its current battle against the incursion of Western 
loanwords from its controversial earlier policies.  In this sense, the wording of the 
announcement cleverly implies a dichotomy in which Arabic and Persian linguistic 
influence, in contrast to that from Western languages, is recast as acceptable.  This, in 
turn, is reflective of a new approach to linguistic purism, often articulated to me by 
linguistic conservatives, that reevaluates well-integrated Arabic and Persian borrowings 
on that basis that the Islamic culture of their speakers renders them more “organic” to the 
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Turkish language than Western loanwords.  This revised ideology of linguistic purism--in 
which elements of vernacularity are tolerated, even embraced, as long as they fall into an 
acceptable range, as defined by contemporary sociopolitical considerations, within the 
sliding scale between strict purism and unabashed vernacularity--is thus characteristic of 
Woolard and Schieffelin’s description of purism as seeking to “close off non-native 
sources of innovation, but usually selectively, targeting only languages construed as 
threats” (1994:64).   
That the TDK has adopted a new orientation toward linguistic purification and 
turkification is likewise manifest in the lists of foreign loanword equivalents prepared by 
the institution in which numerous Arabic and Persian borrowings into Ottoman are 
offered as acceptable “Turkish” substitutions for Western loanwords, as well as in my 
own observations of the use of such earlier borrowings in the speech of top TDK officials 
I interviewed and whose public lectures I attended.  Such reimagination of linguistic 
affinity reflects a larger sociopolitical shift in which developments on the linguistic front 
echo a new nationalist focus among cultural conservatives on the Ottomans’ success in 
assimilating the linguistic and cultural diversity of the multiethnic empire, which is 
nonetheless laced with an underlying concern over the current threat of Turkey’s own 
assimilation by the West.   
In addition to recommending foreign loanword equivalents, both calques and 
neologisms, the TDK also takes pains to model them in its publications and on its 
website, thereby educating the populace in their use.  For example, in an article posted on 
the society’s website which describes the advent of the internet and its current use in 
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Turkey, head of the TDK, Şükrü Halûk Akalın, introduces a number of newly-minted 
equivalents for foreign internet-related terms by using them in the text of the article 
followed by the English loanword they replace in parentheses, to wit: ağ (web), sanal 
(virtual), çevirge (modem), sunucu (server), e-posta (elektronik posta, e-mail), ağ 
kümeleri (web sites), Dosya Aktarım Protokolü (FTP - File Transfer Protocol), Evrensel 
Kaynak Belirleyicileri (URL - Universal Resource Locators), and İletim Denetleme 
Protokolü/İnternet Protokolü (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol, or 
TCP/IP).90  These neologisms have, however, met with mixed success in replacing their 
English equivalents, tending to be adopted exclusively by supporters of the TDK and 
partisans of linguistic purism.   
Furthermore, in 1997, the Turkish Language Society took steps to bring its 
campaign against Western loanwords to a broader audience, producing a poster for 
distribution to schools throughout the country which depicted a crowded city street lined 
by small businesses, each of which was advertised in a foreign language, overwhelmingly 
English: Chicken House, Photo Color, Real Estate Center, La Famme Boutique, and 
simply Hotel.  Is this Turkey? (“Burası Türkiye mi?”), the poster asks.91  Two years later, 
when I arrived at the Turkish Language Society for my first interview with its director, 
the 1997 poster was still displayed inside the glass fronted placard by the street on the 
walkway to the building’s entrance--the sole remnant of and sad testament to an 
                                               
90 See the following webpage on the Türk Dil Kurumu’s website: http://www.tdk. 
gov.tr/TR/Genel/BelgeGoster.aspx?F6E10F8892433CFFAAF6AA849816B2EF7046799
E749A6E99, last accessed August 2, 2011.   
91 See also Lewis' description of the same poster (1999:134).   
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apparently abrogated effort--yet I was unable to obtain a satisfactory answer for why the 
effort had not been further pursued.   
 
 
Figure 5.2  “Is this Turkey?” poster prepared by the Turkish Language Society92 
 
From a political economy of language perspective, it is important to note that 
insofar as the TDK found it necessary to place posters in the schools in an effort to 
promulgate its policies where, in earlier decades, the direct influence its policies had on 
scholastic curriculum via the Ministry of Education would have sufficed, educational 
                                               
92 Please see: http://www.yorumla.net/gereksiz-mesajlar/212559-burasi-turkiye-mi.html, 
last accessed August 2, 2011.   
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institutions in Turkey can no longer be said to serve as handmaidens to state-sponsored 
linguistic policy.93  Indeed, there have been several indications that the TDK’s decline 
had prompted the Ministry of Education to chart its own course with regard to linguistic 
matters, not the least of which was its presumptive decision to host the First Turkish 
Language Congress of 1990 in lieu of the TDK (c.f., chapter two).  More importantly, 
however, it is in the TDK’s clever attempt to capture the attention of Turkish 
schoolchildren outside the stodgy bounds of standard curriculum that it is possible to 
ideate the influence of the technologically-interlinked global nature of the present 
moment where resources on linguistic and orthographic practice that are not under the 
control of the state (e.g., internet forums, blogs, satellite television, etc.) compete with 
official policies promulgated through the state-approved program of study.   
By demonstrating the ways in which the politics of sociopolitical identity 
influence linguistic choice, as manifest in linguistic practice, the history of linguistic 
wrangling presented thus far offers a more nuanced understanding of the complexities of 
the Turkish linguistic marketplace in which the symbolic power of linguistic variants is 
not based solely on state sanctioning, as Bourdieu (1991) suggests.  Were this the case all 
foreign words would be subject to elimination or turkification.  In contrast, it would seem 
that there exists a rich and long-standing tradition in Turkey whereby linguistic capital 
                                               
93 It is important to note that although a quasi-state institution and the officially 
designated authority on issues pertaining to the Turkish language, the Türk Dil Kurumu, 
unlike the L'Académie française, does not at present have the power to enforce its 
policies.  That said, a bill under current consideration by the Grand National Assembly of 
Turkey would grant the TDK, along with the Ministries of Education and Culture, the 
legal right to require that foreign words appearing in advertisements and the media be 
accompanied by their Turkish equivalent.   
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may also be accrued through deliberate resistance to or studied disregard for the state 
sanctioned variant, granting oppositional and/or popular linguistic practices, generally 
initiated by social progressives and adopted by the public, either deliberately as a 
sociopolitical status marker or entirely unwittingly, the opportunity to gain traction 
among the general populace and ultimately influence linguistic policy even as they are 
themselves influenced, by virtue of their resistance to the norm, by the policies of state 
apparati and social institutions entrusted with governing language and delimiting the 
range of available linguistic choice.  In that popular usage, by its very nature, is not static, 
however, state policies designed to circumvent the spread of oppositional linguistic must 
also remain responsive and nimble, resulting in a dynamic tension between policy and 
practice, purism and vernacularity, that curiously benefits the vitality of both, even as it 
deepens the conservative-progressive political divide within contemporary Turkish 
society and their struggle for control over the Turkish language.  Let us now turn, then, to 
an examination of the ways in which the symbiosis between linguistic policy and 
linguistic practice, played out through the opposing politics of purism and vernacularity, 
has likewise influenced the political economy of orthography in Turkey.   
 
ORTHOGRAPHIC INNOVATION AND IDENTITY POLITICS 
Returning to orthography, it should first be noted that although the Turkish 
alphabet has remained unchanged since its adoption in 1928, except for the elimination 
and subsequent introduction of diacriticals associated with Arabic loanwords, it has not 
 334 
been unaffected by progressive cycles of language reform or successive waves of foreign 
language influence.  Over the decades, pronounced shifts in usage conventions have 
emerged in response to these pressures.  Western loanwords adopted into the language, 
for example, were initially spelled on the basis of pronunciation in the language of origin 
and in accordance with Turkish orthographic conventions, using the Turkish letter or 
letter combination associated with the equivalent or closest sound (e.g., quk, xks, wv, 
phf, tzs, ioyo, ch ç, shş).  Note the following examples: 
 
boutique butik economy ekonomi 
hotel otel telephone telefon 
photograph fotograf television televizyon 
taxi taksi gendarme jandarma 
wagon vagon show şov 
waltz vals jazz caz 
fax faks gymnastics jimnastik 
nutrition nütrisyon operation operasyon 
Churchill Çörçil Shànghǎi Şanghay 
station istasyon  (note that st cannot occur in Turkish unless separated 
by a syllable boundary, hence the epenthesis of initial i) 
 
A careful examination of many of the Turkish spellings of these loanwords 
reveals their origin as French, as is particularly evident in the use of –yon for the suffix –
ion in nutrition and operation and the absence of initial h in hotel--three words with 
identical spelling but divergent pronunciation in English and French.  However, as 
English surpassed French as the primary source of foreign loanwords and American 
cultural influence overtook French cultural hegemony in Turkey, popular spelling 
conventions sometimes changed to reflect an Anglicized pronunciation--e.g., nütrisyon 
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becoming nütrişın and operasyon becoming opereyşın (Lewis 1999)--although the 
original spelling is still the version found in dictionaries.94  Deliberate shifts in 
orthographic practice of this sort suggest that like native writers of British Creole, who 
enact a sociopolitical sensibility distinct from mainstream British culture through non-
conventional orthographic practices (Sebba 1998) or Corsican villagers approving road 
signs or participating in spelling contests, who paradoxically enact a “pure” Corsican 
identity distinct from the formal domains of French linguistic hegemony by resisting 
Corsican language activists’ efforts to corsicanize French spellings and standardize 
Corsican spellings (Jaffe 1999a), Turkish progressive elites have deliberately chosen to 
effectuate a sociopolitical identity that marks them as conversant with Western traditions. 
Although to the elite, sociopolitically progressive Turkish speaker, well-versed in 
foreign languages and cognizant of differences in pronunciation of the same word in 
French and English, the shift from operasyon to opereyşın may have been meaningful, 
offering further nuance to linguistic acts of identity aimed at like-minded compatriots, to 
the average Turkish speaker, both spellings rendered the loanword equally 
indistinguishable as foreign as they both complied with Turkish orthographic rules.  It is 
therefore not surprising to note the emergence of a recent propensity toward using the 
original rather than the turkicized spelling of foreign loanwords--e.g., boutique in place 
of butik and photo in place of foto--as captured in the TDK poster described above.  This, 
in turn, has resulted in the use of foreign loanletters (q, w, and x) or combinations of 
                                               
94 Although operasyon is commonly used for “operation,” most Turks use gıda or 
beslenme for “nutrition.”  The deliberate use of nütrisyon as a foreign word in turkified 
spelling is thus already marked.  
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letters (i.e., ou, ea, io, ue, ch, ck, ph) that do not conform to Turkish morphological 
and/or orthographic rules.  Such practices represent an interesting reversal of the usual 
dynamics in the struggle over linguistic purism, in which it is generally to the advantage 
of purists to ensure that foreignisms are clearly marked as foreign in order to better 
facilitate their removal from the language.  As Fishman notes: 
 
Of course for purity to be attainable at all, the ‘opponent(s)’ must be made 
palpably recognizable and, indeed even easily detectable.  Such recognizability 
must not be limited only to the recondite circles of linguists, language activists, or 
language planners more specifically, but must be made palpably clear and 
instantly recognizable, to the public of native speakers at large, rather than just to 
the educated elites, so that ordinary folk too can join in the hunt for ‘foreignisms’ 
that need to be exposed and guarded against (2006:25-6).   
 
By contrast, in long-standing struggles over language, identity politics, and 
national sociopolitical orientation in Turkey that have recently coalesced around the 
opposing ideological poles of orthographic purity versus vernacularity, it is the 
practitioners of vernacularity that seek to enhance the recognizability of foreign 
loanwords through the use of foreign letters or letter combinations based on the 
assumption that such terms are best able to act as symbolic resources in identity politics 
when explicitly recognizable as foreign.  The decision among progressive elites to mark 
their use of foreign loanwords orthographically not only enhances their symbolic value 
among like-minded compatriots, however, but also has broader social implications in 
terms of hastening their spread to the unwitting populace, where foreign products are 
often imbued with a mystique or aura of “superiority.”   
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Thus, returning for a moment to the vignette of the woman searching for body 
wash, I would suggest that were the advertising decision made, as is often the case, to use 
the English loanword in the packaging of the product instead of the calque “vücüt 
şampuanı” (calques, despite violating strict purity rules, being the preferred solution of 
purists to the conundrum of loanwords), spelling “body wash” in accordance with 
Turkish pronunciation and orthographic conventions, as badivaş, might render it easier to 
locate on the shelf, but would not serve the presumed advertising purpose of marking it as 
foreign, and hence indexing it as “superior” or “desirable,” in the way that spelling it as 
body wash would, for as noted above, the average Turk, possessing little to no knowledge 
of English, would be unaware that badivaş was not a Turkish neologism and therefore 
fail to understand the intended indexical meaning.  By contrast, the y and sh, which 
violate Turkish orthographic rules, and the w, which is notably absent from the Turkish 
alphabet, of body wash would render the product instantly recognizable as foreign and 
thus index its putative superiority. 
As a result, supporters of linguistic purism, resigned to, but far from sanguine 
about, the influx of foreign loanwords, seek to diminish their obvious “foreignness” and 
disguise them alongside fully assimilated loanwords of Arabic and Persian origin by 
spelling them in accordance with Turkish orthographic conventions, which, while it 
violates the strictest principles of linguistic purism, nonetheless serves the purists’ larger 
purpose of masking through orthographic turkification the degree to which Turkish is a 
highly “vernacular” language.  In this sense, by limiting the awareness of the foreign 
origin of the loanword by the average Turkish citizen, linguistic conservatives hope not 
 338 
only to diminish the potency of and curtail the audience for the acts of identity entailed in 
the deliberate use of foreign loanwords on the part of their progressive counterparts, but 
also to reduce the adoption of such terms by those seeking to identify themselves with the 
progressive elite, who, in turn, serve as vectors for the unwitting adoption of loanwords 
among others in their socioeconomic class and, hence, speed the untrammeled spread of 
foreign influence within Turkish society.   
In this sense, such trends in orthographic usage clearly suggest that loanletters and 
proscribed letter combinations have been put to much the same use as the foreign 
loanwords Kudret (c.f., above) describes--i.e., as a marker of social status and a resources 
in identity politics.  This is further suggested in another, even more recent orthographic 
innovation.  As Turks with little or no facility in foreign languages have either naturally 
adopted the orthographic innovations that surround them or proactively taken up foreign 
dictionaries to determine foreign orthographic conventions in an effort to affect the social 
status indexed by such orthographic practices, orthographic innovation has been taken 
one step further.  With the widespread adoption of foreign loanwords, in their original 
rather than turkified spellings, those wishing to distinguish themselves by their education 
and command of foreign languages have turned to spelling native Turkish words 
according to foreign conventions, i.e., with loanletters and letter combinations.  This 
trend has resulted in Turkish words such as yemiş (fruit), Taksim (a district in Istanbul), 
and eskici (second-hand dealer) being spelled yemish, Taxim, and eskidji.  Eskidji is a 
particularly fascinating example, since its spelling conforms neither to Turkish nor to 
English orthographic rules, but instead employs a letter combination, dj, sometimes 
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employed in English, especially by Middle Eastern experts, to represent a phoneme (/dʒ/) 
in words borrowed from Arabic, as in hadj and djin (rendered as hac and cin in Turkish), 
and as such, appears to be a loan of a loan.   
The crossover of loanletters and letter combinations from foreign loanwords to 
native Turkish expressions indexes a creative understanding of foreign spelling 
conventions that cannot be feigned through reference to foreign dictionaries95 as it is 
rooted in an intimate familiarity with the phonological structure of foreign languages.  
Insofar as it is thus less cooptable by the general public, the use of foreign loanletters to 
spell Turkish words thus provides more a reliable index of the socioeconomic status of 
the user.  This innovation in orthographic practice thus represents a further step in the 
exploitation of the symbolic capacity of orthography for the purposes of identity politics.  
Moreover, since it is orthography that is the modality of linguistic turkification, the use of 
foreign loanletters to spell Turkish words indexes a reversal of, and hence explicit 
rejection of, linguistic purism.  And, since ideologies of linguistic purism reflect broader 
sociopolitical beliefs concerning the state of society and its relation to the outside world, 
such orthographic innovations constitute an expression of progressives’ unequivocal 
desire to disassociate themselves from their conservative counterparts and their 
commitment to purification through turkification, which, in turn, speaks to larger issues 
of national politics and foreign policy orientation.   
                                               
95 This has not stopped individuals with limited knowledge of foreign languages, but 
eager to cash in on the prestige associated with spelling Turkish words with foreign 
letters, from adopting this practice.  Comical misspellings (e.g., Taxsim and eskijdi) are 
frequently the result.  
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In this sense, I would suggest that such orthographic “acts of identity” among 
Turkish progressives are in keeping with the second half of Le Page and Tabouret-
Keller’s definition, whereby the individual patterns his linguistic behavior “so as to be 
unlike those from whom he wishes to be distinguished” rather than like those “with 
which from time to time he wishes to be identified” (1985:181).  More specifically, the 
linguistic “acts of identity” involved in the deliberate use of foreign loanletters act in the 
negative along the lines of what Jaffe (1999a) describes as the “logic of oppositional 
identity.”  In other words, the use of foreign loanletters and letter combinations does not 
so much index the desire of Turkish progressives to identify themselves with the people 
and culture of the language from which the letters originate, although that may be the 
case for any one individual user, as to position themselves in opposition to those 
conservative forces within Turkish society whose overriding interest in purifying the 
Turkish language of foreign influence, pursued largely through turkification of accepted 
loanwords, they perceive as paralleling foreign policy efforts to strengthen traditional 
Turkish culture through the pursuit of relations with the ex-Soviet Turkic peoples on the 
basis of perceived ethnolinguistic and sociocultural commonality.  In much the same way 
that social progressives dismiss such foreign policy initiatives as “pan-Turkism” and 
“racism,” condemning cultural conservatives for seeking to insulate the country from the 
“dangers” inherent to further integration with the international community and the “risks” 
born of participation in the global economy, they also deliberately engage in linguistic 
and orthographic practices that reflect their openness to foreign influence and their belief 
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in the advantages of geopolitical intercourse with global partners in a rapidly emerging 
new world order. 
As a result, the use of foreign loanletters to spell native Turkish words has been 
the cause of great consternation among purists.  As if it were not bad enough that 
progressives no longer abided by the turkification of foreign words, they had since turned 
to “foreignizing” Turkish words in what linguistic conservatives could only interpret as 
the foreign colonization of the language, or cast more broadly, as the linguistic 
colonization of the country itself by foreign forces.  The purists’ angst over the 
independent future of Turkey called into question by the emergent orthographic practices 
of Turkey’s progressive “fifth column” was recently captured in an award-winning 
cartoon by Atila Özer in which two characters dressed in professional garb survey a 
welter of overhead signs posted on tall buildings along an urban street in Turkey, much 
like the retouched photograph from the TDK’s Burası Türkiye mi? poster.  On the signs, 
several Turkish letters have been swapped for foreign letters or letter combinations: i for 
y, ş for sch or sh, ç for ch, and ks for x.  Thus, the word efendi is rendered efendy, paşa 
becomes pascha, çilek becomes chilek, Arkadaş kafe becomes Arkadash cafe, Taksim bar 
becomes Taxim bar, Dürüm’ün becomes Dürüm’s, and Sultan’ın becomes Sultan’s.  
“These don’t strike me as especially foreign, but?!” the two characters remark in unison.  
This dual assessment of the obvious pollution of the Turkish language represented by the 
signs suggests that foreign language influence has become so commonplace as to no 
longer be recognizable as foreign.  Moreover, the use of the English possessive ’s in 
place of the Turkish equivalent ’in, as well as the use of Turkish-English combinations in 
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Arkadash café and Taxim bar suggest the hybrid Ottoman constructions of decades past 
and the Turklish of recent years, symbolically linking three layers of linguistic pollution 




Figure 5.3  Award-winning caricature by Atila Özer96 
                                               
96 Please see: http://e-psikoloji.com/forum/gulmece-eglenmece-bolumu/3748-burasi-
turkiye-mi.html, last accessed August 2, 2011.   
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Turning to a deeper textual analysis of the cartoon, we find that its symbolic 
content is far more complex than initially meets the eye.  Thus, although we are presented 
with two men that appear nearly identical in terms of physical appearance, surveying the 
same urban landscape and arriving at the same conclusion, that is where the similarity 
ends.  Both figures appear to be dressed in professional attire, but upon closer inspection, 
the man on the left is wearing a business suit (takim elbise) and, more importantly, a tie.  
Although seemingly insignificant, these two elements mark the man on the left as being 
influenced by Western standards of decorum and places him in opposition to his 
doppelganger who is dressed in the fully-buttoned dress shirt and non-matching jacket 
and trousers that indexes the more traditional, conservative, and rural segments of 
Turkish society.  By extension, is it is no coincidence that the man with the tie faces to 
the left, i.e., westward on a compass, while his top-buttoned counterpart faces right 
towards the east, as that is where each looks for inspiration. 
The visual dialectic these two figures bring to the page is further evinced by the 
billboards on the two sides of the street.  On the left side we see efendy, Sultan’s, Taxim, 
and bar--each Turkish words of foreign origin (Greek, Arabic, Arabic, and English 
respectively).  On the right side of the street we have the words pascha, Dürüm’s, chilek, 
and Arkadash cafe, all of which are of Turkmen and Turkish origin (although the word 
café is French, it derives from kahve, the Turkish word for coffee).  Thus, on the 
“western” side of the street, we have Turkish words of foreign origin (Middle Eastern and 
Western), and on the “eastern” side, “native” words of Turkish and Turkic origin--the 
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latter being considered by linguistic conservatives to be the “essence” of the Turkish 
language and, hence, ideal of linguistic purism.  Also of interest is the convergence of the 
two rows of buildings, representing east and west, at the apex of urban Turkey--the road 
running down the middle bisecting these twin traditions while simultaneously forming a 
“bridge”97 between them.   
Of further importance in deconstructing the message conveyed by the two 
characters is the fact that each of the words, both left and right, east and west, are not 
simply “misspelled” but intentionally written with orthographic loanletters and 
possessive suffixes.  Although they appear peculiar, however, none of the words are so 
“foreign” as to be incomprehensible to a Turkish speaker with even a modicum of 
English.  That, indeed, appears to be the point, as the two men speak with one voice in 
commenting: “These don’t strike me as being particularly foreign, but…”  It is that final 
“but” (“ama”), however, that, to paraphrase Gregory Bateson (1972), is “the difference 
that makes a difference.”  Were it not for the inclusion of foreign letters, letter 
combinations, and grammatical elements, the signs would have been only mildly 
remarkable as foreign--the word “bar” alone would, perhaps, have given some pause.   
It is thus the violation of Turkish orthographic rules--this new front in linguistic 
innovation and identity politics--that “breaks the frame,” paving the way for the 
realization that many “Turkish” words which have been so fully assimilated into the 
language as to be unwittingly considered Turkish were, at one point, loanwords 
                                               
97 See chapter two for a more detailed explanation of the ways in which Turkish 
politicians have attempted to position Turkey as a “bridge” between East and West in the 
post-Cold War era.   
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themselves as well as the subsequent recognition of the layers upon layers of foreign 
language influence that have been instrumental in the creation of the modern Turkish 
language.  Indeed, the comment that “[t]hese don’t strike me as being particularly 
foreign, but …” suggests that the very orthographic peculiarities that mark that which has 
become naturalized as “foreign” once again represent a practice that is itself on the cusp 
of becoming normalized, and hence unremarkable.  Finally, on a visual plane, the 
convergence of the two rows of buildings at the horizon indexes the introduction of 
European linear perspective on an Islamic tradition of representing the natural world in 
flat, two-dimensional perspective, thereby further suggesting Turkey's inexorable path 
toward the West--linguistically, orthographically, and culturally.  This cartoon thus 
represents the angst of the linguistic conservative, or purist, who fears that the average 
Turk will continue, either deliberately or unwittingly, to follow the linguistic and 
orthographic example set by the country’s elite, Westward-leaning progressives until 
there is nothing left of traditional Turkish language or culture.   
Because the practice of using foreign loanletters to spell native Turkish words is 
an orthographic innovation so closely associated, in its origins, with Turkey’s well-
educated, politically progressive, Western-leaning elite, it has also become a recognizable 
symbolic resource in the age-old rivalry between progressive and conservative political 
factions within Turkey.  In an article published November 24, 2001 in Radikal 
newspaper, columnist Haluk Şahin brings this issue into focus in describing the creative 
use of Western loanletters by the conservative, Islamic-leaning daily newspaper Zaman to 
render the surname of noted economist Kemal Derviş as “Derwish.”  Appointed Minister 
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of Economic Affairs in 2001 under then Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit and tasked with 
developing an economic recovery plan in the wake of Turkey’s devastating 2000-2001 
financial crisis, Derviş cut a controversial figure in Turkey, highly respected by some and 
much reviled by others for his professional achievements and recognized standing within 
global financial circles.  Derviş was particularly mistrusted within conservative circles, 
where his connection with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund were viewed 
with suspicion born of a belief that such global financial institutions were part of a 
Western imperialist conspiracy to keep developing nations, especially those that were 
Muslim, economically subjugated by granting loans which embroiled them in debt they 
could never repay.  Şahin writes: 
 
Konuyu biraz ilerletip baska 
noktalara degineyim diyorum ama, 
su hinzir ‘w’ harfi pesimi 
birakmiyor. Sabahleyin baktim, 
Islamci gazetelerden birinde sekiz 
sütuna manset: ‘Go Home Derwish’ 
Evet, Dervis degil, Derwish. 
Böylece büyükdedeleri Osmanli 
maliyesini yönetmis Kemal Dervis’i 
akillari sira yabancilastirmislar…. 
W harfinin siyasal bir içerik 
kazanmasi ilk degil. Yakin tarihlere 
kadar ‘Nevruz’ yazanlar senlige, 
‘Newruz’ yazanlar ise hapishaneye 
gitmiyor muydu?  
I say let’s advance this topic a bit 
and touch on other points, but this 
rapacious letter ‘w’ won’t stop 
pestering me. This morning what do 
I see but an eight-column headline 
in one of the Islamist newspapers: 
“Go Home Derwish.” 
Yes, not Derviş, but Derwish.  In 
this manner, in their diminished 
capacity, they foreignized Kemal 
Derviş whose grandfathers 
managed Ottoman finances…. 
This is not the first time the letter w 
has achieved political status. Until 
just recently didn’t those who wrote 
“Nevruz” join in the holiday 
festivities while those who wrote 
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“Newruz”98 went to jail? 
 
Şahin’s description of the way in which Derviş’ surname was made foreign as a 
form of political commentary through deliberate use of the foreign loanletter w and letter 
combination sh in place of v and ş respectively effectively demonstrates the way in which 
the use of foreign orthographic borrowings have become so closely identified with a 
progressive political perspective that they have become part of the arsenal of political 
satire and commentary strategically employed by rival political factions.  Used in 
combination with the phrase “Go home”--written in English, no less--which conjures up 
the international exhortation “Go home Yankee” often used to protest American 
involvement overseas, the deliberate misspelling of Derviş’ surname had the effect of 
transforming even this august figure with an impeccable national pedigree stretching 
back to the Ottoman Empire into a foreign agent, if not a virtual foreigner himself.   
Şahin’s final comment likening the deliberate misspelling of Derviş’ surname to 
the use of the Kurdish w in place of the Turkish v in the name for Newroz, the Persian 
New Year celebrated by the Turkic and Kurdish peoples, recalls the involvement of 
orthography in another politically fraught matter of national concern that pitted leftist 
sympathizers against rightist foes of the nominally Marxist Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
dedicated to ending Kurdish oppression by the Turkish state.  Mainly celebrated by 
                                               
98 This is a reference to Nowrūz, the ancient Iranian new year--celebrated on the vernal 
equinox by Muslims across Turkey, Central Asia, and in parts of the Middle East--which 
Turks spell Nevruz and Kurds spell Newruz.  Since for many years, the holiday sparked 
violent Kurdish protests against the Turkish state, those who spelled Nevruz using of the 
letter w instead of the letter v were accused of harboring sympathies for Kurdish 
separatism.   
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Turkey’s Kurds, Newroz came to symbolize the Kurdish struggle for recognition and 
cultural autonomy and was generally marked by violent protests, leading the Turkish 
government to ban its celebration throughout the 1990s.  In 2000, Ankara reappropriated 
the holiday, legalizing its celebration and organizing state-sponsored festivities.  The 
newly resurrected holiday was spelled in accordance with Turkish orthographic rules as 
Nevruz and the Kurdish spelling, which included an illicit w, was banned, allowing 
Turkish authorities to jail Kurdish activists seeking to reanimate its symbolic power as 
emblematic of Kurdish oppression by spelling it with a letter not found in the Turkish 
alphabet.  Thus, it becomes clear that although loanletters may have first arrived via 
loanwords, their use has since shifted to the extent that not only socioeconomic status, but 
also sociopolitical orientation, can now be indexed through orthography alone.  
 
MODERN COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY AND ORTHOGRAPHIC INNOVATION 
Orthographic rules have also undergone shifts in conjunction with the adoption of 
new communications technology, and it is within this context that the shift of 
orthographic innovations from an explicit index of sociopolitical identity to a more 
generalized public phenomenon is hastened.  Exchanging cellphone text messages with 
Turkish friends, I was immediately struck that they often omitted diacriticals or, more 
accurately, substituted the closest English letter for the six special characters of the 
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Turkish alphabet--i.e, they used c, g, i, o, s, u in place of ç, ğ, ı, ö, ş, ü respectively.99  
This practice was largely driven by economic considerations, for although text messages 
were less expensive than calls, text messages that contained “non-standard” characters--
i.e., the six special characters of the Turkish alphabet--were charged higher rates than 
those that didn't.100  Furthermore, I was told, it was a timesaver.  Since all available 
cellphones were marketed internationally, the first letter to appear when pressing a key 
was the unmarked variant, and finding that letter with the appropriate diacritical--if it 
even existed--required pressing the same key a number of times to scroll through 
additional options.  Thus, many Turks saved time and effort by simply opting for the 
unmarked variant.  After all, they explained, “vakit nakittir” (“time is money”).  Such 
economy of time and effort seemed to reach a whole new level, however, when some 
savvy texters began omitting vowels from their messages, reportedly also in aid of saving 
time and effort.101  What struck me about this new trend was, first, the relative ease with 
which even a non-native speaker like myself could understand the intended message and, 
                                               
99 Although most Turks seemed to use c and s in place of ç and ş, some used ch and sh 
instead, the difference here being whether they privileged appearance over pronunciation 
or vice versa.   
100 In 2006, the surprising additional cost for sending texts with proper Turkish characters 
was finally raised with the Telecommunications Association, and the decision was taken 
to forbid cell phones that did not offer Turkish characters from entering the country and 
to do away with the additional cost associated with using those characters when texting. 
For additional information, see http://www.dildernegi.org.tr/TR/BelgeGoster.aspx? 
F6E10F8892433CFFAAF6AA849816B2EFC78A84C0A88D75FE, last accessed August 
2, 2011.   
101 Although context often prevents misunderstandings, this practice becomes 
problematic with vowel final words like sene, which become sn and hence could be sen, 
son, sana etc.   
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second, how this ease of comprehension implicitly belied the very basis for the Turkish 
alphabet reform nearly a century earlier--namely, that the difficulties associated with 
representing vowels in the Arabic alphabet rendered it unsuited to a vowel-rich language 
such as Turkish, as detailed above.  This inherent contradiction didn’t seem to bother my 
Turkish friends, however, even after I pointed it out.  “It’s different,” one friend replied, 
“because I can always choose to insert the vowels if there’s any possibility of 
misunderstanding.  This is just a quick and easy way of texting, it doesn’t mean I think 
we should rid the alphabet of vowels.”   
Although such pragmatic explanations cast these trends in orthographic usage in 
terms consistent with classic political economy--i.e., orthographic choices made on the 
basis of economic and quasi-economic considerations--I was not convinced that this was 
the full extent of the matter.  In particular, I suspected that other more abstract 
considerations were also at play, namely that omitting diacriticals and vowels was not 
just a timesaver, but constituted a creative performative choice.  In short, it was simply 
more “trendy” or “hip.”  These suspicions seemed borne out by a series of billboard 
advertisements that appeared in downtown Ankara around 2001 which recognized and 
tapped into these orthographic trends in text messaging to attract the attention of potential 
customers.  The advertisements were for Telsim, one of Turkey’s cellphone service 
providers, and depicted a cellphone screen with a short text message sans vowels.  
Further confirmation came several years later when Turkey’s largest cellphone 
service provider, Turkcell, launched a television ad campaign aimed at promoting 
membership in its youth club (http://gnctrkcll.turkcell.com.tr/), which offers access to 
 351 
select calling features and other benefits designed to appeal to Turkish youth.  The name 
of the club, pronounced /gentʃtyrksel/ (youthturkcell), instead of being written 
gençtürksel is rendered--absent the vowels and the cedilla with a double l and the letter c 
replacing s--as gnctrkcll.102  As evidence of gnctrkcll’s “hipness,” several of its ads have 
been posted to YouTube and have reported significant viewer volume.  As the following 
description demonstrates, such ads offer a glimpse into the ways in which an alternative 
linguistic market is generated through creative discursive and orthographic practices:   
An apartment door opens and a young women appears, her smile fading to 
dismay.  “Aşkım, ben geldim,” (“Honey, I’m here”) a young Turkish man wearing a black 
t-shirt with the words IYOU written across the chest says, proudly beaming at her. 
“Ben ayrılmak istiyorum, Barbaros,” (“I want to break up, Barbaros”) she replies. 
“Neden,” (“Why”) he asks, looking dismayed.  “Hep aynı şey giyiyorsun, Barbaros.” 
(“You always wear the same thing, Barbaros”) “Ama aşkım, I love you,”103 (“But honey, 
I love you”) he replies glancing down at the t-shirt. “Bu şekilde, I don’t love you, 
Barbaros,” (“I don’t love you like this”) she asserts, washing her hands of him. “Aşkım, 
ben bunu ikimizin aşkımızı simgesi olarak yaptım.  Bak, burada I, benim, YOU, sensin, 
kalp da ikimizin…” (“Honey, I did this as a symbol of our love.  Look, here I is I, YOU is 
you, and the heart is our….”) he starts to explain pointing to the corresponding words on 
the t-shirt before the door slams shut. The announcer then promotes the 25% discount 
                                               
102 As an aside, it is worth noting that the cell of turkcell is spelled and pronounced as it is 
in English, although the letter c in Turkish is pronounced like English j and the common 
Turkish term for cell phone is cep (short for cep telefonu, meaning “pocket telephone”).   
103 To highlight the characters’ codeswicthing, I have highlighted English loanwords in 
blue characters. 
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gnctrkcll members receive on certain popular youth clothing brands (e.g., Mavi Jeans, T-
box, and Koton (Cotton104)), suggesting that Barbaros run out (“Yürü, Barbaros! Yürü!”) 
and take advantage of this as the gnctrkcll logo pops up.  Barbaros then reappears at his 
girlfriend’s door, looking hip in his new clothes and accessories, with a classic American 
blues riff playing in the background.  He tilts his sunglasses down at her, and she looks 
him up and down approvingly, arching her eyebrows provocatively.  She throws her arms 
around him exclaiming: “Şu I love you yazan t-shirtı değiştirdiğini inanamıyorum.” (“I 
can’t believe that you changed that t-shirt with the I love you writing”). Barbaros looks 
chagrined as the camera angle switches to the rear and we see that he has simply reversed 
the t-shirt such that the IYOU is now in the back.105 
 
 
Figure 5.4  %25 İndirim: Screen shot from a gnctrkcll commercial posted to YouTube 
                                               
104 “Koton” is used here for the English “cotton,” in place of the Turkish pamuk.  Use of 
the turkified spelling of the foreign word (it cannot really be considered a loanword, 
being used in no other context) suggests that the brand was developed before recent 
innovations in orthographic practice, although in a sense, the hybridized name represents 
an orthographic version of “Turklish.”   
105 Please see: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sFGnR5A_ffE, last accessed August 2, 




Figure 5.5  IYOU: Screen shot from a gnctrkcll commercial posted to YouTube 
 
Although any Turk familiar with English will immediately understand the writing 
on Barbaros’ t-shirt, by having him explicitly explain its symbolic meaning (“Look, here 
I is I, YOU is you, and the heart is our…”), the ad teaches the English equivalent of 
Turkish words to young Turks, offering a comic counterpoint to the TDK’s attempts at 
popularizing Turkish language equivalents for foreign loanwords.  The young woman’s 
mid-sentence codeswitching between English and Turkish (“Bu şekilde, I don’t love you, 
Barbaros”) furthermore models “Turklish” for receptive young viewers.  Is it any 
wonder, then, that foreign loanwords and loanletters are becoming ever more widespread 
and orthographic conventions more creative and “vernacular” when marketing campaigns 
that are contemporary, clever and responsive to trends in youth culture continue to be 
countered primarily by word lists of proposed Turkish equivalents publicized in Türk Dili 
and modeled on the TDK’s website?   
 354 
While text messaging seems to have led the way in introducing nonstandard 
orthographic practices, computer use has also had an effect.  In this sense, the interface 
between users and information technology, particularly in relation to internet usage--i.e., 
emails, blogs, and instant messaging--has likewise influenced orthographic practice in 
Turkey.  As with cell phone texting, diacriticals are often omitted from ö and ü, dotted i 
stands in for undotted ı, and ç and ş are written c or ch and s or sh in online texts.  Unlike 
cellphone texting, however, such orthographic practices do not always appear to be 
employed as a time saver or a creative performative choice, but rather seem, in many 
cases, to have more to do with technological access, default settings, and the 
technological savvy of the individual user.  Nonetheless, such practices still have the 
potential to cause shifts in standard orthographic usage.   
Typing in the Turkish alphabet requires the use of a specialized character 
encoding scheme which redesignates certain keys on a standard keyboard to represent the 
five special Turkish characters.  These characters may nonetheless fail to be recognized 
by the intended recipient if his or her computer does not have the necessary drivers and 
software installed or has not been configured to utilize compatible character set 
specifications and may not translate properly to the internet, i.e., blogs, and webpages, if 
the relevant server does not also utilize the proper character encoding scheme.  The 
resulting document will display the characters Ð, Ý, Þ, ð, ý, þ in place of the special 
Turkish letters Ğ, İ, Ş, ğ, ı, ş, requiring some effort to decipher and additional practice to 
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read with ease.106  Since G/g and Sh/sh (or S/s) are arguably more closely recognizable 
than Ð/ð and Þ/þ as the Turkish letters Ğ/ğ and Ş/ş, and the need for or against a dot over 
a capital and lowercase i is generally determinable on the basis of Turkish rules of vowel 
harmony, there is little practical incentive for Turkish users to struggle with the vagaries 
of technology in an effort, which will more often than not go awry, to use a proper 
Turkish font, especially when most users will have no difficulty recognizing the 
substitution of sh for ş, g for ğ, and i for ı.  While problems stemming from different 
encoding schemes may have hastened or popularized the shift away from the use of 
diacriticals associated with the “special characters” of Turkish, the practice of employing 
foreign letters and letter combinations in foreign as well as Turkish words has continued, 
despite not being driven by technical difficulties, suggesting that such innovations in 
orthographic practice continue to act as a sociopolitical status marker of an educated 
progressive outlook.   
By contrast, the use of another, more archaic, diacritical--the circumflex over the 
a, i, and u (â, î, and û)--has recently reemerged in online contexts.  In 1977, in the only 
adjustment to the Turkish alphabet since its adoption in 1928, the TDK made the decision 
to eliminate the circumflex, ostensibly in an effort to “unmark” Arabic and Persian 
loanwords that had been irreversibly absorbed into the Turkish language.  The economy 
of effort this decision represented for users meant that it was quickly adopted and has 
                                               
106 Given that I am not especially well-versed in the technical aspects the topic, I would 
direct interested readers to a more precise explanation of technological incompatibilities 
that prevent special Turkish characters from displaying properly, which can be found at 
the following web address: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wiki_special_characters/Turkish, 
last accessed August 2, 2011.   
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endured despite a reversal of the TDK policy a decade later under the influence of a new 
approach, described above, that reassessed the acceptability of Arabic- and Persian-
sourced words on the basis of shared Islamic culture.  Given the infrequency with which 
the circumflex appears in modern written Turkish, its deliberate inclusion identifies users 
as linguistically and socially conservative, simultaneously indexing their belief in the 
TDK's mandate as final arbiter over issues related to the Turkish language and alphabet 
and reflecting the TDK's revised stance on Islamic-sourced loanwords.  This, in turn, 
marks the reintroduction of the circumflex as qualitatively different from the introduction 
of loanletters--the difference being that while both practices demonstrate orthographic 
creativity, the former counts as revivalist and, under revised definitions, purist, the latter 
as innovative and vernacular, the former being the purview of linguistic conservatives, 
the latter of linguistic progressives.  As a final comment concerning the sociopolitical 
dimensions of the revived usage of the circumflex, I would simply note that in the 
editorial by Yusuf Çotuksöken entitled “Türk Cumhuriyetleri mi, Türki Cumhuriyetler 
mi, Türksel Cumhuriyetler mi?” excerpted in the previous chapter, the term Türkî, in 
keeping with Cumhuriyet newspaper’s center left political affiliation and elite readership, 
was printed without the circumflex, as Türki, requiring Çotuksöken to engage in the 
verbal gymnastics of explaining proper pronunciation, albeit not proper spelling, of the 




Noting the global prevalence of efforts aimed at purifying languages of “foreign” 
influence, Fishman writes: “Just as polities do not permit foreign powers to establish a 
foothold on their soil, so some languages have been struggling for generations not to 
permit foreign languages to establish ‘beachheads’ in their language.  Such struggles can 
go on for generations and are indications of the hold of history on current usage” 
(2006:28).  Although undoubtedly an accurate assessment of the general importance 
placed on language purity by many societies, Fishman’s quote seems to assume a united 
polity in the face of “foreign” influence and hence fails to capture the role that both the 
explicit assertion, as well as deliberate rejection, of purism may play in domestic politics 
within a society.  Thus, while the history of the Turkish language and alphabet reforms is 
of decades of top-down management of linguistic resources in aid of the creation of a 
cohesive national character and an integrated social identity free from outside influence, 
the Turkish language has nonetheless proven prone not only to natural language shift and 
persistent external pressures, but also to deliberate manipulation as “acts of identity” in 
the domestic struggle over identity politics.   
In the post Cold-war era, this process has entered a new domain as innovations in 
orthographic practice have emerged among sociopolitically progressive elite speakers and 
spread rapidly within the Turkish public, with the result that alphabet, like language, has 
become an independent resource in social indexing and “acts of identity” and hence a 
contested site for the negotiation of identity politics.  This, in turn, suggests the fractured 
nature of Turkey’s linguistic marketplace and the existence of two separate, but equally 
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powerful, sources of linguistic legitimation that are indicative of a deep-seated and long-
standing political rift in Turkish society between cultural conservatives and social 
progressives.  The political economy of language and orthography in Turkey is thus 
defined by the opposing ideologies of linguistic purism, advocated by cultural 
conservatives and promulgated by the state, and vernacularity, practiced by social 
progressives and either emulated or unwittingly adopted by the general public.  In this 
sense, linguistic acts of identity bespeak identity politics not only at the individual 
socioeconomic level, but also at the national sociopolitical level, and thus suggest broader 
implications for foreign policy orientation.   
Within the shifting political economy of orthographic practice, then, the 
widespread use of characters that are not found in the Turkish alphabet, including the 
letters q, x, and w, and letter combinations that violate Turkish orthographic conventions, 
such as sh and dj, as well as the increasing use of such foreign letters and letter 
combinations to spell Turkish words suggests an ideological rejection of the principles of 
purism and a staunch preference for vernacularity both linguistically and politically.  The 
emergence of such innovations in orthographic practice are, however, particularly 
troubling to linguistic conservatives who have already made pragmatic concessions to 
strict purism over the years by allowing for some foreign loanwords to be accepted into 
the language as long as they are “turkified,” or spelled in accordance with Turkish 
orthographic rules, such that their “foreignness” is disguised from the average Turkish 
speaker.  Thus, with absolute purism recognized as futile, control over orthography, the 
modality of turkification, becomes all the more important to maintaining at least the 
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appearance of purism and, hence, the salience of purist ideology.  The spread of foreign 
loanletters and letter combinations, the use of foreign orthographic conventions in 
spelling not just loanwords but native Turkish words, and the increasing omission of 
Turkish diacriticals and vowels among the general Turkish public, whether for reasons of 
“hipness” or lack of technological competence on the part of the user, clearly transgress 
the bounds of earlier concessions to linguistic vernacularity, thereby suggesting a 
“slippery slope” that seems to call into question not only the autonomous future of the 
Turkish language, but also the very sovereignty of the Turkish nation.   
As a result, the conservative response to innovations in linguistic and 
orthographic practice has tended to take a broader geopolitical view on the issue, linking 
foreign letters to Western loanwords and casting Turkey as under linguistic assault from 
the West.  In this sense, although ostensibly focused on linguistic pollution, concerns 
over orthographic innovation bespeak anxieties of a sociopolitical nature, indexing fears 
of Western imperialism which have become particularly pronounced in the aftermath of 
the collapse of the Soviet Union.  The cumulative effect of recent orthographic trends and 
the conservative response thus reveals a preoccupation with Turkish national identity 
politics which, by focusing attention on the purported threat posed by the West and the 
concomitant implications of Western cultural imperialism to the exclusion of other 
geopolitical considerations of either a positive or negative nature, ultimately contributed 
to derailing the ability of Turkish linguists and language professionals to exploit the 
sociopolitical opportunities afforded by the post-Cold war shift in the geopolitical 
equilibrium of the region to effectuate linguistic, sociocultural, and geopolitical 
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rapprochement within the Turkic world, thereby largely presaging the ultimate 
abandonment of the ortak alfabe and ortak dil projects.  
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Chapter Six: Turkey, the West, and the Greater Turkic World: Betwixt 
and Between Two Xs, Two Qs, and a W 
 
On this beautiful Sunday day, for your untroubled mind, a trouble from me: the “W” 
problem! I don’t even know whether you read it “dablyu” or “dubleve.” “W” is a letter 
not found in our alphabet.  Not found in our alphabet, but a pertinacious letter, the 
dimensions of which grow ever greater as life goes on. (Su güzelim pazar günü, dertsiz 
basiniza bir dert de benden: “W” sorunu!  Artik “dablyu” mu okursunuz, “dubleve” mi, 
bilemiyorum. “W” alfabemizde bulunmayan bir harf. Alfabemizde bulunmayan, ama 
hayatimizda gittikçe daha fazla boy gösteren sirnasik bir harf!) 
Haluk Şahin 
Should Our Alphabet Change? (Alfabemiz Değişmeli Mi?)107 
 
THE METALINGUISTICS OF ORTHOGRAPHIC DEBATE  
Trends in orthographic usage in Turkey described in chapter five had not escaped 
the notice of language professionals and social commentators, and in November 2001, the 
subject was taken up by liberal social democratic columnist Haluk Şahin in an editorial 
entitled “Should our Alphabet Change?” (“Alfabemiz Değişmeli Mi?”).  The editorial, 
which appeared in the 18 November 2001 edition of the left-leaning daily newspaper 
Radikal, was posted the same day to the online Turkoloji-L discussion group by 
administrator Mehmet Tutuncu, touching off an animated two and a half week debate 
about orthography that offers a unique opportunity to examine the ways in which long-
standing ideologies of linguistic purism have been challenged by recent innovations in 
orthographic practice within Turkey.  Moreover, seen within the context of efforts to 
unite the Turkic peoples through the creation of an ortak alfabe and ortak dil, the 
                                               
107 The article from which this quote was taken appeared in Radikal November 18, 2001. 
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discourse of the online orthography debates powerfully demonstrates the checkered 
fortunes of attempts at supranational linguistic unification and hence the larger politics of 
the post-Soviet Turkic world.  Thus, by contrasting official announcements and 
pronouncements with the vibrant practices of ordinary people employing orthography as 
an expression of sociopolitical identity, the focused discussion of orthographic policy and 
practice that consumed Turkoloji-L reveals metalinguistic attitudes toward orthography 
which, in turn, suggest underlying concerns over such larger sociopolitical issues as 
globalism, imperialism, nationalism, and pan-Turkism as they play across the linguistic 
marketplace.   
The focus on orthography, though critiqued by some contributors to the debate as 
a regrettable distraction from the “real” issue of foreign language influence, marks a shift, 
in a country long saturated by discourse on the politics of language, toward an 
understanding that characters used to represent spoken language possess a comparable 
capacity to represent features of the social world.  In the course of the orthography 
debates, it furthermore emerges that the social symbolic character of such letters is 
neither static nor fixed, meaning that orthography possesses the ability to not only 
represent the social world but also index manifold constructions of it.   
 
TURKOLOJI-L AND THE DIALECTICS OF ONLINE DEBATE 
Before turning to a discursive examination of the debate, some practical issues 
pertaining to the online forum that hosted it, and the ways in which the medium framed 
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the discourse, bear mention.  Turkoloji-L, otherwise known as Türkoloji Haberleşme ve 
Tartışma Topluluğu (Turcology News and Discussion Group), is a listserver discussion 
group hosted on Yahoo Groups which was founded in November 1998 and currently 
boasts over 2200 members internationally.  Subscription to the group is open, and news 
items, announcements, opinion pieces, and commentary pertaining to issues of Turkish 
language, literature, history, art, and the Turkic world are posted by group members or 
list administrator Mehmet Tutuncu for consideration and discussion.  Although much of 
the posted material is generated by members themselves, the online presence maintained 
by most newspapers and many television outlets makes it a simple matter for members to 
search out relevant articles and upload them into the Turkoloji-L forum, resulting in 
significant interplay between the discussion group and traditional mass media.   
Such dialogism between traditional media outlets and more contemporary media 
fora in which readers are not simply consumers of the news but rather active participants 
in its construction was a key element in shaping the orthography debates.  Although in 
the traditional print media format, controversial topics broached by one columnist are 
often taken up by others, it nonetheless remains difficult to conceive of a smattering of 
opinion pieces scattered across politically diverse newspapers with discrete readership as 
social dialogue, even when this illusion is created through reciprocal commentary and 
judicious quotation.   
Within the context of Turkoloji-L, however, it is possible for members to post 
opinion pieces and columns appearing in newspapers ranging across the political 
spectrum from nationalist Hürriyet to liberal Radikal and center-right Milliyet to 
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conservative Yeni Şafak to a single listserver, allowing for the cross-fertilization of ideas 
and eliciting further commentary and discussion among listserver subscribers.  By 
providing a forum in which the various news and opinion articles published on a 
particular topic are amassed, Turkoloji-L effectively creates a dialogic space in which 
ambient news commentary is recontextualized through juxtaposition as well as through 
exposure to a wider chorus of commentary from voices not often heeded in mainstream 
media.   
It is furthermore important to note that some of the Turkish excerpts included 
below will appear incorrect to a speaker of Turkish as several of the “special characters” 
of the Turkish alphabet (e.g., Ğ/ğ, Ş/ş, İ/ı) are displayed without their distinguishing 
diacritical marks (i.e., G/g, S/s, I/i), whereas others (i.e., â, î, û) appear with diacriticals 
that have long since fallen from common use.  As emerges in the course of the debate, 
such orthographic incompatibility across the postings appears to be largely the result of 
font incompatibilities stemming from hardware and software obsolescence and/or varying 
levels of technological competence among contributing members.   
I have nonetheless deliberately left the excerpted texts as they appeared in the 
listserver distribution on the grounds that, as discussed in chapter five, the use of archaic 
diacriticals appears, in many instances, to have been a deliberate choice on the part of the 
contributor marking his/her orthographic ideology. Furthermore, the absence of special 
characters, even when attributable to font incompatibilities and not indicative of 
intentional choice, touched off a spin-off discussion regarding orthographic rights and 
responsibilities among certain participants to the orthographic debates, many of whom 
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believed that such incompatibilities and associated difficulties bespoke Western 
imperialism, of a technological, if not orthographic, nature.  In this sense, those who 
chose to make use of archaic diacriticals were able to do so only because diacriticals that 
have fallen from use in Turkish are found in the various Western languages.  The more 
robust technological attention these characters have received than the “special characters” 
of the Turkish alphabet thus suggests the import of global linguistic hierarchy in 
determining orthographic availability and constraining choice.   
 
DO LOANLETTERS ARRIVE ON THE BACK OF LOANWORDS? AND OTHER QUESTIONS OF 
ORTHOGRAPHIC IDEOLOGY 
Turning now to the actual alphabet discussions hosted on Turkoloji-L, let us begin 
with an initial look at the editorial that set off the firestorm--Şahin’s “Should our 
Alphabet Change?”  Şahin’s provocative article begins by addressing the increasing use 
of “letters not found in our alphabet” (“alfabemiz bulunmayan harflar”) in all spheres of 
Turkish society.  Lamenting this near ubiquitous use of loanletters, Şahin expresses 
particular concern with the prevalence of the letter w, which he claims first infiltrated the 
Turkish language decades ago but has recently become unavoidable largely due to the 
advent of the World Wide Web.  “While formerly seeing this letter on our streets only 
once in a blue moon,” he writes, “we now see this letter every second.  For example, a 
minibus passes by, on top not only is there no familiar minibus writing advertising who is 
king of this realm, there’s an internet address: http://www.bizimminibus.com!” (“Bu harfi 
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eskiden sokaklarimizda kirk yilda bir görürken, artik her dakika görüyoruz. Örnegin, bir 
minibüs geçiyor yaninizdan, üzerinde sadece bu âlemde kralin kim oldugunu ilan eden 
malum minibüs yazilari yok, bir internet adresi de var: http://www.bizimminibus.com!”).  
He then goes on to detail the way in which the importunate letter first infiltrated the 
Turkish language decades ago on the sly and how, while then constrained in its influence, 
it now runs roughshod over Turkey’s urban landscape.  
Şahin is further troubled by evidence that the average Turkish speaker lacks a 
clear understanding of the proper use of the letter let alone any idea of how to reference it 
(i.e., dublyu, ikive, or dubleve).108  Citing the widespread hypercorrective pronunciation 
of “Harvard” as “Harward” when referencing the prestigious university in Massachusetts 
as an example of popular confusion over the pronunciation of the letter w,109 Şahin’s 
article recalls the established discourse of Turkish social commentators such as Cevdet 
Kudret (c.f., chapter five) who argue that that use of foreign loanletters has become a 
sociocultural status symbol, leaving the average Turkish speaker to mimic the urban 
                                               
108 There appears to be disagreement and confusion over whether the name for the letter 
w in Turkish should follow English pronunciation (dublyu), direct Turkish translation 
(ikive), or be rendered as a hybrid of the two (dubleve).   
109 In this case, there appears to be confusion among non-English-speaking Turks about 
the pronunciation of the v in Harvard.  Knowing that foreign loanwords and proper names 
were often transcribed into Turkish using the closest equivalent letter, Turks are prone to 
mistakenly believe that all v’s in foreign words spoken in Turkish represent w’s in the 
original language. Such confusion is further exacerbated by the fact that the letter w is 
pronounced /w/ in English, but /v/ in German, thus conforming to the English (and 
Turkish) letter v.  This confusion persists even among language professionals, as noted by 
Dutch linguist Johan Vandewalle who reports in a posting to the orthography debates that 
his name is often misspelled Wandervalle or Wanderwalle in the appreciative plaques and 
documents he receives in commemoration of his participation in Turkish conferences, 
symposia, etc. 
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elite’s use of foreign borrowings without any direct knowledge of accepted pronunciation 
conventions in the languages of origin.  Quoting another respected social commentator 
whom he describes as having been actively engaged in a decades-long, pitched battle 
against cultural imperialism, Şahin writes: “It is said that the key to the new century is the 
internet.  However, the key to the internet is www.  In other words, three iterations at 
once of a letter not found in our alphabet.  Does this not symbolize what our situation in 
the new century will be?” (“Yeni çagin anahtarinin internet oldugu söyleniyor. Internet'in 
anahtari ise www. Yani alfabemizde bulunmayan harften üç tane birden! Bu bile yeni 
çagda durumumuzun nasil olacagini simgelemiyor mu?”).  He seems to fear that it does, 
implying that Turkey’s lack of the letter w, will relegate it to second-class citizen in the 
new world order: “Yes, the situation is clear.  By virtue of the internet, the letter w has 
become one of the letters most in use and this letter is not in our alphabet. This letter 
confronts everyone in written form, yet no one knows how it should be pronounced” 
(“Evet, durum açik. Internet nedeniyle 'w' harfi en çok kullanilan harflerden birisi haline 
geldi ve bu harf alfabemizde yok. Bu harf yazili olarak herkesin karsisina çikiyor, ama 
kimse nasil okunacagini bilmiyor”).   
Something must be done, Şahin opines, asking if these letters ought to take their 
place in the Turkish alphabet.  He recounts having put this question to two renowned 
Turkish language specialists and his surprise that their responses neglected to pay 
homage to the Turkish alphabet as Ataturk’s legacy and the honor of the Turkish nation 
by suggesting that the foreign letters might beneficially be adopted in response to 
changing conditions, if only for use in foreign loanwords: “The two of them both said 
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that under changing conditions it would be appropriate for these letters to be ushered into 
our alphabet,” he writes.  “One qualified his opinion by saying ‘Of course, only for use in 
foreign words.’  Not a single person in the conference hall said anything like ‘Alphabet is 
our honor.  It is Ataturk’s legacy.  We ought not even hint at it.’”  (“Her ikisi de, degisen 
kosullar altinda, bu harflerin de alfabemize buyur edilmesinin uygun olacagini 
söylediler.  Birisi ‘Tabii, sadece yabanci kelimelerde kullanilmak üzere’ diyerek 
görüsünü niteledi.  Salondan hiç kimse de ‘Alfabemiz bizim onurumuzdur. Atatürk'ün 
armaganidir. Ona dokundurtmayiz,’ türünden seyler söylemedi.”)  Şahin ends by again 
asking his readers to consider whether the time has come to add foreign loanletters to the 
Turkish alphabet.   
 
DISCOURSES OF INFILTRATION AND ASSAULT: LINGUISTIC CONTAMINATION, 
ORTHOGRAPHIC INVASION, SOCIAL POLLUTION, AND CULTURAL IMPERIALISM 
In broad strokes, the substance of Şahin’s article touches on key issues of 
orthographic ideology that both allude to Turkey’s complicated sociolinguistic history 
and acknowledge the country’s changing sociopolitical circumstances.  From a rhetorical 
perspective, what is immediately striking is Şahin’s repeated use of the metaphoric 
language of infiltration and assault to characterize the proliferation of foreign loanletters 
in Turkish society.  For instance, he writes: 
 
‘W’ harfi aslinda dilimize karsi The letter ‘w’ began its infiltration 
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giristigi sizma harekâtina WC ile 
baslamisti. […] 
Ancak bu sizma harekâti, söz 
konusu etkinligin sinirliligi 
nedeniyle tam basarili olamamisti. 
Bu kez w’lar pitrak gibi çogaliyor, 
kimse önünde duramiyor. […] 
Bu ‘w’ harfinin, çaktirmadan hamle 
yaptigi durumlar da oluyor.110  
maneuvers against our language 
with WC. […] 
However this infiltration, due to the 
limited nature of the activity in 
question, appears to have been 
unable to fully succeed.  This time 
w’s multiply like burrs, no one can 
stand in their way. […] 
There are instances where the ‘w’ 
has attacked on the sly. 
 
Such allusions to forcible entry resonate with long-standing discourses of 
linguistic pollution first mustered to justify the expulsion of Arabic and Persian 
loanwords during the Turkish language reform of the early republican era and 
periodically revisited as the Türk Dil Kurumu (TDK) marshaled its forces in repeated 
attempts to curtail the entry of Western loanwords it described as a “contagion” (bulaşim) 
that had “infected” (sirayet etmek) Turkish society (c.f., chapter five).  Şahin’s article 
thus reframes time-honored Turkish concern over linguistic pollution, focusing on 
orthography and awakening a sense of anxiety over contact not just with foreign 
languages, but also the alphabets they employ.   
According to Paul Wexler, perceived linguistic pollution, such as the influx of 
loanwords and increasing use of rival orthographic systems, often fuels “the native 
speaker’s fear that his language could be displaced as a politically recognized language of 
                                               
110 In this text the Turkish letters ı, ş, and ğ have been replaced by i, s, and g, while the 
letter â appears with diacritical intact. Although this article appears with the diacriticals 
of special characters intact on Radikal’s website, for technical reason beyond my ability 
to explain, when the article was posted to Turkoloji-L, the diacriticals on these three 
letters were lost.   
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the community (and hence replaced by another language)…” (1971:346).  Such fears, in 
turn, tend to awaken an active interest in linguistic purism, broadly defined by E. 
Annamalai as “the opening and closure of sources of enrichment…the opening of the 
native sources and the closure of the non-native sources” (1979:36).  Insofar as the 
distinction between native and non-native sources is not always clear-cut in actual 
practice, however, distinctions are often made on the basis of a perceived linguistic ideal.  
Such a notional ideal is not only synchronic by nature, but often amounts to a 
simulacrum, and attempts to revive it, generally entail judgments of a non-linguistic 
nature, involving ideological assumptions demarcating “indigenous” from “foreign” 
which center around the question of “who we are and who we are not.”  While fear of 
language loss thus lies at the center of concerns raised by linguistic pollution, Herderian 
notions of linguistic nationalism permeate sociolinguistic folk ideologies to such a degree 
that the native speaker inevitably perceives the pollution of his/her language by foreign 
linguistic elements as the potential source of a concomitant loss of cultural identity.  Fear 
of language degeneration is thus inextricably tied to anxiety over cultural adulteration 
precipitated by unwanted external influence.   
In this sense, the inevitable conflation of language and culture which lies at the 
heart of ideologies of linguistic purism frequently precipitates the vilification of 
loanwords and foreign constructions as agents of unwelcome social influence, as 
suggested by Brian Weinstein’s (1989) research into “francophonie,” the global 
movement aimed at purifying and revitalizing the French language.  The prevalence of 
this trend is further substantiated by Joshua Fishman’s (1988) research into the U.S.-
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based “English Only” movement which reveals the ways in which the perceived ill 
effects of foreign language contact is associated with the unwholesome social influence 
non-natives are thought to exert on local culture.  Michael Herzfeld’s examination of 
Turkish/Greek diglossia and perceptions of language mixing among indigenous Greeks 
likewise points to a link between linguistic and cultural pollution in the minds of 
members of a speech community, whereby “[l]inguistic pollution often models other 
kinds of pollution: both are a problem of disemia, and both are expressed in the 
architectonic terms of inclusion and exclusion” (1987:116).   
Although the work of these three researchers, and indeed that of most scholars of 
language purism, focuses on spoken language, similar strains of metadiscursive 
commentary emerging within the context of the Turkish orthography debates clearly 
suggest that much the same can be said for written language, especially as pertains to 
foreign orthographic conventions and loanletters.  Such metadiscursive parallelism is 
largely attributable to a tacit understanding that both language and alphabet act not only 
as communicative media but also as independent, if interrelated, symbolic resources fully 
capable of indexing social identity, bolstered, in turn, by the accepted assumption that 
orthographic borrowings have appeared in Turkish as a result of foreign loanwords.  
The perception that loanletters arrive on the back of loanwords and are harbingers 
of foreign social influence and global hierarchies of power was first voiced by Şahin 
who, in characterizing the pervasiveness of the letter w as an invasion, employs various 
discursive devices that cast it as irretrievably foreign to the Turkish language and 
threatening to Turkish cultural sovereignty.  Moving fluidly from well-established 
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discourses of linguistic pollution to newer anti-Western/anti-capitalist rhetoric, Şahin 
traces the letter’s inexorable proliferation across the Turkish landscape in recent years, 
beginning with its purported Turkish debut in a rather undignified lexical borrowing.  He 
writes:  
 
‘W’ harfi aslinda dilimize karsi 
giristigi sizma harekâtina WC ile 
baslamisti. Amerikanca ‘water 
closet’ kelimesinin kisaltilmisi olan 
bu kelime, nedense, dilimizde ayni 
anlama gelen kenef, abdesthane, 
ayakyolu ve hatta Fransizca kökenli 
tuvalet gibi kelimelere tercih 
edilmisti.  (‘Nedense’ dediysem, 
lafin gelisi, Amerikan hamburgeri 
yiyen bir neslin WC’ye gitmesi 
gayet tutarli aslinda!) 
The letter w actually appears to 
have begun infiltration maneuvers 
against our language with the WC. 
This word, a supposed abbreviation 
of the Americanish word ‘water 
closet,’ was preferred, for some 
reason, to words with the same 
meaning in our language such as 
kenef, abdesthane, ayakyolu and 
even the French-derived tuvalet. (If 
I said ‘for some reason,’ in a 
manner of speaking it is actually 
quite a fitting way to describe the 
bathroom habits of a generation of 
American hamburger-eaters!) 
 
Tracing the infiltration of the letter w to its purported ignominious beginnings as a 
borrowed euphemism for “lavatory,” Şahin seems to imply that the letter is as 
unmentionable in polite society as the apparatus itself.  Moreover, Şahin rejects the very 
need for such a term, pointing to the prior existence of four perfectly acceptable 
alternatives to WC “with the same meaning in our language”--kenef, abdesthane, 
ayakyolu, and tuvalet.  Only one of the “native” alternatives Şahin identifies (ayakyolu) is 
actually of Turkish origin, yet this presents no impediment to his argument.  Although he 
does single out tuvalet as a French derivation, Şahin makes no mention of the Persian 
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origins of kenef and abdesthane.  It thus becomes clear that even among established 
foreign borrowings, a hierarchy of acceptability exists such that Persian and Arabic 
loanwords have been fully assimilated, while more recent loanwords of French origin 
remain marked, despite their spelling having been altered to reflect Turkish orthography.  
WC, meanwhile, remains on the outside of this paradigm--an utterly and irretrievably 
foreign element--largely, it seems, because the presence of the letter w prevents it from 
being “Turkified.”   
Although such selectivity in appraising foreign elements may appear arbitrary or 
even contradictory to the purist agenda, it can largely be explained through reference to 
shifts in prevailing geopolitical conditions that have transformed the ways in which 
external linguistic threats are perceived and evaluated.  According to Weinstein:  
 
Purists know the enemy very well.  As a result there is probably no such thing as 
absolute purism--only purism with respect to the challenging language.  
Reportedly, Catalan purists who struggle against Castilian influence accept 
English borrowings.  Greek defenders of Katarevusa could accept the French 
word for “tea” in order to remove the Demotic word for it (c.f. Mirambel 
1964:415).  What should be called ‘selective closure’ is also at work among 
French purifiers who do not object to the study of German and are increasingly 
willing to accept some contributions to the French lexicon from Low varieties of 
language as long as French dominance is assured (1989:54). 
 
In essence, the foreign language perceived as posing the most significant threat to 
purists resolved to protect their native tongue is largely determined by the relative 
standing of the languages, which, in turn, relies largely on the comparative prestige of the 
respective societies with which the languages are associated within local and/or 
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international hierarchies.  Thus, citing Wexler (1974), Weinstein suggests that the 
“apparent inconsistency” behind the selective treatment of foreign loanwords is best 
explained by non-linguistic factors.  Annamalai further argues that although “factors 
which lead to purism may be, theoretically, internal or external to the language…. [m]ore 
important than any structural consideration is the attitudes of speakers toward native and 
non-native elements… [as] determined by socio-cultural, political, and historical factors 
which are external to the language” (1979:36).   
Returning, then, to Şahin’s article, it becomes clear that not only is English 
perceived to pose the greatest threat to the Turkish language, but that general 
apprehension over the incursion of loanwords, followed by loanletters, is rooted in larger 
sociopolitical concerns over American global hegemony and cultural imperialism.  Şahin 
himself suggests this link by rhetorically tying the borrowed term WC, on the coattails of 
which he accuses the letter w of having first entered Turkey, to American linguistic 
imperialism through his claim that it represents the “Americanese”111 abbreviation for 
“water closet.”  This is, in fact, a misapprehension or misrepresentation in that the term 
WC originated in Britain and enjoys continued widespread usage across Europe, while its 
use in the U.S. is largely restricted to plumbing manuals and would likely cause the 
average American to scratch his head perplexedly.   
Nonetheless, this distinction matters little, for few of Şahin’s readers would be the 
wiser and the association thus made accords well with increasing anti-American 
                                               
111 Very rarely is the dialect of English spoken in the U.S. given status as a language unto 
itself (e.g., Americanese), but Şahin appears to want there to be no mistake about the 
main purveyor of global linguistic hegemony in the modern era. 
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sentiment within the general populace.  Şahin further reinforces the association by 
suggesting that the letter w is actually quite suited to describing the presumably boorish 
“bathroom habits of a generation of American hamburger eaters” (“Amerikan hamburgeri 
yiyen bir neslin WC'ye gitmesi”).  In so doing, he deftly links the pertinacious, interloping 
loanletter to prevailing anti-globalization discourses which decry the McDonaldization of 
Turkey, employing culture specific social capital to imply that the letter w sits as poorly 
on the Turkish tongue as American fast food does on the Turkish palate. 
 
REPELLING THE “INFIDEL” VERSUS WELCOMING THE “FOREIGNER”:  DIVERGENT 
APPROACHES TO THE FOREIGN LOANLETTER CONUNDRUM  
Precisely by virtue of the tripartite ideological link between language, its graphic 
manifestation, and the social world, however, purist ideologies, no matter how carefully 
couched in linguistic terms, are vulnerable to criticism that they are, at heart, deeply 
politically motivated.  Indeed, one of the earliest responses to Şahin’s editorial on the 
Turkoloji-L listserver challenged his description of the letter w as “pertinacious” 
(“sırnaşık”) and his treatment of it as a foreign imposter.  Claiming to have observed the 
tendency to denigrate foreign orthographic borrowings in earlier posts to the list, 
Turcologist Vera Tigris professes being at a loss for understanding why such letters as x, 
q, and w should be the cause of such consternation.  Questioning the validity of branding 
these letters “foreign” implicit in labeling them “letters not found in our alphabet” 
(“alfabemiz bulunmayan harflar”), she argues that every one of the characters of the 
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Latin alphabet were “foreign” (“yabancı”) to Turkish prior to the alphabet reform of 
1928.  She writes: 
 
A, B, C... Z nasil latin alfabesinin 
harfleri ve Türkiye’de harf 
devriminden önce yabanci idilerse 
X, Q, W da öyle idiler. Ne oldu ki 
ilk saydiklarim Türkiye’nin mali 
oldu da X, Q, W “gavur” 
kaldilar…. 
Just as A, B, C… Z were letters of 
the latin alphabet and were foreign 
before the Turkish alphabet reform, 
so too were X, Q, W.  For whatever 
reason, the former were 
appropriated by Turkey while X, Q, 
W remained “infidel”… 
 
If all letters of the modern Turkish alphabet, in spite of their canonization over the 
past seventy years, were borrowed, Tigris thus suggests, what then could be the 
justification behind singling out the letters x, q, and w?  Arguing that their omission from 
the Turkish alphabet devised and ratified in 1928 does not constitute sufficient cause, 
Tigris implies that much deeper issues of social perception are at play, describing the 
Turkish reaction to the three disputed letters by reference to the term gâvur--an Arabic-
derived word for “foreign,” implying “non-Muslim,” “infidel,” even “godless,” which, 
while often used in casual reference to Westerners, is generally recognized as rude and 
eschewed in polite society in favor of the more neutral Farsi-derived construction 
yabancı.  From a semantic perspective, Tigris’ use of gâvur is highly charged, implying 
that she believes the Turkish reaction against the three letters to be governed by historical 
animosities, contemporary geo-politics, and sentiment rather than sound linguistic 
considerations.  This opinion is echoed at the conclusion of her posting in which she 
suggests that the adoption of loanletters ought to be rationally evaluated based on the 
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strength of their usefulness to the language rather than dismissed out of hand in an 
emotional, knee-jerk reaction to that which is foreign:  “In my opinion, it is necessary to 
be rational and put the principle of usefulness to the fore.  This is my humble view” 
(“Bence soguk kanlı olunmalı ve yararlılık prensibi öne alınmalıdır.  Nacizane görüsüm 
budur.”).   
Although in the minority, Tigris’ perspective does find support among fellow 
Turkoloji-L members and contributors to the debates, including translator and proprietor 
of an independent publishing house dedicated to works on Turkish and the Turkic 
languages, Tevfik Turan, who, in a response to Şahin’s article and subsequent 
commentary from Turkoloji-L members joins Tigris in taking issue with what he 
perceives to be the xenophobic reaction to foreign loanletters on display in contributions 
to the listserver.  In a dispatch posted two days after Tigris’, Turan equates blatant 
rejectionism of loanletters with that of loanwords and ascribes both impulses to a deep-
seated Turkish fear of that which is foreign or, more precisely, the “foreignness within 
that which is foreign” (“yabancı olanı yabancılığı içinde”), for which he also uses the 
Turkish phrase “yabancı korkusu” (“fear of the foreign/foreigner”) and the loanword 
“xenophobia,” spelled according to English rather than Turkish orthography.  He writes: 
 
Bizim asıl derdimiz, bana öyle 
geliyor ki, yabancı olanı yabancılığı 
içinde kabullenemeyişimiz. Bu 
kapsamlı ve derin yabancı korkusu 
özellikle dilde akıl almaz 
aşırılıklara varabiliyor…. 
What our actual problem is, it 
seems to me, is that we seem unable 
to accept the foreignness within that 
which is foreign. This deep and 
encompassing fear of the 
foreign/foreigner is especially able 
 378 
Bu xenophobia havası içinde, bazı 
harflerin artık es geçilemez biçimde 
hayatımıza girmesi de, beraberinde 
bir saldırı karşısında olduğumuz 
algısını getiriyor.  
to reach excessiveness beyond 
rationality with regard to 
language….  
Within this climate of xenophobia, 
the entry of some letters that cannot 
be ignored into our lives creates the 
impression that we are together up 
against an assault.  
 
Turan goes on to critique the overzealous, and to his mind misplaced, purist 
impulses of the original Turkish language reformers who, in the name of restoring the 
language of the folk, expelled countless foreign loanwords employed regularly by the 
Turkish folk themselves (e.g., mekteb, hayat, Allah, tabiat).  He furthermore reserves a 
good measure of criticism for contemporary Turkish writers, living in their ivory towers, 
for routinely engaging in all manner of contortions in order to avoid using such 
commonplace Arabic loanwords, even going so far as to place contrived neologisms in 
the mouths of the characters in their novels:  “There are no verbal gymnastics to which 
our writers and translators will not resort to avoid using words with the faintest whiff of 
Arabic.  And furthermore, they cram such neologisms dreamt up at the work table into 
the mouths of the characters who speak in their stories and novels.” (“Yazarlarımız, 
çevirmenlerimiz biraz Arapça kokan kelimeleri kullanmamak için yapılmadık cambazlık 
bırakmıyorlar. Üstelik bir de, masa başında geliştirdikleri yeni sunîliklerini 
hikâyelerinde, romanlarında konuşan kişilerin ağzına da oturtuyorlar.”).   
Such artificial use of language, Turan argues, has little resonance among the 
Turkish populace; rather it is Turkish intellectuals who make much ado over nothing in 
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their drive to maintain the mythologized linguistic purism of the imagined Turkish folk:  
“And the strange side of this business is that intellectuals are far more populist on this 
topic than even the people themselves:  While he who writes www on the minibus, 
knowing that that letter is not found in the Turkish alphabet, is not troubled by its 
foreignness, those who claim to represent the superstructure of language are carried away 
with foreboding that there is a “problem” in the populace.” (“Işin garip bir tarafı da, 
aydının bu konuda gene halktan fazla halkçı olması: Minibüsüne www yazan, o harfin 
Türk alfabesinde olmadığını bildiği halde, yabancılığını dert etmezken, dilin üstyapısını 
temsil etme iddiasında olanlar bir kere daha, tabanda bir “sorun” olduğu vehmine 
kapılıyor.”)   
Welcoming the “foreigner” (yabancı) to their midst, Turan suggests a simple and 
pragmatic approach toward the loanletters that involves openly acknowledging their 
foreignness and accepting their practical uses rather than banning them solely on the 
basis of misguided idealism and trenchant xenophobia.  In Turan’s view, the process of 
familiarization with English loanletters arising from regular use will furthermore serve to 
prevent the average Turk from developing “inferiority complexes” (for which he uses the 
Turkish calque “aşağılık kompleksleri”) by derailing those within the society who 
employ foreign letters in Turkish to flaunt their knowledge of foreign languages and 
display a purported air of worldliness and, hence, superiority.  He writes: 
 
Yabancıyı niçin şöyle 
karşılamayalım, anlamıyorum: 
I don’t understand why I shouldn’t 
be able to greet the foreigner thus: 
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“Ben senin yabancı olduğunu 
biliyor ve seni, benden farklı 
olduğunu gözardı etmeden, yabancı 
kimliğin içinde algılıyorum. Işime 
yarıyorsun, seni kullanıyorum, 
pratik tarafın hoşuma gidiyor; 
bunun için de sana, yabancı 
olduğundan gocunmadan ve sana 
muhtaç olduğumu vehmedip 
aşağılık kompleksleri filan 
edinmeden, kocaman bir evet 
diyorum. Seni kullanarak 
dildaşlarına böbürlenenlere, yabancı 
dil bildiğini göstererek üstünlük 
taslayanlara, yani seni kasıtlı veya 
kasıtsız olarak kötüye kullanmaya 
çalışanlara karşı çıkıyorum ve bu 
kötüye kullanmaların ülkede 
yabancı bilgisi geliştikçe 
azalacağına inanıyorum. Aramıza 
hoş geldin, yabancı!” 
“I know that you are foreign, and 
without overlooking your being 
different from me, I perceive you 
within your foreign identity.  You 
are useful to me, I use you, I like 
your practical side, and because of 
this, without being resentful of your 
foreignness and without fearing my 
need for you and developing 
inferiority complexes or whatnot, I 
say a huge yes.  Using you, I will 
come out against those who put on 
airs for fellow language colleagues, 
against those who pretend to 
superiority by making a show of 
their knowing a foreign language, 
in other words, against those who, 
whether purposely or not, try to 
misuse you, and I believe that such 
misuse will decrease as foreign 
knowledge develops in our country. 
Welcome to our midst, stranger! 
 
For many contributors, however, foreign orthographic influence and the 
concomitant fear of cultural annihilation remained an issue of great emotional import, not 
subject to rational assessments of practicality.  Thus, while Şahin’s efforts to depict 
orthographic borrowings as foreign met with objections from certain quarters for being 
alarmist, xenophobic, and irrational, what ultimately proved most controversial about his 
op-ed was the seemingly offhand suggestion that such loanletters be considered for 
adoption into the Turkish alphabet:  “In that case, what shall we do? Shall we just ignore 
the problem or has the time come for the letter “w” to take its place in our alphabet?”  
(“Öyleyse ne yapacagiz? Sorunu görmezden mi gelecegiz? Yoksa ‘w’ harfini alfabemize 
almanin zamani geldi mi?”).   
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Indeed, what ultimately prompted other editorialists to pick up the thread of 
Şahin’s argument, the TDK to weigh in, the international news to take note, and members 
of Turkoloji-L to take the issue under debate--was not Şahin’s reanimation of time-
honored discourses of linguistic purism in aid of addressing foreign-sourced orthographic 
innovation, nor even his deliberate association of the letter w with American cultural 
imperialism, but rather his suggestion that orthographic borrowings may have reached a 
watershed point where accommodation offered a viable alternative to expulsion.   
This simple but radical suggestion was an alien concept to orthographic 
innovators who embraced the constantly evolving, or “lived,” nature of language but had 
hitherto largely pursued their own orthographic and linguistic practices as a marker of 
social identity without seeking revision of official linguistic policy.  Moreover, it was a 
complete anathema to purists, who had long fought foreign language influence and now 
feared the opening of a second front in the battle over linguistic purism, as well as 
nationalists, who were alarmed by the specter of linguistic imperialism and a loss of 
Turkish cultural integrity.  Drawing on arguments ranging from legal to linguistic, 
educational to social, members of Turkoloji-L wrote in to defend the sanctity of the 
Turkish alphabet and, by extension, Turkish linguistic and cultural sovereignty.   
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FROM LEGAL TO LINGUISTIC:  PROTECTING AND PRESERVING THE TURKISH 
ALPHABET 
The responses to the orthographic challenge posed by Şahin initially centered on 
bolstering the authority of the existing Turkish alphabet from both a legal and linguistic 
perspective and linking it to specific social capital within the society.  Early contributors 
to the debate thus marshaled the dual discourses of state power and quasi-state authority, 
invoking the constitutional provision setting forth and safeguarding the Turkish alphabet 
and referencing Turkish Language Society policies and publications.  For example, in an 
early posting to the listserver, professor of literature Erdoğan Boz writes:   
 
Bilindiği gibi Türk alfabesi, Latin 
harfleri esas alınarak 1.IX.1928 gün 
ve 1353 sayılı kanunla tespit ve 
kabul edilmiştir. Bu kanuna göre de 
alfabemizde 8'i ünlü 21'i ünsüz 29 
harf vardır.  
Türkçe asıllı kelimelerde 
bulunmayan ve Batı dillerinden 
dilimize giren kelimelerde 
karşılaştığımız Q, W ve X harfleri 
alfabemizde yer almamakla beraber 
TDK'nun çıkardığı Imlâ 
Kılavuzu'nda bu harflere temasla 
sözlük, dizin ve ansiklopedilerdeki 
sırası belirtilmiştir. 
As is known, the Turkish alphabet, 
taking the base of Latin letters, was 
established and approved on 
September 1, 1928 and with law 
number 1353. According to this 
law, there are 8 vowels, 21 
consonants, 29 letters in our 
alphabet.  
The letters Q, W, and X--which are 
not found in words of Turkish 
origin, but are encountered in words 
that entered our language from 
Western languages--even though 
they are not included in our 
alphabet, their placement in 
dictionaries, indices, and 
encyclopedias is indicated in the 
Spelling Guide put out by the TDK.  
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While reaffirming the legal basis for the 29-character Turkish alphabet, Boz 
nonetheless goes on to remark that “alphabet is an ends not a means” (“alfabe, amaç 
değil bir araçtır”) and echo Tigris’ insistence that the decision of whether or not to adopt 
foreign loanletters into the Turkish alphabet should not be clouded by emotion:  “In my 
opinion, by acting rationally and thinking soundly, we will come to a good result.  Most 
often, however, our national sensitivities cause us to err in making the appropriate 
decisions.”  (“Bence soğukkanlı davranarak ve sağlıklı düşünerek iyi bir sonuca 
varabiliriz. Milli duygusallığımız ise bizi çoğu kere isabetli kararlar almada 
yanıltmıştır.”)   
The day after Boz’s remarks were posted, the head of the Turkish Language 
Society, Şükrü Halûk Akalın, submitted an official statement concerning the society’s 
position on Turkish orthographic conventions and the adoption of foreign loanletters.  It 
read:   
 
Alfabemizi belirleyen 1353 sayılı 
yasada Q, X, W gibi harfler 
bulunmamaktadır. Bu ve benzeri 
harfler Türkçe sözlerde 
kullanılmamakta, ancak alıntı 
sözlerle karşımıza çıkmaktadır. 
Eski alıntılardaki bu sesler, 
Türkçede en yakın ses ve harfle 
karşılanmıştır. Bu tür sözleri 
alfabemizdeki harflerle 
kullanıyoruz: ‘taxi’ > taksi, ‘quarz’ 
> kuvars, ‘wagon’ > vagon... 
Ancak son yıllarda dilimize giren 
Letters such as Q, X, and W are not 
found in law number 1353 which 
defines our alphabet. These and 
similar letters are not used in 
Turkish words, only in loanwords 
do they confront us.  Such sounds 
found in old loanwords, were 
represented by the closest sound 
and letter in Turkish.  We use these 
types of words with letters from our 
alphabet: ‘taxi’ > ‘taksi,’ ‘quarz’ 
[sic] > ‘kuvars,’ ‘wagon’ > 
‘vagon’… 
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‘show’ gibi kimi yabancı sözlerde 
bu harflerin kullanımı gündeme 
gelmiştir. TDK olarak, bu sözlerin 
Türkçelerinin kullanılmasının daha 
doğru olacağına inanıyoruz.  
However, in recent years, use of 
these letters in some foreign words 
that have entered our language, 
such as ‘show,’ has come under 
discussion.  As the TDK, we 
believe that usage of the Turkish 
form of these words would be more 
correct. 
 
Although its long history suggests a preference for coining Turkish lexical 
alternatives over adopting foreign loanwords, the Turkish Language Society seems to 
acknowledge in this official position paper the tremendous challenge of sustaining 
absolute linguist purism and indicate a willingness to accept foreign borrowings on the 
condition that they are transliterated into the existing Turkish alphabet.  The gist of the 
Society’s statement was thus to reiterate the legal status of the Turkish alphabet and 
assert the TDK’s position that transliterating foreign loanwords using the 29 existing 
letters, although not ideal, was nonetheless preferable to adopting foreign loanletters.   
While coming out strongly against spelling foreign loanwords with foreign 
loanletters, however, the TDK statement ends by arguing the far greater importance of 
reversing the more troubling recent trend toward spelling Turkish or Turkified words 
with foreign letters or letter combinations (e.g., writing Taksim as “Taxim” or yemiş as 
“yemish”).  Thus, while the TDK appears to acknowledge that language is not inviolable 
and that loanwords will ultimately wend their way into Turkish, it stalwartly advocates 
retaining the sanctity of the alphabet--arguably a more circumscribed, and hence more 
 385 
easily defensible, subject than the language itself--with the entailed understanding, read 
injunction, that foreign loanwords be subject to Turkification.   
Legalistic arguments in favor of banning loanletters from the alphabet being 
naturally limited, they soon gave way to linguistic arguments, such as that advanced in a 
20 November posting by Adnan Atabek.  Reminding fellow Turkoloji-L members of the 
mathematical logic behind the one-to-one relationship between sound and symbol upon 
which the Turkish alphabet is based, Atabek focuses on the letter x, arguing against its 
adoption on the grounds that it violates this fundamental principle by representing a 
combination of two separate phonemes, [k] and [s].  He writes:   
 
Turkce'de 'x' isteyen beyler, eger, 
'kisa' sozcugunu 'xa' biciminde daha 
ekonomik yazmak için istiyorlarsa, 
kendilerine bir hatirlatmam var: 
Turkce, fonetik ve alfabetik bir 
dildir. Bir ses matematigidir. Her 
'ses'in bir 'im'i vardır. Bati dilleri ise 
yarı-alfabetik dillerdir. Alfabetik-
ideogramatik dillerdir. Bu da, 
bircok dilden soz ve kural 
aldiklarindan, ses-im ilisiginin 
yitmesi sonucudur. Yani 'x'e iki ses 
yuklemek ileri degil geri vitestir. 
For those gentlemen who want an 
‘x’ in Turkish, if they want it in 
order to write the word ‘kisa’ in the 
more economic form ‘xa,’ I have 
one reminder for them: Turkish is a 
phonetic and alphabetic language. 
A sound is mathematical. Each 
‘sound’ has a ‘symbol.’ Western 
languages, however, are half-
alphabetic languages. They are 
alphabetic-ideogrammatic 
languages. For this reason, the loss 
of relation between sound and 
symbol is the result of the 
vocabulary and grammatical rules 
taken from a number of other 
languages. In other words, loading 
the ‘x’ with two sounds is backward 
not forward gear.  
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Şahin also addresses the sanctity of the sound/symbol relationship in two follow-
on opinion pieces posted to Turkoloji-L on the 24th and 25th of November respectively.  
In the first article, while acknowledging the fundamental importance of the one-to-one 
phoneme/grapheme correlation to Turkish orthography, Şahin nonetheless notes that the 
fractured nature of the contemporary linguistic marketplace lends itself to a shift in 
orthographic practice away from such fundamentals such that the letter c--which 
represents the phoneme /dʒ/ in Turkish--is often pronounced /s/ or /k/ as it is in many 
foreign languages.  As a result, foreign loanwords such as center and café, which were 
once rendered sentır and kafe in keeping with Turkish orthographic rules, are now spelled 
according to the original English or French.  By contrast, instances of /dʒ/ being 
represented in native Turkish words by the letter combination dj instead of c are 
becoming ever more common.  He writes:   
 
1928'de kabul ettigimiz yeni Türk 
alfabesinin fonetik bir alfabe 
oldugunu hakli bir övünçle 
söylüyoruz. Fonetik alfabe demek, 
her harfin tek bir sesi karsiladigi 
alfabe demektir. Ancak son 
zamanlarda bakiyoruz o tek harf 
çok farkli biçimlerde okunabiliyor. 
Örnegin Cumhuriyet kelimesinin en 
basinda bulunan 'C' harfi, 'cafe'de 
'k', 'center'da 's' olarak da 
seslendiriliyor. 
Dün karsi komsum Hakki Devrim 
de degindi: Adam firmasinin adini 
'Eskidji' koymus ama 'Eskici' olarak 
With justified pride, we say that the 
new Turkish alphabet adopted in 
1928 is a phonetic alphabet. To say 
a phonetic alphabet, is to say an 
alphabet in which every letter 
represents just one sound. However, 
lately we see that this single letter 
can be read in many different ways. 
For example, the letter ‘C’ found at 
the beginning of the word 
Cumhuriyet [republic] can be 
pronounced both in ‘café’ as ‘k’ and 
in ‘center’ as ‘s’. 
Yesterday, even my cross-the-way 
neighbor, Hakki Devrim, touched 
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okunmasini istiyor. 'dj' ne 
zamandan beri yeniden 'c' olarak 
okunuyor? 
on it: A man gave his company the 
name ‘Eskidji’ but wants it to be 
read as ‘Eskici.’ Since when is ‘dj’ 
read as the new ‘c’? 
 
In the second article, Şahin reviews some of the recommendations he received from 
readers concerning adoption of foreign loanletters and the Turkish alphabet in general, 
with a critical eye toward suggestions that violate the phonetic logic of the Turkish 
alphabet.  He writes:   
 
En radikal fikir, internet ortamina 
ve küresellesmeye uyum saglamak 
için yeni harfler almanin yani sira, 
s, ç, ö, ü, g gibi harfleri 
alfabemizden atma önerisiydi. Bu 
görüse göre, örnegin s harfi sh ile 
karsilanabilir, ö harfi karsiliginda 
oe harfleri kullanilabilirdi. O zaman 
örnegin yönetmen Serif Gören adini 
Sherif Goeren olarak yazacakti... 
Yeni Türk alfabesinin her sesi tek 
harfle karsilamaya çalisan fonetik 
mantigi ile çelisen bir öneriydi bu.  
The most radical idea was a 
suggestion to throw letters such as 
ş, ç, ö, ü, and ğ out of our alphabet 
in order to accept new letters and so 
harmonize with the internet 
environment and globalization. 
According to this view, the letter ş, 
for example, could be represented 
by sh and the letters oe could be 
used to represent the letter ö. In that 
case, for example, the name of 
director Şerif Gören could be 
written as Sherif Goeren… What 
this is is a suggestion that 
contradicts the operant phonetic 
logic of the Turkish alphabet that 
every sound is represented by a 
single letter.  
 
Objections such as those voiced by Atabek and Şahin suggest that for some 
contributors, the adoption of foreign loanletters raised concerns not simply because they 
represent foreign sounds and external influence, but because they constitute a threat to the 
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fundamental cultural logic of Turkey’s orthographic system, thereby offering further 
evidence of the notion that concerns over orthographic purity are of a deeper-level 
ideological order that transcends issues of sound-symbol representation to speak directly 
to fundamental cultural precepts within the society.   
This same notion of a one-to-one phoneme-to-grapheme relationship led other 
contributors to not only reject the adoption of foreign loanletters but also take the 
opportunity to contest the inclusion of certain letters in the original alphabet.  For 
example, listserver member Turhan Tisinli’s recommendation against adopting the letter 
x into the Turkish alphabet in a 22 November posting is accompanied by a critique of the 
letter ğ and a suggestion that the letter j ought to be removed from the current Turkish 
alphabet.  He writes:   
 
Benim Turk abecesiyle112 iki 
sorunum var. Birincisi ‘j’ harfidir, 
ikincisi de yumusak g sesi icin ozel 
bir harf bulunmasidir.  ‘X’  
Turkceye ne kadar yabanci ise,  ‘j’ 
de o kadar yabancidir.  Bu harf 
yalniz yabanci kokenli sozcuklerde 
kullanilmaktadir , ozel olarak 
Fransizca kokenlilerinde.  ‘ks’ 
I have two problems with the 
Turkish alphabet.  The first is the 
letter ‘j,’ the second is the existence 
of a special letter for the sound 
represented by the soft g.  However 
foreign ‘x’ is to Turkish, ‘j’ is just 
as foreign.  This letter is only used 
in words with foreign roots, 
especially those with French roots.  
                                               
112 In his contributions to the online discussion, Tisinli appears to have taken especial 
care to avoid using foreign lexical borrowings of any provenance, going so far as to use 
less common Turkish variants rather than the well-integrated English, Arabic, and 
Persian loanwords more commonly employed (i.e., abece vs. alfabe, sorun vs. problem, 
sözcük vs. kelime, -e dek vs. –e kadar, orneğin vs. mesala, ya da vs. veya, yeğlemek vs. 
tercih etmek).  I have highlighted such lexical choices in red characters, as his seemingly 
deliberate preference for “native” terms works to reinforce his argument against even 
long-accepted and well-integrated foreign linguistic influence.   
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degerinde olan ‘x’i almayalim, 
‘j’den de kurtulalim.  ‘J’li 
sozcukleri Turkcelestirene dek 
onlardaki ‘j’lerin yerine ‘c’ 
kullanabiliriz, ornegin  jeoloji >> 
“ceoloci” >> “ceyoloci” (ya da 
ciyoloci) (tabi “yerbilim”i 
yeglemeliyiz). 
Let us not accept the ‘x’ with the 
value “ks,” let us be rescued from 
the ‘j’.  Until words with ‘j’ are 
Turkified, we can use ‘c’ in place of 
‘j,’ for example jeoloji >> “ceoloci” 
>> “ceyoloci” (or even ciyoloci) (of 
course, we must prefer “earth 
science”). 
 
Within the context of debate over the acceptance of the foreign loanletters x, q, 
and w, Tisinli’s focus on perceived flaws in the existing alphabet seems incongruous, but 
scholars of language purism note that such zeal is not uncommon.  Although advocates of 
linguistic purism tend to focus on the languages--or, by extension, the orthographic 
elements--currently perceived as threatening and hence targeted as foreign, Annamalai 
(1979) notes the existence of a complementary tendency toward rehashing the past.  
Thus, when confronting linguistic or orthographic pressure, purists become both 
prospective and retrospective, seeking to not only prevent future contamination but also 
undo past foreign-sourced linguistic influence.  Within this context, however, 
retrospective review, rather than serving to undermine existing linguistic or orthographic 
systems, seeks to reinforce their authority by rendering their underlying logic sound, 
flawless, and hence unassailable.  Thus, for Tisinli, the inclusion of certain characters in 
the original Turkish alphabet does not grant them immunity from contemporary criticism.  
Focusing on the letter j, Tisinli notes that the words in which it appears are uniformly 
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foreign borrowings113 and suggests that continued use of the letter serves only to prevent 
such loanwords from being fully Turkified, in much the same way retention of the Arabic 
kāf (voiceless velar plosive) in 1928 would have complicated the elimination or 
assimilation of Arabic and Persian borrowings.   
Given Atatürk’s original admonition against admitting letters for the sole purpose 
of representing foreign words which had “infiltrated” Turkish (c.f., chapter five), it is 
reasonable to ask how the letter j came to have been included in the Turkish alphabet of 
1928 in the first place.  A look at the contemporaneous Turkic world provides one answer 
insofar as the Latin-based alphabet of Azerbaijan adopted in 1922 included both a letter 
representing the phoneme /ʒ/--although the letter in question was ƶ, not j--as well as the 
letter j--although that letter represented the phoneme /j/ not /ʒ/.  Another answer can be 
found through an examination of the history of Turkish orthographic reform which 
suggests that this exception to the principle of a one-to-one, sound-to-symbol relationship 
is best explained by recalling Weinstein’s (1989) observation that language purists know 
the enemy well.  At the time of the Turkish alphabet reform, Atatürk and his advisors 
were chiefly concerned with omitting letters that represented non-native sounds prevalent 
in Arabic and Persian borrowings, as these languages then constituted the greatest threat 
to the Turkish language, and the retention of such characters would have allowed 
loanwords to resist being eliminated or even Turkified.  Nearly seventy-five years later, 
                                               
113 The lack of any entries beginning with the letter j in İsmet Zeki Eyuboğlu’s Türk 
Dilinin Etimoloji Sözlüğü (Etymology Dictionary of the Turkish Language) published in 
1988 is telling of the fact that all words beginning with the letter j are loanwords. 
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Western languages have overtaken those from the East as the primary source for foreign 
borrowings, so it is only natural that a letter whose function is limited to Western 
loanwords would come under the scrutiny of a new generation of purists.   
After laying forth his ideological objections to the inclusion of the letter j in the 
Turkish alphabet, Tisinli turns to the practical, arguing that the Turkish letter c (/dʒ/), 
which represents a sound sufficiently close to that represented by the foreign letter j (/ʒ/) 
as to be virtually interchangeable to Turkish speakers, renders the latter superfluous.  
Although Tisinli goes on to offer a variety of alternate Turkish spellings for loanwords 
containing the letter j, he ultimately concludes by emphasizing that the need to find a 
Turkish proxy for j would be eliminated altogether were Turkish equivalents to be 
created for foreign borrowings, thereby reaffirming the enduring power of the hegemonic 
belief that foreign letters enter the language via loanwords.   
It is important to emphasize that Tisinli’s objection to the letter j was not simply 
that it was “foreign” to Turkish, but that it was used primarily in loanwords of Western 
origin and offered no salient distinction from the Turkish letter it most closely 
approximated.  Seen in this light, Tisinli’s criticism of j and recommendation that it be 
removed can be understood as a valiant effort to protect the fundamental linguistic logic 
of the Turkish alphabet even as it shone a harsh light on an accepted constituent 
character.  In this sense, Tisinli’s justification for removing the letter j from the Turkish 
alphabet echoes arguments raised in support of barring adoption of the loanletters q, x, 
and w--namely protection of the purity of the Turkish alphabet and, by extension, the 
integrity of the language itself.   
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Thus, while some contributors to the debate define the orthographic ideal as the 
29-letter alphabet ratified on 1 November 1928 by Law 1353 “On the Adoption and 
Application of the Turkish Alphabet” and retained along with seven other so-called 
reform laws in the 1982 Turkish Constitution, Tisinli suggests a new ideal--one in which 
all letters of the alphabet are appraised in accordance with their merits and retained or 
eliminated on the basis of their ability to represent a pure linguistic standard.  In essence, 
then, Tisinli’s posting suggests that the foreign character of a letter rests not with the 
length of its tenure in the Turkish alphabet, but rather its clear adherence to the 
fundamental logic of Turkish orthography.  As such, his advocacy against continued 
inclusion of certain original, but, in his estimation, unnecessary, letters offers a clear 
counterpart to Tigris’ recommendation that letters ought not to be excluded from the 
Turkish alphabet based solely on their original omission.   
 
EDUCATIONAL AND SOCIOCULTURAL RAMIFICATIONS: FOREIGN LOANLETTERS AS 
AGENTS OF WESTERN IMPERIALISM AND CULTURAL ANNIHILATION 
Although legal and linguistic arguments continue to be raised throughout the 
debate, the bulk of the discussion ultimately turns to the perceived social ramifications of 
adopting foreign loanletters into the Turkish alphabet.  Picking up from Şahin’s initial 
criticisms concerning the invasiveness of foreign loanletters to critique his suggestion 
that they be preemptively adopted into the Turkish alphabet, later contributors are even 
more direct in linking foreign loanletters to the threat of cultural imperialism and the loss 
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of both language and culture.  Alper Beşe, for one, takes Şahin himself to task in an email 
rejoinder submitted to Turkoloji-L on 24 November for suggesting that in order to 
participate in the increasingly technologically interlinked global environment, Turks will 
find it ever more necessary to employ foreign loanletters.  Quoting from Şahin’s “Our 
Alphabet and Realities” article: “Like it or not, we will be forced to use these letters.  
This will be even more the case in this era of globalization driven by American cultural 
hegemony.” (“Bu harfleri, istesek de istemesek de, kullanmak zorunda birakiliyoruz. 
Küresellesme döneminde Amerikan kültürünün egemenligi sürdükçe daha da 
birakilacagiz”), Beşe responds by first questioning whether the future “realities” Şahin 
paints are inevitable and then offers the prospect of an even bleaker future should foreign 
loanletters be adopted into the Turkish alphabet on the basis of such spurious 
justifications.   
 
Neden [alinti harflar] kullanmak 
zorunda bırakılalım? Başka dillerde 
konuşurken ve yazarken tabii ki bu 
harfleri kullanacağız ama bu harfler 
neden böyle bir gerekçeyle dilimize 
girsin? Siz bir yandan 
anaokulundan üniversiteye kadar 
bütün eğitim kurumlarınızdan 
Türkçe’yi kovacaksınız, bir yandan 
Türkçe kelimeleri Ingilizce 
imlasıyla yazacaksınız (yemish vs.) 
bir yandan da dilimizde karşılığı 
olmayan harfleri (Kaynak: Şükrü 
Haluk Akalın'ın Haluk Şahin'e 
Why should we be left with the 
need to use [foreign loanletters]? 
We will, of course, use these letters 
when speaking and writing in other 
languages, but why let these letters 
enter our language with such a 
justification? On the one hand 
you’ll drive Turkish out of 
educational institutions from 
primary school to university, on the 
other hand you’ll write Turkish 
words with the English orthography 
(yemish, etc.), and on the other 
hand you will try to stick letters that 
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cevabı) sırf komplekslerinizden114 
dolayı alfabemize sokmaya 
çalışacaksınız.  
have no representation in our 
language (Source: Şükrü Halûk 
Akalın’s answer to Haluk Şahin) 
into our language purely because of 
your complexes. 
 
Beşe’s particular disquiet with the effect of foreign loanletters on cultural 
continuity, particularly within the schools where children are formally enculturated, 
echoes concerns expressed in the TDK’s official policy statement of the projected 
pedagogical confusion that would undoubtedly result from accepting foreign letters into 
the Turkish alphabet.  While the TDK opined that the use of foreign letters for internet 
addresses and the personal names of foreigners presented no problem as these letters 
already existed on a standard keyboard, it abjured adopting them into the alphabet 
arguing that there were no Turkish words containing these letters that could highlighted 
in aid of teaching children their ABCs.  In the words of the TDK: “When these letters are 
accepted into the alphabet, which words will you present to teach the letters in question to 
our children to whom we teach reading in the first grade of primary school?”  The 
statement continues: “Such a practice accomplishes nothing other than increasing foreign 
elements in the language” (“Bu harfler alfabeye alındığında ilkokulda birinci sınıfta 
yazıyı öğrettiğimiz çocuklarımıza söz konusu harfleri hangi sözleri örnek göstererek 
öğreteceksiniz?  Böyle bir uygulama, dildeki yabancı ögeleri artırmaktan başka bir işe 
                                               
114 In this and subsequent excerpts, I will highlight English loanwords in blue characters 
in an effort to demonstrate the degree to which foreign lexical borrowings pervade daily 
spoken Turkish.  It is particularly ironic to note the use of such loanwords within the 
context of a discussion over the increasing prevalence of foreign loanletters and their 
purported link to foreign lexical borrowings.  
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yaramaz”).  While it might be argued that foreign loanwords, given their abundance and 
widespread acceptance, could easily be employed to teach the letters q, x, and w, to 
institute such a pedagogical practice would mean honoring the spelling conventions of 
the originating languages, which ultimately would not only undermine the TDK’s policy 
of spelling loanwords with the closest Turkish letters but also reinforce the practice of 
lexical borrowing that the TDK has long sought to stem.   
Beşe goes on to warn fellow listserver members of the slippery slope toward 
linguistic and cultural subjugation that he perceives to be the inevitable result of adopting 
foreign elements into the Turkish alphabet.  He writes:   
 
Türkçe, Türk milletinin bağımsızlık 
sembolüdür. Bugün okullardan 
Türkçeyi atanların, alfabeye bizim 
olmayan harfleri sokmaya 
kalkanların yarın bağımsızlığın 
diğer alameti olan bayrağımız 
üzerinde değişiklik yapmaya 
kalkmayacağının garantisini kim 
verebilir? 
Turkish is the symbol of 
independence of the Turkish nation. 
Who can guarantee that those who 
throw Turkish out of the schools 
and those who get it into their heads 
to stick letters we don’t have into 
our alphabet today won’t set out 
tomorrow to make changes to our 
flag, that other symbol of our 
independence? 
 
Şahin, meanwhile, has found new grounds for concern over the threat posed to 
Turkish culture by the barrage of foreign loanletters to which the language is subjected.  
In an editorial for Radikal posted to the Turkoloji-L website on November 24, he returns 
to an issue mentioned in passing in his initial editorial--the pronunciation of loanletters--
claiming that the infiltration of foreign letters, which he previously identified as the result 
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of linguistic imperialism, were themselves furthering forces of linguistic imperialism.  He 
writes:   
 
Amerikan Cumhurbaskani’nin 
adinin George W. Bush oldugunu 
biliyoruz. Haberciler Corc Dablyu 
Bus diye okuyorlar. Tabii, ‘dablyu’ 
(çift-u) dediklerinde Ingilizce 
konusmus oluyorlar. 
Kültürel hegemonyanin böylesi de 
az görülmüstür: Adamlar adlarini 
okuturken kendi dillerini 
konusturuyorlar. 
We know that the American 
president’s name is George W. 
Bush. Newscasters read it as 
George double-u Bush.” Of course 
in saying ‘dablyu’ (double-u) they 
become virtual English speakers. 
Rarely has cultural hegemony such 
as this been seen. By having their 
names read, these folks force their 
own languages to be spoken. 
 
The concern over the pernicious influence of foreign loanletters on cultural 
integrity Şahin expresses in this editorial surpasses even that of the TDK, which finds the 
use of loanletters in foreign names unproblematic:  “There is no obstacle to the use of 
these letters in proper names of foreign origin” (“Yabancı kaynaklı özel adlarda bu 
harflerin kullanılmasına engel yok”).  In contrast, Şahin suggests that the mere act of 
uttering the names of foreign letters in the original turns one into a speaker of the 
originating language and thus declares it an overt act of linguistic imperialism to impose 
foreign pronunciations on Turkish speakers.  To Şahin’s mind, moreover, it would seem 
that there is no question of speakers choosing to eschew foreign pronunciations--the 
cultural imperatives of American-led globalism compel their use.  Here again, Şahin’s 
focus is on the United States as the source of foreign adulteration of Turkish culture, and 
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his objections are once more couched in well-worn discourses of the evils of Western 
imperialism and cultural hegemony.   
 
TO REJECT, TO BORROW, OR TO APPROPRIATE:  THAT IS THE QUESTION 
At this point, let us step back for a moment to examine the deeper ideological 
assumptions behind fears of cultural annihilation roused among Turkoloji-L members and 
within the larger society by proposals endorsing the adoption of the letters q, x, and w 
into the Turkish alphabet.  First, it is essential to acknowledge a certain logic to the 
proposal.  If what was so irksome about the loanletters q, w, and x was the distasteful 
matter of their being foreign, which left the average Turkish citizen unschooled in 
pronunciation or proper use, yet these characters nonetheless seemed to have taken hold, 
what then was to be done?  While banning the use of foreign characters offered an 
obvious solution to the conundrum, it was unlikely to prove effective, given the inroads 
these loanletters had already made and the TDK’s lack of legal authority to enforce such 
a ban.  Alternatively, the letters could be deprived of the stature accorded them by their 
foreignness through incorporation into the Turkish alphabet.  Although seemingly 
counterintuitive, this suggestion springs from the belief that foreign elements, once 
assimilated and normalized, lose their mystique and social cachet and hence their ability 
to influence or power to threaten.   
Moreover, as contributor Tevfik Turan aptly points out, further support for this 
line of reasoning can be found in a longstanding Turkish tactic for subverting forced 
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assimilation and thereby diffusing the forces of cultural annihilation--namely the practice 
of takiye.  Takiye is an Arabic-derived loanword meaning “hidden,” “concealed,” or 
“protected,” which is generally associated with the 106th verse of the 16th Sura (Bee Sura 
or Nahl Suresi) of the Koran in which a Muslim is spared Allah’s wrath for renouncing 
(inkâr etmek) his faith only if he is forced to do so and thus commits this sacrilege in bad 
faith, all the while preserving his true beliefs in his heart.115  Extrapolated from its 
religious connotation, takiye is understood to be the act of subverting an imposed alien 
practice even as one professes outward adherence to it.   
In the same posting in which he welcomes the “stranger” to their midst, Turan 
makes reference to the concept of takiye in characterizing the position of those who 
would entertain the notion of adopting foreign loanletters into the Turkish alphabet.  He 
writes:   
 
Başlangıçta, WC'ler yoluyla 
giriştiği “sızma harekâtı” boyunca 
görmezden gelebildiğimiz, ama 
sonra “pıtrak gibi” çoğalarak 
minibüs yazılarına bile girerek 
“başımıza dert” olan, “sırnaşık” ve 
daha da ötesi, “kültür 
emperyalizmi” çağrışımlı w harfine 
In the beginning, we were able to 
ignore its “infiltration maneuvers” 
by way of WCs, but later, as it 
spread “like a burr” and appeared 
even in the writing on minibuses, 
crying out “troublesome,” 
“pertinacious” and further yet 
“cultural imperialism” we say let’s 
                                               
115 In English translation, the sura reads: “Those who disbelieve in God, after having 
acquired faith, and become fully content with disbelief, have incurred wrath from God. 
The only ones to be excused are those who are forced to profess disbelief, while their 
hearts are full of faith.” Quoted from Quran. The Final Testament by Rashad Khalifa, 
found at http://www.godsmosque.org/html/quran/sura16.html, last accessed August 2, 
2011. 
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artık bir “takiye” yapalım da 
alfabemize alalım, diyoruz; 
otuzuncu harfimiz olarak kafa 
kâğıdı alırsa, büyük kusuru olan 
yabancı statüsü de kendiliğinden 
kalkacaktır, düşüncesiyle.  
engage in “takiye” already and 
accept the letter w into our 
alphabet, with the thought that if it 
takes out citizenship as our thirtieth 
letter, its greatly deficient foreign 
status will be spontaneously lifted.  
 
Expressing skepticism that formal recognition would serve to neutralize foreign 
loanletters and holding firm to his belief that judicious borrowing was preferable, Turan 
ridicules those Turks who, upon realizing that turning a blind eye to the rampant 
proliferation of these letters across the Turkish landscape is no longer viable, take to 
decrying them as instruments of cultural imperialism, yet simultaneously propose 
adopting them into the alphabet in the misguided belief that by thus engaging in takiye 
they will be able to cleverly subvert the forces of global hegemony and reassert control 
over the renegade characters.   
Despite the cultural logic supporting this line of reasoning, however, the 
numerous objections it provoked clearly signal the presence of equally deep-seated 
ideological assumptions that run counter to it, and as a result, mitigate the proposed 
solution’s efficacy.  Outside the digital confines of the Turkoloji-L orthographic debates, 
discussions with Turkish language professionals and interested laypersons that focused 
on the issues surrounding foreign orthographic influence ultimately revealed that, after 
the full gamut of linguistic-based arguments had been exhausted, the primary objection to 
adopting foreign letters was rooted in the fundamental belief that it is the colonized and 
the weak that are obliged to accept the cultural devices, linguistic or otherwise, of more 
powerful groups.  That Turkey should be characterized as weak, even if part of a 
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deliberate illusion in the service of takiye, was wholly unpalatable to most Turks who, 
despite recent academic preoccupation116 with the specter of a persistent inferiority 
complex manifest in the purported Turkish proclivity to place greater value on Western 
trappings than on their own traditions and forsake their own culture for Western 
alternatives, nonetheless generally view their society as the proud inheritor of an ancient 
civilization and powerful former empire and consider their alphabet, despite its relative 
recency and clear indebtedness to Western precursors, to be part of their cultural heritage.  
Indeed, Ataturk himself was careful to nurture this feeling of ownership over the Latin-
based alphabet by always referring to it as the “Turkish alphabet” (Mango 1999:494).   
As such, the suggestion that loanletters be adopted into the Turkish alphabet was 
widely perceived as tantamount to open acceptance of Turkey’s second-class status in the 
global community.  Nor could such an admission be softened by the suggestion that 
adopting the loanletters was merely an act of takiye or that to accept foreign letters was to 
expropriate them and thereby proactively preempt the forces of cultural imperialism that 
would impose them.  In this sense, objections among Turkoloji-L contributors to Şahin’s 
offhand proposal that foreign letters be adopted into the Turkish alphabet, even when 
expressed in legal and linguistic terms, ultimately revolved around the notion of Turkish 
national identity and sociopolitical standing within the changing world order.   
 
                                               
116 Several contributors allude to the existence of a Turkish inferiority complex (aşağılık 
kompleksleri), including Tevfik Turan in the posting in which he welcomes the “stranger” 
to our midst. 
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TURKIC UNITY AND REGIONAL POWER: CENTRAL ASIA AND TURKEY’S NEW 
REGIONAL ROLE 
In describing the emergence of movements for linguistic purism, Annamalai 
notes: “There are certain conditions some or all of which must be present for the puristic 
regulations to emerge in any language,” primary among them a “social order [that] is 
undergoing change with power relations redefined” (1979:36).  Insofar as social and 
political upheaval create an environment conducive to the emergence of linguistic 
purism, it naturally follows that support for language and alphabet reform first emerged 
in the waning days of the Ottoman Empire and was pursued in earnest during the early 
years of the Turkish republic.  Nor should it come as any surprise that concerns over 
linguistic and orthographic purity have reemerged in the aftermath of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union.   
Until this point in the orthography debates, the arguments presented for and 
against the adoption of foreign loanletters have largely suggested a heightened concern 
with linguistic purism developed in response to the perceived threat of increasing 
Western influence within the context of a changing global order.  As emerges in later 
contributions to the debates, however, it is the very nature of the new world order and its 
local significance to Turkish interests--in particular, the specific threats and opportunities 
it presents--that have complicated the pursuit of linguistic and orthographic purism within 
the country.   
As discussed at greater length in previous chapters, the end of the Cold War 
precipitated a crisis in Turkey’s foreign policy orientation, which had long been based on 
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its role as a “buffer state” between the Soviet Union and the West.  Although Ankara 
moved quickly to reaffirm its relationship with the West and guarantee its continued 
international standing, the emergence of the United States as the sole remaining 
superpower also heightened fears within Turkey of American imperialism and increased 
Western influence--fears that are clearly reflected within the discourse of the online 
orthographic debates.  Meanwhile, the fall of the Soviet Union had the additional effect 
of awakening long dormant aspirations within segments of the Turkish public that dreamt 
of laying claim to the country’s envisioned destiny as the leader of a powerful union of 
Turkic peoples.  It was during this period that the talk of “Turkic brotherhood” was 
common, the slogan “Bir millet, iki devlet” (“One people, two states”) was conceived, 
and the ortak dil and ortak alfabe projects were pursued in earnest.  Although at its height 
in the direct aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, the east-west push-pull of the post 
Cold War environment produced long-lasting ripple effects within Turkish society that 
could still be felt nearly a decade later in the discourse of the online orthography debates.   
Thus, although the early focus of the debates was on the threat of Western--
particularly American--imperialism, the course of discussion did inevitably turn to the 
potential effects of adopting loanletters on Turkey’s relations with its eastern neighbors--
namely the Turkic peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus.  Şahin first draws attention 
to this larger global aspect of Turkish orthographic politics in the post-Cold War era, by 
noting that many of the Latin-based alphabets adopted by the fledgling Turkic republics 
of Central Asia contain two of the same letters that had infiltrated Turkey from the West.  
In a 24 November editorial for Radikal, he writes:   
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Asya'daki Türk cumhuriyetlerinin 
bizim alfabemizi oldugu gibi kabul 
etmek yerine Latin harfleriyle yeni 
alfabeler olusturmalari isleri daha 
da karistirdi. Örnegin, yeni Azeri 
alfabesinde x harfi de var q harfi de.  
The business of the Turkish 
republics in Asia creating new 
alphabets with Latin letters in place 
of accepting our alphabet as such is 
even more complicated. For 
example, there is a letter x and also 
a letter q in the new Azeri alphabet.  
 
Within this expanded geolinguistic context, the question then becomes how the 
letters q, x, and w could be rejected as foreign elements and Western impositions if these 
very same letters:  (1) represented sounds within non-standard Turkish (i.e., sounds 
accepted as being part of the historical and dialectical variation within Turkey), (2) had 
been adopted in the alphabets of many of the Central Asian republics to represent sounds 
still in active use in these related Turkic languages, and (3) were included in the ortak 
alfabe devised jointly by Turkish and Turkic language professionals to represent the 
fundamental sounds of the Turkic language family.   
The implied cognitive dissonance is perhaps best understood through reference to 
the semiotic concept of the “floating signifier,”117 in which a single signifier is 
understood to have multiple or shifting signifieds depending on time, place and the 
                                               
117 The concept of the “floating signifier,” derived from semiotics, was first coined by 
Claude Lévi-Strauss in to reference a signifier that lacks a referent.  In the glossary of his 
book Semiotics: The Basics, Daniel Chandler defines floating signifiers as “a signifier 
with a vague, highly variable, unspecifiable or non-existent signified. Such signifiers 
mean different things to different people: they may stand for many or even any signifieds; 
they may mean whatever their interpreters want them to mean” (2002:250). In a speech 
titled “Race: A Floating Signified?” Stuart Hall suggests that the concept of race operates 
as a floating signifier.  
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idiosyncrasies of individual perception.  Thus to some participants in the online 
orthography debates the letters x, q and w are unabashed symbols of Western linguistic 
hegemony and the imperialist threat to “Turkishness,” while to others, they mark the 
distinctive sound system of the Turkic languages and the as yet untapped potential for a 
greater sociocultural and geopolitical union of Turkic peoples.  In this sense, juxtaposed 
against the numerous objections to adopting foreign loanletters that had infiltrated from 
the West, the revelation that some of the very same letters were in use among the Turkic 
peoples suggests slippage in the relationship between signifier and signified, which, 
enables divergent foreign policy ambitions to be imprinted on three unassuming 
orthographic characters.   
On November 25, Turkoloji-L administrator Mehmet Tutuncu Turkoloji-L posted 
an article that appeared in that day’s edition of the conservative newspaper Yeni Şafak 
which directly addresses the multifaceted character of the foreign loanletters.  Entitled 
“Our Alphabet between Two Q’s” (“Alfabemiz iki Q arasinda”), the article reports on an 
interview with the nationalist poet and writer Yavuz Bülent Bakiler regarding his views 
on orthography and the inclusion of q, w, and x in the Turkish alphabet.  Bakiler, who 
rejects altering the alphabet to accommodate Western loanletters, nonetheless strongly 
recommends the adoption of two of the very same letters (q and x), as well as one or two 
other letters that figure in the contemporary Central Asian alphabets, as a means of 
strengthening both linguistic and social relations among the Turkic peoples.  According 
to Bakiler:   
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Harf alalim ama...  
Alfabemize Q, X, W alinsin mi 
alinmasin mi tartismasi sürerken, 
Türkçe üzerindeki tezleriyle dikkat 
çeken Yavuz Bülent Bakiler 
tartismaya çok farkli bir noktadan 
katildi. Bakiler'e göre de, alfabeye 
acilen yeni harfler eklenmeli, ama 
bu harfler tartismanin odagini 
olusturan ve Bati dillerinde 
kulanilan Q, W ve X harfleri degil. 
Türk alfabesinin bu harflere ihtiyaci 
bulunmadigini dile getiren Bakiler, 
buna karsin Türki 
Cumhuriyet'lerden Türkistan ve 
Azerbaycan'da kullanilan H (X), 
sert K (Q) ve kapali E harflerinin 
acilen Türk alfabesine de alinmasi 
gerektigini söyledi. “Biz kendi 
alfabemizi Bati standartlarina göre 
hazirlamak durumunda degiliz” 
diyen Bakiler, “Ancak Orta 
Asya'yla iliskilerimiz açisindan, 
mutlaka bu ülkelerle ortak bir 
alfabe üzerinde anlasmaliyiz” diye 
konustu.   
Let’s adopt the letters but… 
While the discussion about 
accepting Q, W, and X into our 
alphabet has been ongoing, Yavuz 
Bülent Bakiler who pays attention 
to theses about Turkish, joined the 
discussion from a very different 
note. And according to Bakiler, the 
new letters that are needed in our 
alphabet should be adopted, but not 
the Q, W, and X letters that form 
the focus of these letter discussions 
and are used in the Western 
languages.  Bakiler, who reflects 
that there is no need for these letters 
to be found in the Turkish alphabet, 
in contrast also said that there is an 
urgent necessity to adopt into the 
Turkish alphabet the letters H (X), 
hard K (Q), and closed E that are 
used in the Turkic republics in 
Turkistan and Azerbaijan. Bakiler, 
who says: “we are not in the 
situation of preparing our own 
alphabet according to Western 
standards,” said that “from the 
perspective of relations with 
Central Asia, however, we must 
definitely agree upon a common 
alphabet with these countries. 
 
By shifting the referent of the letters q and x from west to east, from the European 
languages to the Turkic languages, indeed by suggesting that they cannot even be 
considered the same letters insofar as they represent different sounds, Bakiler seeks to 
shift the conversation from Westernism to pan-Turkism and from imperialism to 
intraethnic coalition-building.  In essence, he suggests that it is not the letters themselves 
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that are problematic, but rather the Turkish mentality surrounding them.  In his view, 
rather than rejecting these letters on account of their association with the United States 
and Europe, Turkey should accept them in light of the potential they offer for affiliation 
with the Turkic republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus.   
The article goes on to report Bakiler’s conviction that powerful internal and 
external forces hostile to Turks (“Türk'e düsman”) fear the expanded influence Turkey 
would gain from closer affiliation with the Turkic republics and are actively seeking to 
contain or control the possibility:   
 
Büyümemizden korkuyorlar  
Türkiye'yi yönetenlerin Türk 
dünyasinin büyümesinden endise 
ettiklerini öne süren Bakiler, bu 
potansiyelin hem dis ülkeleri hem 
de bizzat ülke içindeki bir takim 
kesimleri korkuttugunu iddia etti. 
Bakiler, “Kültür degerlerimizin 
ortaya çikmasindan büyük paniye 
kapiliyorlar. Bizzat devletin içinde 
Türk'e düsman olan birtakim 
kimselerin cehaleti vardir. Bir takim 
kimseler 64 milyon nüfusu 
oldugumuzu düsünüyor. Anadolu 
Türklügü disinda 200 milyona 
yakin Türk toplugu daha var” diye 
konustu. Balzac'in “millet edebiyati 
olan bir toplumdur” ve Atatürk'ün 
“Cumhuriyet'in temeli kültürdür” 
sözlerine atifta bulunan Bakiler 
söyle konustu: “Eger millet 
edebiyati olan bir topluluksa, bizim 
kültürümüzün kaynagi Türkistan ve 
They fear our expansion  
Bakiler who puts forth the concern 
of those that run Turkey that the 
Turkic world will expand, insists 
that this potential frightens a 
number of factions both in foreign 
countries and within our own 
country.  “They panic greatly that 
our cultural values will emerge. 
Within our own state, there is the 
ignorance of those people who are 
enemies of Turks. A number of 
those people think that we are 64 
million in population. Outside of 
Anatolian Turkishness, there is also 
a nearly 200 million strong Turkish 
community,” he said. Bakiler, who 
finds a relation between Balzac’s 
words “that which has a national 
language is a society” and Ataturk’s 
word “the foundation of a republic 
is culture,” says the following: 
“If that which has a national 
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Azerbaycan topraklaridir. Bu 
ülkelerle masaya oturup alfabede 
alinmasi gereken harfleri almaliyiz. 
Büyük devlet olmaktan 
korkmamaliyiz.  Baska devletlerin 
korkulari bizi korkutmamali, bizim 
gücümüz olmali. Alfabe birligine 
gitmis olsaydik, Türkiye'yi büyük 
aydinliklara çikartirdik. 
literature is a society, the source of 
our culture is the lands of Turkistan 
and Azerbaijan. Let’s sit down at 
the table with those countries and 
take those letters into our alphabet 
that need to be adopted. Let’s not 
be afraid of being a big state. The 
fears of other states need not 
frighten us.  We must be strong.  
Had we gone toward alphabet unity, 
we would have brought Turkey to 
great brightness. 
 
Bakiler’s support for adopting q and x into the Turkish alphabet is thus neither 
merely a pragmatic matter of enhancing communication with the Turkic peoples nor 
simply a symbolic gesture of embracing the nearly 200 million Turkic peoples who 
comprise the wider Turkic world, but rather a political injunction to Turkey to embrace 
its new role in the world order.  Bakiler contends that it is incumbent on Turkey to 
eschew its protectionist stance and relish the notion of becoming a “big state” (büyük 
devlet) if it is to achieve its potential as regional powerhouse and expand Turkish 
standing and influence in the international community.   
In this sense, Bakiler appears to be suggesting that the adoption of foreign 
loanletters into the Turkish alphabet--when done purposefully rather than by default and 
from a dominant rather than subaltern position--would serve to strengthen rather than 
diminish Turkish sovereignty.  This perspective echoes views outside the bounds of the 
orthographic debates of advocates for the establishment of closer sociocultural and 
geopolitical ties between Turkey and the Turkic people who argued that a greater 
regional role would reinforce Turkey’s strategic importance to the West, and hence serve 
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the dual purpose of strengthening the country’s relative position in the international 
community and greatly diminishing Western influence such that it would no longer pose 
the same degree of threat to Turkish national interests.   
Other contributors to the debate, however, reject Bakiler’s conviction in the 
ability of the prospective loanletters to forge relations with the Turkic peoples and 
strengthen Turkey’s position within the international community.  In a long response 
posted on November 29, Özkan Öztekten, condemns references to the alphabets of the 
Turkic peoples as little more than a ruse to advance the adoption of the foreign 
loanletters.  Summarizing such arguments, he writes:  
 
Üstelik bu harf konusu, sadece Batı 
dil(leri)ni ilgilendirmeyip, Türk 
lehçe ve şivelerini de ilgilendiren 
bir meseleymiş gibi gösterilerek 
haklılığı arttırılmaya çalışılıyor; 
çünkü zaten bizim dükkan 
adlarımızın yarısı Kazakça veya 
Tatarcadır, gazetelerimizin bir 
kısmı Azerbaycan Türkçesiyle 
yayımlanmaktadır, okullarımızda 
diğer Türk halklarının edebi eserleri 
asıllarından okutulmaktadır ya, o 
zaman q veya x işaretlerini 
kullanmamız bu bakımdan da 
yararlıdır. Üstüne üstlük, 
çocuklarımıza bu işaretleri 
öğretirken, kullanıldığı yere göre 
ses değerlerinin değiştiğini de 
açıklamalıyız. Değilse bir öğrenci 
Azeri Türkçesi qorxu “gorhu” 
(korku) sözünü Ingilizceymiş gibi 
okuyabilir. 
In addition this letter topic is trying 
to have its share increased by it 
being demonstrated that it is as if 
this were a problem concerning not 
only the Western language(s), but 
also the Turkic dialects and accents, 
because in fact half of our shop 
names are in Kazakh or Tatar, a 
portion of our newspapers are 
published in Azerbaijan Turkish, 
selections from the classic literary 
works of the other Turkic people 
are taught in our schools, and, thus, 
our use of the q or x characters is 
also worthwhile from this 
perspective. Most importantly, 
when teaching our children these 
letters, we should also explain that 
the value of the sound changes 
depending on the place it is used. If 
not, a student could read Azeri 
Turkish word qorxu “gorhu” 
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(korku) as if it were English. 
 
Öztekten goes on to note that advocates of adopting the letters have even gone so 
far as to invoke the name of Atatürk, hypothesizing that Turkey’s most venerated figure 
would support their adoption were he alive.  Pleading with them not to willfully 
reinterpret Atatürk’s legacy with regard to language, he writes:   
 
Gazete köşelerini tutmuş olan 
yazarlar… bir çok siyasi grubun 
yapmaya çalıştığı tavrını bu konuda 
da sergiliyorlar ve “Atatürk bunları 
bilseydi o da bu harfleri alfabeye 
alırdı” gibi ahkamları savuruyorlar. 
Yapmayın Allah aşkına, bu kadar 
hafife almayın…. Yabancı 
çizmeleri altındaki Türk toprağını 
kurtaran Atatürk, yabancıların 
(sadece batı değil doğu) dillerinin 
ne sözünü ne de harfini alırdı. 
The writers who hold the 
newspapers corners exhibit the 
attitude on this topic that a number 
of political groups have tried to take 
and bluster such pronouncements 
as, “Had Atatürk known this, he 
would have adopted these letters 
into the alphabet.” Don’t do this for 
God’s sake, don’t take it this 
lightly….  Atatürk who rescued the 
Turkish lands from under the boots 
of foreigners would have adopted 
neither the words nor the letters of 
the languages of foreigners (not just 
the west but also the east). 
 
By reminding fellow members of the online forum of Atatürk’s drive to create an 
independent state equally free of influence from the West and the East, Öztekten redirects 
the discussion back from pan-Turkism to nationalism, implying that Turkey would be 
best served by protecting its own national interests rather than overextending itself in aid 
of its Turkic counterparts.  In this sense, Öztekten’s perspective on the loanletters recalls 
Atatürk’s decision nearly seventy years earlier to disappoint pan-Turkist yearnings by 
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renouncing relations with the “outside Turks” (dış Türkler) in favor of securing the core 
of the Turkish state.   
In a rejoinder both to the notion of accepting orthographic borrowings as a gesture 
of fraternity with the Turkic peoples as well as a waypoint along the road to becoming a 
“big state,” and to the notion of rejecting foreign loanletters in deference to national 
sanctity, Taha Akyol takes a more pragmatic approach.  In an editorial for center-right 
daily newspaper Milliyet and posted to Turkoloji-L on 29 November, Akyol notes that:  
“The 29 letters do not represent some of the sounds found in the Turkishes of Turkey and 
the outside Turks” (“29 harf Türkiye ve dis Türk Türkçelerinde bulunan bazi sesleri 
karsilamiyor”).  Acknowledging the reality of phonetic loss in modern standard Turkish 
resulting from a lack of graphic representation for these sounds, Akyol nonetheless 
rejects both a romantic preoccupation with reinstating the missing letters and an 
anachronistic obsession with ignoring them.  He writes:   
 
Bugün mesele, alfabemizde bazi 
harflerin bulunmamasi sebebiyle 
Türkçemizdeki bazi seslerin 
kaybolmasi degildir. Bugün mesele 
“dünyaya açilmak”tan doguyor: 
Internet alfabesine asina olmamiz 
gerekiyor... Azerbaycan, 
Türkmenistan ve Özbekistan gibi 
Latin harflerine geçmis ama özel 
harf kullanimlari olan ülkelere 
gittigimizde hiç olmazsa trafik, 
vitrin ve TV yazilarini okuyacak 
kadar, o harfleri bilmemiz 
gerekiyor! Uluslararasi 
Today the issue is not that some 
sounds in our Turkish are lost 
because some letters are not found 
in our alphabet. Today the issue is 
born from “opening up to the 
world”: It is necessary for us to 
become acquainted with the internet 
alphabet… we must know these 
letters if nothing else well enough 
that we can read what is written in 
traffic, shop windows and TVs 
when we go to countries like 
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan which have switched to 
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transkripsiyon metinlerini okumak 
için de bu harfleri tanimamiz 
gerekiyor. 
the Latin alphabet but use special 
letters.  We must also recognize 
these letters in order to read the text 
of international transcriptions.   
 
Locating the increasing use of foreign letters within Turkey in the exigencies of 
globalization, Akyol goes on to suggest that the country’s ability to “open up to the 
world” (“dünyaya açilmak”) would increase were its citizens to familiarize themselves 
with and learn the proper use of these foreign characters “for informational purposes” 
(“bilgi olarak”).  He writes:   
 
Bugünkü alfabemize yeni harfler 
eklemek kargasa yaratabilir.... Bir 
de falanca tarihten önceki ve 
sonraki harfler ve yazim kurallari 
diye bir meseleyle karsilasmayalim! 
Mevcut harflerimizle yazmaya 
devam edelim. Ama bizde 
bulunmayan Q, X, W harflerini ve 
Türk cumhuriyetlerinin toplam 
sayisi 5 civarinda olan özel 
harflerini okullarimizda bilgi olarak 
ögretelim. Internete de, Türki 
cumhuriyetlere de daha kolay 
açiliriz… 
Adding new letters to today’s 
alphabet could create confusion.… 
And furthermore, let’s not be 
confronted by the problem of the 
letters and writing rules from before 
and after history. Let us continue to 
write with our existing letters. But 
let us teach the Q, X, and W letters 
that we don’t have and the total of 
roughly five special letters of the 
Turkic republics in our schools for 
informational purposes. In this way 
we will more easily open up both to 
the internet and to the Turkic 
republics…  
 
Thus, while recommending against formal adoption of the letters q, x, and w, Akyol 
nonetheless proposes embracing the new realities of the post-Cold War global 
environment, suggesting that familiarity with the controversial letters would facilitate 
Turkey’s integration with both the international community and the Turkic world and 
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hence support Turkey’s bid to become a prominent actor both regionally and 
internationally.   
Of additional interest here is the fact that although the course of discussion did 
inevitably turn to the potential effects of adopting loanletters on Turkey’s relations with 
its eastern neighbors--namely the Turkic peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus--it 
was a tangent that garnered far less commentary than might have been expected given 
that post-Cold War Turkish interest in orthography was inaugurated with the ortak alfabe 
project.  However the simple reality is that just over ten years after the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, Turkey’s relationship with the Turkic world is no longer discursively cast 
as a moral imperative or noble obligation (e.g., Başlamış 2001) as was generally the case 
in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse and at the height of the ortak dil and 
ortak alfabe projects--but rather as a pragmatic means of advancing Turkey’s bid to 
become a regional powerhouse and international powerbroker.  This shift in discourse, in 
turn, reflects the more sober political discourse of Turkish leaders in their interactions 
with their Central Asian counterparts--a marked shift from what critics have denounced 
as the “personal politics” of the early post-Soviet era under Presidents Turgut Özal and 
Süleyman Demirel (Başlamış 2001).  In short, just as the Turkic republics chose to focus 
on nationalism rather than pan-Turkism as the appropriate ideological vehicle for 
advancing their respective ambitions, and adopted their own national alphabets 
irrespective of the ortak alfabe, Turkey too turned inward in terms of not only 
orthographic politics but also state politics in a concerted effort to determine the courses 




As the discourse of the online orthography debates reveals, orthography has the 
ability, during times of political and social change, to transcend its customary function as 
a graphic representation of spoken language to become a potent nexus for the imagination 
of national, supranational, and international identity.  Yet, as the plethora of opinions 
from the wide range of language professionals and interested laypersons who contributed 
to the debates suggest, the reimagination of identity in the shadow of historic global shifts 
entails significant local and regional reverberations and is unlikely to be a 
straightforward, consensus-driven exercise.   
Recalling Derrida’s contention that the relationship between alphabetic writing 
and the ambient social constructs it indexes is more mediated and hence of a higher 
symbolic order than that between spoken language and the social world (c.f., chapter 
one), the ability of letters to succinctly and powerfully index not only a variety of 
different sounds, but also a comparable range of distinct social realities, introduces a 
crucial flexibility which accords orthographic characters the power to act as “floating 
signifiers,” thus enabling the same letters to index multiple, often divergent, social 
constructs.  It is this symbolic flexibility that enables some participants to the discussion 
to excoriate the letters x, w, and q as agents of Western imperialism and cultural 
annihilation, while allowing others to extol their potential to promote rapprochement 
among the diverse Turkic languages and peoples.   
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As a result, what appears on the surface to have been a straightforward debate 
over orthographic policy and practice also spoke to larger issues of national, 
supranational, and international identity, revealing contested notions of “Turkishness” 
and “foreignness” and exposing a deep-seated sense of communal angst over Turkey's 
place in the post-Cold War global hierarchy.  In this sense, the orthographic debates serve 
as précis to the sociopolitical east-west push-pull exerted on Turkey in the post-Soviet 
period.  In the end, however, it is interesting to note that the arguments both for and 
against adopting the loanletters parallel one another in a peculiar way such that whether 
the letters are conceived of as artifacts of the West or relics of the East is largely 
immaterial--except, of course, in the minds of those asserting these positions--for 
assessments of the relative value of either protecting or expanding the Turkish alphabet 
ultimately revolves around judgments, albeit differing, of how best to represent Turkish 
interests in the shifting post-Cold war era.   
 
CODA 
Over six years after the online orthography debates on Turkoloji-L, a news story 
from the city of Gaziantep in Turkey's predominantly Kurdish southeast demonstrates not 
only that orthography remains a potent resource in defining Turkish national identity but 
also that the multiple post-Cold War sociopolitical realties indexed by orthography 
remain a powerful hindrance in the linguistic unification of the Turkic world.  On January 
17, 2008, Turkish newspapers reported that Gaziantep’s public prosecutor had issued a 
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directive ordering that day’s edition of the local newspaper, Çoban Ateşi, removed from 
the newsstands and seized.  Twenty-one affiliates of the newspaper were subsequently 
indicted under Article 222 of the Turkish Penal Code which criminalizes violations of 
Law 671 mandating the use of the Latin-based Turkish alphabet.  The defendants were 
accused of having published selected poems and a short biography of a Kurdish writer 
identified as Abdula Pesew.   
At issue was the final w in Pesew’s name, a letter found in the Latin-based 
Kurdish alphabet but not in the Turkish alphabet.  Although laws passed in support of 
Turkey’s bid for accession to the European Union have slowly granted Turkey’s Kurdish 
minority limited linguistic rights, publishing, broadcasting and orating in Kurdish 
nonetheless remains subject to continuing restrictions.  Public prosecutors, who have 
pursued charges against Kurdish writers and newspaper publishers, for their use of the 
letter w, have cast such demonstrations of Kurdish orthographic choice as a deliberate 
challenge to the authority of the Turkish state.   
Here, then, is further confirmation of the power of orthography as a floating 
signifier. Within the context of a bloody civil war between Turkish security forces and 
Kurdish guerillas that has raged for nearly thirty years and cost approximately 40,000 
lives, the letter w indexes Kurdish rejection of Turkish cultural hegemony and demands 
for linguistic and cultural autonomy and hence provokes deep-seated Turkish 
apprehensions over alleged Kurdish aspirations to carve an independent state out of 
southeastern Turkey.  Determined to thwart even such an attenuated assault on Turkey’s 
territorial integrity as that implied by the use of w, the Turkish state has demonstrated its 
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willingness to employ whatever means necessary, no matter how absurd, to prevent the 
unauthorized Kurdish use of w.118   
While the referent in this use of the letter w (Kurdish separatism) differs from the 
referents in the online alphabet debates of 2001 (Western imperialism vs. pan-Turkism)--
not to mention the referent in ongoing debates over the creation of an ortak alfabe for use 
among the Turkic peoples (pan-Turkism)--the overarching issue, namely contested 
visions concerning the essential nature of the Turkish nation, remains the same.  The 
irony is that even as Justice Ministry minions pursue criminalization of w use among 
Turkey’s Kurdish population, the ministry’s official webpage begins with a triple w 
(www.adalet.gov.tr).  Moreover, even the Turkish Language Society continues to mark 
its online presence with a triple w (http://www.tdk.gov.tr) despite having remonstrated 
against the adoption of w borrowed from Western languages into the Turkish alphabet, 
and reminded listserver members that internet addresses were not required to begin with 
www in an official statement published to Turkoloji-L during the orthography debates:  
“However, there is no law specifying that ‘www’ absolutely must be found at the 
beginning of internet addresses, there are hundreds of webpage addresses that do not 
begin with ‘www’” (“Ancak, internet adreslerinin başında mutlaka ‘www’ ile bulunacak 
                                               
118 Interestingly, eight years after the online orthographic debates, a story linked to 
orthography once again swept the Turkish public, instigated by the suggestion that in the 
course of broader constitutional changes, the ruling AK Party might make changes to the 
article of the constitution that delineated the Turkish alphabet, allowing for the addition 
of the letters w, x, and q in an effort to allow for greater linguistic and cultural expression 
among Turkey’s Kurds in the hopes that this would lead to their rapprochement with and 
eventual integration into the Turkish state.  
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diye bir kural yok, ‘www’ ile başlamayan yüzlerce sayfa adresi var”).119  The question 
that remains is whether the threat posed by the letter w is greater than the opportunity it 
affords.  Until this question is resolved, and the numerous domestic concerns over 
altering the Turkish alphabet addressed, the ortak dil and ortak alfabe projects will 
continue to languish and the potential for the Turkic peoples to unite linguistically and 
thereby strengthen Turkey’s standing in the international community will likely remain 
unrealized.   
  
                                               
119 As pointed out by the TDK, internet addresses do not necessarily have to begin with 
www.  They do, however, have to include English domain names (e.g., “.gov” or “.com”) 
and be written in the 26 letters of the English alphabet.  Nonetheless, this may soon 
change.  On October 30, 2009, the nonprofit organization that exercises oversight over 
internet addresses, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), 
unanimously approved the use of non-Latin alphabets in domain names.  For more 




Chapter Seven:  From Conflict in Cooperation to Commonality in 
Difference? 
 
The conventional wisdom of the Tower of Babel story is that the collapse was a 
misfortune.  That it was the distraction or weight of many languages that precipitated the 
tower’s failed architecture.  That one monolithic language would have expedited the 
building, and heaven would have been reached.…  Perhaps the achievement of Paradise 
was premature, a little hasty if no one could take the time to understand other languages, 
other views, other narratives.   
 
Tony Morrison 
The Nobel Lecture in Literature120 
 
This dissertation has examined three phases in Turkey’s post-Cold War relations 
with the ex-Soviet Turkic republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus through the lens of 
four distinct, yet circumstantially related, language ideological debates over the 
dimensions of linguistic and orthographic convention and practice, focusing first on the 
efforts of a loosely-defined community of practice, composed largely of Turkish linguists 
and language professionals operating at the meso level between the state and private 
citizenry, to strengthen the status and reach of the Turkish language through an ostensibly 
bilateral program of linguistic rapprochement with the Turkic peoples, and subsequently 
on the resistance such efforts provoked among the Turkic peoples themselves as well as 
ideologically opposed groups within Turkey proper.  The aim of examining the discursive 
and metadiscursive negotiations over issues of language and orthography that coalesced 
around a series of language ideological debates among and between the Turkic peoples 
was to provide critical ethnographic detail of the micro-level processes by which new 
                                               
120 Morrison (1993:19). 
 419 
sociopolitical relations within and between states were established in the aftermath of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and attendant adjustments to the world order, descriptions of 
which have tended to focus on macro-level factors and state-level actors.  In essence, this 
dissertation, by focusing on the efforts of meso-level actors in a domain generally 
considered peripheral to matters of the state and thus of little diplomatic import, offers a 
theoretical framework for examining the locally salient, micro-level processes behind 
national identity formation, regional affiliation, and international relations in the post-
Cold War era, often captured under the rubrics of “nationalism,” “regionalism,” and 
“globalization,” thereby posing a theoretical challenge to prevailing macro-level political 
and economic paradigms traditionally employed to explain sociopolitical shifts in the 
regional or international order.   
Broadly speaking, this study was organized around the theoretical premise that 
language and orthography are inherently multifunctional, both indexical and constitutive 
of the material world, and thus function as symbolic resources onto which interests are 
projected, around which alliances are constructed, and through which power is exercised 
(Blommaert 1999).  In this sense, I have argued, it becomes possible to study strategic 
efforts to establish and manage social relationships within and beyond the nation by 
attending to the ways in which issues of linguistic convention and practice are 
discursively and metadiscursively negotiated by interested individuals and groups.  Thus, 
within the context of the Turkic world, recognition of the key role played by linguistic 
resources in the strategic management of social relations constituted a local ideological 
presupposition that consciously or unconsciously underpinned the endeavors of interested 
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actors, such that while the specific nature of the language ideological debates addressed 
in the preceding chapters has varied, they each coalesced around an underlying 
assumption in the salience of language and orthography to the constitution of the material 
world and, hence, the belief that social reality can be advantageously shaped through the 
strategic management of language-related resources--be they orthographic conventions or 
practices, naming conventions, language classification, or foreign lexical borrowings.   
Insofar as the strategic management of linguistic resources has long been the 
purview of the interrelated fields of language planning and policy, this study has drawn 
on scholarly approaches from this field, but has also expanded on the extant literature by 
applying the critical lens of a language ideologies approach in suggesting that language 
planning, as a socially embedded practice, constitutes a discursive site in which not just 
language, but also aspects of the social world that are implicitly or explicitly linked 
through beliefs and attitudes to language, are actively negotiated.  From this perspective, 
attempts at managing linguistic resources are seen as rooted in the presumption that 
linguistic “problems” are reflective of broader social issues and that addressing what ails 
language will ultimately contribute to resolving society’s own ills.  In this sense, it 
becomes possible to view efforts at strategic language management as influencing not 
simply the development of official linguistic policy, but also the dynamics of the ambient 
sociopolitical context that contributed to the (re)examination of linguistic practice and 
policy in the first place.  As a result, the value of studying instances of language planning 
writ large from a language ideologies perspective rests not simply in assessing their 
relative success in effecting changes to linguistic policy and practice, but also in 
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exploring the attendant dimensions of sociopolitical contestation that bespeak the 
sociocultural, historical and political conditions which influence the course, direction, 
and dynamics of language management and thus either contribute to or mitigate against 
its objectives being met.   
Put another way, insofar as we find in language planning a projection of identity 
politics onto linguistic form, an exploration of the metadiscursive debate surrounding 
instances of language planning allows for an examination of the bids for power by 
interested parties and the ambient sociopolitical and historical conditions that enable or 
preclude them.  In this sense, this study of formal and informal efforts at language 
management within the post-Cold War era Turkic world falls squarely within a 
historiographical approach to language ideologies in which the opinions, attitudes, and 
values people hold toward language, as manifested in discursive practice and explicitly 
articulated in metalinguistic discourse, are investigated in relation to more general 
ideological developments within a society, born of its particular historical engagement 
with broader sociopolitical trends and geopolitical conditions.  Moreover, it expands on 
the historiographical approach by exploring the ways in which specific historical and 
political influences over the development of language ideologies become increasingly 
explicit when groups with a common linguistic heritage and ostensibly shared 
presumptions about language come into direct contact within or beyond the bounds of the 
nation, with the result that they are found, despite sharing broad attitudes vis-à-vis the 
relationship between language and the material world, to nonetheless diverge in more 
culturally specific opinions.  
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In this sense, I have broadly argued that the inability of Turkish linguists and 
language professionals to effect the adoption of the ortak alfabe amongst the Turkic 
peoples or curtail the use of foreign loanletters and letter combinations as sociopolitical 
“acts of identity” or creative performative choices within Turkey proper is interesting 
insofar as it bespeaks ideological contestation over the nature of the putative language-
related “problem” and/or the most appropriate means of resolving it that, in turn, suggests 
divergent linguistic cultures or sociopolitical objectives.  Thus, in the case of the ortak 
alfabe project, while the convention of a series of early linguistic congresses designed to 
formulate a common Turkic alphabet was made possible by an ostensibly shared 
underlying presumption in the latent mutual intelligibility of the Turkic languages, which 
cast differences in orthographic convention as the source of patent communicative 
barriers among the Turkic peoples, the dynamics of metadiscursive negotiation during the 
course of the congresses revealed significant differences in perspective regarding the role 
of language and orthography in national consolidation and supranational affiliation which 
suggested fundamental divergences in the linguistic cultures of Turkey and the Turkic 
republics.  While the Turks, for whom national identity formation had been an exercise in 
linguistic homogenization, or the standardization of regional linguistic diversity to create 
a unified Turkish language capable of representing the nation and its citizens, approached 
the creation of a supranational ortak alfabe project from the perspective of minimizing 
the orthographic representation of phonological diversity, the Turkic peoples, for whom 
national identity formation had revolved around enhancing their linguistic distinctiveness 
from the other Turkic peoples, had an understandably difficult time sacrificing 
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phonological repertoire, and thus national distinctiveness, in the name of supranational 
orthographic unity.   
Thus, while both parties to the debate supported the creation of a common 
alphabet in aid of linguistic and sociocultural rapprochement, their different conceptions 
as to the form it should take revealed divergent expectations concerning the nature of the 
resulting supranational community which ultimately contributed to the failure of the 
project.  While the Turks foresaw rapprochement as bringing the Turkic peoples closer to 
Turkey and, hence, imagined the Turkic world as an extension of the Turkish nation, the 
Turkic peoples envisioned a supranational community more in keeping with their 
experience of the Soviet Union in which national distinctiveness could be retained under 
an overarching supranational common identity.  More importantly, however, the failure 
of the ortak alfabe project was presaged by the unspoken assumption, implicit to notions 
of the Turkic world as an extension of the Turkish nation, that the Turkish language, and 
hence society, was “superior”--an assumption which, although not made explicit during 
the course of the early linguistic congresses, became increasingly evident in the diffuse 
language ideological debate over linguistic classification and naming conventions of the 
Turkic languages, peoples, and republics that followed in their wake.  The realization that 
the intent behind Turkish efforts to promote linguistic rapprochement in aid of 
sociocultural unification was “cooptive” rather than “cooperative” in nature provoked a 
general resistance among the Turkic peoples that effectively spelled the failure of the 
ortak alfabe project.   
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Similarly, with relation to debates over orthographic practice in Turkey proper, 
while all Turkish citizens share the basic underlying presumption that the Turkish 
language and alphabet act as symbolic representations of the country itself and, as such, 
should remain free of “foreign” influence, they diverge in their conceptualizations of that 
which is “foreign” and, by extension, that which is “native” on the basis of their 
sociopolitical orientation and sense of Turkey’s place in the world.  Thus, while linguistic 
conservatives, including, predominantly and most notably, the linguists and language 
professionals actively involved in promoting linguistic and sociocultural rapprochement 
with the Turkic peoples as part of the Turkic world community of practice viewed the 
Turkic languages, and, more recently, even Arabic and Persian, as acceptable sources of 
linguistic enrichment on the basis of the shared culture and/or religion of their speakers, 
they were quick to denounce as “foreign” the lexical and orthographic influence from 
Western languages which they accused their socially progressive counterparts of 
introducing into the language.  By contrast, social progressives, who deliberately 
employed Western loanwords and orthographic conventions as a means of demonstrating 
not only their own conversance with Western languages and cultures but also their 
perception of Turkey’s rightful position in the international community, viewed their 
conservative counterparts’ attempts to promote linguistic rapprochement with the Turkic 
peoples not as a return to the linguistic fountainhead of their language, but as an attempt 
to introduce “alien” influence, where “alien” was defined on the basis of their conception 
of Turkey as a modern, westward-leaning nation.  Thus, while cultural conservatives in 
Turkey focused on the “Turk-ness” of the “dış Türkler” (“outside Turks”), social 
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progressives focused on their “outside-ness.”  This discrepancy in focus not only 
coalesced around a long-standing rift in political identity within Turkey, but also served 
to define divergence perspectives on the opportunities afforded during the transitional 
period that obtained in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse.  
In essence, then, by revealing differences in linguistic culture which bespoke 
broader ideological divergences both between Turkey and the Turkic republics as well as 
within Turkey proper, the metalinguistic discourses and discursive practices surrounding 
the ortak alfabe project created a pervasive sense of sociocultural and sociopolitical 
difference which, in turn, influenced broader cooperative endeavors in the political and 
economic spheres and precipitated domestic contestation over the dimensions of regional 
and international affiliation in the post-Cold War era.  In this sense, the “conflict in 
cooperation” that first emerged through the modality of language and orthography not 
only reflected the phased transition from “euphoric” to “sobering” to “disillusioned” but 
also actively contributed to constituting these three stages in the ambient political 
environment.  In the final analysis, the gradual realization of “difference within 
commonality” was key to the post-Cold War transition process within the Turkic world, 
enabling both the Turks and the Turkic peoples to move past the simulacra of an 
imagined past and projection of an imagined future to delineate their respective identities 
within the contemporary sociopolitical context.   
In concluding, I would like to take a moment to reflect on the broader theoretical 
implications of this investigation into the series of language ideological debates that 
collectively defined linguistic, sociocultural, and geopolitical relations in the post-Cold 
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War era Turkic world.  From the perspective of a language ideologies approach, this 
dissertation has demonstrated the ability of orthography to act independently of language 
as a symbolic representation of sociocultural identity and sociopolitical orientation, such 
that attitudes toward orthography, like language attitudes, mediate between orthographic 
practice and real or imagined social structure.  In this sense, this study expands on recent 
research into the ideological purposes to which orthography has been put in constructing 
sociopolitical identities at the local, regional, and national levels by exploring similar 
processes within the context of supranational relations.  Here I have suggested the 
intrinsic interrelatedness of different levels of identity formation such that in the wake of 
upheaval to the established social order, attempts to standardize orthographic practice at 
the supranational level, by symbolically solidifying external affiliations, inevitably 
carries implications for the internal processes of national identity formation, while efforts 
to purify and otherwise manage orthographic convention at the national level, in 
identifying that which is “foreign,” cannot help but have implications for national foreign 
policy orientation.   
From a language planning perspective, this study has argued the importance of 
attending to the ideological valence inherent to efforts to negotiate social relationships 
through judicious language management; suggested the value of investigating not just 
formal, but also informal and quasi-formal efforts to manage the status and/or corpus of a 
language or languages; pointed to the ways in which historically produced divergences in 
linguistic culture may hinder good-faith cooperative language planning efforts; and 
contended that breaches of linguistic convention may serve as deliberate means of 
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contesting not only linguistic policy but also the authority to manage relationships 
through language.   
Finally, this study has expanded on traditional conceptualizations of the role of 
language ideological debates within a historiographical approach to language ideology 
both by arguing the importance of attending to the ideological presuppositions that 
inform the organization of formal instances of debate, which may serve to limit 
participation or preclude “non-preferred” discourse, thereby creating a “lacuna of the 
unspoken,” and by suggesting that diffuse, ambient level discourse that occurs between 
instances of formal debate and revolves around many of the same issues, but imposes 
fewer restrictions on participation and topic, constitutes another type of language 
ideological debate which may, indeed, represent the best opportunity for discovering 
unvarnished opinions and attitudes that for ideological, political, or pragmatic reasons 
often remain unspoken within the bounds of more formal contexts.  The main theoretical 
contribution of this study thus lies in integrating the fields of language planning, language 
ideology, and language historiography, lending a language ideological perspective to 
language planning writ large by examining the ways in which efforts to strategically 
manage orthography by formal, quasi-formal, and informal means in aid of negotiating of 
sociopolitical affiliations in the supranational and international context were mediated by 
historically produced divergences in linguistic culture enacted through the instrumentality 
of discursive and metadiscursive debate.   
As a final note, it is interesting to observe that orthography continues to play a 
role in national identity politics and supranational relations within the putative Turkic 
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world.  In Turkey, at the behest of advocates of linguistic purification seeking to staunch 
the spread of foreign orthographic conventions in technology-related contexts, the 
country’s Telecommunications Board recently prohibited the importation of cell phones 
that do not support the six “special characters” of the Turkish alphabet and banned cell 
phone providers from imposing additional surcharges or higher rates on text messages 
containing these characters.121  While such decisions have ensured the availability of the 
Turkish orthographic option and removed the economic disincentive for choosing 
Turkish over more “standard” Western characters, it remains to be seen whether this will 
suffice to shift the political economy of orthographic practice in Turkey away from 
strategic and creative use of foreign orthographic conventions.   
Meanwhile, in a reversal of Kazakhstan’s decision to retain the Cyrillic alphabet, 
the country’s Minister of Culture and Mass Communications, in the course of unveiling 
the Conception of State Language Policy for 2011-2020, announced that “life itself” will, 
in due time, require Kazakhstan to adopt a Latin-based orthography.  While the minister 
was clear to stipulate that the “new” alphabet would be based on the Latin-based Kazakh 
alphabet of the 1920s,122 rather than the ortak alfabe, the latter received a recent boost, 
when the creation of a common Turkic alphabet was made the second item on the agenda 
of the Summit of Turkish Speaking Countries (Türk Dili Konuşan Ülkeler Zirvesi).  The 
                                               
121 Please find a report on this issue at the following website: http://www. 
dildernegi.org.tr/TR/BelgeGoster.aspx?F6E10F8892433CFFAAF6AA849816B2EFC78
A84C0A88D75FE, last accessed August 2, 2011. 
122 Please find a report on this issue at the following website: http://www.kyivpost. 
com/news/opinion/ op_ed/detail/90232/, last accessed August 2, 2011. 
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notion of a Turkic lingua franca has also been resuscitated, albeit in quite altered form, 
involving the promotion of one of the Turkic languages to a language of wider 
communication within the Turkic world rather than the amalgamation of the Turkic 
“dialects” originally envisioned by ortak dil advocates.   
The first steps toward realizing this revised objective were made at the 2010 
Summit of Turkish Speaking Countries when Istanbul Turkish was unanimously declared 
“Yüksek Türkçe” (“High Turkish”), or the common language for communication among 
the Turkic heads of state in attendance at the summit.123  With issues of language and 
orthography still so salient to the processes of identity politics and sociopolitical 
affiliation among the Turkic peoples, it seems possible that recent developments on this 
front may herald a fourth stage in Turkic world relations in which matters of a linguistic 
and orthographic nature may play a key role in fostering the development of a “special 
relationship” among the Turkic peoples based on the recognition of their “commonality 
in difference.” 
  
                                               
123 Please find a report on this issue at the following website: http://www.tdtkb.org/ 
content/t%C3%BCrk%C3%A7e-konu%C5%9F-%C3%BClkeler-zirvesi-istanbul-t%C3% 
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